英文早读第131篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。
Analysis of 1967 Results
1967年结果分析
The overall figures given earlier conceal vast differences in profitability by portfolio category during 1967.
之前给的整体数据按组合范畴分在1967年隐藏着很大的盈利能力差异。
We had our worst performance in history in the "Workout" section. In the 1965 letter, this category was defined as,
我们发生了历史上在“套利类”模块最差表现。在1965年信中，这个范畴被定义为，
"...securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity -- sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category, we are not talking about rumors or inside information pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk does not pertain primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in. to a degree). but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected corporate development does not materialize."
“…有时间表的股票。他们源于公司行为——出售、合并、重组、拆分等等。在这个范畴，我们不是谈论这类发展中存在的传闻或内部消息，而是这类公开宣告的活动。我们等待到直到可以在报纸上读到他。首要风险不是存在于股市行为（尽管某种程度上有时有联系），而是那些扰乱进度表以至于预期公司发展没有实现的事。”
The streets were filled with upset applecarts - our applecarts - during 1967. Thus, on an average investment of 17,246,879, our overall gain was 153,273. For those of you whose slide rule does not go to such insulting depths, this represents a return of .89 of 1%. While I don't have complete figures. I doubt that we have been below 10% in any past year. As in other categories, we tend to concentrate our investments in the workout category in just a few situations per year. This technique gives more variation in yearly results than would be the case if we used an across-the-board approach. I believe our approach will result in as great (or greater) profitability on a long-term basis, but you can't prove it by 1967.
道路上充满着打乱的进度表——我们的进度表——在1967年。因此，平均1724万6879美金的投资，我们的整体盈利事15万3273美金。对于那些计算尺还没有到过如此侮辱人的地步，这代表着0.89%的回报率。尽管我没有完整的数据。我怀疑在过去任何一年我们是否低于过10%。如在其它范畴，我试图在套利类策略里集中我们的投资在每年仅有几个案子上。这个技术使年度结果有更大差异相比于我们按全盘方法来计算。我相信我们的方法将带来长期维度的较大（或者更大）盈利能力，但是你不能在1967年证明他。
Our investment in controlled companies was a similar drag on relative performance in 1967, but this is to be expected in strong markets. On an average investment of 20,192,776 we had an overall gain of 2,894,571. I am pleased with this sort of performance, even though this category will continue to underperform if the market continues strong during 1968. Through our two controlled companies (Diversified Retailing and Berkshire Hathaway), we acquired two new enterprises in 1967. Associated Cotton Shops and National Indemnity (along with National Fire & Marine, an affiliated company). These acquisitions couldn't be more gratifying. Everything was as advertised or better. The principal selling executives, Ben Rosner and Jack Ringwalt, have continued to do a superb job (the only kind they know), and in every respect have far more than lived up to their end of the bargain.
我们在控制类公司的投资在1967年同样在表现上相对拖后腿，但是在强劲的市场他预期就是这样。平均2019万2775美金投资金额拥有整体盈利289万4571美金。我对这类表现很开心，即使如果1968年市场继续强劲这个范畴将继续低于市场。通过2个我们控制的公司（零售百货和伯克希尔哈撒韦），我们在1967年获得了2家新的公司。联合棉纺商店和国立保障（和国立火灾和海事公司一起，一家子公司）。这些收获再令人高兴不过了。每件事都如宣传的一样甚至更好。主要的销售人员，本罗斯恩和杰克伦怀特继续做着卓越的工作（他们只知道卓越这个类型），每一方面都比他们在交易结束的时候还要好。
The satisfying nature of our activity in controlled companies is a minor reason for the moderated investment objectives discussed in the October 9th letter. When I am dealing with people I like, in business I find stimulating (what business isn't?), and achieving worthwhile overall returns on capital employed (say, 10-12%), it seems foolish to rush from situation to situation to earn a few more percentage points. It also does not seem sensible to me to trade known pleasant relationships with high grade people, at a decent rate of return, for possible irritation, aggravation or worse at potentially higher returns. Hence, we will continue to keep a portion of our capital (but not over 40% because of the possible liquidity requirements arising from the nature of our partnership agreement) invested in controlled operating businesses at an expected rate of return below that inherent in an aggressive stock market operation.
在控制类公司我们的行动令人满意的性质是在10月9日信件中讨论温和投资目标的小原因。当我和我喜欢的人打交道，在我发现的振奋人心的业务上（什么业务不是呢？），并且实现有价值的资金整体回报（也就是说，10-12%），那将看起来很蠢疲于从一个案子跳到另一个案子上去赚取仅有的几个更多的百分点。那也似乎没有意义对我来说从已知的令人满意的和高层次人群的关系中以可观的回报率去为了潜在可能更好的回报，而去交易到可能的恼怒、恶化或者更糟的事情上。因此，我们将继续保持我们的资金比例（不超过40%因为根据我们的合伙协议要求的可能的流动需求）投资在控制类运作业务上以低于在更积极股票操作可能的预期回报率。
With a conbined total of 37,439,655 in workouts and controls producing an overall gain of only 3,047,844 the more alert members of the class will have already concluded we had a whale of a year in the "Generals - Relatively Undervalued" category. On a net average investment of 19,487,996, we had an overall gain of 14,096,593, or 72%. Last year I referred to one investment which substantially outperformed the general market in 1964, 1965 and 1966 and because of its size (the largest proportion we have ever had in anything - we hit our 40% limit) had a very material impact on our overall results and, even more so, this category. This excellent performance continued throughout 1967 and a large portion of total gain was again accounted for by this single security. Our holdings of this security have been very substantially reduced and we have nothing in this group remotely approaching the size or potential which formerly existed in this investment.
合计3743万9655美金在套利类和控制类金额产生仅仅整体盈利304万7844美金，班里相对敏感的同学已经得出我们在“一般类——相对低估”范畴是一个猛击一年的结论。以平均1948万7996美金投资额，我们有整体1409万6593美金或者说72%的盈利。去年我提到一个投资在1964、1965和1966年都大幅优于股市表现，因为他的规模（我们在任何标的上持有的最大比例——我们达到了40%的上限）对我们的结果尤其是在这个范畴里有很大的实质性影响。这个优秀的表现在整个1967年都持续了并且我们再一次获得的大比例盈利都有这个单一股票贡献。我们在这个股票上的持续现在很大幅减少了并且在这个组合中之前存在的投资还没有什么未来达到或潜在达到这个规模。
The "Generals - Private Owner" section produced good results last year (1,297,215 on 5,141,710 average investment), and we have some mildly interesting possibilities in this area at present.
“一般类——私有化”去年产生了好的结果（514万1710平均投资盈利129万7215美金），我们现在已经有一些还不错的感兴趣的可能机会。
Miscellaneous
杂项
We begin the new year with net assets of 68,108,088. We had partners with capital of about 1,600,000 withdraw at yearend, primarily because of the reduced objectives announced in the October 9th letter. This makes good sense for them, since most of them have the ability and motivation to surpass our objectives and I am relieved from pushing for results that I probably can't attain under present conditions.
我们以6810万8088美金资产开启了这个新年。我们合伙人在年末支取了160万美金因为在10月9日信件中宣布减少的目标。这对他们很有意义，既然他们大部分有能力和动机去超越我们的目标，我也得以从追求或许在现在条件下达不到的结果中解脱出来。
Some of those who withdrew (and many who didn't) asked me, "What do you really mean?" after receiving the October 9th letter. This sort of a question is a little bruising to any author, but I assured them I meant exactly what I had said. I was also asked whether this was an initial stage in the phasing out of the partnership. The answer to this is, "Definitely, no". As long as partners want to put up their capital alongside of mine and the business is operationally pleasant (and it couldn't be better), I intend to continue to do business with those who have backed me since tennis shoes.
一些赎回的人（还有没有赎回的）问我，“你到底什么意思？”在收到10月9日信件后。这类问题有点让任何一个作者受打击，但是我保证我的意思就是我已经说的那些。我也被问到这是否是结束合伙协议的征兆。这个答案是，“绝对不是”。只要合伙人还想把他们的钱和我的放在一起，并且这个业务还运作的满意（没有什么比这个更好），我就倾向于继续和那些从白手期间就在我身后的人做这个业务。
Gladys Kaiser has joined us and is doing the same sort of top-notch job that we have long received from Donna, Bill and John. The office group, spouses and children have over 15 million invested in BPL on January 1, 1968, so we have not had a need for NoDoz during business hours.
格莱迪丝凯瑟加入了我们，做着和我们长期收到的来自于多娜、比尔和约翰一样的一流工作。办公室人员、配偶和子女们在1968年1月1日有超过1500万美金投资在巴菲特合伙基金，因此我们在工作时间没有对NoDoz（提神丸）的需求。
Within a few days, you will receive:
在几天后，你将会收到：
A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1967 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
1.一封税务信给你所有的巴菲特合伙基金信息用于1967年联邦个人所得税申报。这封信是唯一一个用于税务用途的。An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (they have again done an excellent job) for 1967, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
2.一封来自于毕马威公司（他们一直做着优秀的工作）对1967年审计报告，阐述巴菲特合伙基金的运作和财务状况，同样包括你自己的资金账户。A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1968. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
3.一封由我签署用于阐述你于1968年1月1日在巴菲特合伙基金股份状况的信。这和在审计报告中发展的数据是一致的。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July 15th, summarizing the first half of this year.
让我知道如果在这封信有任何事或者在这一年发生的事有需要澄清的。我的下一封信将会大约在7月15日，总结上半年度。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
热情的，
沃伦E.巴菲特
16.conceal：隐藏；隐瞒；掩盖
17.spin-off：拆分；副产品
18.pertaining：适用；存在；与……有关系
19.slide rule：计算尺；滑尺
20.insulting：无礼的；有冒犯性的
21.across-the-board：全面的；包括一切的
22.indemnity：赔偿；补偿；保障；赔款
23.affiliated：附属的
24.gratifying：令人高兴的；使人满意的
25.live up to：不辜负；符合
26.stimulating：振奋人心的；激励人的
27.worthwhile：值得的；重要的；有趣的
28.irritation：生气；气恼；恼怒；刺激；烦心事
29.aggravation：加重；恶化
30.whale：鲸鱼；捕鲸；击打；猛击
31.relieved：放心的；释然的；感到宽慰的；显得开心的；从……解脱出来
32.bruising：艰难讨厌的；繁重麻烦的；擦伤；磋商；打击
33.phase out：逐步淘汰；停止使用
34.top-notch：一流的；最好的；卓越的
