英文早读第212篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。
We continue to look for ways to expand our insurance operation. But your reaction to this intent should not be unrestrained joy. Some of our expansion efforts - largely initiated by your Chairman have been lackluster, others have been expensive failures. We entered the business in 1967 through purchase of the segment which Phil Liesche now manages, and it still remains, by a large margin, the best portion of our insurance business. It is not easy to buy a good insurance business, but our experience has been that it is easier to buy one than create one. However, we will continue to try both approaches, since the rewards for success in this field can be exceptional.
我们继续寻找扩张我们保险业务的途径。但是你对这个意图的反应不应该很开心。一些我们的扩张努力，大部分由你们的董事长发起的，是黯淡无光的，另一些则是昂贵的教训。我们在1967年通过购买现在菲尔莱舍管理的部分进入这个业务，他仍然以较大的毛利率水平持续为我们保险业务的最佳部分。购买一个好的保险业务不容易，但是我们的经验表明购买一个会比创造一个简单些。然而，我们将会继续尝试这两种途径，因为在这个领域对成功的奖励异常丰厚。
Insurance Investments
保险投资
We confess considerable optimism regarding our insurance equity investments. Of course, our enthusiasm for stocks is not unconditional. Under some circumstances, common stock investments by insurers make very little sense.
我们承认考虑到我们的保险实体投资有些乐观。当然，我们对股票的热情也不是没有条件的。在某些环境下，承保人做的股票投资几乎没有意义。
We get excited enough to commit a big percentage of insurance company net worth to equities only when we find (1) businesses we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) priced very attractively. We usually can identify a small number of potential investments meeting requirements (1), (2) and (3), but (4) often prevents action. For example, in 1971 our total common stock position at Berkshire's insurance subsidiaries amounted to only 10.7 million at cost, and 11.7 million at market. There were equities of identifiably excellent companies available - but very few at interesting prices. (An irresistible footnote: in 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% of net funds available in equities - at full prices they couldn't buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, they committed a then record low of 21% to stocks.)
当我们可以将大比例的保险公司净值交易到实体公司时我们会很兴奋，但必须满足（1）业务是我们懂的；（2）长期预期很好；（3）由诚实且有能力的团队运营；（4）价格非常有吸引力。我们通常可以识别小部分的潜在投资可以满足要求（1）、（2）、（3），但是（4）经常会组织行动。例如，在1971年，我们以伯克希尔保险子公司持有的股票总成本仅1070万美金，市值1170万美金。有些实体可以看到是可以获得的很好的公司，但是几乎没有价格令人感兴趣。（一个引人注目的注释：在1971年，退休基金管理者创纪录的将可用资金的122%投入到股市，即便价格高昂，他们仍觉得买的不够。在1974年，股市崩盘后，他们投入股票的资金历史最低点，低至21%。）
The past few years have been a different story for us. At the end of 1975 our insurance subsidiaries held common equities with a market value exactly equal to cost of 39.3 million. At the end of 1978 this position had been increased to equities (including a convertible preferred) with a cost of 129.1 million and a market value of 216.5 million. During the intervening three years we also had realized pre-tax gains from common equities of approximately 24.7 million. Therefore, our overall unrealized and realized pre-tax gains in equities for the three year period came to approximately 112 million. During this same interval the Dow-Jones Industrial Average declined from 852 to 805. It was a marvelous period for the value-oriented equity buyer.
在过去几年，我们的股市截然不同。在1975年末，我们的保险子公司持有实体市值几乎等同于3930万的成本。在1978年末，形势变为实体股票（包括优先可转债）成本增长至1.291亿美金，市值2.165亿美金。在这中间3年，我们也从股票实体实现了结算的税前利润接近2470万美金。因此，我们的整体未结算和已结算税前利润在实体股票中，3年期间接近1.12亿美金。在同样的时期，道琼斯指数从852下跌到805。这对价值投资者是了不起的时期。
41.unrestrained：无节制的；放纵的
42.lackluster：无趣味的；单调的；无光泽的
43.exceptional：杰出的；卓越的；异常的
44.confess：承认（自己感到羞愧或尴尬的事）；坦白（错误或罪行）
45.irresistible：不可抗拒的；无法抵制的
46.pension：退休金；养老金
47.intervening：介于中间的
48.marvelous：不可思议的；了不起的
