The introduction of this conception of “universal estate” into the scheme shows how much Hegel was continuing to grapple with his hometown background in light of developments since the Revolution.  The distinguishing characteristic of the universal estate is precisely that its members are not tied to particularistic hometown life. The merchant, the peasant, and, the local tradesmen (the people who are not Geschdftmdnner but do engage in local trade, Gewerbe) are deeply tied to local custom and local privilege and can only form their opinions on the basis of that local custom and privilege. The members of the universal estate, however, are those whose talents and occupations do not bind them to any particular community but to the “people” as a whole and who are therefore most suited to reworking the implicit universal principles of the “people” into explicit form. The other estates are too particularistic to be able to generalize; and, of course, philosophers working for universities (state-sponsored institutions) are members of the “universal estate.”

    引入“普通等级”这一概念，表明黑格尔正在根据自法国大革命以来的事件发展来继续努力克服他头脑中的家乡背景。普通等级的显著特征恰恰是它的成员不受特殊恩宠论家乡生活的束缚。商人、农民和地方店主（地方店主属于某些不属于商人而确实在地方做生意的人们）深受地方风俗习惯和地方特权的束缚，并且只能够基于地方风俗习惯和特权从而形成他们的意见。然而，普通等级的成员属于这样一些人，他们的才干和职业大体上使他们不隶属于任何具体的共同体，而使他们属于“人民”范畴，他们因此最适合去重新使“人民”内隐的普遍原则变成外显的形式。其余等级过于特殊恩宠论，以致不可能对事物作出推断；毋庸置疑，那些为大学（国家资助的社会机构）工作的哲学家当属“普通等级”的成员之列。

The universal estate is thus identified with the people whose “stance” in life is that of “universality,” that is, whose knowledge and interests are not tied to particular communities. In Hegel’s own lifetime, he had witnessed a new and highly visible group come into being - that of the mobile government advisors, government ministers, and the new style of professors - which had brought along with it great tensions into German life. The reformers, of which Hegel was one, wanted to bring rationality and legal uniformity to German life and, naturally enough, they were often met with the entrenched hostility of local custom and privilege. As Hegel himself had witnessed, the result up to that point had been that reform was carried out at either the most general level, leaving local privilege untouched (in other words, no real reform at all); or efforts at reform came into direct conflict with local custom and privilege, and reform generally had to yield. Indeed, the sheer diversity and eccentricity of local custom and privilege and the absolute determination of the locals not to yield had made the issue of “reform” one of the flashpoints in Germany during the period that Hegel was lecturing.

    普通等级从而被等同于人民，它的“生活态度”就是“大学”的生活态度，也就是说，普通等级的知识和兴趣不局限于某些特殊的共同体。在黑格尔自己的一生中，他亲眼目睹了一个新的、极为引人注目的群体的问世——走马灯似的政府顾问、官方牧师和新型的教授——他们这三类人连同这个新问世的群体给德国人生活带来了巨大的张力。改革者们，黑格尔作为其中一员，想要恢复德国生活的合理性和合法的统一性，极其自然地，他们经常遭到秉持地方风俗习惯和特权的敌对势力的围攻。像黑格尔本人亲眼目睹的，上述情况在一定程度上带来的结果是：改革要么在最一般层面上进行，不触及地方特权（换句话说，根本不是真正的改革）；要么改革派的努力直接与地方风俗习惯和特权相冲突，改革通常不得不屈服于地方势力。实际上，形形色色、千奇百怪的地方习惯与特权和那绝不逆来顺受的当地居民的顽固性使得“改革”问题成为在黑格尔讲课阶段德意志的民怨爆发点之一。

The alternatives thus seemed to be either yielding to localism and forgoing reform; or adopting liberal, individualistic principles and riding roughshod over the locals, which was met with only the greatest hostility by the locals themselves. Hegel obviously wanted neither of these: he wanted to preserve some of the mediated nature of the hometowns while at the same time pushing centralizing reform onto them. He thought that “liberalism,” as a doctrine of sheer individualism, was completely inadequate to this task, since it was incapable of capturing the necessary background predeliberative norms of a “people” without which any deliberation about the future of “Germany” would only result in sterile speculation, not in anything actual.

    因此，德国人可选择的似乎是：要么屈服于地方风俗习惯从而放弃改革；要么采纳自由主义的个人主义原则从而对地方风俗习惯不理不睬，这只会招致地方习惯势力极大的敌视。黑格尔显然两者都不想要：他既要保持家乡人的某些折中秉性，同时又要使家乡人脱胎换骨。他认为“自由主义”，作为一种纯个人主义理论，完全不适合用来完成这一任务，因为它不可能捕捉到“人民”前审慎规范所必需的背景，若无这些规范，则任何关于“德意志”未来的考虑都仅仅总会导致毫无结果的思考，而绝不会产生任何实际的东西。

In this respect, Hegel was responding to his own time and in some sense even mirroring it. Only since the Revolution — indeed, really only since 1800 - had there opened up for a wider class of young men (roughly of his generation) a way of life that was not tied to the hometowns. In Hegel’s case, this new, more modern form of life, on which he had set his sights as a teenager in Stuttgart, had its legitimating ideal in the concept of Bildung, that is, of “education, culture, and self-cultivation.” The young men of Bildung saw themselves as free from the strictures of hometown life, as having a right to be “somebody” by virtue of their cultivated characters, not by virtue of their birth. As the “movers and doers” of German society, cosmopolitans who were not tied to any particular hometown, they were in direct conflict with the structures of the hometowns and usually understood themselves to be in conflict with them.

    在这方面，黑格尔对他自己的时代作出了回应，从某种意义上说，他甚至在反映着他自己的时代。仅仅自法国大革命以来——更确切地说，确实仅仅自1800年以来——才已经为更加广泛的受过教育的青年人这个阶层（大体上为黑格尔这代人）打开了那不被家乡背景约束的生活方式大门。在黑格尔列举的事例中，这种新的、更为现代的生活形式，根据他在斯图加特时作为十几岁少年对这种生活形式所持有的看法，具有它在教养这一概念方面的合法化理想，也就是说，具有它在“教育、文化和自我修养”这些概念方面的合法化理想。有教养的年轻人认为他们自己摆脱了家乡生活的束缚，认为他们自己有权做“名人”，凭借的是他们自己的有教养的品格而非凭借他们的出身门第。作为德国社会中的“行动者和实干家”，作为不受家乡任何特殊东西束缚的世界主义者，有教养的年轻人与家乡机构是直接相冲突的，并通常把他们自己理解成是与家乡机构直接相冲突的。

In speaking of the “universal estate” as “those who work for the state,” Hegel also seemed to be coming to terms with his father’s generation; Hegel’s father had been a cameralist bureaucrat in Duke Karl Eugen’s administration and had thus been a member of what Hegel had now taken to calling the “universal estate,” namely, those trying to bring rationality and order to hometown life. Thus the experience of his own family in old Wiirttemberg had left deeply ingrained in his own experience the model of a class of educated, cultivated individuals whose function was to bring order and rationality to society and whose claim to legitimacy rested on their educational credentials and not on being any part of the aristocracy - the Wiirttemberg aristocracy, after all, played no role in the Wiirttemberg parliament, the Landtag}'^^

    在提及“那些为国家工作的人们”所属于的普通等级时，黑格尔同时似乎与他父亲那代人达成了思想上的妥协；黑格尔的父亲是卡尔·欧根公爵属下的财政官员，因此成了黑格尔现在称作的“普通等级”中的一员，也即成了那些试图恢复乡村生活合理性和秩序的人中的一员。因此，黑格尔自己在古符腾堡家庭中的经历，早已把受过教育的有教养的个体阶层思维模式，深深地印在他的经验中，这样的个体起的作用必定是恢复社会的秩序和合理性，他们的合法主张依赖于他们的教育文凭而非依赖于贵族门第的任何内容——符腾堡贵族毕竟在符腾堡议会（ **Landtag** ）中已经不扮演任何角色。

In developing his ideas about the “universal estate,” Hegel was clearly trying to come to terms with and combine two very different features of his own personal experience: the universalism of his upbringing - of his father as a member of the universal estate, entitled to his position because of his diploma in law from Tiibingen - and the particularism of hometown life, something whose value and emotional pull he obviously also deeply felt. This refusal to give up either his Enlightenment-inspired universalism or his deeply felt particularism sharply distinguished Hegel from a number of other thinkers working within the old Holy Roman Empire at that time. It obviously distinguished him from all those who continued to argue for Enlightenment universalism and for the simple abolition of traditional hometown privileges. However, it also distinguished him from the German “counter- Enlightenment,” which by and large tended to argue in the opposite way - against universalistic. Enlightenment “reason” in favor of particularistic feeling and communal tradition.

    在阐述他关于“普通等级”的想法时，黑格尔显然在试图调和他自己的个人经历中两个截然不同的特点，并试图使这两个截然不同的特点融为一体：他教育上的普救论——他那作为普通等级中一员的父亲的普救论，父亲有资格获得他的职位是因为他有图宾根大学的法律文凭——和家乡生活中的特殊恩宠论，这种同样也明显被他深深感受到其价值和情感吸引力的东西。要么拒绝放弃他被启蒙运动唤起的普救论，要么拒绝放弃他深深感受到的特殊恩宠论，这种二选一的做法明显使黑格尔区别于一些当时供职于过时的神圣罗马帝国的其他思想家。这种做法显然使他区别于一切继续主张启蒙运动普救论和主张简单地消灭家乡传统特权的人们。然而，这种做法同样也使他区别于德国“反启蒙运动思想家们”，这批思想家大体上倾向于反其道而行之——反对普救论的启蒙运动“理性”而赞成特殊恩宠论看法和共同的传统。

The particularistic pull of the hometowns colored the thought of many such people, and found its most forceful expressions in the writings of the irrationalist Johann Georg Hamann and the always eloquent F. H. Jacobi; both attacked the Enlightenment’s ideal of a universalistic reason as standing for all that was “dead” and “mechanical” in opposition to what was “living” and “organic.” In making such arguments, both Hamann and Jacobi were in effect intellectually playing out on a larger scale the encounter of the hometowners of the Holy Roman Empire with the forces of reform and rationalization of which Hegel’s family had been partially representative. Thus, when Hamann and Jacobi tended to make claims to the effect that only the particular was real, they were also in effect endorsing the immediate experience of German hometownness against the claims made by the “universal estate,” which itself was only gradually making its appearance.

    家乡特殊恩宠论的吸引力影响着上述很多人思想，并极其有力地表现在非理性主义者约翰·格奥尔格·哈曼的著作和一直以雄辩著称的F.H.雅科比的著作中；哈曼和雅科比两人攻击启蒙运动思想家普救论理性的理想，抨击这种理性理想代表一切与“活的东西”和“有机的东西”对立的“死的东西”和“机械的东西”。在作出这些论证过程中，哈曼和雅科比两人实质上都在知识上大量展现了神圣罗马帝国的家乡人与黑格尔家庭部分地代表着的改革与理性化力量的冲突。因此，当哈曼和雅科比倾向于作出大意是“只有具体才是真实东西”的主张时，他们实质上同样也在赞同德国人家乡的直接经验，而反对由“普通等级”作出的主张，“普通等级”本身只不过是逐渐地粉墨登场而已。

Indeed, hometown life was for many essentially bound up with the very idea of leading an ethical life at all; the corporate structure of hometown life made it necessary for members of each corporation to provide for each other’s needs, and thus for such people the policing of other people’s ethics - how responsible they were, whether they generated illegitimate children for which the corporation would then have an obligation to provide sustenance, and so on - was intimately connected with the economics of hometown life. This was complicated by the fact not only that the reformers wished to limit or abolish the traditional privileges of the hometowns in the name of “reason,” but also that many in the French and British Enlightenment had attacked religion itself in the name of “reason.” The conflation of “reason” with both “reform” and an attack on religion only made the confrontation between “hometown” life and rational reform all the more combustible. In combining particularism with the defense of religion, Hamann and Jacobi in effect identified the continuance of hometown life with the continued survival of religion and morality itself They helped make the idea plausible that the so-called reformers were calling not merely for a more efficient administration of the state but in effect for a wholesale abolition of all that was true and beautiful.For Hegel, the “either-or” of both “reform or hometown life” and “universalistic reason or particularistic feeling” had to be overcome, and he set out to bring the two together in his thought. He still, however, saw no means to bring about this transition except through the intervention of some “Theseus” who would, somehow, insure that it all happened.

    更确切地说，家乡生活对很多人来说本质上和完全过一种合乎道德的生活这一特有的观念有着密切的联系；家乡生活的社团机构使每个社团成员必需满足彼此的需求；所以对这样的人们来说，别人的伦理方针——他们是多么负责任，他们是不是生出非婚生子女，对这些非婚生子女社团继而是不是将有义务提供生活资料等——是与家乡生活经济情况密切相关的。上述这种情况事实上是极为复杂的，不仅是因为其时德国改革者们希望以“理性”名义限制或消灭家乡的传统特权，而且是因为法国和英国很多启蒙运动思想家早就以“理性”名义抨击宗教本身。“理性”加上“改革”和对宗教的抨击只不过使得“家乡”生活与合理改革之间的冲突变得更加一触即发而已。在把特殊恩宠论与对宗教的辩护融为一体过程中，哈曼和雅科比两人实际上都认为家乡生活的继续就是宗教与道德本身的继续存在。他们两人有助于使得下列的这一看法变得貌似有理：所谓的改革者不但在要求更加有效地管理德国，而且实质上还要求彻底消灭一切作为真的和美的东西。“对于黑格尔来说，“要么进行改革要么过着家乡生活”和“要么保留普救论理性要么保留特殊恩宠论感情”这样的“非此即彼的选择”必将被加以克服，他着手在他思想中使得这两个方面融为一体。可是，他依然没有看出有什么手段能造成这种过渡，除了通过某个“武修斯”的介入外，因为“武修斯”将以某种方式来确保这样的过渡完全发生。

In response to the obvious danger of such a “Theseus transforming himself into a tyrant, in his lectures Hegel offered the French Revolution as an example of “tyranny” transforming itself into a “rule of law.”2'5 Although “tyrants” often appear in the early stages of revolutions, once the revolution’s goals have been securely anchored in institutional practice, the need for such tyranny vanishes and so does the hold that the “great man” has on the “people.” Thus, in Hegel’s 1806 analysis, as the Revolution was under attack by the coalition of counterrevolutionary (German) forces, the Jacobins were able to hold onto power and institute the Terror in order to secure the Revolution; but once it was clear that the Revolution had been secured - once French troops had proved themselves to be the masters of Europe in virtually all their campaigns - there was no longer any need for the Terror, and in 1794 Robespierre and the Jacobins were therefore overthrown. As Hegel put it in his lecture notes, “[Robespierre’s] power left him because necessity had left him, and thus he was overthrown by force.  The implication is that by 1805-1806 Hegel had come to agree with the assessment of the French Council of State in 1800 that “we have finished the novel of the Revolution: now we must begin its history.”^” From his standpoint in Jena, it seemed as if the excesses of the Revolution were over, that the Revolution itself was secure - who, after all, was capable of taking on the seemingly invincible French army.? - and that the only outstanding issue had to do with what would become of “Germany.” (Hegel’s own account of the French Revolution as “absolute freedom and terror” in the Phenomenology! - an account often taken as a negative assessment of the Revolution but which appeared in the book he was writing as he gave those lectures - has to be considered in light of what he was saying in public at the time.)

    在对这样一个把自己变成暴君的“武修斯”明显的危险作出回应时，在他讲课的过程中，黑格尔列举法国大革命作为把自己变成“法制”的“暴政”的例子。尽管“暴君”常常出现在革命的早期阶段，一旦革命的目标已经被牢牢固定在公共机构实践中，就不复需要这样的暴政了，也就不复需要“大人物”对“人民”的掌控了。这样一来，在黑格尔的1806年分析中，当法国大革命受到反革命（德国）武装联盟攻击的时候，雅各宾党人能够继续执政并实行革命恐怖以便保护法国大革命；但是一旦十分清楚的是法国大革命已得到保护——一旦法军实际上用他们的所有战役证明了他们自己成了欧洲的主人——就不复需要任何这样的革命恐怖了，1794年罗伯斯比尔和雅各宾党人政权从而被推翻。像黑格尔在他讲稿中论述的，“[罗伯斯比尔]政权之所以垮台是因为它已没有什么存在的必要了，因此他被暴力推翻。”这就意味着到1805至1806年黑格尔就已逐渐赞同1800年法国国家委员会的评价，也即“我们已经写完了法国大革命这部小说：现在我们必须开创它的历史。”从他耶拿时期观点看，看来好像法国大革命的暴行已经结束，看来好像法国大革命本身是无危险的——终究谁能够接受表面上不可战胜的法军的挑战呢？看来好像唯一突出的问题与“德意志”将会有何种遭遇有关？（黑格尔自己在他《精神现象学》中对法国大革命作出“绝对自由和恐怖”的释述——一种通常被看作对法国大革命的否定评价的释述，而这种释述出现在他当时边上课边撰写的《精神现象学》这本书中——必须被根据他在当时公开场合所说的东西加以思考。）

Political reorganization in the style of the French, however, would not be enough. There must be an articulation by the “universal estate” of what ultimately matters to the community if such political action in Germany were not to descend into the kind of anarchy and terror practiced in France. For that, something other than a purely political practice is needed, and Hegel identified those practices in the manuscript as “art, religion, and science {Wissenschaft) ,” whose goal must be “to self-knowingly create this content as such.”^'®

    然而，按照法国人风格进行的政治改组总是带有不完美的成分。必须借助“普通等级”来系统论述最终对特定共同体至关重要的东西，如果德意志这样的政治行动要想不沦为一种出现在法国的无政府状态和恐怖的话。出于这样的考虑，这种东西是必不可少的，而一种纯政治实践不是必不可少的，黑格尔在有关手稿中也认为那些实践是“艺术、宗教和科学（ **Wissenschaft** ）”，它们的目标必须在于“自知式地创造内容本身”。

Art does this by creating the “illusion” of a self-enclosed world of beauty; in this way, art appeals to a “people’s” highest interests, in what is “infinite,” through its creation of a beautiful “veil, that covers the truth.Art can thus present only a beautiful, dreamlike illusion about its self-contained nature.

    艺术凭借创造美的自我封闭世界的“错觉”从而进行上述这样的创造；以这种方式，艺术诉诸于“人民的”最高利益，正是由于作为“无限”的东西，通过艺术对美的“面纱的创造”，从而掩蔽艺术的真理。“艺术因此只能描述它独立自足秉性的美丽的梦幻般的错觉。

A better likeness of the true nature of “spirit” is found in religion.  In what Hegel calls “absolute religion” (by which he meant Protestant Christianity reinterpreted in the terms of modern, speculative philosophy), what ultimately matters in human life is brought to full selfconsciousness: In his words, “The absolute religion, however, is the depth brought to daylight,” and, as he puts it, “This depth is the I, it is the concept, the absolute pure power.Thus, in “absolute religion” one has the representation in rite and symbol of the idea that “the divine nature is none other than human nature,”^^' that “God, the absolute essence in the beyond, has become man,”^^^ that “God is the self, God is man.”^^^ Still, although “absolute religion” can assure a people of this, it cannot demonstrate it; it can only reveal this to us without “insight.”

    一个关于“精神”真秉性的较好相似物见于宗教中。在黑格尔称作的“绝对宗教”（凭借“绝对宗教”，他意味着新教应该被按照现代思辨哲学加以重新解释）中，最终对人类生活至关重要的东西常常被归于充分的自我意识：用他的话说，“然而，绝对宗教是被揭露的深奥的东西”，像他说道的，“这深奥的东西是自我，它是特定的概念，绝对纯粹的力量。”因此，在“绝对宗教”里，一个人以仪式和象征来表示下列的想法：“神性只是人性”，“上帝，彼岸的绝对本质，变成了人”，“上帝是自我，上帝是人”。然而，虽然“绝对宗教”使人确信上述想法，但它却不可能证明上述想法；“绝对宗教”只能够向我们显露上述想法而不具有任何“洞见”。

For such “insight,” one requires philosophy, the “absolute science {Wissenschaft).^’’^^'^ Philosophy does fully what art and religion can do only partially; it thus completes the task of self-knowing that art and religion begin: bringing to self-consciousness not merely what matters to a particular “people” but what ultimately matters to mankind in general - that is, what “spirit” really is. As such, it divides itself into two parts: speculative philosophy and philosophy of nature. It begins in immediate consciousness of the world, and it culminates in spirit’s knowing itself as free.

    为得到这种“洞见”，一个人需要哲学。“绝对科学（ **Wissenschaft** ）——哲学完全起到艺术和宗教只能部分地起到的作用；它从而完成了艺术和宗教着手去完成的自知任务：带给自我意识的不仅是对一个特定“民族”至关重要的东西，而且最终对整个人类至关重要的东西——就是说，“精神”真正地所是的东西。就这点而论，哲学把它自己划分成两个部分：思辨哲学与自然哲学。哲学始于世界的直接意识，而哲学以精神认识到它自己是自由的告终。

Despite their rather telegraphic, fragmented form, these lecture notes end in such a way as to make it clear that Hegel had in his own mind come to some resolution regarding the shape his system was to assume.  There would be an introduction, a way of guiding the reader into philosophy, which would, of course, begin with “immediate sensuous consciousness.It would then proceed to the way in which we must make judgments about nature - to the “expression of the Idea in the shapes of immediate being”^^*^ - and would be followed by a treatment of spirit as shaping itself into a “people.” It would then culminate with a section on philosophy’s reflection on its role in the whole process, on how it makes fully explicit what had been only implicit in all the divisions that had preceded it. Philosophy’s task would thereby be to articulate the “whole” in terms of which we must situate ourselves and in terms of which we must orient ourselves in order to make the judgments that we must make.

    尽管它们采取了颇为简短的、断断续续的形式，这批讲稿仍然以这样的一种方式结束，这种方式表明黑格尔在他自己的心目中已经有了他体系必将采取形式的某种解决办法。应该有个导言作为引导读者进入哲学的路径，导言当然将从“直接的感性意识”开始。“直接的感性意识”接着将进入我们必须借以作出自然判断的方面——进入“以直接存在形式表现的观念”——随后将论述精神使它自己成为具体化的“人民”。这样的论述于是将随着哲学对下列内容的反思这一部分而达到顶点：哲学在整个过程中的角色，哲学怎样充分地彰显仅仅早就内隐于已经处在它之前的所有部分中的东西。哲学的任务从而将应该依据我们必须借以使我们自己安身立命的东西、依据我们必须借以定位我们自己以作出我们必须作出判断的东西来系统阐述“整体”。

Hegel at first seemed to think that this only required some minor adjustments to the “system” that he had worked out in 1805-06, and that it would serve as a good introduction to that “system.” Having done the introduction, he could then proceed to finish his “logic” - of which in 1805-06 he already very likely had a good draft (which has since been lost) - and follow it with the “philosophy of the real” (the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of “spirit” that he had worked out in his lectures of 1805-06). He did not know as he started out on this project that once again, just as it had before, his conception of a quick introduction to the “system” would fall apart, and he would be forced to begin again.

    黑格尔起先似乎认为，要完成哲学的任务，只不过需要对他早在1805至1806年就已制定出的“体系”稍作些调整，经过调整后的内容将恰好用作“整个体系”的导言。在写出这个导言后，他接着就可以进而去完成他的“逻辑学”——早在1805年至1806年他就已很可能有了很好草案的“逻辑学”（这个草稿从那时起就已失落）——接在“逻辑学”后面的是“实在哲学”（他早在1805年至1806年授课过程中就已制订出的自然哲学和“精神”哲学）。他不知道当他这一计划付诸实施的时候，这一次，正像这一计划以前所遭遇的一样，他关于“整个体系”的简短导言的构想将完全落空，他将被迫另起炉灶。

This time, however, his failures were to lead to his masterpiece, the Phenomenology of Spirit, a book whose very conception Hegel ended up revising even as he was writing it. There were, however, many personal troubles yet to befall Hegel before he reached that goal.

    然而，这一次，他的失败注定成就他写出杰作，《精神现象学》，一本甚至被黑格尔在撰写时就以修改它特有的概念告终的文本。可是，在黑格尔达到这一目标前，仍然还有诸多个人的麻烦事将降临在他头上。