Yet in making the self-referential (exemplary) normative judgment that others ought to judge as I do (and hence come to feel the same aesthetic pleasure that I do), I am also making the normative judgment that I ought to be judging as others (who have taste) do. That is, I seem to be presupposing that my own subjective tastes (that is, judgments) are also universal, or at least universally communicable. (My own sub- jective pleasures may not and need not be so universally communicable.) In making normative aesthetic judgments, therefore, we seem to be engaged in a non—rule bound way of adjusting our own judgments of tastes to what others ideally would do and of making normative demands on others as to what kinds of judgments they therefore should make. We presuppose, that is, that a community of rational beings would have to mutually adjust their own judgments of taste so as to maintain the normative force of their own judgments.
然而，在作出一个自指的（典型的）规范判断——即他人应当像我一样作出判断（他人因此开始像我一样感受到相同的审美愉悦）的时候，我同样也在作出一个规范的判断——即我应当像他人（具有鉴赏力的他人）一样作出判断。这就是说，我看来好像在假定我自己的主观鉴赏力（即判断力）同样也是普遍的或至少是普遍地可传达的。（我自己的主观快乐不可能且不需要是那么普遍地可传达的。）所以说，在作出规范的审美判断时，我们看来好像涉及一种与非规则密切相关的方法，调整我们自己的审美判断力以适应他人理想地应该做的事情，按照他人因此应该作出何种判断来对他人提出规范的要求。也就是说，我们假定理性存在者的共同体必将相互调整他们自己的审美判断力以便维持他们自己判断力的规范力量。
This only shows, Hegel argues, that the experience of beauty on Kant’s own terms demonstrates that “the opposition between intuition and concept falls aw^ay.”'^^ I cannot perceive the beautiful by just receptively taking in some experience and then applying a formal norm to that experience. Rather, in order to have the aesthetic perception, I must already have a sense of myself as situated in a larger whole, namely, the community of rational agents in terms of which I adjust my reflective judgments as to what I am experiencing and who, I must presuppose, are also adjusting their reflective judgments to the normative demands I place on them. However, this implies that this reflective judgment cannot therefore be a matter of reflection (in the sense that Hegel uses it), since it does not involve the application of any norm to some given content. The pleasure that comes from the aesthetic judgment about an object is not a sensation, not any kind of elemental “vibration” in experience, but a pleasure that is the feeling that my cognitive powers are working as they ought to\ it is a pleasure that results from my grasp of their harmonious “free play,” from the self-legislating spontaneity of the mind. Most importantly, Kant seems to be saying that I impose a norm on myself by adjusting my judgments in light of a prior orientation toward what I take other rational agents to be doing. This self-orienting must be presupposed in order for me to make any reflective aesthetic judgment at all. The problem, of course, is, as Kant admits, that this orientation is itself rather indeterminate and general; the important point, however, is that it cannot be a matter of rules, since it is the community of rational agents themselves that are legislating the rules for themselves in a kind of idealized form of mutual imposition as mutual adjustment of judgments.
以上论述只不过表明，黑格尔认为，康德自己术语意义上的审美经验证明“直观与概念之间的对立消失了”。我不可能只是通过愿意接受某种经验且进而把正式的规范应用于这种经验来感知美的东西。恰恰相反，为具有美感，我必须已经感觉到我自己置身于更大整体中，即，置身于理性行动者共同体中，根据共同体，我调整我按照下列东西作出的反思判断：我在经验的东西与谁，我必须假定，同样也在调整他们的反思判断以适应我对他们寄予的规范要求。然而，这就暗示反思的判断因此不可能是反思的问题（从黑格尔使用反思意义上说），因为反思的判断不涉及把任何规范应用于某种给定的内容。那出自关于对象的审美判断的愉悦不是一种感觉的东西，不是某种经验元素的“共鸣”，而是一种作为我认识能力像它应该作出那样作出的感觉的愉悦；正是愉悦产生于我对我认识能力和谐的“自由嬉戏”式的把握，产生于对心灵自发的自律。最重要的，康德看来好像在说我借助一种做法把规范强加于我自己，即我根据对我以为其他理性行动者还将做的事情的先验定向来调整我自己的判断。“这自我定向必须被预先假定以便我完全作出任何反思的审美判断。问题无疑是，像康德承认的，这定向本身是很难确定的和一般的东西；然而，重要的一点在于这定向不可能是规则的问题，因为正是理性行动者自身的共同体以一种理想化的相互强加形式为行动者们自己制定规则以便他们相互调整判断。
Kant’s conception of aesthetic judgment as involving mutual adjustment of judgments thus gave Hegel a new way of thinking about something that had long bothered him. The author of the “The Oldest System Program in German Idealism” had stated that the state could not be a realization of freedom, since the state was only a Hobbesian or Wolffian social “machine.” But in exploring the Critique of Judgment, Hegel must have taken notice - although he does not mention it in “Faith and Knowledge” - of the crucial footnote in which Kant had explicitly compared his idea of the way in which we judge organisms to be purposive to the way in which “a” society had been similarly “readjusted” by recent political events (almost certainly an allusion on Kant’s part to the American Revolution). In that note, Kant asserted, “For each member in such a whole should indeed be not merely a means but also an end; and while each member contributes to making the whole possible, the Idea of that whole should in turn determine the member’s position and function.”'^’ Hegel would have seen Kant’s enticing analogy between the intrinsic purposiveness of organisms and rational social life to be further support for his notion of the way the Kantian conception of aesthetic judgment should be developed beyond the realm of aesthetic judgments per se.
康德把审美判断力设想成牵涉理性行动者相互调整判断，因而为黑格尔开辟了一条新的用以思考某种长期以来始终使他感到迷惑不解的东西的路径。《德国唯心主义最早体系纲领》的作者早已挑明，国家不可能代表自由的实现，因为国家只不过是一台霍布斯式或沃尔夫式的社会“机器”。可是在考察康德《判断力批判》时，黑格尔想必已经注意到——虽然他在《信仰与知识》中没提到——一个至关重要的脚注，在这个脚注中，康德已经明确地把他所设想的我们借以判断有目的有机体的方法比作“一个”社会借以被现时政治事件（几乎肯定是康德部分地暗指美国革命）类似地“重新调整”的方法。在这个脚注中，康德断言：“因为这样一个整体中每个成员实际上都应该不仅是手段而且也是目的；当每个成员齐心合力使整体成为可能存在的时候，整体观念反过来又应该确定成员的地位和作用。”黑格尔大概把康德对有机体内在目的与合理社会生活所作的诱人的类比看作进一步支撑康德关于某种方法的看法，依靠这种方法，康德的审美判断力概念应该得以推广到审美判断力自身领域以外。
In “Faith and Knowledge,” Hegel still retained much of Schelling’s explanatory apparatus for expressing all these claims even as he was starting to depart from Schelling’s own specihc employment of the apparatus. Thus, he accounted for this mutual adjustment of judgment by invoking Schelling’s notion of there being a “potency” (Potenz) in each level of things that is raised to a higher “potency” by virtue of the tensions within it. The higher “potency” of the original identity of intuition and understanding is “the understanding” itself. The original unity of self-consciousness has its lower “potency” in the multiplicity of sensuous intuitions, and when this original identity “simultaneously sets itself against the manifold, and constitutes itself within itself as universality, which is what makes it a higher potency,” then it constitutes within one and the same consciousness “the understanding,” which itself must be taken only as a more developed function within the whole (or the “identity”) that is conscious life.’^® (And, like Schelling, Hegel is drawn to the image of the magnet as the proper metaphor for this activity.)'^'’ Since this reflective judgment requires some orientation, Hegel concluded, rather strikingly and without much argument, that the idea of the intuitive intellect was not a regulative ideal at all but the “Idea of the transcendental imagination that we considered above.
在《信仰与知识》中，黑格尔仍然保留了谢林的很多解释性成分以表述所有这些主张，恰恰其时他在开始摆脱谢林自己对这些成分的具体运用。因此，他借助某种做法来说明判断的相互调整，就是诉诸谢林认为的在事物每一层面都存在着“乘方”（Potenzen），而且“乘方”被凭借它自身中张力提升到更高的“乘方”。直观与知性原初同一的更高的“乘方”是“知性”自身。自我意识的原初统一因感性直观的多样性而具有它较低的“潜能”，而当原初同一“同时使它自己反对杂多并使它自己在自身中构成普遍性”，这意味着使得自我意识的原初同一具有更高潜能的时候，那么自我意识的原初同一在同一个意识领域构成“知性”，“知性”本身必须仅仅被看作有着自觉生活的整体（或“统一物”）领域一种更加发达的官能。（而且，像谢林一样，黑格尔被引得以对磁铁的描述作为这种活动的恰当比喻。）“因为反思的判断需要某种取向，所以，黑格尔断言，颇为引人注目地且单刀直入地断言，直觉理智概念根本不是规定的理想，而是‘被我们上面考虑过的先验想象力概念’。”
What gives “reflective” philosophy its appeal over and against such philosophies of the absolute, so Hegel argued, is its partial, one-sided assumption of the revolution in philosophy that was brought about in Kant’s works. It embodied what he called the “coloration of inwardness” and the tendencies of the most recent “fashionable culture,” namely, the notion that the “subject” must assume his own freedom, learn to think for himself, and choose his own ends. The “philosophies of reflection” therefore are not written off by Hegel as mistakes so much as they are seen as the penultimate stage of (or as evidence for) the completion of the historical process that has seen its political expression in the Revolution. This final stage can only come about through the offices of systematic philosophy, which by introducing us to the absolute reestablishes “the Idea of absolute freedom and along with it the absolute passion, the speculative Good Friday that was otherwise only the historical Good Friday.”'^' Hegel was probing once again his notion of radically reinterpreting religion in terms of idealist philosophy, of finding in Christianity the practice by which this “mutual adjustment” of judgments could be carried out in a modern, reconciliatory way.
使“反思的”哲学诉诸绝对哲学的，黑格尔也力主，是“反思的”哲学部分地和片面地假定康德著作中发起的哲学革命。这哲学革命体现了他所称作的“本质倾向”和最新“流行文化”的趋势，即，在他看来，“主体”必须假定他自己的自由，必须学会独立思考，必须选择他自己的目的。“反思的哲学”因此没有被黑格尔一笔勾销，没有被当作错误东西看待，而“反思的”哲学被看作倒数第二阶段，那见证了法国大革命中政治表现的历史过程的完成的倒数第二阶段（或看作对这一完成的证明）。法国大革命中政治表现的历史过程完成的最后阶段只能是通过体系哲学来完成的任务，体系哲学借助把我们引向绝对从而重新确立“绝对自由观念和跟绝对自由一道的绝对受动性，那仅仅是作历史受难节的思辨受难节”。黑格尔将再度探讨他设想的按照唯心主义哲学彻底地重新解释宗教，将再度探讨他设想的去发现基督教中一种实践，通过这种实践，判断的“相互调整”可能以现代和解方式得以实现。
1802-1804; The Embryonic Hegelian System
Recognition and Social Life: The Break with Hdlderlin’s Conception
1802至1804年：酝酿中的黑格尔哲学体系
认识和社会生活：与荷尔德林构想的决裂
Hegel’s viewpoint was rapidly evolving, and more hints of its direction can be gleaned from several works written between 1802 and 1804. One was a long essay published in parts in the Critical Journal of Philosophy in 1802 and 1803; “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its Place in Practical Philosophy, and Its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law.”'^^ Around the same time, Hegel worked on two manuscripts, neither of which were published in his lifetime: a set of lecture notes (including what is now known as the “First Philosophy of Spirit”) and a lengthy sketch of part of his whole system, which has become known under the title the editors gave it, the System of Ethical Life {System der Sittlichkeit), a topic on which Hegel was lecturing at the time.'^^ In those works, Hegel was still attempting to bring his Frankfurt position into line with his newly adopted Schellingian views, combining those two influences in developing his own views vis-a-vis his longstanding interest in the developing political situations in France and Germany, Hegel ended up extending Schelling’s ideas in ways that find little parallel in Schelling’s own thought.Most importantly, he was led to take one of the most crucial and decisive steps toward formulating his own distinctive view.
黑格尔的观点在迅速形成，他观点发展方向的很多启示在他写于1802至1804年间若干篇著作中俯拾皆是。其中一篇是写于1802至1803年间的部分刊发在《哲学评论杂志》上的长篇论文：“论对待自然法的科学方法、自然法在实践哲学中的地位和自然法跟实定法律科学的关系。”大约在这同一时期，黑格尔致力于撰写两部手稿，这两部手稿在他生前都没有发表过：一套讲稿（内含现已闻名于世的“第一精神哲学”）和他整个体系的部分很长的纲要，这个纲要以编者给它加的标题《伦理体系》（System der Sittlichkeit）而闻名于世。在这批著作中，黑格尔仍然在尝试使他法兰克福时期立场与他新采用的对谢林的看法相一致，仍然在使这两种具有影响的观点融为一体用以发展他自己关于他长期以来感兴趣的法国和德国发展着的政治形势的看法。黑格尔终于不再在某些方面去延伸谢林的思想，因为这些方面几乎和谢林自己的思想对不上号。最重要的是，他向系统阐述他自己别具一格的见解迈出了至关重要的决定性一步。
In the essay on “Natural Right,” Hegel took on what he saw as the two modern false starts in understanding natural rights: the empiricist, psychologistic theories of natural right typified by Hobbes and Locke, and the transcendental theories of natural right, typified by Kant and Fichte. The essay developed at some length what he took to be their myriad failures to acknowledge their hidden presuppositions, and he diagnosed the basic reason for such failure to be the way in which both types of theories attempted to develop a conception of a social “whole” out of the idea of a social contract among individuals already vested with normative authority outside of that social whole. Both of them failed, in Hegel’s eyes, because they could not understand how individuals are only “potencies” of a larger social whole and ultimately of the “absolute,” that is, ultimately “potencies” of “spirit.
在“自然法”这篇论文中，黑格尔把他看到的东西理解为现代人理解自然法的两个错误的出发点：以霍布斯和洛克为代表的经验主义的心理学自然法理论与以康德和费希特为代表的先验的自然法理论。这篇论文详细阐述的是他所看作的他们根本未能承认他们隐含的假定，他进而分析这种失败的基本原因在于一种方法，以这种方法，上述两类理论尝试阐述一种出之于社会契约幻想的社会“整体”概念，“整体”中的个体已经被赋予社会整体之外的规范权力。上述两种理论都无济于事，在黑格尔眼里，因为它们不可能理解个体怎么只是一个更大的社会整体的“乘方”和最终只是“绝对”的“乘方”，也即最终只是“精神”的“乘方”。
To explain this, Hegel also brought into play a Fichtean idea of mutual “recognition” that gave him the key for which he had been looking in his attempts to work out his own views vis-a-vis Schelling’s and Holderlin’s.'-’'^ Hblderlin had convinced Hegel in Frankfurt that Fichte’s own procedure was too “subjective”; one simply could not begin with the “subject’s” certainty of itself and then ask how the “subject” manages to posit a world of “objects”; instead, one must begin with a commitment to an unarticulated unity of subject and object, which Hblderlin considered to be implicitly, nondiscursively in play in all the activities of our conscious lives. Hegel’s great insight in 1802 had been to develop Hblderlin’s point that one cannot begin with an isolated, individual subject experiencing the world and then ask how a world of objective experience gets built up out of the “inner” world of purely subjective experience; one must begin with an already shared world of subjects in a world making judgments in light of the “possible judgments” of others (the theme developed out of Kant’s third Critique in “Faith and Knowledge”). In 1803, Hegel developed that idea further: The “original unity” was not to be articulated in terms of Holderlin’s conception of a nondiscursive grasp of “Being”; it was to be understood as an inter subjective unity, a unity of mutually recognizing agents in the natural world. In the System of Ethical Life, his term for this unity was “absolute ethical life.”
为阐明上述问题，黑格尔也利用了费希特的相互“认识”的概念以便为他提供一把钥匙，一把始终被他在尝试提出他自己见解以跟谢林和荷尔德林见解相抗衡过程中寻找的钥匙。荷尔德林早在法兰克福时期就使黑格尔确信费希特自己的程序过于“主观”；一个人完全不可能从“主体”关于它自身的确然性开始，完全不可能继而追问“主体”怎样设法设定“对象”世界；恰恰相反，一个人必须从相信存在着未经阐述的主体与客体的统一开始，这种做法被荷尔德林认作是含蓄地、推论式地利用我们自觉生活中的一切活动。黑格尔在1803年时的大彻大悟在于推进了荷尔德林的下列观点：一个人不可能从孤立的、个别的主体开始来体验世界，不可能继而追问客观经验世界怎样被依据纯粹地主观的经验的“精神”世界逐步建立起来；一个人必须从在世界中主体已经分有的世界开始，必须从根据他人“可能的判断”作出判断开始（《信仰与知识》中阐述的这一主题发源于康德的第三《批判》）。在1803年，黑格尔进一步阐述了下列观点：“原初的统一”不可能被根据荷尔德林对“存在的非推论式把握”的构想加以系统阐述；它应该被解读为主体际的统一，即自然世界中相互认可的行动者的统一。在《伦理体系》中，他就这种统一所使用的术语是“绝对伦理”。
This concept of “recognition” gave Hegel a nondualistic, yet also nonreductionist account of the relation between spirit and nature. Hegel argued that the “ethical life” {Sittlichkeit) of any particular “people” must be construed entirely in terms of the patterns of entitlements and commitments that those individuals confer and sustain by acts of mutual recognition; it must not be construed as any kind of separate realm requiring its own special causal powers, nor as simply the result of a natural process. The difference between spirit and nature is thus not that between two different types of substance; it lies in the way in which humans are led to self-consciously regard themselves, to establish points of view on the world in addition to being natural entities in that world. “Spirit,” as Hegel put it, “is the absolute intuition of itself as itself (or absolute knowing).”'^’
“认识”这一概念为黑格尔提供了精神与自然关系的一种非二元论而又非还原论的说明。黑格尔论证道，任何特定“人们”的“伦理”（Sittlichkeit）必须被完全根据那些个人依靠相互认可行为从而赋予和支撑的权力与承诺的模式来加以理解；它未必将被理解成是任何种类需要它自己的特殊因果力量的独立王国，它也未必将仅仅被理解成是自然过程的结果。精神与自然之间的差异因此不是两种不同类型实体之间的差异；精神与自然的差异在于以某种方法人们被使得自觉地看待他们自己，被使得去确立关于世界和在世界中自然实有的观点。“精神”，像黑格尔说的，“是它纯自身的绝对直观（或绝对知识）”。
Moreover, we articulate this intersubjective unity in different ways depending on the purposive contexts in which we find ourselves. At any given moment, either “concepts” or “intuitions” can be playing the preponderant role in our conscious life. When our consciousness of things is preponderantly intuitive - when we are primarily aware of particular items and things - the conceptual element in experience is muted and blurred (but not absent); Hegel calls this the “subsumption of the concept under intuition.” It is that aspect of conscious life in which the appearance of things as simply being “given” to us is strongest. For example, our “practical feelings” (called the “practical potency”) of the need for something as elemental as food appears to us as an “intuitive” awareness of a singular and seemingly just “given” need for a particular object, and the element of conceptual (normative) activity at work in such needs is submerged within our consciousness. Nonetheless, even in those cases of the “concept’s being subsumed under intuition,” we still see things as such and such, for example, our seeing an apple as the kind of thing that would satisfy hunger, so that our “taking up” of the manifold of sense incorporates the elemental conceptual mediating activity at work in it. On the other hand, when the element of conceptual mediation is more obviously in view, as when we perceive something as a tool, we have a case of “intuition’s being subsumed under the concept.” Seeing something as a tool is seeing it more self-consciously in terms of certain “concepts” it instantiates, in terms of the ways in which it fits into our practical projects. The intuition of apples thus seems like a “given,” but the intuition of tools seems much less “given.” Both ways of “seeming” are the result of the interplay of “concept” and “intuition” and of the relative weight each plays in their different purposive contexts.
尚不止于此，我们以不同的方式系统阐述主体际的统一，不同的方式仰赖于在其中我们找寻我们自己的有目的的语境。在任何特定的环节，要么“概念”要么“直观”能够在我们自觉的生活中扮演重要的角色。当我们关于事物的意识主要是直观的时候——当我们主要意识到具体项和事物的时候——经验中概念元素缄默不语、模糊不清（而非不在场）；黑格尔称这种情况为“在直观支配下概念的归入”。这就意味着，自觉的生活方面是最强烈的，在自觉的生活中，事物的现象只不过是“被给予”我们而已。举例来说，在我们看来，我们需要某种像食物一样须臾不可离开的东西的“实际感受”（被称作“实际潜能”）显露我们“直观地”意识到唯一且似乎只是“给予式地”需要具体的对象，在这些需要中发挥作用的概念（规范）活动元素淹没在我们的意识领域。然而，即使在“概念被以直观加以归纳”的这些情况下，我们仍然把某物——例如我们把苹果看作一种应该消除饥饿的东西——所以，我们对感性杂多的“接纳”包含在感性杂多中起作用的元素式的概念中介活动。另一方面，当概念中介元素被更明显地看到的时候，像当我们把事物作为工具的时候一样，我们具有“直观被依照概念归纳”的问题。把某物看作工具，就是更为自觉地根据某物用具体例子说明的那些“概念”来看待某物，就是自觉地按照被标物借以符合于我们的实际计划的方式来看待某物。苹果的直观因此看起来像“给予物”，而工具的直观看起来不大像“给予物”。这两种“看起来”的方式都是“概念”与“直观”相互作用的结果，都是这两种方式中每种方式在它们不同的有目的语境中发挥作用的相对重要的结果。
We progress from being natural creatures with relatively straightforward organic needs to being complex laboring creatures who work in order to satisfy those needs; labor and its concomitant use of tools in turn raises us to being social creatures, mutually shaping each other through an even more complex process of “formative culture,” Bildung, and this progression is articulated in the language of the “potencies.”'^* The law-governed regularities of nature (the first “potency”) are thus necessary for the normativity of social life (the second “potency”), but these normative features of human agency are not thereby reducible to these natural regularities. The great difference between the two kinds of life - organic and social — is that just as “the single individual was dominant in the first potency, the universal is dominant” at the potency of the social level.Thus, in Hegel’s preferred Schellingian way of putting the matter: “Man is potency, is universality for the other, but the other is just as much the same for him; and so he makes his reality, his unique being, his effecting this into himself into an incorporation into indifference, and he is now the universal in contrast to the first potency.
我们从具有相对地简单的有机需要的自然动物进化到复杂的进行工作以满足需要的会劳动动物；劳动及其伴随工具的使用又依次把我们提升为社会动物，二者通过“教养”（Bildung）这一更为复杂的进化过程而相辅相成，这一进化过程被以“潜能”这类术语加以系统阐述。受到规律支配的自然（第一“潜能”）规则性因而是社会生活的规范（第二“潜能”）必需的东西，但行动者的这些规范特征没有因此沦落为这些自然规则性。这两种生活——有机生活与社会生活——之间的巨大差异在于，正像“单一个体过去支配第一潜能一样，具体的普遍现在支配‘社会层面的潜能’”。所以，由于黑格尔更喜爱谢林提出问题的方式：“人是潜能，是他人的普适性，但他人恰恰等同于他；所以他使他的现实、他的唯一的存在，他对这的影响、变成他自已，变成结合，变成中立，而他现在与第一潜能形成对比的具体的普遍。”
Hegel returned to these themes a year later in 1803 and developed them even further. With Schelling’s departure for Wurzburg in the summer of 1803 the personal and professional demands of fitting his rapidly developing thought into Schellingian form began to ease, and in his lectures during this period Hegel took the opportunity to sharpen his own thoughts with the aim of producing his own system in the form of a book (which he desperately needed to secure a salaried position). What remains of the lecture notes written between 1803 and 1806 has become known to us as the Jena System Drafts {Jenaer Systementipurfe).''*'
黑格尔在1803年晚些时候回到了上述这些论题并且对它们加以进一步阐述。随着谢林1803年夏去维尔茨堡，适合使他思想迅速发展为谢林形式的个人要求和职业要求已经不复存在，在他这个时期讲课中，黑格尔用这个机会来磨砺他自己的思想，目的在于将以书的形式创立他自己的哲学体系（这就使他极需弄到个带薪的职位）。依然是那批写于1803年和1806年的讲稿现已成了众所周知的《耶拿体系草案》（Jenaer Systementwürfe）。
In the 1803-04 manuscripts, there is much more emphasis on the notion of “consciousness” than there is in, for example, the System of Ethical Life, but the lines of thought are fairly continuous. Hegel uses the perception of color to illustrate how the “potencies” work in ex- plaining sensuous “consciousness.” There is first of all the sheer givenness of the sensation of color, but “spirit as sensing is itself animal, submerged in nature.”*-*^ This first “potency” does not give us the consciousness of color but merely the animal-like discrimination of color. To have consciousness of a color, one must be able to report on the experience, and one’s report on the experience (as a sensing of blue, for example) is a correct report only if it is sanctioned as reasonable according to the norms of one’s linguistic community. For the agent to be able to make such a normatively correct report, a particular sensation of color must be taken up by him and inferentially linked to other color concepts, and he must, moreover, be able to understand a “particular” sensing of blue as an instance of the “general” color blue. Thus, there are three such “potencies”: in Hegel’s own words, “[i] in sensation as determinateness of blue, for example, and [2] then as concept, formally and ideally related to others as names, as opposed to them and at the same time as identical with them in that they are colors, and [3] in this, simply, universally as color.(These three “potencies” for Hegel correspond to the functions in consciousness of sensation, imagination, and memory.)
在1803年至1804年的手稿中，更多的是强调“意识”概念而不是例如《伦理体系》中的内容，但手稿中的思路与黑格尔之前作品中的思路一脉相承。黑格尔用颜色感来具体说明“潜能”怎样被用来“解释感性”意识。首先存在着纯粹的给予性的颜色感，但“精神”作为鉴赏力本身是动物般的，被淹没在自然中。这第一“潜能”没有赋予我们颜色意识而只赋予我们对颜色的动物似的区分。为具有颜色意识，一个人必须能够对经验作出描述，一个人对经验的描述（例如把经验描述成蓝色感）是一个正确的描述，唯一的条件是它被认可是按照一个人的语言共同体中规范作出的合理描述。就某个行动者能够作出这样一种合乎规范的正确描述而言，具体的颜色感必须被他接纳且被推论式地与其他颜色概念相联系，而且他必须能够把“具体的”蓝色感理解成是“一般”蓝色的例子。所以，存在着三种这样的“潜能”：用黑格尔自己的话说，例如，[1] 确定蓝色感的“潜能”，[2] 再者作为概念的“潜能”，概念形式上合乎理想地与作为名词的他者相关联，是跟他者相对立的，同时概念是与他者相统一的，因为他者是颜色，[3] 只不过普遍地作为颜色感的“潜能”。（上述这三种“潜能”对于黑格尔来说具有相应的感觉意识功能、想象力意识功能和记忆意识功能。）“意识”在作为个体的行动者与“精神”之间起着中介的作用。
“Consciousness” mediates between the individual agent and “spirit.” The individual organic agent comes to be conscious of the natural world insofar as he manages to respond judgmentally, normatively, and not merely habitually to nature: not merely to have sensations of blue or to be able to discriminate blue things from non-blue things but to be able to report that he is experiencing blue and to evaluate that report in terms of whether it meets the standards of correctness held by his linguistic community. (That is, to be able to say both things like, “That looks blue to me,” and, “Oh, it’s not really blue, it only looked blue.”) The norms for being able to respond appropriately to episodes of sensing blue by saying things like, “That’s blue” or “That’s funny; it looked blue in that light,” are relative to the relevant linguistic community; or, as Hegel puts it, “the preceding potencies, in general, are ideal, they exist for the first time in a people: Language only is as the language of a people, and understanding and reason likewise.”''^
作为个体的有机行动者逐渐意识到物质世界，就他想方设法对自然作出判断式地、规范式地而不仅仅习惯式地反映而言：不仅具有蓝色感或能够区分蓝色的东西和非蓝色的东西，而且能够描述他在体验蓝色的东西，并能够根据这种描述是不是符合为他语言共同体所拥有的正确标准来评估这种描述。就是说，他能够作出像“那在我看起来是蓝色的”和“哦，它确实不是蓝色的，它只是看起来是蓝色的”一样的两种表述。这些规范，就它们能够依靠作出像“那是蓝色的”或“那是滑稽的；它被光线照着看起来是蓝色的”一样的表述来对蓝色感的经验作出恰当的反应而言，涉及有关的语言共同体；或者说，像黑格尔论述的，“那些先在的潜能通常是理想化的，它们最初存在于国民中：语言仅仅作为国民的语言而存在，知性和理性也同样如此。”
In the 1803-04 manuscripts, the notion of “recognition” received some substantial reworking. The Kantian idea of “mutual adjustment of judgments” in “Faith and Knowledge” became transmuted into an original struggle for recognition that possessed its own logic. Agents, as occupying a particular physical part of the world and having a subjective, personal point of view on that world necessarily appear to each other as particular points of view, as “excluding” each other: As Hegel puts it, “each appears in the consciousness of the other as that which excludes him from the whole extension of his individuality,” and this leads to a struggle to determine whose point of view is to be normatively dominant.'"*^ Since there is no given objective point of view to which the agents can turn to resolve such epistemic disputes between themselves, they must struggle to the death. The reasoning in the rather condensed lecture notes of 1803-04 seems to be that each agent must orient and situate himself with some conception of a “whole” of such judgments, and thus each at first claims to be that “whole,” an “absolute consciousness,” not as a matter of fulfilling some Hobbesian desire for power or security, but in order to be recognized simply “as rational, as totality in truth.He who capitulates, who would rather live than risk his life to preserve his claims to being an “absolute consciousness,” becomes “for the other immediately a non-totality, he is not absolutely for himself, he becomes the slave of the other.
在1803年至1804年的手稿里，“认识”这一概念得到了某些实实在在的修正。康德关于“判断相互调整”的想法在《信仰与知识》中变成了拥有它自己的逻辑认识的原初斗争。行动者，作为占有世界的具体物质部分和具有关于世界的主观个人观点的行动者，必然相互看来好像是具体的观点，是彼此“排斥的”：像黑格尔论述的，“每个人在他者的意识中都表现为排除了他个性的全部延展的东西”，这就导致了一场斗争以确定谁的观点必将规范上是占支配地位的观点。“因为根本就不存在着行动者们能够赖以解决他们自己之间的这些认识上争论的给定的客观观点，所以他们必须进行殊死搏斗。”1803年至1804年颇为浓密的讲稿中的推论看来好像意味着每个行动者都必须使他自己适应和置于这些判断的“整体”的某种概念，因此每个行动者起初都声称属于这个“整体”，属于“绝对意识”，不是作为满足霍布斯式的某种权力欲或安全欲的问题，而仅仅为了被认作是“合理的问题，真理的总体。”正是屈从的他，正是宁可平淡生活而不遭受危险以保全他关于“绝对意识”的主张的他，“为了他者而立刻”变成了“非总体，他绝对不是为了他自己，他成为他者的奴隶。”
This lopsidedness of recognition - its going one way and not the other - is, he says, an “absolute contradiction,” something that cannot be sustained.He who becomes the slave is posited in the relationship as someone whose claims to knowledge and truth can only be interpreted as being subordinate to somebody else’s point of view, and the slave thus becomes the type of being who is incapable of bestowing the recognition that is necessary upon those for whom he is the slave. In his lecture notes, Hegel concluded that the mutual failure at securing such recognition compels both agents to acknowledge and develop that “absolutely universal consciousness” within themselves that makes it possible to conciliate their respective positions.(In the surviving lecture fragments, this is as far as the argument goes; the rest of the surviving notes after the section on recognition are short, but they indicate that Hegel intended to carry out his argument in a similar vein to that found in the System of Ethical Life; the problems of economic dependence treated in the earlier manuscript are also articulated through examples taken directly from Adam Smith - at one point Hegel invokes Smith’s notion of the division of labor in a “pin factory” only to argue that it is only “machinelike” and therefore ultimately degrading to people.)
认识的这一失衡——认识倾向于一方而不倾向于另一方——是，他说道，“绝对矛盾”，是某种不可能被支撑的东西。“正是变成奴隶的他通常被置于他人的关系中，他人关于知识和真理的主张只能被解释成是隶属于其他他人的观点，奴隶因此成了典型的不可能被赋予认识的人，认识是他为其做奴隶的人们所必需的。在他的讲稿里，黑格尔得出的结论是，为保卫这样的认识而导致的两败俱伤，迫使两个行动者承认和发展他们自身的“绝对地普世的意识”，这就使他们有可能调和他们各自的立场。“（在残存的讲稿中，论证就到这里；在认识部分之后的其余现存的讲稿篇幅上非常简短，但它们标志着黑格尔打算以类似的语气来论证见于《伦理体系》中的东西；他早期手稿中论述的经济依赖问题也通过直接从亚当·斯密那里选出的一些例子得到系统阐述——在每个方面，黑格尔只不过求助于斯密“发夹厂”中分工这一概念来论证分工只是“像机器似的”东西，因此分工最终削弱人的力量。）
In the unpublished System of Ethical Li fe Hegel showed that he was struggling to put this new conception of “spirit” and “freedom” into play as a conception of how freedom is both a necessary feature of agency and something that is to be socially achieved. For us to understand the ways in which we deny or affirm that we or others are entitled to certain claims to knowledge or rights to action, we must understand the more fundamental unity in which such recognitional activities and statuses operate as an “Idea” of reason: As he put it, since the “Idea” is the “identity of concept and intuition,” we must always be operating with a notion, however obscure, of what it would mean to “get it right” in our judgmental activities.’^®
在他生前未发表的《伦理体系》中，黑格尔表明他在竭力把对“精神”与“自由”的新构想，用来设想自由怎样既必须是代理的特征也是某种将得到社会实现的东西。就我们理解借助这些方式我们否定或证实我们或他人可以作出关于知识或行动权的某些主张而言，我们必须理解一种更为基本的统一体，在这种统一体中，这些认识活动与地位发挥着理性的“观念”的作用：像他指出的一样，因为理性的“观念”是“概念与直观的统一”，所以我们必须始终在与理性的“观念”通常意味着的在我们判断活动中“搞清它”这一见解打交道，不管这一见解是多么晦涩难懂。
But it w'as also clear that we did not always “get it right” and that we have not always been in a position of freedom. That has to do, so Hegel argued, wfith the stance we assume toward nature. Nature does not determine our stance toward it; we spontaneously determine that, and it is our “distance” from natural determination that determines how adequate our realization of freedom is. Thus, he noted that natural “life” always has an element of “inequality” to it, that some have more “power” than others, and that when encounters between agents occur without the right kind of social mediation, the result cannot be complete mutuality of recognition but instead must be relations of domination, of “lordship and bondage.”’^’
然而，同样十分清楚的是，我们并不总是“搞清它”，我们没有总是处在自由的位置。这涉及，黑格尔也坚称，我们对自然所采取的态度。自然不决定我们对它的态度；我们自发地决定我们对自然的态度，正是我们与自然确定的“距离”决定我们对自由的认识是多么适当。因而，他注意到，自然“生活”总是具有与自然“不相等”的元素，一些人具有比他人更多的“力量”，当行动者在没有通过一种正确的社会中介的情况下相遇的时候，结果不可能产生完整的相互认识关系而反倒必然产生支配关系和“统治与奴役”关系。
Hegel took the transition point between nature and sociality to be the family as a social unit founded on natural relations (those between the sexes) but incorporating within itself normative commitments and ethical ideals. The family is the “supreme totality” - that is, the most complex normative unity - “of which nature is capable.Other modes of sociality would then be founded on increasing departures from nature toward the ideal of “absolute ethical life,” which would be completely “indwelling within individuals and is their essence,”’” in which “the ethical life of the individual is one pulse beat of the whole system and is itself the whole system,” and in which the stances individuals jointly assume toward each other are free from natural determination.’” These increasing departures from nature toward sociality correspondingly mark increasingly adequate realizations of freedom (that is, of conditions under which the self-determination of norms rather than behavior according to natural regularities is possible). Following the family is therefore the economy, which arises out of the system of natural needs, of work with tools, of the organization of labor and the like; the economy eventually produces and gives way to what Hegel calls an “absolute ethical totality,” a people, a Volk, which is defined not along ethnic or racial lines (that is, not in terms of nature) but in terms of what ultimately collectively matters for it.'” The “universality” of a people “in which they are one is absolute indifference ... in which all natural difference is nullified,”'” which implies (in the Schellingian framework Hegel is using) that a “people” is not an unstable unity that pushes itself on toward any higher set of “potencies.”
黑格尔把自然与社会的转变点看成是作为社会单位的家庭，家庭奠基于自然关系（不同性别之间的关系）而家庭自身中包含规范性承诺和伦理理想。家庭是“最高总体”——也即最复杂的规范统一体——“自然所能够形成的统一体”。其他的社会模式于是应该建立在逐渐离开自然而走向“绝对伦理”理想基础上，“绝对伦理”总是完全“存在于个体中和构成个体的本质”。因此，“个体伦理是整体系统的一种显露，它自身就是整体系统”，因此个体彼此共同采取的态度不受自然确定性的影响。这些逐渐从自然到社会性的偏移相应地标志着越发适合自由的实现（也就是，这些条件的实现，在这些条件下，规范的自决而不是行为的自决按照自然规则性是可能存在的）。此后家庭从而成了经济单位，这种经济单位出之于自然需要系统，出之于使用工具进行劳动系统，出之于劳动的组织化系统以及出之于诸如此类的方面；家庭这种经济单位最终产生且让位于黑格尔称作的“绝对伦理总体”，民族（ **Volk** ），民族的界定不是按照种族的思路（也即不是根据自然的思路）而根据最终共同对民族至关重要的东西来界定民族。“作为一个整体的民族的‘普世性’”是绝对中立的……在民族中一切自然差异都消除干净。“这就意味着（在黑格尔所使用的谢林构架中）‘民族’不是一个能够把它自己推向任何一套更高‘潜能’的不稳定的统一体。
Nonetheless, a particular “people” is not the “absolute indifference,” the point at which the tensions and oppositions in lower-order “potencies” no longer exist to drive the system on toward higher and higher unities.'” Behind all the different peoples is an unchanging spirit of “humanity.” Hegel noted that “the world-spirit, in every one of its shapes, has enjoyed its self-awareness, weaker or more developed but always absolute; it has enjoyed itself and its own essence in every nation under every system of laws and customs” - an indication, if nothing else, of just how strong was the hold that Holderlin’s ideas still exercised on Hegel.'” Rather than bring into play Schelling’s notion of history as the progressive revelation of God, Hegel stayed with the notion oi fate that he had worked out in the “Spirit of Christianity” and that had been inspired by Holderlin: Each people is destined to a “tragic fate,” and the rise and fall of peoples is “the performance within the realm of the ethical of the tragedy which the absolute eternally plays on itself. . . . Tragedy consists in this, that ethical nature segregates its inorganic nature (in order not to become embroiled in it) as a fate (Schicksal), and places it outside itself; but by the recognition of this fate in its struggle against it, ethical nature is reconciled with the divine essence as the unity of both.”'” This conception of the way in which “spirit” appears in different historical forms, the particular conception of fate and divinity, is virtually the same as that found in Holderlin’s own notes on history and tragedy, an idea that informed much of Holderlin’s poetry in his short, brilliantly creative period after 1800."’" Thus, like Holderlin, Hegel asserted that such “divinity” appears in forms relative to the “people” for whom it is a divinity - “In this way the ideality as such must be given a pure absolute shape, and so must be regarded and worshipped as the nation’s God.”"’' In the System of Ethical Life, Hegel makes it clear that he thinks that there is an “absolute” conception of divinity but that it appears in particular forms for different peoples “This universality which has directly united the particular with itself is the divinity of the people, and this universal, intuited in the ideal form of particularity, is the God of the people.Nonetheless, Hegel seems to think that history must have an overall unity, noting rather darkly that “over the single stages [of each shape of spirit] there floats the idea of totality which, however, is mirrored back by its whole scattered image, and sees and recognizes itself therein” - another, rather oblique reference to the views of his former Frankfurt companion.
然而，一个“具体的”民族不是“绝对的中立”，不是一个中立点，在该中立点，较低秩序“潜能”中的张力与对立不复存在，不复迫使系统走向越来越高的统一体。“在所有不同的人们背后是不变的‘人类’精神。”黑格尔注意到，“世界精神，以它的每一种形式，享有它的自我意识，‘世界精神’时而较贫弱时而更加发达而总是非绝对莫属；它享有它自身及其自己的本质，存在于受法律和习惯的每一系统支配的每一民族中”——这就表明，如果说没有什么其他区别的话，荷尔德林的观念这种约束仍然对黑格尔的影响恰恰是多么强大。黑格尔不是不利用谢林关于历史作为上帝的渐次启示的见解，而是继续采用那早就被他在《基督教精神及其命运》中制定出的且作为受到荷尔德林启发产物的命运这一概念：每个民族都注定具有“悲剧的命运”，民族的兴衰“表现在悲剧伦理领域，悲剧自身永远受到绝对的影响。”悲剧在于的是，伦理的自然分开它的作为命运（ **Schicksal** ）的无机自然（以便不被卷入无机自然，并把无机自然置于它自身之外；但借助在它与命运的抗争中认识命运，伦理的自然跟作为伦理自然与无机自然统一的神的本质相和解）。关于“精神”因之以不同形式显露的方面构想，关于命运与神性的具体构想，实质上等同于见于荷尔德林自己关于历史与悲剧札记中的东西，实质上等同于一种贯穿在荷尔德林1800年后短暂而光辉的创作时期很多诗篇中的想法。“因此，像荷尔德林一样，黑格尔断言这种‘神性’以某些与‘民族’相关的形式显现，就‘民族’而言这意味着神性——‘以这种方式，理想性本身必须被赋予一种纯粹绝对的形式，因此理性本身必须被看作且散奉为特定民族的上帝。’在《伦理体系》中，黑格尔明确地表示他认为存在着‘绝对’神性概念，但他同时认为‘绝对’神性概念以具体的形式向各种不同的民族显露——‘这已直接把它自身和具体东西相结合的普世性就是特定民族的神性，这普世性，被以特殊的理想形式直观的普世性，就是特定民族的上帝。’可是，黑格尔看来好像认为历史必须具有总的统一体，看来好像颇为模糊地注意到‘在[精神每一形式]的单一阶段上漂浮着总体观念，总体观念却得到它整个消散的镜像的反射，看到和认识到它自己在那里’——又一次颇为婉转地提到他以前在法兰克福时期同伴的见解。
Cameralism, the Estates, and Modernity in Germany
官房学、等级和德国现代性
These kinds of fundamental considerations permitted Hegel to return to the theme of Germanic freedom he had earlier discussed in the “German Constitution.” The crucial issue was, again, that of the “fate” of “Germanic freedom” and its correlated notion of “representation.” As he had done in “The German Constitution,” Hegel argued that a legal organization of society into estates was necessary for a free people, and he knew that in arguing in this way he was going against the trend. The estates were already an outmoded institution in Hegel’s own day, and, by 1802, they seemed clearly to be destined to vanish. An estate was a social grouping according to legally recognized social rank (which tended to correlate with economic status but was not equivalent to it) in which members had certain rights and privileges peculiar to that estate. The classical medieval distinction of the estates had sorted them into nobility, ecclesiastics, and commoners according to the formula of one estate doing the work, one estate being in charge of spiritual activities, and one estate doing the fighting necessary for the common defense (at least according to Philip de Vitry’s virtually canonical 1335 description).'*’*' But as many had already recognized for quite some time, the category of those who did the “work” inadequately grouped together two very different economic groups: prosperous merchants and all the others who worked, including peasants. Even in the medieval world in which the tripartite division of the estates was most at home, the “townspeople” and the rural populations were still very different in wealth and power. By 1800, it seemed not only that the continued existence of the traditional estates was incompatible with the emerging sense of personal freedom in European life, but also that it was also putting a stranglehold on economic progress.
上述种种基本思考使黑格尔可以回过头来论述他早先在《论德意志宪法》中探讨的日耳曼人的自由这一主题。至关重要的再度是“日耳曼人自由”的“命运”问题及其相关的“代表”这一概念问题。像他早在《论德意志宪法》中就已论述的，黑格尔坚称一个合法的具有等级的社会机构是一个自由的民族所必需的，他同样知道在以这种方法论证时他可能招惹众怒。社会等级已经成了黑格尔自己时代过时的制度，截至1802年的时候，社会等级看来显然注定要走向灭亡。等级是按照得到合法认可的社会地位而形成的社会群体（社会地位往往涉及经济地位但不等于经济地位），在社会群体中，成员具有某些权利和这一等级特有的特权。中世纪对社会等级作出了经典区分，把社会等级分成贵族、传教士和平民，这种区分依照的惯例是某个等级做的工作，某个等级负责的精神活动，和某个等级做的为共同防御所必需的作战（至少根据菲利普·德维特里实际教规第1335条的描述是这样区分的）。但是像许多人早在很久以前就已认识到的，这类做特定“工作”的人们不适合组成两个截然不同的经济群体：财源兴旺的商人与所有做工的其他人，包括农民。甚至在中世纪世界里，社会等级的三重划分像家常便饭一样，“城里人”与乡下人在拥有财富和享有权力方面仍然有着天壤之别。到1800年，看来好像不仅传统社会等级的继续存在是与正在产生的欧洲生活中个人自由感不相一致的，而且传统社会等级的继续存在也正在压制着经济的发展。
Hegel’s argument for their continued existence rested on his radical reinterpretation of them as ethical unities instead of natural or primarily economic social formations. Each estate, he argued, was constituted by the type of shared stance that its members took toward themselves, each other, and members of other estates. Thus, even though between 1802 and 1803 Hegel divided the three estates in a way that more or less mirrored the conventional distinctions at work in German law at the time - nobility. Burger (townsman), and peasant - he quite distinctively reinterpreted each of them: The estate of Burger (townsmen) was about the principle of “uprightness” (Rechtsschaffenheit); the aristocracy was about courage; and the peasantry about the virtue of “simple trust” in the nobility.'*’^
黑格尔对社会等级继续存在的论证，仰赖于他激进地把社会等级重新解释成是伦理统一体而非自然的社会组织或主要地经济的社会组织。每一等级，他论证道，都由这类具有共同立场的群体及该群体成员们对他们自己、对他们彼此之间、对其他等级成员所采取的态度组成。因此，尽管1801年至1803年黑格尔以一种或多或少反映在当时德意志法律中所用的常规区分的方式来划分三种等级——贵族、 **Bürger** （市民）和农民——但他却重新对它们中每个等级作了十分独特的解释： **Bürger** （市民）等级关心“诚实”（ **Rechtschaffenheit** ）原则；贵族关心勇敢；农民关心“单纯信仰”这一美德。
Hegel’s ideas on the necessity of the estates were clearly colored by his reactions to German cameralism, a doctrine developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by and for German civil servants in the employment of various monarchs; the doctrine concerned itself with the proper methods for rationally administering a state with the goal of increasing its wealth. Cameralism assumed that society (specifically, German society) was in essence a harmonious whole and that the state should rationally administer the whole only so as to increase wealth for the state and should intervene in the workings of the social whole only in order to remedy distortions in it (for example, when individuals or groups were demanding more than their naturally just share or were engaged in activities that did not follow from their historical privileges).Cameralism was a theory of fiscal administration, holding that fiscal tasks should be both administratively centralized and made more uniform; it was thus very much tied into the leading ideas of the German Enlightenment and its related concepts of “enlightened absolutism” and the state as a “machine.” It did not hold that society itself should become more uniform, only that the rational, enlightened administration of society should become more uniform. According to cameralist theory, the fiscal administration of the “state” helped to coordinate the various corporate bodies of society; it did not reform them.'*’’
黑格尔的社会等级的必然性这一想法显然受到他反对德国官房学的影响，德国官房学是17和18世纪期间由受雇于各种不同君主的德国文官们发展出且为他们服务的一种学说；这种学说涉及合理地管理国家目的在于增加国家财富的一些恰当的方法。官房学假定社会（特别是德国社会）本质上是一个和谐的整体，国家应该合理地掌管这个整体而仅仅在于为国家增加财富，应该干预社会整体的工作而仅仅为了消除社会整体中的扭曲（例如当个体或团体过量要求他们的自然公正份额或从事一些不在他们历史特权范围内活动的时候）。“官房学是一门财政管理理论，认为财政任务既应该加以集中管理也应该被使得更加统一；它因此与德国启蒙运动一流思想和它相关的‘开明专制主义’概念及作为‘机器’的国家概念有着极为密切的联系。官房学不认为社会本身应该变得更加统一，只认为合理的、开明的社会管理应该变得更加统一。”
Cameralism’s highly flawed foundations came into clear view around 1803-06 as the Holy Roman Empire was starting to exhale its last breaths. Its most basic problem was that, given the complex, particularistic existence of the hometowns, the intrinsic harmony that it postulated in German society simply did not exist. After the first wave of reaction to revolutionary French incursions into Germany, cameralist theory necessarily, although only gradually, began to shift toward notions of centralized social reform. At that point, it seemed that the state could only pursue the goal of increasing its aggregate wealth by claiming sovereignty over all elements of society, that is, by claiming that all the local, particularized corporate bodies with their unwritten, centuries-old sets of norms and practices had to submit to the rationalizing dictates of the centralized administration.
官房学漏洞百出的基本原理大约在1803年至1806年已经清晰可见，其时神圣罗马帝国已经奄奄一息。它的最基本问题是，考虑到复杂的特殊恩宠论家乡的存在，它所假定存在的德国社会固有的和谐是根本不存在的。在第一波反对法国大革命对德国的入侵后，财政学理论必需，尽管只是逐渐地，开始转向以社会改革为中心的概念。在这方面，它看来好像认为国家只会借助下列的做法来达到加快聚集财富的目标：主张所有社会元素，也即主张一切地方的、特殊的法人团体因它们多少世纪以来没有古老的不成文的一套套规范和习俗从而都必须听任集中化管理的合理支配。
