英文早读第121篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。

Personally, within the limits expressed in last year's letter on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance. To be perfectly clear - under our policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance (far more likely in sharply rising markets) to offset the occasional overperformance such as we have experienced in 1965 and 1966, and as a price we pay for hoped-for good long term performance.
就个人而言，在去年年度信中表达的分类限制内，我愿意以短期大幅表现差异的痛苦（忘掉快乐）来换取长期表现的最大化。然而，我不愿意承担大幅永久资金损失的风险来寻求更好的长期表现。更完美的澄清就是在我们持股集中度的策略下，合伙人应该充分准备好一段时期的大幅低于大盘表现（很像市场快速增长时）来抵消偶尔的像我们在1965年和1966年经历的优秀表现，作为代价我们愿意去支付来获得期望的好的长期表现。

All this talk about the long pull has caused one partner to observe that "even five minutes is a long time if one's head is being held under water." This is the reason, of course, that we use borrowed money very sparingly in our operation. Average bank borrowings during 1966 were well under 10% of average net worth.
这里所有谈到的长期拉升引起一个合伙人观察到“当一个人的脑袋被按到水下时即使5分钟都是很长的时间”。这是一个理由，当然，我们在我们的运作中很慎用借款。在1966年平均银行借款远低于平均净值的10%。

One final word about the Generals - Relatively Undervalued category. In this section we also had an experience which helped results in 1966 but hurt our long term prospects. We had just one really important new idea in this category in 1966. Our purchasing started in late spring but had only come to about 1.6 million (it could be bought steadily but at only a moderate pace) when outside conditions drove the stock prices up to a point where it was not relatively attractive. Thought our overall gain was 728,141 on an average holding period of six and a half months in 1966, it would have been much more desirable had the stock done nothing for a long period of time while we accumulated a really substantial position.
我们最后关于一般类——相对低估值范畴的陈述。在这一部分，我们也有段经历在1966年对结果有帮助但是伤害了我们的长期预期。我们在1966年仅仅有一个真正重要的标的。我们的购买开始于晚春但是仅仅来到了大约160万美金（他是被稳定但以适中的节奏被购买）当外部条件让股价抬升到一个相对不再有吸引力的点时。尽管我们的整体获利有72万8141美金，在1966年平均持有六个半月时间，但更倾向于这个股票在较长一段时间什么都没有发生从而我们可以积累到相当重要的席位。

Workouts
套利类

In last year's letter I forecast reduced importance for workouts. While they were not of the importance of some past years. I was pleasantly surprised by our experience in 1966 during which we kept an average of 7,666,314 employed in this category. Furthermore, we tend to ascribe borrowings to the workout section so that our net equity capital employed was really something under this figure and our return was somewhat better than the 22.4% indicated on page six. Here, too, we ran into substantial variation. At June 30, our overall profit on this category was 16,112 on an average investment of 7,870,151 so that we really had a case of an extraordinarily good second half offsetting a poor first half.
在去年的心中我预测套利类重要性降低。尽管他们在过去一些年不是很重要，我很高兴惊讶于在1966年的经历我们保持平均766万6314美金应用在这个范畴。更进一步，我们倾向于将借款用在套利类部分这样我们的净资金使用将某种程度上低于这个数字并且我们的回报某种程度高于在第六页显示的22.4%。这里，同样，我们也有大幅差异。在6月30日，我们在这个范畴的整体盈利是1万6112美金以平均投资787万151美金，因此我们真的有一个卓越的好的下半年来抵消一个可怜的上半年度。

In past years, sometimes as much as 30-40% of our net worth has been invested in workouts, but it is highly unlikely that this condition will prevail in the future. Nevertheless, they may continue to produce some decent returns on the moderate amount of capital employed.
过去这些年，有时大约30-40%的净资产投资在套利类，但是这种情况在未来仍持续很不太可能。然而，他们或许会继续产生可观的回报在使用适度资金量后。

66.incur：招致；引起；遭受；引来
67.offset：抵消；补偿；弥补
68.sparing：慎用；谨慎的；俭省的
69.steadily：稳定地；不断地；坚定地；坚固地
70.ascribe：归因；把…归咎于；认为…具有