Because in our understanding of the world, if we consider phenomena as the only objects we can know, then we need to question the reasons or basis behind them. Excluding things in themselves, excluding God, and excluding anything else that can be used as an object of faith have the same ontological significance.
In other words, Kant simply transformed the objects of faith that we once held as objects of faith into the thing itself. And this is also a very important reason for later philosophers to repeatedly criticize him. You are simply replacing faith with the thing in itself, or more specifically, replacing God with the thing in itself, and then saying that God is unknowable, we can only think of it and accept it, but you cannot doubt it, you cannot have knowledge of it.
Because if you want to have some understanding of it, you will definitely have doubts. Anything known will be doubted. Only things that do not need to be known and cannot be known will not arouse suspicion. So, the confirmation of this unquestionable and, of course, unknowable object has become the basis for the existence of all suspicious and recognizable objects.
So, in this way, the fragility of Kant's construction of the building of knowledge is very obvious, because we can completely build this building on another foundation, something that has the same ontological significance as the essence of things. For example, God, therefore, human cognitive activity is due to the existence of God, so that humans can understand.
In that case, all cognitive activities are based on a certain belief that we already have, which is a very troublesome problem, or in other words, a great challenge for our cognitive activities.
So, the first problem that Fichte needs to solve is how to thoroughly clarify Kant's unstable, uncertain foundation built on the beach. Thus, all cognitive activities come from a stable and deterministic foundation.
How did Fichte do it?
Simply put, Fichte regards all cognitive activities as the subject of all cognitive activities, as the premise of all cognitive activities. However, this subject is the so-called 'self'.
This subject is not a subject in conscious activity, because once a subject produces conscious activity, it has the existence of an object, because any conscious activity is an object's conscious activity. And only the subject that exists before the object is created is the truly pure subject, that is, the subject in pre consciousness.
In the pre conscious subject, because there is no object present, such a subject is the purest.
Therefore, the existence of the subject itself becomes a purely formal requirement. This subject must be a formal subject, not a substantive or content subject.
So let's understand Kant's thinking. All the explanations Kant gave about cognitive activities are based on the existence of objects, because sensation must be a sensation towards something, so although the existence of sensation needs to be grasped in intellectual form. However, we all grasp objects through our understanding of them. You do not grasp yourself or the subject, nor do you grasp the conscious activity itself. It is all through conscious activity that we grasp external objects.
Therefore, the existence of an object, which in Kant refers to a phenomenon, constitutes a prerequisite for all cognitive activities.
If there were no phenomena, how would our cognitive activities be generated and how would they occur?
It has no basis for occurrence, so there must be a phenomenon present. So, as humans, grasping and understanding phenomena is a fundamental process of human cognitive activity.
However, the existence of this phenomenon itself precisely dictates that our conscious activities have content. The different contents of consciousness activities determine the form of our consciousness activities. Therefore, in Kant's view, self-awareness is not purely formal or pure.
So, Fichte points out that if I want to completely eliminate this uncertain, or rather unstable, cognitive foundation in Kantian philosophy, then we must start from the purity of the self. And the basis for such purity does not come from considerations of content, but only from considerations of form.
So, Fichte said that Kant only gave us the theory of how to acquire knowledge methods, that is, how human cognitive activities arise, from sensibility to intellect to reason, and then people can analyze, synthesize, and then judge, and finally form conclusions. This is the process of human cognitive activity, or in other words, the theory of "knowledge acquisition".
The process by which we acquire knowledge constitutes the core of Kant's doctrine, so Kant is concerned with how to acquire knowledge. And Fichte said that this is not about discussing knowledge issues, the main content is precisely about our discussion of knowledge itself.
Therefore, for Fichte, he does not focus on how knowledge is acquired, but rather on how knowledge is constructed.
Acquisition is a process, while composition is a form. We can also say that the process is an active process, and the composition of knowledge is a form.
Kant's idea is to attempt to construct and explain an activity process in a formal way. However, Fichte, on the contrary, explains form in the form of activity, which he calls "factual action" and is also referred to as "fundamental action" in some places.
These are two completely different directions, so, as Fichte himself said, my philosophy is not just a development of Kant's philosophy. Therefore, he believes that he is a student of Kant and has never deviated from Kant. Although his thinking is different from Kant's, we can read that Fichte's basic reasoning is still basically based on Kant's reasoning. But what he emphasizes more is to achieve a formal explanation through factual actions.
So, the three fundamental principles of his epistemology are all "formal regulations" rather than so-called explanations of activities or processes. In Kantian philosophy, we cannot see these explanations of form, but rather the arrangement of categories. For example, the arrangement of the twelve categories is not about explaining the process of form. Kant's purpose is not to explain the process of form, but to reveal the basic scope of human reason by understanding activities, and form serves activities.
In Fichte's view, activity serves form, and it is precisely because of the two different paths that two different philosophies are derived.
Not only that, Fichte also believed that Kant's distinction between practical reason and theoretical reason was also incorrect. In other words, he distinguished between intellectual and rational activities, that is, the pure rational activities discussed in theoretical reason and the activities about free rationality discussed in practical reason. He believed that this was Kant's biggest problem. And the basis for this problem lies in the existence of an object in itself that he has set up.
This expresses Fichte's critique of Kant, but also reveals how Fichte made an effort to reinterpret and construct Kant's philosophy.
So, as we mentioned earlier, Kant's philosophy has two problems: the distinction from the thing in itself to phenomena, and the transition from intellectual ability to rational ability. Fichte attempted to break through these two problems and use his theory of the composition of knowledge, which he called "epistemology," to solve this problem.
His original words were, 'Knowledgeology is the science of knowledge, which discusses the ways in which knowledge itself is constructed, rather than the ways in which knowledge is acquired.' Therefore, this is indeed very different from Kant's.
He doesn't talk about how knowledge is obtained. Today we are talking about epistemology, which is more about the process of cognitive activity, such as the laws of cognition, the basic principles of cognition, and the logical reasoning of cognition. These things all indicate the ways in which knowledge is acquired. Fichte said, 'What I am more concerned about here is the way knowledge is composed.'. This kind of composition is achieved through "formal" means and "factual actions". So, this is what Fichte needs to care about.
So, his epistemology broke through Kant's epistemology and constructed a completely new philosophical theory about knowledge.
Since knowledge is a way of understanding the external world, or in other words, it is used to express the way the external world exists. Therefore, knowledge cannot be separated from the existence of objects in the external world, and knowledge cannot be separated from the ability to obtain sensory experiences or information related to objects in the external world.
Therefore, how can knowledge be about the acquisition of knowledge? However, in Kant's view, even when he talks about the acquisition of knowledge, he focuses on the existence of rational ability in the acquisition of knowledge. As we just said, he defined the concept of rationality from both theoretical and practical aspects. Therefore, in Kant's view, there is a distinction between theoretical rationality and practical rationality.
The rationality of theory and the rationality of practice both talk about a rational ability.
However, regarding the concept of reason itself and how it should be defined, Kant's use of the word "reason" in his three major critiques is quite inconsistent, and can even be said to be quite chaotic. He uses the concept of "reason" in different places, and the content referred to is different.
Some places refer to rational ability, some refer to rational experience, some are forms of rationality, and some refer to the relationship between rationality, knowledge, and other abilities. Therefore, expressing his understanding of the concept of rationality is quite confusing, and it is precisely this confusion that makes it impossible for him to regulate rationality itself.
