引言：关于和什么样的人在一起，巴菲特股东信中描述了他的想法，做法，还有BRK遇到的一些很好的人。

芒格讲：投资只是普世智慧的一个小分支。对巴菲特投资的探讨汗牛充栋，对巴菲特这类普世智慧的分享却寥若晨星。前者或许是果，后者或许为因。

本文分为5部分，读完大概需要6分钟。

1、想法
2、做法
3、让自己配得上
4、遇见你的遇见
5、滚雪球

想法

001 Much of what you become in life depends on whom you choose to admire and copy.（2015）

你在生活中成为什么样的人，很大程度上取决于你选择钦佩和模仿谁。

002 After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whomI like, trust, and admire.（1989）

在经历了其他一些错误之后，我学会了只和我喜欢、信任和欣赏的人做生意。

003 An owner-or investor-can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himselfwith such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics.（1989）

与这样的人（你喜欢、信任、和欣赏）一起工作，加上好的商业模式，企业家或投资者就能创造奇迹。

004 If Charlie and I were to go into a small venture with a few partners, we wouldseek individuals in sync with us, knowing that common goals and a shareddestiny make for a happy business “marriage” between owners and managers. Scaling up to giant size doesn’t change that truth. （2009）

如果查理和我要和几个合伙人一起成立一家小型企业，我们会寻找与我们步调一致的人，因为我们知道共同的目标和共同的命运有助于所有者和管理者之间幸福的商业“婚姻”。扩大规模并不能改变这个事实。         

005 We have found splendid business relationships to be so rare and so enjoyablethat we want to retain all we develop. （1989）

我们发现极好的商业关系是如此罕见和令人愉快，以至于我们想保留我们发展的一切。

006 This decision is particularly easy for us because we feel that these relationships will produce good - though perhaps not optimal - financial results.（1989）

这个决定对我们来说特别容易，因为我们觉得这些（极好的）关系会产生好的财务结果，尽管可能不一定是最佳结果。

007 Churchill once said, "You shape your houses and then they shape you."We know the manner in which we wish to be shaped. For that reason, we wouldrather achieve a return of X while associating with people whom we stronglylike and admire than realize 110% of X by exchanging these relationships foruninteresting or unpleasant ones.（1987）

丘吉尔曾说过，“你塑造你的环境，然后环境塑造你。”我们知道自己想活成什么样子，所以，我们宁愿在与我们非常喜欢和钦佩的人合作时获得X的回报，也不愿获得110%的X回报，如果换成和我们不喜欢或者讨厌的人打交道的话。         

008 We think it makes little sense for us to give up time with people we know to beinteresting and admirable for time with others we do not know and who arelikely to have human qualities far closer to average.（1989）

我们认为，放弃与我们喜欢和钦佩的人在一起的时间，而与我们不了解的人在一起，或者与人品平庸的人在一起，是没有意义的。

009 Working with people who cause your stomach to churn seems much like marryingfor money - probably a bad idea under any circumstances, but absolute madnessif you are already rich.（1986）

与让你反胃的人一起工作，就像为了钱而结婚，在任何情况下这都可能是个坏主意，如果你已经富有了还这样做，那绝对是疯了。

010 We do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matterhow attractive the prospects of their business.（1989）

我们不愿意与人品不好的经理们共事，不管他们的公司前景多么诱人。     

011 We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.（1989）

我们从未与坏人做成好的生意。

012 Charlie and I don’t expect to win many of you over to our way of thinking – we’ve observed enough human behavior to know the futility of that – but we do want you to be aware of our personal calculus. （2011）

查理和我并不指望说服多少人接受我们的思维方式，我们已经观察了足够多的人类行为，知道这是徒劳的，但我们确实希望你们了解我们个人的考量。         

013 But we are willing to back our conviction with our own money. （1999）

但是我们愿意用自己的钱来支持我们的信念。         

014 We intend to continue our practice of working only with people whom we like andadmire.  This policy not only maximizes our chances for good results, italso ensures us an extraordinarily good time. （1986）

我们打算继续我们的做法，只和我们喜欢和钦佩的人一起工作。这个策略不仅最大限度地增加了我们取得好成绩的机会，也确保了我们度过一段非常美好的时光。         

做法 

015 Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me isthe acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and amanagement that we like, trust and admire.  Such acquisitions are not easyto make but we look for them constantly.（1992）

在伯克希尔的经营中，最让查理和我兴奋的是收购这样的公司：商业模式好，管理层是我们喜欢、信任和钦佩的。 

016 We find it meaningful when an owner cares about whom he sells to. We like to dobusiness with someone who loves his company, not just the money that a salewill bring him (though we certainly understand why he likes that as well). （2000）

我们发现，如果所有者关心买他公司的是什么样的人，就非常有意义。我们喜欢收购热爱自己公司的人的公司，如果对方只是关心卖公司给他带来多少钱，我们就不愿意收购他的公司。（尽管我们也非常理解他为什么喜欢这样）         

017 When this emotional attachment exists, it signals that important qualities willlikely be found within the business: honest accounting, pride of product,respect for customers, and a loyal group of associates having a strong sense ofdirection. The reverse is apt to be true, also.（2000）

当这种热爱公司这种情感存在时，它标志着在企业中可能会发现重要的品质：诚信的财务，引以为豪的产品，尊重客户的理念，以及忠诚的同事，还有对未来有明确的发展方向。反之亦然。         

018 Our evaluation of the integrity of Mrs. B and her family was demonstrated whenwe purchased 90% of the business: NFM had never had an audit and we did notrequest one; we did not take an inventory nor verify the receivables; we didnot check property titles. We gave Mrs. B a check for $55 million and she gaveus her word. That made for an even exchange. （1984）

当我们购买NFM 90%的股权时，证明了我们对B夫人及其家族的诚信评价：NFM从未进行过审计，我们也没有要求进行审计；我们既没有盘点也没有核查应收账款；我们没有检查房产地契。我们给了B夫人一张5500万美元的支票，她给了我们承诺。就这样完成了公平交易。（注：伯克希尔买下了90%的股份，最终实际持有比例为80%，B夫人家族成员保留了10%股份，另有10%的股份以期权的方式授予了B夫人家族参与公司经营的年轻一代）  

019 You and I are fortunate to be in partnership with the Blumkin family.（1984）

你和我都很幸运能和B夫人家族合作。（注：NFM为伯克希尔创造了数以亿美元计的财富，并且后来收购的波仙珠宝、R.C. Willey家居用品、Star家具等多家公司都和B夫人家族有渊源）        

020 Not only did Berkshire acquire three outstanding retailers; these deals alsoallowed me to become friends with some of the finest people you will ever meet.（1999）

伯克希尔不仅收购了三家杰出的零售商；这些交易也让我与一些你将会遇到的最优秀的人成为朋友。（注：这三家零售商即NFM、R.C. Willey、Star，后两者以及再后来的成功收购，大都源于前面收购后的卖方推荐，以及买方BRK的持续口碑。）         

021 I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike Friedman and his familywill never be disappointed. The way in which we purchased our interest in theirbusiness is the ultimate testimonial. Barshim’s had no audited financial statements; nevertheless, we didn’t take inventory, verify receivables or audit the operation in any way. Ike simply told us what was so - and on that basis we drew up a one-page contract and wrote a large check. （1988）

我可以向你们保证，那些信任Ike Friedman及其家族的人永远不会失望。我们购买他们公司的方式就是最好的证明。波仙珠宝没有经过审计的财务报表；尽管如此，我们也没有盘点存货、核实应收账款或以任何方式审计业务。Ike简单地告诉了我们实际情况，在此基础上，我们起草了一份一页纸的合同，开了一张大额支票，成交。         

022 Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman but also a man of integrity. Webought the business without an audit, and all of our surprises have been on theplus side. "If you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler" makes sensewhether you are buying the whole business or a tiny diamond.（1989）

Ike Friedman不仅是一个出色的商人，还是一个正直诚信的人。我们未经审计就收购了这家公司（波仙珠宝），之后我们所有的意外都是喜出望外。“如果你不懂珠宝，那你得懂你的珠宝商”，这句话很有道理，不管你买的是整个公司还是一粒小钻石。         

023 It is great fun to be in business with people you have long admired. TheFriedmans, like the Blumkins, have achieved success because they have deservedsuccess.  Both families focus on what ’s right for the customer and that, inevitably, works out well for them, also. We couldn’t have better partners. （1988）

和你钦佩已久的人一起做生意非常有趣。和B夫人家族一样，Friedman家族也取得了成功，因为这是他们应得的成功。两个家族都从顾客角度出发，专注于做对的事情，对他们来说结果不错是必然的。他们是我们最好的合伙人。（注：经营NFM的B夫人家族，和经营波仙珠宝的Friedman家族是一个大家族的两个分支，B夫人的妹夫1948年买下波仙珠宝并将之发展壮大。巴菲特1983年收购的NFM，5年后波仙珠宝也出售了80%股权给巴菲特）         

024 A few days later, Melvyn and I met in New York and made a deal in a single,two-hour session. As was the case with the Blumkins and Bill Child, I had noneed to check leases, work out employment contracts, etc. I knew I was dealingwith a man of integrity and that's what counted. （1997）

几天后，我和梅尔文在纽约见了面，在一次两个小时的会谈中达成了协议。就像和B夫人家族、和比尔打交道收购一样，我不需要查看租约，拟定雇佣合同等等。我知道我在和一个正直诚信的人打交道，这才是最重要的。         

025 Ben Bridge Jeweler was another purchase we made by phone, prior to anyface-to-face meeting between me and the management. Ed Bridge, who with hiscousin, Jon, manages this 65-store West Coast retailer, is a friend of BarnettHelzberg, from whom we bought Helzberg Diamonds in 1995. Upon learning that theBridge family proposed to sell its company, Barnett gave Berkshire a strongrecommendation. Ed then called and explained his business to me, also sendingsome figures, and we made a deal. （2000）

Ben Bridge珠宝公司是我们通过电话进行的另一次收购，我和对方管理层未曾谋面就成交了。Ed Bridge和他的堂兄Jon一起管理着这家拥有65家店铺的西海岸零售商，他是Barnett Helzberg的朋友，我们于1995年从Barnett那里购买了Helzberg钻石公司。得知Bridge家族准备出售其公司后，Barnett给他们强烈推荐了伯克希尔。然后，Ed Bridge打电话给我，描述了他的生意，还发来了一些数据，然后我们成交。 

026 Charlie and I are not big fans of resumes. Instead, we focus on brains, passionand integrity. （2007）

查理和我都不看重简历。相反，我们注重智慧、热情和正直。       

027 Susan came to Barshim’s 25 years ago as a $4-an-hour saleswoman. Though she lacked a managerial background, I did not hesitate to make her CEO in 1994. She’s smart, she loves the business, and she loves her associates. That beats having an MBA degree any time.（2007）

苏珊25年前来到波仙珠宝，做一名时薪4美元的售货员。尽管她没有管理背景，但我在1994年任命她为首席执行官时没有丝毫犹豫。她很聪明，热爱珠宝生意，也热爱她的同事。任何时候这都比只拥有一个MBA学位要好。         

让自己配得上   

028 Our long-avowed goal is to be the “buyer of choice” for businesses – particularly those built and owned by families. The way to achieve this goal is to deserve it. That means we must keep our promises; avoid leveraging up acquired businesses; grant unusual autonomy to our managers; and hold the purchased companies through thick and thin (though we prefer thick and thicker). （2008）

我们长期致力于成为企业的“首选买家”——尤其是那些由家族创立和拥有的企业。实现目标的方法就是让我们自己配得上。这意味着我们必须信守承诺；不去抵押已收购的企业去融资；放权让我们的子公司经理自主经营；长期持有被收购的公司，同甘共苦(尽管我们更愿意同甘和越来越甘)。 

029 Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.  CharlieMunger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves asmanaging partners.  (Because of the size of our shareholdings we also are,for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itselfas the ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view the company asa conduit through which our shareholders own the assets. （1983）

虽然我们的形式是公司，但我们的态度是合伙关系。查理·芒格和我认为我们的股东是所有者合伙人，我们自己是管理合伙人。(由于我们的持股规模，不管怎样，我们也是控股合伙人。)我们不认为公司本身是我们企业资产的最终所有者，而是将公司视为我们股东拥有资产的渠道。 

030 In line with this owner-orientation, our directors are all major shareholdersof Berkshire Hathaway. In the case of at least four of the five, over 50% offamily net worth is represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our owncooking. （1983）

遵循所有者导向，我们的董事都是伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的主要股东。五位董事至少有四个人的家庭净资产的50%以上都是伯克希尔的股票。我们卖烧饼的话，吃自己做的烧饼。（注：巴菲特家族的99%净资产在BRK，芒格家族是90%）         

031 Basically, we want the behavior of our directors to be driven by the effecttheir decisions will have on their family ’s net worth, not by their compensation. That’s the equation for Charlie and me as managers, and we think it’s the right one for Berkshire directors as well.（2002）

基本上，我们希望董事们的行为是由他们的决定对其家庭净资产的影响来驱动的，而不是由他们的薪酬来驱动的。查理和我作为管理者也是如此行事，我们认为这对伯克希尔的董事们同样正确。（注：巴菲特的年薪只有10万美元，网上查询的数据显示：伯克希尔的许多董事2020年的薪酬为1200美元，而标普500指数成份股公司董事的年均薪酬超过25万美元）         

032 This same owner-orientation prevails among our managers. In many cases, theseare people who have sought out Berkshire as an acquirer for a business thatthey and their families have long owned. They came to us with an owner ’s mindset, and we provide an environment that encourages them to retain it.（2010）

这种所有者导向在我们子公司经理中普遍存在。有很多这样的案例，家族长期拥有的企业，愿意选择伯克希尔来收购他们公司。他们带着所有者的理念来找我们，我们提供一个支持他们这种理念的环境。         

033 At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and Iare working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us willbe the ones we send on to you. （2018）

在伯克希尔，我们的观众既不是分析师也不是评论员：查理和我在为我们的股东合伙人工作。我们不做假账，我们呈现给你们的数字就是我们收到的数字。         

034 We do, of course, have an active audit function; no sense being a damned fool.To an unusual degree, however, we trust our managers to run their operationswith a keen sense of stewardship. After all, they were doing exactly thatbefore we acquired their businesses. （2014）

当然，我们有主动审计职能；做个该死的傻瓜毫无意义。然而，我们非同寻常的信任我们子公司经理，他们会当好家，运营好他们的业务。毕竟，在我们收购他们的公司之前，他们就是这么做的。         

035 With only occasional exceptions, furthermore, our trust produces better resultsthan would be achieved by streams of directives, endless reviews and layers ofbureaucracy. Charlie and I try to interact with our managers in a mannerconsistent with what we would wish for, if the positions were reversed. （2014）

此外，除了偶尔的例外，我们的信任比一连串的指令、没完没了的审查和层层官僚机构产生的效果更好。将心比心，如果和子公司经理们换下位置，查理和我希望对方如何对待我们，我们就以同样的方式对待他们。         

036 So, I’ve taken the easy route, just sitting back and working through great managers who run their own shows. My only tasks are to cheer them on, sculpt and harden our corporate culture, and make major capital-allocation decisions. Our managers have returned this trust by working hard and effectively.  （2006）

所以我选择了一条简单的道路，只是坐在后座，和那些表演自己拿手好戏的伟大经理人一起工作。我唯一的任务就是鼓励他们，塑造和强化我们的企业文化，还有做出主要的资本配置决策。我们的经理通过辛勤和有效的工作回报了这种信任。         

遇见你的遇见

037 Here's a story illustrating what Melvyn and Shirley are like: When they toldtheir associates of the sale, they also announced that Star would make large,special payments to those who had helped them succeed -- and then defined that groupas everyone in the business. Under the terms of our deal, it was Melvyn andShirley's money, not ours, that funded this distribution. Charlie and I love itwhen we become partners with people who behave like that. （1997）

这件事可以说明梅尔文和雪莉是什么样的人：当他们告诉他们的同事公司被收购时，他们宣布公司将向那些帮助他们成功的人支付一大笔特殊报酬，然后他们将这个群体定义为公司中的每个人。根据我们的收购协议，是梅尔文和雪莉支付的这笔特别报酬，而不是我们。当我们能够和这样的人成为合伙人的时候，我和查理心花怒放。（注：这是Star家具公司被收购后的故事）  

038 In their typically classy way, the Bridges allocated a substantial portion ofthe proceeds from their sale to the hundreds of co-workers who had helped thecompany achieve its success. We ’re proud to be associated with both the family and the company.（2000）

Bridge家族以他们通常的经典做法，把公司出售收益的相当一部分，分给了帮助公司取得成功的数百名员工。能够与这个家族和这个公司共事，我们非常自豪。（注：这是Ben Bridge珠宝公司被收购后的故事）         

039 The disposition of money unmasks humans. （2022）

对金钱的处置揭示了人性。         

040 In those rare instances in which Murph's personal interests diverged from thoseof shareholders, he unfailingly favored the owners.  When I say that Ilike to be associated with managers whom I would love to have as a sibling,in-law, or trustee of my will, Murph is the exemplar of what I mean. （1995）

在那些墨菲的个人利益与股东利益相背离的情况下，他总是向着股东。当我说我喜欢与那些我希望成为兄弟姐妹、姻亲或我的遗嘱受托人的经理们交往时，墨菲就是我所说的典范。         

041 If Murph should elect to run another business, don't bother to study its value- just buy the stock. （1995）

如果墨菲选择经营另一家企业，不用费心去研究它值多少钱，直接买股票就行。     

042 From the time we first met, Gene shot straight 100% of the time - the onlybehavior pattern he had within him.  At the outset of negotiations, helaid all negative factors face up on the table; on the other hand, for yearsafter the transaction was completed he would tell me periodically of somepreviously undiscussed items of value that had come with our purchase. （1980）

从我们第一次见面开始，Gene就100%的正直坦率，这是他唯一的行事方式。收购谈判一开始，他就把他公司所有的负面因素都摆在桌面上；另一方面，在收购完成后的几年里，他会不时告诉我一些以前没有谈及过的有价值的东西，这些东西在我们收购时就包含了。（注：巴菲特收购Rockford银行，Gene是这家银行的创始人）     

043

Though he was already 71 years of age when he sold us the Bank, Genesubsequently worked harder for us than he had for himself. （1980）

尽管Gene在把银行卖给我们时已经71岁了，但他后来为我们工作得比给他自己工作还辛苦。    

044 Bill then insisted on a truly extraordinary proposition: He would personallybuy the land and build the store -- for about $9 million as it turned out --and would sell it to us at his cost if it proved to be successful. On the otherhand, if sales fell short of his expectations, we could exit the businesswithout paying Bill a cent. This outcome, of course, would leave him with ahuge investment in an empty building. I told him that I appreciated his offerbut felt that if Berkshire was going to get the upside it should also take thedownside. （1999）

比尔坚持一个非同寻常的提议：他个人出资购买土地并建造商店（完工后实际成本约为900万美元），如果证明新店成功，他将以成本价卖给我们。另一方面，如果销售没有达到他的预期，我们可以退出业务，不用支付比尔一分钱。当然，这种结果会让他在一栋空房子里浪费大量资金。我告诉他，我很感谢他的提议，但我觉得，如果伯克希尔想获得好处，就应该也承担坏处。         

045 The store opened last August and immediately became a huge success. Billthereupon turned the property over to us -- including some extra land that hadappreciated significantly -- and we wrote him a check for his cost. And getthis: Bill refused to take a dime of interest on the capital he had tied upover the two years. （1999）

新建商店于去年8月开业，并立即获得巨大成功。于是，比尔把新店资产移交给了我们，其中包括一些已经大幅升值的额外土地。我们给他开了一张支票，支付他的费用。结果：尽管比尔自己垫付了两年的资金，但他却一毛钱的利息都不收。         

046 If a manager has behaved similarly at some other public corporation, I haven'theard about it. You can understand why the opportunity to partner with peoplelike Bill Child causes me to tap dance to work every morning. （1999）

我还从未听说，在其他上市公司有哪位经理有类似的做法。所以你可以理解，为什么拥有和比尔这样的人搭档的机会，会让我每天早上都跳着踢踏舞去上班。         

滚雪球 

047 At both GEICO and Executive Jet, our best source of new customers is the happyones we already have. Indeed, about 65% of our new owners of aircraft come asreferrals from current owners who have fallen in love with the service. （1999） 

在GEICO保险和EJA商务机公司，我们已经拥有的满意客户是我们最好的新客户来源。事实上，我们大约65%的新飞机所有者都是从已经爱上这项服务的现有客户那里推荐来的。 

048 Our acquisitions usually develop in the same way.（1999）

我们的收购通常以同样的方式发展。         

049 Every year in Berkshire ’s annual report I include a description of the kind of business that we would like to buy.  This "ad" paid off in 1986. （1986）

每年在伯克希尔的年度报告中，我都会描述我们希望收购的企业类型。这个“广告”在1986年得到了回报。         

050 At Berkshire, our carefully-crafted acquisition strategy is simply to wait forthe phone to ring. Happily, it sometimes does so, usually because a manager whosold to us earlier has recommended to a friend that he think about followingsuit.（1999）

在伯克希尔，我们精心制定的收购策略就是等待电话铃响。令人高兴的是，真的有人会打来电话出售公司，通常对方是之前我们所收购的某家公司经理的朋友，他也想卖出自己公司，而那位经理推荐他找我们。         

051 Our acquisition technique at Berkshire is simplicity itself: We answer thephone. I’m also glad to report that it rings a bit more often now, because owners and/or managers increasingly wish to join their companies with Berkshire. （2000）

我们在伯克希尔的收购技巧很简单：我们接电话。我也很高兴地告诉大家，现在铃声响得更频繁一点了，因为所有者和/或管理者越来越希望他们的公司能够加入伯克希尔大家庭。         

052 Flushed with success, we repeat our ad. If you have a business that fits, callme or, preferably, write. （1986）

带着成功的兴奋，我们重播下我们的广告。如果你有合适的企业，打电话给我，或者最好写信。   

053 We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom wehave done business in the past. （1986）

我们邀请有可能的卖家，可以通过问询我们过去收购的卖家来了解我们。     

054 For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home. （1986）

对于合适的企业和合适的人，我们可以提供一个很好的归宿。    

后记感悟：
1、复利不仅仅存在于投资中，生活中处处有体现。
2、人每天所做的事，或许既是销售，也是投资。