上周弹药已全部打出，静等国运。若市场再下跌20%，则需要加杠杆再入了。

近来无事，再温习下巴菲特早期给合伙人（股东）的信件（1957-1970），只当巩固英语了。

（获得1957-1970书信原件，关注微信TGame的学习笔记，回复巴菲特）

先从1957开始：

1956年，在为自己的导师格雷厄姆工作了2年后，25岁的巴菲特（8. 30,1930 出生）离开纽约，回到了自己的家乡奥马哈，开始了合伙人投资之旅。第一次是和七个人合伙，包括继父、妹妹、大学室友、aunt Alice，共集资105000美元，其中巴菲特出资100美元。全年成立投资合伙企业3家，总投资额30万美元。1957年中期，又成立2家。

1957巴菲特致合伙人的信（翻译）：

（1957-1970书信原件，关注微信TGame的学习笔记， 回复巴菲特）

1957 年市场分析

在去年写给合伙人的信中，我写道：

“我认为股市整体价格高于内在价值，主要是蓝筹股估值过高。如果确实如此，所有股票都存在大幅下跌的风险，无论是否低估。无论如何，我认为，五年之后回过头来看，人们不太可能觉得现在的价格很便宜。就算大规模熊市出现，我们的套利类 (work-outs) 部分投资的市场价值也不会受到影响。

如果整个市场回归到低估状态，我们会增加普通股 (general issues) 投资仓位，可能还会借一部分钱来买低估的股票。反之，假如市场继续大幅走高，我们的策略是，将普通股卖出兑现利润，并增加套利类投资(work-outs)组合的比重。”

上面几句话是关于市场分析的，但是我首要考虑的不是市场分析。无论什么时候，我都把主要精力放在寻找严重低估的股票上。

去年，股市出现了温和下跌，我要强调的是“温和（moderate）”二字。我们听新闻或与刚进入股市的人聊天时，会产生股市跌了很多的感觉。实际上，在我看来，与当前经济情况下公司盈利能力下跌的幅度相比，股价的下跌幅度太小了。公众仍然对蓝筹股和宏观经济强烈看多。我无意预测经济或股市。我只是想告诉你们，不要产生这样的错觉，以为股市已经出现了大幅下跌，不要以为整体市场目前处于较低水平。从长期投资价值出发，我仍然认为当前股市整体高估。

1957年投资回顾

随着股市下跌，投资低估股票的机会越来越多。总体上，与去年相比，我们的投资组合中普通股所占比重高于套利类。下面我解释一下什么是“套利类”。套利类投资与普通低估类股票投资不同，它的获利途径不是来自一般意义上的股价上涨，而是取决于公司的某些活动。套利投资机会出现在出售、并购、清算、要约收购等公司活动中。 在每一笔套利投资中，风险不是经济形势会恶化，也不是股市下跌，而是可能出现意外事件，打乱原有计划，公司不按原计划行事。1956年末，我们持有的普通低估类和套利类仓位比重为 70：30，现在比例是 85：15。

去年，我们在这两只股票上的持股数量已经达到可以影响公司决策的规模。其中一只股票占比为 10% 到 20% 之间，另一只占比约 5%。这两只股票都大概需要三到五年时间实现利润，但是现在看来，它们都风险极低，而且可以实现很高的年化收益率。虽然它们不属于套利类，但这两只股票受大盘影响非常小。当然了，如果大盘大幅上涨，预计这部分投资会落后于市场涨幅。

1957年业绩

1957年，我们在 1956年成立的三个合伙人账户大幅跑赢大市。1957年年初，道指为 499 点，年末 435 点，下降 64 点。买入指数可以获得 22 点的分红，亏损可以降低到 42 点，也就是全年亏损 8.470%。投资大多数基金获得的差不多就是这个收益，据我所知，今年投资股票的基金没有一个取得正收益的。

1956年成立的三个合伙人账户均取得正收益，按照 1956年净值计算，收益率分别为 6.2%、7.8% 和 25%。你肯定会注意到，前两个合伙人账户的投资者一定也存在这样的疑问，最后一个合伙人账户的收益率为什么高出这么多。这个业绩差异表明，短期内运气很重要，特别是何时投入资金。第三个合伙人账户是 1956年最晚成立的，当时市场更低，有几只股票特别便宜。我用当时收到的这批资金大笔买入了这几只股票。由于先前成立的两个合伙人账户中的资金已经大量用于投资，所以这两个账户只能以较小的仓位买入这几只便宜的股票。

所有合伙人账户基本上都投资同样的股票，持股比例都相差不多。在成立初期，资金投入时间不同，股市所处点位不同，所以我们刚开始时业绩会有较大差别，将来差别会缩小。我的目标是能够长期取得每年领先指数 10% 的收益率，按照这个标准，这三个合伙人账户 1957 年的业绩都很好，甚至可以说是相当好了。1957年年中，我新建立了两个合伙人账户，在 1957年下半年里，这两个账户的业绩与指数差不多，在此期间下跌了大约 12%。现在这两个账户的投资组合将逐渐与1956年合伙人账户投资组合同步，将来所有合伙人账户的收益率差距会缩小。

业绩解读

1957年，我们的业绩高于一般水平，一部分原因是今年大多数股票表现普遍较差。与一般水平相比，我们在熊市里会比牛市里做得更好。我们今年的业绩不错，但在这样的年份中，我们的表现本来就应该比指数更好。当股市整体大幅上涨时，只要能跟上指数涨幅，我就非常满意了。

我可以肯定地说，与 1956年末相比，1957年末我们的投资组合价值更高了。原因有两方面，一是股价整体更低了，二是我们有更多时间来收集严重低估的股票，收集这种股票就需要耐心。我前面提到了，我们最大的这一只股票占公司资产的 10% 到 20%。我计划将这只股票配置为公司资产的 20%，但是这不可能一步到位。毫无疑问，无论是买哪只股票，我们最希望看到的都是这只股票原地不动或下跌，而不是上涨。正因为如此，无论什么时候，我们的投资组合中都有相当大的一部分是处于沉寂阶段。这个投资策略需要耐心，但会给我们带来最高的长期收益。

在这封信中，我尽量讲到所有你可能关心的话题，讲解我们的理念，尽量不深入讨论具体投资细节的情况。如果有关于我们投资活动的任何问题，请告诉我。

英文原版：

1957 Letter

WARREN E. BUFFETT

5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska

SECOND ANNUAL LETTER TO LIMITED PARTNERS

The General Stock Market Picture in 1957

In last year's letter to partners, I said the following:

“My view of the general market level is that it is priced above intrinsic value. This view relates to blue-chip securities. This view, if accurate, carries with it the possibility of a substantial decline in all stock prices, both undervalued and otherwise. In any event I think the probability is very slight that current market levels will be thought of as cheap five years from now. Even a full-scale bear market, however, should not hurt the market value of our work-outs substantially.

If the general market were to return to an undervalued status our capital might be employed exclusively in general issues and perhaps some borrowed money would be used in this operation at that time. Conversely, if the market should go considerably higher our policy will be to reduce our general issues as profits present themselves and increase the work-out portfolio.”

All of the above is not intended to imply that market analysis is foremost in my mind. Primary attention is given at all times to the detection of substantially undervalued securities.

The past year witnessed a moderate decline in stock prices. I stress the word "moderate" since casual reading of the press or conversing with those who have had only recent experience with stocks would tend to create an impression of a much greater decline. Actually, it appears to me that the decline in stock prices has been considerably less than the decline in corporate earning power under present business conditions. This means that the public is still very bullish on blue chip stocks and the general economic picture. I make no attempt to forecast either business or the stock market; the above is simply intended to dispel any notions that stocks have suffered any drastic decline or that the general market, is at a low level. I still consider the general market to be priced on the high side based on long term investment value.

Our Activities in 1957

The market decline has created greater opportunity among undervalued situations so that, generally, our portfolio is heavier in undervalued situations relative to work-outs than it was last year. Perhaps an explanation of the term "work-out" is in order. A work-out is an investment which is dependent on a specific corporate action for its profit rather than a general advance in the price of the stock as in the case of undervalued situations. Work-outs come about through: sales, mergers, liquidations, tenders, etc. In each case, the risk is that something will upset the applecart and cause the abandonment of the planned action, not that the economic picture will deteriorate and stocks decline generally. At the end of 1956, we had a ratio of about 70-30 between general issues and work-outs. Now it is about 85-15.

During the past year we have taken positions in two situations which have reached a size where we may expect to take some part in corporate decisions. One of these positions accounts for between 10% and 20% of the portfolio of the various partnerships and the other accounts for about 5%. Both of these will probably take in the neighborhood of three to five years of work but they presently appear to have potential for a high average annual rate of return with a minimum of risk. While not in the classification of work-outs, they have very little dependence on the general action of the stock market. Should the general market have a substantial rise, of course, I would expect this section of our portfolio to lag behind the action of the market.

Results for 1957

In 1957 the three partnerships which we formed in 1956 did substantially better than the general market. At the beginning of the year, the Dow-Jones Industrials stood at 499 and at the end of the year it was at 435 for a loss of 64 points. If one had owned the Averages, he would have received 22 points in dividends reducing the overall loss to 42 points or 8.470% for the year. This loss is roughly equivalent to what would have been achieved by investing in most investment funds and, to my knowledge, no investment fund invested in stocks showed a gain for the year.

All three of the 1956 partnerships showed a gain during the year amounting to about 6.2%, 7.8% and 25% on yearend 1956 net worth. Naturally a question is created as to the vastly superior performance of the last partnership, particularly in the mind of the partners of the first two. This performance emphasizes the importance of luck in the short run, particularly in regard to when funds are received. The third partnership was started the latest in 1956 when the market was at a lower level and when several securities were particularly attractive. Because of the availability of funds, large positions were taken in these issues. Whereas the two partnerships formed earlier were already substantially invested so that they could only take relatively small positions in these issues.

Basically, all partnerships are invested in the same securities and in approximately the same percentages. However, particularly during the initial stages, money becomes available at varying times and varying levels of the market so there is more variation in results than is likely to be the case in later years. Over the years, I will be quite satisfied with a performance that is 10% per year better than the Averages, so in respect to these three partnerships, 1957 was a successful and probably better than average, year.

Two partnerships were started during the middle of 1957 and their results for the balance of the year were roughly the same as the performance of the Averages which were down about 12% for the period since inception of the 1957 partnerships. Their portfolios are now starting to approximate those of the 1956 partnerships and performance of the entire group should be much more comparable in the future.

Interpretation of results

To some extent our better than average performance in 1957 was due to the fact that it was a generally poor year for most stocks. Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the Averages.

I can definitely say that our portfolio represents better value at the end of 1957 than it did at the end of 1956. This is due to both generally lower prices and the fact that we have had more time to acquire the more substantially undervalued securities which can only be acquired with patience. Earlier I mentioned our largest position which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. In time I plan to have this represent 20% of the assets of all partnerships but this cannot be hurried. Obviously during any acquisition period, our primary interest is to have the stock do nothing or decline rather than advance. Therefore, at any given time, a fair proportion of our portfolio may be in the sterile stage. This policy, while requiring patience, should maximize long term profits.

I have tried to cover points which I felt might be of interest and disclose as much of our philosophy as may be imparted without talking of individual issues. If there are any questions concerning any phase of the operation, I would welcome hearing from you.

1957信件解读

三类投资：

一是低估类普通股票（undervalued/general issues），购买完了以后坐等股票上涨。二是套利（work-outs），通过公司重组等赚取价差,后面巴菲特会多次解释套利的细节。还有一种，具备控制权的投资（control），即信件里提到的占到公司仓位的10%-20%的一项投资，这一类投资后面巴菲特会详细讲到。

第一种方法是我们值得学习的，后面两种，现在还是算了，条件不具备啊。

巴菲特反复提及，他的投资方式，在熊市肯定比指数好的多，在牛市不一定比得上指数。但巴菲特合伙企业十三年的成绩惊人，无论熊市牛市，没有一年亏损，而且所有年份都超过指数平均水平。这可能就是价值投资吧，不要期望牛市能够获得多么高的收益，但要在熊市保证不能亏的太多。

以后，会逐个学习早期的巴菲特合伙人信件，参考意义非常大。

获得1957-1970书信原件，关注微信 TGame的学习笔记，回复巴菲特。