英文早读第33篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
July 6, 1962
巴菲特合伙公司
基伟特广场810室
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市31区
1962年7月6日
A Reminder
一个回顾
In my letter of January 24, 1962 reporting on 1961, I inserted a section entitled. "And a Prediction." While I have no desire to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon my readers, nevertheless, a reprinting of that section, in its entirely, may be worthwile:
在1962年1月24日报告1961年的信中，我插入了一段名为“一个预测”的部分。尽管我不想对我的读者造成残酷和不同寻常的惩罚，然而，把那段完整的重新写一遍是值得的：
And a Prediction
一个预测
Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shield away and I still do in the normal sense.
长期读者（我或许在自卖自夸）会有感觉当我开始谈到预测时就脱轨了。这是一件我一直避免的事情，我会继续基于尝试做事。
I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.
我当然不会去预测一般的商业或者股市在下一年或者两年将会怎样，因为我对此没有任何想法。
I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.
我认为你可以相当确定在接下来10年，有一些年份大盘会涨20%或者25%，有一些年份同样比例下降，大部分年份介于两者之间。关于这些发生的次序我没有主意，我也不认为这对长期投资者很重要。
Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.
在任何长期的一段时间，我认为有可能道琼斯指数会产生年化复合5%到7%的增长，包括股息和市值增长合在一起。尽管有最近这些年的经历，任何人期望会比大盘明显领先可能都会面临失望。
Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varing degrees of enthusiasm. It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.
我们的工作是年复一年的累计优于道琼斯指数的表现，而不用过多担心在某一年的绝对值是正还是负。我会考虑我们下降15%而道琼斯指数下降25%的年份会比我们的合伙基金和道琼斯指数都增长20%的年份要好得多。我已经在和合伙人谈论时强调了这一点，并且看到了他们伴随着不同程度的兴奋而点头赞成。对我来说最重要的是充分理解我在这一方面的推论并同意我，不仅是在你的理智范畴，同时需要降低你的胃口预期。
For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.
根据我的运作方法的概述，我们相较于道琼斯指数最好的年份似乎是下降的或持稳的市场。因此，我们需求的优势可能会有巨大的差异。有一些年份会让我们被道琼斯指数超越，但是如果长期来看，我们可以平均优于道琼斯指数10个百分点，我会对这个结果满意。
Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occuring one year in the next ten--no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.
具体来说，如果市场一年下降35%或者40%（我认为这会大概率在接下来10年的某一年发生——没有人知道哪一年），我们应当下降15%或者20%。如果这年基本没有变化，我们会希望增长大约10个百分点。如果道琼斯指数增长20%或者更多，我们将会艰难的去增长同样多。这个在这么长时间年份表现的推论意味着如果道琼斯指数年化复合净值增长5%到7%，我希望我们的结果会是每年15%到17%。
The above expections may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happend in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won't all be!
上面这些预测或许听起来有点粗糙，他们没有问题但他们或许到1965年或者1970年回顾收益点数时才更清晰。它或许结果证明我完全错了。然而，我认为合伙人应该有权知道我在这一领域正在思考的东西尽管商业的真谛可能最终导致了我这些预测的高概率错误。在任何一年，差异似乎都很大。这在1961年发生了，但是幸运的是，这个差异时令人开心的一面。他们不会都是！
The First Half of 1962:
1962年上半年度：
Between yearend 1961 and June 30, 1962 the Dow declined from 731.14 to 561.28. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 11.00 would have been received so that overall a loss of 21.7% would have been the result of investing in the Dow. For the statistical minded, Appendix A gives the results of the Dow by years since formation of the predecessor partnerships.
在1961年底到1962年6月30日，道琼斯指数从731.14下降到561.28。如果一个人在这期间持有道琼斯指数，收到股息大约在11美金，因此整体投资道琼斯指数的结果是损失21.7%。为了统计意图，附录A按年份给出了道琼斯指数的结果，从前期合伙基金成立开始。
As stated above, a declining Dow gives us our chance to shine and pile up the percentage advantages which, coupled with only an average performance during advancing markets, will give us quite satisfactory long-term results. Our target is an approximately 1/2% decline for each 1% decline in the Dow and if achieved, means we have a considerably more conservative vehicle for investment in stocks than practically any alternative.
像上面表述的，下降的道琼斯指数给了我们机会去闪光并堆积百分点数领先，而在上涨的市场仅有平均的表现水平，会给我们相当满意的长期投资结果。我们的目标是道琼斯指数每下降1%，我们大于下降0.5%，如果实现了，意味着我们拥有了一辆比实际上任何其他在股市的投资的选择都相当更加保守。
As outlined in Appendix B, showing combined predecessor partnership results, during the first half of 1962 we had one of the best periods in our history, achieving a minus 7.5% result before payments to partners, compared to the minus 21.7% overall result on the Dow. This 14.2 percentage points advantage can be expected to widen during the second half if the decline in the general market continues, but will probably narrow should the market turn upward. Please keep in mind my continuing admonition that six-months' or even one-year's results are not to be taken too seriously. Short periods of measurement exaggerate chance fluctuation in performance. While circumstances contributed to an unusually good first half, there are bound to be periods when we do relatively poorly. The figures for our performance involve no change in the valuation of our controlling interest in Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company, although developments in recent months point toward a probable higher realization.
像附录B中概述的，结合前期合伙基金结果一起展现，在1962年的上半年我们收获了历史上最好的时期之一，在支付给合伙人费用前实现了-7.5%收益，相比于道琼斯指数-21.7%的结果。这14.2个百分点领先优势预期下半年会扩大如果大盘下跌继续的话，但是也有可能缩窄如果市场反转上涨。请记住我一直告诫的六个月或一年的结果不要太当真。短期评判会夸大表现中的机遇波动。尽管环境导致了上半年不同寻常的优秀，也一定会有一些我们做的相对差的时期。我们表现的数据中在邓普斯特磨机制造公司的控股股份的估值没有变化，尽管最近几个月的发展表明可能更高的变卖价格。
1.reminder：引起回忆的事物；提醒；（告知该做某事的）通知单；提示信
2.inflict：使遭受打击；使吃苦头
3.nevertheless：然而；不过；尽管如此
4.entirety：整体；全部；全体；整体性
5.formation：形成；组成；编队；队形
6.predecessor：前任；原先的东西；替代的事物
7.practically：几乎；差不多；实际地；很接近
8.alternative：可供替代的；非传统的；另类的；可供选择的事物
9.admonition：告诫；警告
10.exaggerate：夸大；夸张；言过其实
11.fluctuation：波动；起伏；涨跌
12.circumstance：环境；条件；状况；境况；境遇；经济状况；命运；客观环境
13.be bound to：注定；一定要；决心
