英文早读第257篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。

We also allowed overexchanges, and thirty-nine additonal shareholders accepted this option, thereby increasing their ownership in the Bank and decreasing their proportional ownership in Berkshire. All got the full amount of Bancorp stock they requested, since the total shares desired by these thirty-nine holders was just slightly less than the number left available by the remaining 1200-plus holders of Berkshire who elected not to part with any Berkshire shares at all. As the exchange of last resort, I took the small balance (3% of Bancorp's stock). These shares, added to shares I received from my basic exchange allotment (80% of normal), gave me a slightly reduced proportional interest in the Bank and a slightly enlarged proportional interest in Berkshire.
我们也允许超额兑换，有 39 位额外的股东选择了这一方案，从而增加了他们在银行的持股比例，降低了在伯克希尔的持股比例。这 39 位股东都获得了他们所要求的全额银行股票，因为这 39 位股东所需的股票总数略低于其余 1200 多位选择不放弃任何伯克希尔股票的股东所剩余的可用股票数量。作为最后的交换手段，我接受了剩余的少量股票（占银行股票的 3%）。这些股票，加上我从基本兑换配额中获得的股票（正常数量的 80%），使我在银行的持股比例略有下降，而在伯克希尔的持股比例略有上升。

Management of the Bank is pleased with the outcome. Bancorp will operate as an inexpensive and uncomplicated holding company owned by 65 shareholders. And all of those shareholders will have become Bancorp owners through a conscious affirmative decision.
该银行的管理层对这一结果感到满意。这家银行控股公司（Bancorp）将作为一家成本低廉且架构不复杂的控股公司来运营，其股东为 65 位。而且所有这些股东都是通过经过慎重考虑后做出的积极决定才成为该银行控股公司的股东的。

Financing
财务

In August we sold 60 million of 12 3/4% notes due August 1, 2005, with a sinking fund to begin in 1991. The managing underwriters, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation, represented by Bill Fisher, and Chiles, Heider & Company,Inc., represented by Charlie Heider, did an absolutely first-class job from start to finish of the financing.
8 月，我们发行了价值 6000 万美元、票面利率为 12.75% 的票据，这些票据于 2005 年 8 月 1 日到期，偿债基金从 1991 年开始设立。主承销商分别是由比尔・费舍尔代表的唐纳森、勒夫金及詹瑞特证券公司（Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation），以及由查理・海德代表的奇利斯、海德公司（Chiles, Heider & Company, Inc.）。在整个融资过程中，他们自始至终都展现出了一流的专业水准。

Unlike most businesses, Berkshire did not finance because of any specific immediate needs. Rather, we borrowed because we think that, over a period far shorter than the life of the loan, we will have many opportunities to put the money to good use. The most attractive opportunities may present themselves at a tme when credit is extremely expense - or even unavailable. At such a time we want to have plenty of financial firepower.
与大多数企业不同，伯克希尔进行融资并非出于任何特定的迫切需求。相反，我们之所以借款，是因为我们认为，在远远短于贷款期限的一段时间内，我们将有许多机会把这笔资金妥善运用。最具吸引力的投资机会可能会在信贷成本极高 —— 甚至根本无法获得信贷的时候出现。在那样的时刻，我们希望拥有充足的财务实力。

Our acquisition preferences run toward businesses that generate cash, not those that consume it. As inflation intensifies, more and more companies find that they must spend all funds they generate internally just to maintain their existing physical volume of business. There is a certain mirage-like quality to such operations. However attractive the earnings numbers, we remain leery of businesses that never seem able to convert such pretty numbers into no-strings-attached cash.
我们对于收购的偏好倾向于那些能够产生现金的企业，而非消耗现金的企业。随着通货膨胀的加剧，越来越多的公司发现，他们必须将内部产生的所有资金都用于维持现有的业务规模。这类经营活动存在着某种虚幻的特质。无论盈利数字多么诱人，对于那些似乎永远无法将这些漂亮的数字转化为自由支配现金的企业，我们始终持谨慎态度

Businesses meeting our standards are not easy to find. (Each year we read of hundreds of corporate acquisitions; only a handful would have been of interest to us.) And logical expansion of our present operations is not easy to implement. But we'll continue to utilize both avenues in our attempts to further Berkshire's growth.
符合我们标准的企业并不容易找到。（每年我们都会读到成百上千起企业收购案例，但其中只有寥寥几个会让我们感兴趣。）而且，对我们目前的业务进行合理扩张也并非易事。不过，我们仍会继续通过这两种途径来推动伯克希尔的发展。