20-0411期
Open standards, not sanctions, are America’s best weapon against Huawei
放开标准，而非制裁，是对付华为最好的武器。
TECHNOLOGY IS POWER. Whoever controls the global digital infrastructure controls the world. That is why America is so worried about China’s rise as a technological superpower. It also explains why it is going to such lengths, even using European-style industrial policy, to rein in Huawei, China’s leading maker of telecoms equipment. The company leads the world in 5G, the next generation of mobile networks, which are expected to become the central nervous system of the global economy.
科技就是力量。得数字基站者，得天下。这是米国担心兔子崛起成为技术超级大国的原因。同时也解释了为何米国不余遗力地遏制华为——兔子电信设备制造的领头羊，甚至采用欧洲的工业标准。华为在5G领域引领世界，即下一代移动网络，它将有望成为世界经济的中枢神经。
Yet by any measure America is losing the fight against Huawei, along with what President Donald Trump, steeped in zero-sum thinking, calls the “race to 5G”. The Chinese firm keeps on growing; the rollout of 5G in China continues apace; and most of America’s allies have so far ignored its entreaties to ban Huawei gear entirely from their national 5G networks on security grounds. Even so, the Trump administration seems intent on doubling down on its strategy. If hawks have their way, any chipmaker that uses American technology, which nearly all do, will soon have to ask for permission in Washington, DC, to sell its wares to Huawei.
然而无论采取怎样的措施，米国都将在对抗华为的竞争中败北。秉承Donald Trump零和博弈的思维，称其称之为“5G竞赛”。而兔子的公司竿头直上，5G的推广也在加速。基于国家5G安全的理由，目前为止，米国大部分的同盟惘顾其禁止华为的请求。即使如此，Trump的行政机构似乎想加倍贯彻其政策。如果鹰派得逞，几乎所有的公司都将如此：任何使用米国技术的芯片制造商，将必须向Washington, DC申请许可才能向华为供货。
The problem with America’s strategy is that it is trying to win today’s “tech cold war”, as some call it, with yesterday’s arsenal. In effect it is trying to build an impenetrable wall around Huawei by any means necessary. This is a fool’s errand in a hyper-connected world in which technology and talent can flow freely. It only provides extra incentives for Huawei—and China—to become technologically self-sufficient. If America wants to win the race to 5G and, more generally, the battle for digital supremacy, it needs a new approach. Happily, the country’s own technology industry points the way: it has thrived on openness, software and a healthy balance of competition and co-operation. And that approach is at last now being applied in telecoms.
米国的策略，企图用过去的军事力量赢得今日人们所言的“科技冷战”。事实上，他不惜一切代价在华为周围筑起了柏林墙。这是一个愚蠢的行径，在一个无限连通的世界里，技术和人才可以自由流动。它只会给华为一个额外刺激——以及兔子——使得技术自给自足。如果米国想要在赢得这场5G竞赛，更一般的说法，信息霸权战争，他需要一个新的策略。幸运的是，N自己的科技产业指出了明路：它兴盛于其开放理念，软件，竞争与合作的良性平衡。这样的策略最终将在电信行业得以实践。
Mobile networks, long dominated by specialised hardware, are becoming defined by software. On April 8th Rakuten, a Japanese online giant, launched the world’s first fully “virtualised” mobile network, built using general-purpose hardware and lots of software (see article). Other mobile carriers will follow suit. Such networks would go a long way towards dealing with America’s concern about Huawei: that using the firm’s gear in 5G networks could let the Chinese government intercept data or sabotage rival economies.
移动网络，长期以来被专门化的硬件控制，现在正在被软件定义。4月8日，日本的网络巨头Rakuten[1]，发布了世界上第一个完全虚拟化的移动网络，使用非专门化的硬件以及一些软件搭建。其他的运营商也将效仿他。米国对华为的担忧：使用该公司的5G设备将使X拦截数据或者破坏竞争对手的经济，该网络应对这个问题将大有裨益。
Virtualised networks need not rely on one vendor, but can be built with components from many, allowing carriers to pick and choose—and, if necessary, to steer clear of those made in China. They also create an opening for American tech firms, which play only a small role in the mobile-telecoms networks of today. (Many of the components of Rakuten’s network are made in America.) Moreover, such networks are cheaper to develop, make and maintain than conventional ones, because they are made mostly from off-the-shelf hardware, controlled by software—doing away with the argument of many mobile operators, that banning Huawei would force them to buy more expensive kit from Ericsson and Nokia, its main competitors.
虚拟化网络不再需要一个供应商，但却需要更多的组件，这让供应商可以进行挑选——如果必要的话，可以避开Emm。今天仅承担小份额的米国电信网络，这样做为其打开了缺口。（Rakuten许多的组件都来自米国。）此外，较传统网络而言，因其大多数由现成的硬件组成并由软件控制，故虚拟化网络开发、搭建和维护也更低廉——同时消除了移动经营商们的争论，禁止华为将迫使他们从Ericsson 和 Nokia购买更加昂贵的设备，这些是华为的主要竞争对手。
Admittedly, virtualised networks will not solve all security problems, and the underlying standard, called OpenRAN, is not yet mature. But it is early days for all 5G networks. It will take years to roll them out fully and the covid-19 crisis has done nothing to speed up the process. So there is time.
诚然，虚拟化网络无法解决所有的安全问题，其底层标准，即所谓的OpenRAN至今还不成熟。但它是所有5G网络的早期阶段。其完全铺开需要数年时间，C19危机对其进程没有任何帮助。因此还需要一些时间。
The Trump administration and other governments should do all they can to accelerate the development of virtualised networks by subsidising research and perhaps even mandating the use of technical standards that allow mobile networks to be virtualised. All this may sound far-fetched at a time when America’s government appears stuck in the past and incapable of coming up with a coherent strategy. But as in many other domains, covid-19 creates room for new thinking. America will either pursue a tech cold war with an uncertain outcome, or help create an industry of the kind that American tech firms understand and have thrived in—letting Chinese companies join in only if they follow the rules. Sometimes establishing a robust, safe technology is not about concentrating power so much as diffusing it. ■
Trump的行Z机构和其他G部门应竭尽所能，通过投入资金研究，甚至授权移动虚拟化网络技术标准的使用，从而加速虚拟网络的开发。是时米国似乎正陷入过去，以及无法提出一个一致的战略，这一切看上去就会很牵强。但在其他领域，X为新的思考创造了空间。米国既不会为一个不确定的结果寻求一场科技冷战，也不会帮助那些米国公司已经取得成果的公司和夕阳产业——让兔子公司加入，只要他们遵守规则。与其说安全而稳定的技术是集中力量，不如说是分散力量。
-
乐天株式会社（Rakuten)，是日本最大电子商店街“乐天市场”经营者，2006年使用者超过1800万人，此外也经营“Infoseek”等许多不同业务的网站。 ↩
