英文早读第202篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。
Insurance Investment
保险投保
During the past two years insurance investments at cost (excluding the investment in our affiliate, Blue Chip Stamps) have grown from 134.6 million to 252.8 million. Growth in insurance reserves, produced by our large gain in premium volume, plus retained earnings, have accounted for this increase in marketable securities. In turn, net investment income of the Insurance Group has improved from 8.4 million pre‐tax in 1975 to 12.3 million pre‐tax in 1977.
在过去两年中，保险投资成本（不包括对关联公司蓝芯票证公司的投资）从1.346亿美元增长到2.528亿美元。由于保费收入大幅增长带来的保险储备金增加，以及留存收益，共同促成了有价证券投资的增长。反过来，保险集团的净投资收益也从1975年的840万美元（税前）提升至1977年的1230万美元（税前）。
In addition to this income from dividends and interest, we realized capital gains of 6.9 million before tax, about one‐quarter from bonds and the balance from stocks. Our unrealized gain in stocks at yearend 1977 was approximately 74 million but this figure, like any other figure of a single date (we had an unrealized loss of 17 million at the end of 1974), should not be taken too seriously. Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our investment decisions will be provided by business results over that period, and not by prices on any given day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company; i.e., marketable common stocks.
除了股息和利息收入，我们还实现了690万美元的税前资本利得，其中约四分之一来自债券，其余来自股票。1977年末，我们持有的股票未结算收益约为7400万美元，但这个数字，就像任何一个特定日期的数字一样（1974年末我们有1700万美元的未结算亏损），不应看得过于严肃。我们持有的大部分大规模股票都将持有多年，对我们投资决策的评判将取决于这段时期内的业务成果，而非任何一个特定日子的股价。正如在收购一整家公司时过度关注短期前景是愚蠢的，我们认为在购买一家公司的小部分股权，即可交易普通股时，痴迷于短期预期收益或近期收益趋势同样不合理。
A little digression illustrating this point may be interesting. Berkshire Fine Spinning, Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing were merged in 1955 to form Berkshire Hathaway Inc. In 1948, on a pro forma combined basis, they had earnings after tax of almost 18 million and employed 10,000 people
at a dozen large mills throughout New England. In the business world of that period they were an economic powerhouse. For example, in that same year earnings of IBM were 28 million (now 2.7 billion), Safeway Stores, 10 million, Minnesota Mining, 13 million, and Time, Inc., 9 million. But, in the decade following the 1955 merger aggregate sales of 595 million produced an aggregate loss for Berkshire Hathaway of 10 million. By 1964 the operation had been reduced to two mills and net worth had shrunk to 22 million, from 53 million at the time of the merger. So much for single year snapshots as adequate portrayals of a business.
为说明这一点，讲个有趣的题外话。1955年，伯克希尔精纺联合公司与哈撒韦制造公司合并，成立了伯克希尔哈撒韦公司。1948年，按预估合并基准计算，这两家公司的税后盈利近1800万美元，在新英格兰地区的12家大型工厂共雇佣了10000名员工。在当时的商业世界里，它们是经济巨头。例如，同年IBM的盈利是2800万美元（如今为27亿美元），西夫韦连锁超市是1000万美元，明尼苏达矿业制造公司是1300万美元，时代公司是900万美元。然而，在1955年合并后的十年里，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司5.95亿美元的总销售额却带来了1000万美元的总亏损。到1964年，运营工厂缩减至两家，净资产从合并时的5300万美元缩水至2200万美元。由此可见，仅用单一年份的数据来描绘一家企业是远远不够的。
13.reserve：储备；保留
14.retain：保持；保留；持有
15.in turn：依次；轮流；转而；逐个
16.unduly：过分地；不适当的
17.unsound：靠不住的；破旧的；摇摇欲坠的；不稳妥的；有错误的
18.mesmerize：迷住；吸引
19.digression：离题；脱轨
20.snapshot：快照；简要
21.portrayal：描绘；描述；描写
