巴菲特1981年度信(六)。2025-05-07

英文早读第266篇,选自巴菲特年度信,友才翻译。

Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the open-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.
最近,我们发现价值很容易可以通过在公开市场购买那些有出色的商业机构和胜任的诚实地管理层的公司部分股份获得价值。我们从来不期望去运营这些公司,但是我们期望从他们身上获利。

We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders. If they don't, we have made mistakes as to either :(1) the management we have elected to join ;(2) the future economics of the business ; or (3) the price we have paid.
我们期望来自于这类公司的未分配利润将会对伯克希尔和他的股东产生充分的价值(当结算时会纳税)。如果他们没有,我们会是犯了以下任何一个错误:(1)我们选择加入的管理层;(2)业务未来的经济状况;或者(3)我们支付的价格。

We have made plenty of such mistakes - both in the purchase of non-controlling and controlling interests in businesses. Category (2) miscalculations are the most common. Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes - sometimes as deep as two or three months back. For example, last year your chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy future of aluminum business. Several minor adjustments to that opinion - now aggregating approximately 180 degrees - have since been required.
我们已经犯了很多这类错误-无论是在购买非控制类和控制类的业务股份。第2类范畴的错误计算是最常见的情况。当然,深挖我们的历史去找到这些错误的诠释是必要的,有时只需要回溯2到3个月。例如,去年,你们的董事长志愿奉献了他的专业观点在铝行业的光明未来上。一些对那个观点的小的调整,现在机会是180度转弯。

41.rosy:美好的
42.subject to:从属于;属于…中

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