Three Absolute Idealism
第三章 绝对观念论(2)
With what then does philosophy begin? With a very simple question, the fundamental question behind all metaphysics: What is reality in itself? What is the thing itself, apart from its relations to other things? In both his Phenomenology and Logic Hegel begins with this question. The Phenomenology begins when consciousness asks itself what is its object, the object in itself (das An-sich or Ansichselbstsein); all the stages of its development can be understood as progressively more specific or concrete answers to this question. The Logic too begins with the concept of pure being (reines Seyn), being as it is apart from any determinations that we attribute to it. For Hegel, this is another formulation for substance, for reality in itself, reality apart from the specific determinations that relate it to something else. Indeed, in the Encyclopedia version of his logic he is explicit that pure being is the proper characterization of Spinoza’s substance (§86; VIII, 183).
那么哲学应当以什么为开端呢？以一个简单的问题、一个隐藏在所有形而上学背后的基础性问题为开端：什么是实在性本身？撇开与其他事物的关系的事物自身是什么？在《精神现象学》和《逻辑学》中，黑格尔都以这个问题为开端。《精神现象学》开始于意识问自己什么是它的对象，什么是对象本身（das An-sich or Ansichselbstsein）之时；意识发展的所有阶段，都可以被理解为是一种渐进的、对这个问题给出的更详细或更具体的回答。《逻辑学》也是始于纯存在（reines Seyn）的概念，去除我们归诸其上的任何规定之后的存在自身。对黑格尔而言，这是实体、实在本身、去除将它和其他事物联系在一起的各种特殊规定的实在的另外一种提法。实际上，在《哲学百科全书》版本的逻辑学中，他明确指出，纯存在是对斯宾诺莎实体概念的恰当描述（§ 86；VIII, 183）。
This account of the method of philosophy was first developed jointly by Schelling and Hegel in their Jena years. They held that it is the task of reason to know something in itself, apart from its relation to other things.14 Reason must grasp each thing as if it were the entire world, and as if nothing else existed outside it.15 This means that reason should strip away from the thing its properties or distinctive form, the determinations by which it differs from all other things, since these properties or determinations constitute its relations to other things. Once we remove all the distinguishing properties of the thing we see the entire universe within it, for all things are the same without distinguishing properties. This method of considering a thing in itself by abstracting from its distinguishing properties Schelling and Hegel called construction. Although Hegel would later abandon the method, he would still adhere to its underlying task: to grasp the thing itself.
关于哲学方法的这一论述，首先是谢林和黑格尔在耶拿时期共同发展起来的。他们认为，理性的任务就是撇开某一事物与其他事物的联系，去认识事物自身。14理性必须这样来把握每一事物，仿佛它就是整个世界，仿佛在它之外无物存在。15这意味着，理性应当从事物中剥离掉它的属性或独特形式，以及它借以与其他事物区别开来的那些规定性，因为这些属性或规定性构成它和其他事物的联系。一旦我们移除了某一事物的所有独特属性，我们就可以从中看到整个宇宙，因为所有去除了独特属性的事物都是一样的。这种通过抽象掉其独特属性来思想事物自身的方法，谢林和黑格尔称之为建构（construction）。尽管黑格尔后来放弃了这一方法，但他还将坚持它的基本任务：把握事物本身。
SUBJECT–OBJECT IDENTITY
主—客同一
Now that we have examined the meaning of the absolute, we have a better idea of the subject matter of absolute idealism. But we still have none about the doctrine itself. Unfortunately, Hegel is again not very helpful. He provides no working definition of the phrase or preliminary account of its meaning. The few occasions where he uses it already presuppose some established general meaning.
既然已经考察过了绝对的含义，我们就能更好地理解了绝对观念论的主题了。但是我们对这一学说本身还一无所知。不幸的是，对此黑格尔于我们同样没多大帮助。关于这一短语，他没有提供有用的定义，也没有对其含义做初步的说明。不过，在黑格尔使用这个词的少数场合，已经预设了一些确定的一般含义。
One important clue is offered by Schelling, who, during his collaboration with Hegel, defined the term explicitly on two occasions. According to Schelling, absolute idealism is the doctrine that the ideal and the real, the subjective and objective, are one and the same in the absolute.16 In other words, it is the doctrine that the absolute consists in subject–object identity. As it stands, Schelling’s definition could not pass for Hegel’s own, given that, already in the Jena years, Hegel differed significantly from Schelling regarding the nature of the absolute. As early as his Differenzschrift he declared that the absolute is not only subject–object identity but the identity of subject–object identity and subject–object non-identity (II, 96/ 156). Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to disregard Schelling’s definition entirely. For Hegel does agree with Schelling that subject– object identity is one important moment of the absolute; furthermore, he tells us explicitly in the preface to the Differenzschrift that the principle of subject–object identity expresses the very spirit of ‘authentic idealism’ (II, 9–10/79–80). It was indeed Hegel’s purpose in the Differenzschrift to defend Schelling’s interpretation of this principle against Kant’s and Fichte’s.
谢林提供了一条重要的线索，在与黑格尔合作期间，他在两个场合对这个术语下过明确的定义。在谢林看来，绝对观念论是这样一种学说：在绝对中，观念与实在、主观与客观是同一回事。16换句话说，这种学说就是，绝对存在于主—客同一之中。事实上，考虑到在耶拿时期黑格尔在绝对的本性方面与谢林已经有实质性的差异，因此不能认为谢林关于绝对的定义就是黑格尔自己的。早在《费希特与谢林哲学体系的差别》中，黑格尔已经宣称绝对不仅是主—客同一，而且是主—客同一与主—客非同一的同一（II, 96/156）。然而，完全轻视谢林的定义也是错误的。因为，黑格尔完全同意谢林，认为主—客同一是绝对的一个重要环节；此外，在《费希特与谢林哲学体系的差别》的序言中，他明确告诉我们，主—客同一原则表达的正是“真正的观念论”的精神（II, 9–10/79–80）。捍卫谢林对这一原则所做的阐释以与康德和费希特的阐释相抗衡，的确是黑格尔写作《费希特与谢林哲学体系的差别》的目的。
So, to understand the meaning of Hegel’s absolute idealism, we must determine what Schelling and Hegel mean by ‘the principle of subject–object identity’. But now it seems that we have only replaced one slogan with another, making the obscure more obscure, for the principle of subject–object identity is one of the most dense and difficult in all German idealism. The principle has no single univocal meaning, its precise meaning depending on its specific context. We must be very careful, therefore, to distinguish Hegel’s understanding of this principle from that of his contemporaries.
因此，为了理解黑格尔绝对观念论的含义，我们必须确定谢林和黑格尔使用的“主—客同一原则”究竟意味着什么。但目前看来，我们仅仅是用一个标语代替了另一个标语，让本来晦暗不彰的事情变得更加晦暗而已，因为主—客同一原则是德国观念论所有问题当中最高深最困难的一个问题。这个原则没有唯一明确的含义，它的精确含义取决于各种特殊的语境。因此，我们必须特别仔细地将黑格尔对这一原则的理解与他的同时代人区别开来。
One apparent hint about its meaning comes from the preface to the Differenzschrift where Hegel states that Kant has expressed the principle of subject–object identity in his transcendental deduction of the categories.17 ‘In the principle of the deduction of the categories’, Hegel writes, ‘Kant’s philosophy is authentic idealism . . .’ (II, 9/79). Here Hegel is referring to Kant’s principle of the unity of apperception, which states that I can have representations only if I can be aware of them. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant made this principle the basis for his ‘transcendental deduction’, i.e. his attempt to show that the categories (the most basic concepts by which we understand the world) must apply to experience. The precise role of this principle in Kant’s deduction has been the subject of endless controversy, which need not concern us now. The crucial question is whether Hegel’s concept of subject–object identity should be understood according to Kant’s principle. It is striking that Fichte uses the term ‘subject–object identity’ to describe the act of self-knowledge involved in Kant’s principle. Since Hegel uses the same term, it would seem that he too has a Kantian interpretation of this principle.
关于它的含义的一个明显暗示出自《费希特与谢林哲学体系的差别》的序言。黑格尔在那里声明，康德已经在他的范畴的先验演绎中表达了主—客同一的原则。17“在范畴演绎的原则中”，黑格尔写道，“康德哲学是真正的观念论……”（II, 9/79）。在这里，黑格尔指的是康德的统觉统一性原则，其含义是，只有在我能够意识到它们的时候，我才能具有各种表象。在《纯粹理性批判》中，康德将这一原则作为他的“先验演绎”的基础，也就是说，他试图表明范畴（我们借以理解世界的最基本的概念）必须应用于经验。这一原则在康德演绎中的确切作用，一直是一个争论不休的话题，而我们现在无需关心这些。至关重要的问题是，黑格尔的主—客同一概念是否应当按照康德的原则来理解。引人注目的是，费希特使用“主—客同一”来描述自我—认识的行动时，牵涉到康德的原则。既然黑格尔使用相同的术语，看来他对这一原则也抱有某种康德主义的解释。
It is important, however, not to be misled by this verbal similarity. Despite its initial plausibility, the Kantian interpretation cannot withstand closer textual scrutiny. Immediately after praising Kant’s deduction in the Differenzschrift, Hegel expressly states that Kant has imperfectly understood the principle of subject–object identity. He complains of Kant’s interpretation: ‘. . . on what a subordinate stage it grasps the principle of subject–object identity’ (II, 10/81). Throughout the Differenzschrift Hegel criticizes Kant’s principle of the unity of apperception because it is only formal and subjective: formal, since it is mere self-awareness of representations, regardless of the content of the representations themselves; and subjective, since the identity takes place only in the subject, amounting to nothing more than its self-awareness. Hegel charges Kant with having a subjective concept of reason, according to which reason is something imposed on the world by the activity of the subject, where the world prior to this activity is an unknowable thing-in-itself.
然而，重要的是不要被这种用词的相似性所误导。尽管初看起来是合理的，但康德主义的阐释经不起更进一步的文本审查。在《费希特与谢林哲学体系的差别》中，黑格尔赞扬了康德的演绎之后，立刻明确指出，康德对主—客同一性的理解有不完善之处。他抱怨康德的解释：“……它只把握到了主—客同一性的一个次要的阶段”（II, 10/81）。黑格尔对康德“统觉的统一性”的批评贯穿《差异论文》全文，因为它仅仅是形式的和主观的：说它是形式的，因为它仅仅是诸表象的自我意识，而不管诸表象自身的内容；说它是主观的，因为同一仅仅发生于主体内部，从未超出自我意识自身。黑格尔指责康德持有一种主观的理性概念，按照这一概念，理性是主体的活动强加于世界之上的某种东西，而先于这种活动的世界是不可知的自在之物。
The Kantian reading of the principle of subject–object identity also ignores Schelling’s and Hegel’s explicit critique of it in their Jena writings. Schelling and Hegel argue that the Kantian–Fichtean reading of the principle of subject–object identity ultimately ends in solipsism, the doctrine that I know only the immediate contents of my own mind.18 Since the transcendental subject knows only what it creates, it is caught inside the circle of its own consciousness; and since it cannot create the entire world, the reality outside it will be an unknowable thing-in-itself. Hence, during their Jena years, Schelling and Hegel spurn rather than embrace Kant’s interpretation of the principle of subject–object identity.
康德关于主—客同一原则的解读，也同样忽视了谢林和黑格尔在其耶拿时期著作中对此提出的明确批评。谢林和黑格尔认为，康德—费希特关于主—客同一原则的解读最终归结于唯我论，而唯我论意味着我仅仅认识我自己心灵中的直接内容。18由于先验主体仅只认识它的创造物，便落入了其自身意识的循环；并且由于它不能创造整个世界，外部实在势必作为不可知的物自身而存在。因此，在耶拿期间，谢林和黑格尔摒弃了而非拥抱康德关于主—客同一原则的阐释。
The prototype for Hegel’s reading of the principle of subject– object identity came not from the Kantian–Fichtean tradition but its very antithesis: Spinozism. For Schelling and Hegel around 1801, the principle of subject–object identity essentially functioned as a declaration of their monism. It served as a statement of protest against all forms of dualism, whether Kantian, Fichtean or Cartesian. Schelling and Hegel greatly admired Spinoza for his monism, for showing how to overcome dualism when Kant, Fichte and Jacobi had only reinstated it. True to Spinoza, their principle of subject–object identity essentially means that the subjective and the objective, the intellectual and the empirical, the ideal and the real – however one formulates the opposition – are not distinct substances but simply different aspects, properties or attributes of one and the same substance. The principle follows immediately from the Spinozist proposition that there is only one substance, of which everything else is either a mode or an attribute.19 If this is the case, then the subjective and objective cannot be two things but must be only modes or attributes of one and the same thing.
黑格尔关于主—客同一原则的解读，其原型并非来自康德—费希特传统，而恰恰来自它的对立面：斯宾诺莎主义。对1801年前后的谢林和黑格尔来说，主—客同一原则，本质上起到了作为他们一元论宣言的作用。它充当了反对一切形式二元论的声明，无论这种二元论是康德式的、费希特式的，还是笛卡尔式的。谢林和黑格尔极为赞赏斯宾诺莎的一元论，因为当康德、费希特和耶可比等人试图恢复二元论的时候，斯宾诺莎展示了如何能够克服它。他们的主—客同一原则忠实于斯宾诺莎，本质上意味着：主观与客观、思想与经验、观念与实在——无论人们如何阐释它们的对立——都不是独特的实体，而仅仅是同一实体的不同方面、性质和属性。这一原则直接从斯宾诺莎的如下命题得出：只有一个唯一的实体，其他所有一切，或者是它的样式，或者是它的属性。19如果事实如此，那么主观和客观就不能是两种事物，而必定只是同一事物的样式或属性。
Though he never used the term, Spinoza himself had developed something like a principle of subject–object identity. In Part Two of the Ethics he argued that the mental and physical are simply different attributes of one and the same substance.20 The order and connection of ideas is one and the same as the order and connection of things, Spinoza wrote, because both the mental and the physical are ultimately only different aspects of one and the same thing. That Hegel wanted to give his principle of subject–object identity this Spinozist meaning there cannot be any doubt. On two occasions in the Differenzschrift he refers approvingly to Spinoza’s propositions (II, 10, 106/80, 166).
斯宾诺莎自己已经发展出了某种类似于主—客同一原则的东西，尽管他从未使用过这个词。在《伦理学》的第二部分，斯宾诺莎论证了心理和物理不过是同一实体的不同属性。20斯宾诺莎写道：观念的秩序与联系，和事物的秩序与联系是同一的，因为心理和物理两者最终不过是同一事物的不同方面。黑格尔想要赋予他的主—客同一原则以斯宾诺莎主义的意义，这一点是毫无疑义的。在《差异》中，有两个场合，黑格尔赞许地提到斯宾诺莎的命题（II, 10，106/80，166）。
But here again it seems that we are offering only an explanation obscurum per obscurius. For Spinoza’s doctrine is one of the most impenetrable in his philosophy. A large part of its difficulty comes from Spinoza’s notoriously equivocal definition of an attribute: ‘that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance’.21 The definition is a masterpiece of ambiguity. Are the attributes essentially subjective, simply different ways in which the intellect perceives, explains or understands substance? Or are they objective, different manifestations, appearances or forms of substance? Or are they somehow both?
但是这里提供给我们的，似乎仍然是一种用晦涩的语言解释难懂的问题（obscurum per obscurius）式的说明。因为斯宾诺莎的学说，是其哲学中最令人费解的部分之一。困难主要来自斯宾诺莎关于“属性”的那个恶名昭彰而又含糊不清的定义：“理智将之视为构成实体的本质的东西”。21这一定义是模棱两可的杰作。“属性”本质上是主观的，仅仅是理智看待、解释和理解实体的不同方式？抑或它们是客观的，是实体不同的显现、表现或形式？抑或是兼而有之？
Fortunately, though, we need not dwell on the precise meaning of Spinoza’s doctrine. The only question for us now is how Hegel understood it or the meaning he gave to it. In his Differenzschrift Hegel explains the precise meaning he wants to give to Spinoza’s principle. He insists that the difference between the subjective and objective must be not only ideal but also real, i.e. it must be not only one in perspective but also one in the object itself. This means that the subjective and the objective are distinct appearances, embodiments or manifestations of the absolute. On several occasions he stresses that philosophy needs to explain the distinction between the subjective and the objective of ordinary experience. That the subject is distinct from the object – that the object is given and produces representations independent of our will and imagination – is a fact of ordinary experience. Philosophy should not dismiss this appearance as an illusion, Hegel insists, but it should explain it and show its necessity.22
幸运的是，我们无需详细阐述斯宾诺莎学说的确切含义。现在对我们而言，唯一的问题是，黑格尔是怎么理解它的，或者说黑格尔赋予它什么意义。在《差异论文》中，黑格尔说明了他想要赋予斯宾诺莎学说的确切意义。他主张，主观和客观之间的差异，必定不仅是观念的，也是实在的，也就是说，必定不仅是视角的差异，也是客体自身的差异。这意味着，主体和客体是“绝对”之不同的表现、体现和展示。在好几个场合，黑格尔强调说，哲学有必要解释日常经验中主观和客观之间的区分。主体明显不同于客体——客观是被给予的，并产生出独立于我们意志与想象的表象——这是日常经验的一个事实。黑格尔坚持认为，哲学不应当把这种现象当作幻象打发掉，而是应当解释它和显示其必然性。22
It is precisely on these grounds that Hegel departs from Schelling, insisting that the absolute is not only identity but also the identity of identity and non-identity. If philosophy is to explain the opposition between subject and object in ordinary experience, then it must somehow show how the single universal substance, in which the subject and object are the same, divides itself and produces a distinction between subject and object. The philosopher faces an intrinsically difficult task: he must both surmount and explain the necessity of the subject–object dualism. It was precisely the failure of Spinoza, Hegel argues, that he could not explain the origin of finitude.23 We shall later consider how Hegel attempted to explain the origin of finitude and the dualism of subject–object identity (see pp. 92–5).
正是由于这些原因上，黑格尔与谢林分道扬镳了。他主张绝对不仅是同一，而且是同一与非同一的同一。如果哲学要去阐明日常经验中的主客观对立，那么它就必须以某种方法指出唯一的普遍实体——在其中主客观是同一的——是如何分离自身并产生主客观差别的。由此，哲学家面对着一个内在的艰巨任务：他必须既克服又解释主—客二元论的必然性。黑格尔认为，无法阐明有限性的起源，正是斯宾诺莎的失败之处。23下文我们将仔细考察，黑格尔是如何试图解释有限性的起源以及主—客同一之二元论的（参见第92–95页）。
THE MEANING OF ‘IDEALISM’
“观念论”的含义
We have now seen that Hegel’s absolute idealism is essentially a monistic doctrine. It is important to see, however, that it is so in two very different senses. First, in the anti-dualist sense that it denies there is any substantial distinction between the subjective and objective, the ideal and real, the mental and physical, and affirms instead that they are distinct attributes or appearances of one and the same substance. Second, in the anti-pluralistic sense that it denies there are many substances and affirms instead that there is only one substance. The anti-dualist sense need not imply the anti-pluralist sense, because even if the subjective and objective are aspects of a single substance it is still possible that there are many such substances. But Schelling and Hegel also affirmed the stronger form of monism. They endorsed Spinoza’s argument that there could be one, and only one, being that has an independent essence. If there were two substances, then they would have to be conceived in relation to one another, at least in the negative sense that one is essentially not the other; in that case both substances would have a dependent essence.
现在，我们已经看到，黑格尔的绝对观念论本质上是一元论的学说。然而，重要的是要看到，它包含着两种截然不同的含义。首先，在反二元论的意义上，它否认在主观与客观、观念与实在、心理与物理之间存在任何实体性的差别，并且断言，与此相反，它们是同一个实体的不同属性或表现。其次，在反多元论的意义上，它否认存在多种实体，相反，断言只有唯一的实体。反二元论的含义不必蕴含着反多元论的意义，因为即使主体和客体是单一实体的不同方面，也可能存在许多这样的实体。但谢林和黑格尔还肯定一种更强形式的一元论。他们推崇斯宾诺莎的如下论证：只有一个唯一的存在者，这个存在者具有独立的本质。如果有两种实体，那么它们就将被设想为是相互联系着的，至少在否定的意义上，即一方本质上不是对方；在这种情况下，两种实体都将具有独立的本质。
What, though, does this radical monistic doctrine have to do with idealism? The answer is not obvious since, prima facie, there is no necessary connection between monism and idealism, in either the ancient Platonic or the modern Berkeleyian sense. After all, some monists are not idealists; for example, Spinoza and Schopenhauer.
可是，这种激进的一元论学说和观念论有什么关系呢？回答是，关系并不明显，因为表面看来（prima facie），无论是在古代的柏拉图主义还是现代的贝克莱主义的意义上，一元论与观念论都并不存在必然的联系。毕竟，有些一元论者不是观念论者；例如，斯宾诺莎和叔本华。
Hegel states that absolute idealism is the doctrine that things are appearances of ‘the universal, divine idea’ (EPW §24A). It is tempting to read this as a form of Platonic idealism, as if the idea were Plato’s form or archetype. Absolute idealism would then be a form of idealistic monism or monistic idealism, according to which everything is an appearance of a single absolute idea. So when Hegel says with Spinoza that everything is a mode or attribute of the single universal substance he also means with Plato that it is an appearance or manifestation of the single universal idea.
黑格尔写道，绝对观念论是这样一种学说，即事物都是“普遍和神圣的理念”的显现（EPW§ 24A）。把它解读为柏拉图式观念论的一种形式，这种做法极有诱惑力，仿佛这个理念是柏拉图的形式或原型。那样，绝对观念论将会是一种观念论的一元论或一元论的观念论。按照这种学说，所有事物都是唯一的绝对理念的显现。因此，当黑格尔与斯宾诺莎一道，说所有事物是唯一普遍实体的样式或属性的时候，他也和柏拉图一道，意味着它是唯一的普遍理念的显现或展示。
This reading comes close to Hegel’s meaning; but not close enough. For Hegel identifies the idea not with Plato’s archetype but with Aristotle’s formal–final cause. Hegel saw Aristotle, not Plato, as the proper founder of absolute idealism: ‘Aristotle superseded Plato in speculative depth, since he knew the most solidly grounded speculation [or] idealism . . .’ (XIX, 133/II, 119). Following Aristotle’s critique of Plato, Hegel thinks that universals do not exist as such but only en re, in particular things.24 As forms inherent in things, as concrete universals, universals are, in Aristotle’s language, the formal–final causes of things. The formal cause consists in the essence or nature of a thing, what makes it the thing that it is; and the final cause is the purpose the object attempts to realize, the goal of its development. The two senses of causality are joined in Hegel, as in Aristotle, because the purpose of a thing is to realize its essence or to develop its inherent form. Like Kant, Hegel calls the formal-final cause the ‘concept’ (Begriff) of a thing.25
这种解读接近了黑格尔的含义，但接近得还不够。因为，黑格尔没有将理念并等同于柏拉图的原型，而是将之等同于亚里士多德的形式—目的因。黑格尔把亚里士多德而非柏拉图看作是绝对观念论的真正奠基者：“亚里士多德在思辨的深度上超越了柏拉图，因为他知道具有最坚实地基的思辨（或）观念论……”（XIX, 133/II, 119）。黑格尔跟随亚里士多德对柏拉图的批判，认为普遍物并不单独存在，而是存在于特殊事物当中（en re）。24作为内在于事物的形式，作为具体的普遍，用亚里士多德的语言来说，普遍即是事物的形式—目的因。形式因是使某一事物成为其所是的本质或本性；目的因是客体试图实现的目的，是它发展的目标。在黑格尔这里，正像在亚里士多德那里一样，两种意义上的原因是联结在一起的，因为某一事物的目的，就是实现它的本质，或发展它的内在形式。像康德一样，黑格尔把形式—目的因称为“某一事物的概念（Begriff）”。25
If we keep in mind Hegel’s Aristotelian concept of the idea, then his idealism has a fundamentally teleological meaning. To state that everything is an appearance of the idea now means that it strives to realize the absolute idea, or that everything acts for an end, which is the absolute idea. Such was Hegel’s Aristotelian transformation of Spinoza’s monism: the single universal substance now becomes the single absolute idea, the formal–final cause of all things. Since he despised teleology, Spinoza would have turned over in his grave.
如果我们牢记黑格尔的亚里士多德式的理念概念的话，那么，他的观念论就在根本上具有某种目的论的意味。声称每一事物都是理念的一种显现，现在意味着这个事物在努力实现绝对理念，或者说意味着每一事物在趋向于作为绝对理念的目的。这便是黑格尔对斯宾诺莎一元论的亚里士多德式转换：唯一的普遍实体现在变成了唯一的绝对理念，亦即所有事物的形式—目的因。由于斯宾诺莎藐视目的论，他在坟墓里大概也会感到恶心吧。
This teleological dimension of Hegel’s absolute idealism appears very explicitly in the introduction to his lectures on world history. Here Hegel states that the fundamental thesis of philosophy is that reason governs the world, a thesis he identifies with the old teaching of Anaxagoras that the world is ruled by ‘nous’ (VG 28/27). To say that the world is governed by reason, he then explains, means that it has an ultimate purpose (VG 50/44). This means that whatever happens does so of necessity, but not merely in the sense that there are prior causes acting upon it in time but also in the sense that they must realize some end. What this end is we will determine later (pp. 266–7).
黑格尔绝对观念论的目的论维度，十分明确地表现在他世界历史讲演录的导论中。在这里，黑格尔声称哲学的根本主题是理性统治世界；黑格尔将这个主题与阿那克萨哥拉的“努斯（nous）”支配世界这个古老的教诲等同起来（VG 28/27）。黑格尔进一步解释说，理性统治世界，意味着它有一个终极目的（VG 50/44）。这意味着，无论发生什么都是出自必然性，但这种必然性不仅是在这种意义上，即存在着在时间上在先的原因作用于它；而且是在这种意义上，即它们必须实现某种目的。我们在后文将确定这种目的的涵义（第266–267页）。
The teleological aspect also becomes clear from his implied distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ idealism.26 According to this distinction, the subjective idealist holds that the rationality of the world, its conformity to law, has its source in the creative activity of the subject; its fundamental principle is Kant’s doctrine that we know a priori of objects only what we create or produce in them. The subjective idealist therefore holds that the world is rational only to the extent that we create or make it so; and to the extent that we cannot create or make it, the world is an unknowable thing-in-itself, an irrational surd. The objective idealist, however, holds that the rationality of the world is not something imposed on the world by the subject but something that inheres in the object itself, its concept or formal–final cause. Objective idealism is therefore another phrase for Hegel’s doctrine that reason governs the world, an equation Hegel explicitly confirms when he writes: ‘To say that there is reason in the world is what is meant by the expression “objective thought” ’ (EPW §24).
从他对于“主观的”和“客观的”观念论的含蓄区分来看，这一目的论的方面变得非常清楚了。26根据这一区分，主观的观念论者坚持认为，世界的合理性、它的遵从规律，在主体的创造性活动中有其根源；它的根本原则是康德的如下学说，即我们关于对象的先天认识，仅仅是我们在它们之中创造或生产的东西。因此，主观的观念论者认为，世界是合理的，仅仅是在我们创造或制造它所及的程度上；而在我们不能创造或制造它的程度上，世界是不可知的物自身，是一个非理性的无理数。然而，客观的观念论者坚持认为，世界的合理性不是某种主体强加于世界之上的东西，而是内在于对象本身，是它的概念或形式—目的因。因此，当黑格尔这样写道：“说理性在世界之中，也就是说出了‘客观思想’这一表达所包含的意义”（（EPW§ 24）之时，客观的观念论是他的理性统治世界学说的另一种表达，是一个明确证实了的方程式。
Hegel’s concept of objective idealism, and his Aristotelian concept of the idea, show that he does not limit the idea to the realm of subjectivity, as if it were the content or intention of some mind. On several occasions in his lectures on world history he is at pains to stress that the reason that governs the world should not be understood to mean a self-conscious subject or a spirit (VG 29, 37, 81/ 28, 34, 69). The purpose that governs the world is only its inherent form or structure, and it does not necessarily imply the intention of some agent.
黑格尔的客观观念论的概念，以及他的亚里士多德式的理念概念，表明他并不将理念限制于主观性的领域，仿佛它是某种心灵的内容或意图似的。在他的世界历史讲演中，有好几个场合，黑格尔煞费苦心地强调，统治世界的理性不能被理解为一种具有自我意识的主体或精神（VG 29，37，81/28，34，69）。统治世界的目的仅仅是内在于世界的形式或结构，它并不必然暗含着某些行动者的意图。
