Basel 1
为什么要制定Basel1？
背景：1988年之前银行监管混乱。
为了
1.To strength the soundness and stability of the international banking system;
2. To diminish existing sources of competitive inequality among international banks
1.加强国际银行体系的健康稳定。
2.消除国际银行之间竞争不平等的现有根源
摘自Balthazar,L., 2006.From Basel 1 to Basel 3: The integration of state of the art risk modelling in banking regulation. Springer.
In the early 1980s, the onset of the Latin American debt crisis heightened concerns that the capital ratios of the main international banks were deteriorating at a time of growing international risks. The world needs a unified banking regulatory system to remove a source of competitive inequality arising from differences in national requirements.
并且在1980年代初，拉丁美洲债务危机的爆发加剧了国际风险，主要国际银行的资本率正在恶化。世界范围内需要一个统一的银行监管体系来消除因国家资本要求不同而产生竞争不平等的根源。
1974年，巴塞尔银行监管委员会成立，1988年巴塞尔协议1来临。
Basel 1的内容是什么？
针对"internationally-active", G10-incorporated banks，
Since 1 January 1993, all G10 incorporated, internationally-active banks have been obliged to observe a minimum risk asset ratio (RAR) of 8% to cover credit risk.
自1993年1月1日起，所有10国集团注册的、在国际上活跃的银行都必须遵守8%的最低风险资产比率(RAR)，以覆盖信贷风险。
Since 1 January 1998, the same banks have been obliged to accommodate market risk alongside credit risk under a revised RAR methodology but using the same floor of 8%.
自1998年1月1日起，根据修订后的RAR方法，同一家银行有义务同时承担市场风险和信贷风险，但使用相同的8%下限。
Subject to supervisory approval, banks may use internal models (i.e. VaRs) to calculate their market risk capital charges.
经监管部门批准，银行可以使用内部模型(即VaRs)计算其市场风险资本费用。
Basel 1 的意义与缺陷
意义：Basel 1 created a worldwide benchmark for banking regulations. Designed originally for internationally active banks of the G10 countries, it is now the basis of the inspiration for banking regulations in more than 100 countries and is often imposed on national banks as well. international banks are now facing a uniform set of rules, which avoids them having to discuss with each national regulator what the correct capital level should be for conducting the same business in many different countries. Additionally, banks of different countries competing on the same markets have equivalent regulatory capital requirements. That is clearly an improvement in comparison with the situation before 1988.
The introduction of different risk-weights for different assets' classes, although not reflecting completely the true risks of banks' credit portfolios, is a clear improvement on the previous regulatory ratios that were used in some countries - such as equity: assets or equity: deposits ratios.
Has the Basel 1 Accord succeeded in making the banking sector a safer place? A lot of research has been carried out on the subject (see, for instance, Jackson, 1999), but the answer is still unclear. The capital ratios of most banks indeed increased at the beginning of the 1990s (the capital ratios of the large G10 banks went from an average of 9.3 percent in 1988 to 11.2 percent in 1996), and bank failures diminished (for instance, yearly failures of FDIC-insured banks in the US wen tfrom 280 in 1988 to fewer than 10 a year between 1995 and 2000).
巴塞尔协议1为银行监管设立了一个全球基准。最初是为10国集团(G10)的国际活跃银行设计的，如今已成为100多个国家银行业监管的灵感来源，并经常被强加于本国银行。国际银行目前正面临一套统一的规则，这使它们不必与各国监管机构讨论在许多不同国家开展同一业务的正确资本金水平。此外，在同一市场上竞争的不同国家的银行具有相同的监管资本要求。与1988年以前的情况相比，这显然是一个改善。
针对不同资产类别引入不同的风险权重，虽然不能完全反映银行信贷组合的真实风险，但与一些国家以前采用的监管比率(例如股本:资产或股本:存款比率)相比，这是一个明显的进步。
巴塞尔协议1是否成功地使银行业成为一个更安全的地方?关于这一主题已经进行了大量的研究(例如，Jackson, 1999)，但是答案仍然不清楚。大多数银行的资本充足率的确增加了1990年代初(G10大型银行的资本比率从1988年的平均9.3%到1996年的11.2%),和银行倒闭减少每年的失败(例如,fdic担保银行在美国从280到1988年的不到10之间的1995年和2000年)。
缺陷：
1. The agreement is not legally binding, undermining its effectiveness.
2. The geographical coverage achieved is limited, undermining the stability of' the international banking system.
3. The use of a flawed methodology in the credit risk assessment process
4. The use of'"inexact" (in an actuarial sense) risk weights and conversion. factors in the weighting system
5. Induces a misallocation of capital resources within the banking industry.
6. Induces a misallocation of capital resources between the bank and non-bank sectors of the economy.
7. Induces distortion in banks' pricing and other business decisions.
[if !supportLists]8. [endif]Leads to a misallocation of resources due to the induced balance sheet restructuring by banks.
9. May breed complacency. [Strict adherence to the guidelines by all internationally-active banks would still not guarantee their solvency nor the stability of the international financial system.]
10. Not enough done to level the playing field for international banks.
11. Risks contributing to global and/or regional"credit crunches".
12. May induce perverse and potentially destabilising responses on the part of banks.
1.该协议没有法律约束力，削弱了其效力。
2.覆盖的地理范围有限，破坏了“国际银行体系”的稳定。
3.在信用风险评估过程中使用有缺陷的方法
4.使用“不精确”(精算意义上的)风险权重和换算。权重系统中的因子
5.导致银行业内部资本资源配置不当。
6.导致银行和非银行经济部门之间的资本资源配置不当。
7.导致银行定价和其他业务决策的扭曲。
8.导致银行资产负债表重组导致资源配置不当。
9.可能滋生自满情绪。(所有从事国际业务的银行严格遵守这些指导原则，仍不能保证它们的偿付能力，也不能保证国际金融体系的稳定。)
10.在为国际银行提供公平竞争环境方面做得还不够。
11.造成全球和/或地区“信贷紧缩”的风险。
12.可能导致银行做出反常且可能破坏稳定的反应。
Perhaps the most serious are:
1.the use of a flawed risk assessment methodology（使用有缺陷的风险评估方法）
2.the induced distortions and misallocation of resources（造成资源扭曲和分配不当）
3.the perverse, and potentially destabilising, bank responses that may be induced (the most worrying forms of balance sheetengineering–nowtermed“regulatory capital arbitrage” –are“cherrypicking”and securitisation)（可能引发的反常且可能破坏稳定的银行反应(最令人担忧的资产负债表工程形式——现在被称为“监管性资本套利”——是“樱桃采摘”和证券化)）.
Basel 2
1999年因为Basel 1的种种不足，2被提案并且一直在修正，直至2007年得到实施。
为什么要制定Basel2？
因为银行业需要一个更复杂的框架，2针对1的缺陷进行了一系列改进。
目的是
• to continue to promote safety and soundness in the financial system
• to continue to enhance competitive equality
• to adopt a more comprehensive approach to addressing risks
• to continue to focus on internationally-active banks, although the new framework’s underlying principles should be suitable for application to banks of varying levels of complexity and sophistication
特别的，
1. improve the way regulatory capital requirements reflect underlying risks（改善监管资本要求反映潜在风险的方式）
2. better address the financial innovation that has occurred in recent years（更好地应对近年来出现的金融创新）;
3. recognise and promote improvements in bank risk management and control（认识及推动银行风险管理及控制的改善）
4. adopt a more comprehensive approach to addressing risks（采取更加全面的办法应对风险）。
Basel 2的内容是什么？
三大支柱。
The three "pillars":
• minimum regulatory capital requirements
巴2对于信用风险资本金采用了新的计算方式，这一方式体现对手的信用风险。计算方法分为【标准法，内部评级基础法，内部评级高级法】标准法和巴1差不多，只不过风险权重更加细分了。内部评级法是监管人员将资本金建立在VaR基础上，这里的VaR是一年展望期99.9置信度。巴2还增加了操作风险资本金。
• supervisory review of an institution’s capital adequacy
and internal assessment process
巴2要求加强监督审查。各国监管部门对于利率风险，信用风险，操作风险特别注意。监管部门管理过程透明可靠。
• greater market discipline
鼓励银行信息披露力度
After the publication of CP1, two further sets of proposals emerged – “CP2” and “CP3” – following consultation with the banking industry and other interested parties and “quantitative impact assessments” (“QISs”).
《巴塞尔资本协议》征求意见稿CP1、CP2和CP3分别于1999年6月、2001年l月和2003年4月相继颁布，并将于2007年1月l日正式实施。
CP2, CP3是对CP1的完善和扩充。
Basel 2 的影响
Positive impact
1.Would increase stability of the internationalised banking system.
This would result from: the attempts made to minimise the"perverse" incentives facing banks; the focus on other bank risks; the new obligations placed onsupervisors to engage in "prompt corrective action" and to imposebank-specific capital charges that closely reflect the risk exposures actuallyassumed; the consolidation of parent holding companies; the linking of thebenefits to be derived, in the form of reduced risk weightings (i.e. below 100%), by highly-rated banks to their supervisors' adoption of the BaselCommittee's "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision"; theencouragement given, via wider supervisory recognition, to the development ofrisk mitigation techniques; the reduction of the bias in favour of short-terminterbank lending, the introduction of a higher (i.e. 150%) risk weight forlowly-rated (i.e. below "B-") borrowers; the abolition of the 50% capon the risk-weighting of derivative exposures; the incentives provided to allborrowers (bar some of those currently unrated) to seek higher credit ratings;the demand for greater information disclosure; and the new requirement forsupervisors to take explicit account ofan individual bank's relative importance in national and international marketsand potential to trigger systemic instability.
增强国际化银行体系的稳定性。
这将源于:试图将银行面临的“反常”激励降至最低;关注其他银行风险;监管机构承担的新义务是“迅速采取纠正行动”，并对与实际承担的风险风险密切相关的银行特定资本收取费用;母公司控股公司的合并;将高评级银行以降低风险权重(即低于100%)的形式获得的利益与其监管者采纳巴塞尔委员会“有效银行监管的核心原则”联系起来;透过更广泛的监督认可，鼓励发展减低风险的技术;减少对短期银行间贷款的偏好，为评级较低(即低于“B-”)的借款人引入较高(即150%)的风险权重;取消对衍生品风险权重的50%上限;向所有借款者(除一些目前未评级的借款者外)提供的寻求更高信用评级的激励措施;要求更大程度的信息披露;新规定要求监管机构明确考虑单个银行在国内和国际市场上的相对重要性，以及引发系统性不稳定的可能性。
2.Would increase economic efficiency.
This would result from: the use of external credit ratings,which take account of, inter alia, the characteristics of the obligor, to determine risk weights;possible supervisory recognition of internal credit ratings and portfoliocredit risk models, which would align regulatory capital requirements moreclosely with the internal allocation of economic capital; the removal of thebias in favour of loans to OECD countries and OECD banks; the reduction·in thebias in favour of short-term (i.e. for less than 365 days) interbank lending; theremoval of the bias in favour of off-balance-sheet (rather than onbalance-sheet) exposures viaabolition of the 50% cap on the risk weighting of derivative exposures; theremoval of the bias in favour of commitments of up to one year; theintroduction of a 150% risk weight for lowly-rated borrowers; the linking ofthe benefits gained by highly-rated sovereign borrowers (from reduced riskweights, i.e. below 100%) to the country's compliance with the IMF's"Special Data Dissemination Standards"; the attempts to block theuse of securitisation as a means of circumventing capital requirements throughthe risk-weighting of securitisation tranches; the incentives created for allborrowers (other than some of those currently unrated) to seek improved ratings;the encouragement given to the continued development of sophisticated riskmanagement techniques and their closer integration with capital allocationprocedures; the enhanced information disclosure requirements, which will leadto improved market transparency and greater market discipline.
提高经济效率。
这将是由于:利用外部信用评级，除其他外，考虑到债务人的特点，以确定风险权重;可能对内部信用评级和投资组合信用风险模型进行监管认可，使监管资本要求与经济资本的内部配置更紧密地一致;消除有利于向经合发组织国家和各经合发组织银行提供贷款的偏见;·有利于短期(即少于365天)银行间贷款的偏好下降;通过取消衍生品风险权重的50%上限，消除偏向表外(而非表内)风险敞口的偏见;消除对至多一年的承诺的偏见;为低评级借款人引入150%的风险权重;将高评级主权借款人所获得的好处(从风险权重降低到低于100%)与该国是否遵守IMF的“特殊数据——传播标准”联系起来;试图阻止利用证券化作为一种手段，通过证券化部分的风险权重规避资本要求;鼓励所有借款人(目前未评级的一些借款人除外)寻求改善评级;鼓励继续发展复杂的风险管理技术，并使其与资本分配程序更密切地结合;加强资讯披露的规定，将有助提高市场透明度和加强市场纪律。
3.Would contribute, on balance, to a further levelling of the regulatory playing field.
This would result from: the enforced geographical spread of prompt corrective action and the application of bank-specific capital charges; convergence in information disclosure standards and supervisory practices; removal of the bias resulting from OECD membership/incorporation.
总的来说，有助于进一步提高监管领域水平。
这将是由于:强制执行迅速纠正行动的地域分布和适用银行特定的资本费用;信息披露标准与监管实践的趋同;消除经济合作与发展组织成员/合并所造成的偏见。
Concerns
[if !supportLists]1. [endif]the retention of the flawed standardised riskassessment methodology which ignores risk correlations (even though a morerisk-sensitive framework, embracing external credit assessments, was applied)
保留有缺陷的标准化风险评估方法，这种方法忽视了风险相关性(尽管采用了一种更敏感的框架，包括外部信用评估)
[if !supportLists]2. [endif]persisting disagreement over the risk assessment of certain credits (many viewed the treatment of residential property loans and commercial lending as lenient, as subsequently proved to be the case) and the use of VaR models for regulatory purposes
对某些信贷的风险评估(许多人认为对住宅物业贷款和商业贷款的处理过于宽松，这一点后来被证明是正确的)和为监管目的而使用VaR模型的问题上，一直存在分歧。
[if !supportLists]3. [endif]the failure to address, satisfactorily, thepro-cyclical impact of the reform package, which risked amplifying businesscycles (although bankers were later asked to assess the riskiness of the loansover the full economic cycle under a Pillar 2 requirement that demands“meaningfully conservative credit risk stress testing” by banks adopting theIRB approaches)
未能确定的、圆满的顺周期性影响改革方案,这可能会放大经济周期(尽管银行家们后来被要求评估贷款风险在一个完整的经济周期下支柱2要求“有意义的保守的信用风险压力测试”的要求银行采用IRB的方法)
[if !supportLists]4. [endif]given the continuing doubts about the current“state of the art” in credit risk modelling and the lack of historical data on loan defaults, the real risks to “safety and soundness” if banks are given, prematurely, supervisory recognition of their IRB approaches and, further down the round, their portfolio credit risk models (there is a real possibility that, in some jurisdictions, the banks will be able to “browbeat” their supervisors into granting supervisory recognition of their models in circumstances where a more cautious approach would be advisable)
鉴于持续质疑当前的“先进的”信用风险建模和贷款违约缺乏历史数据,真正的“安全与稳健”如果银行风险,过早,监督IRB的识别方法,进一步降低,投资组合信用风险模型(这是一个真正的可能性,在某些司法辖区,银行将能够“胁迫”它们的监管者，让他们在更谨慎的做法更为可取的情况下，认可自己的监管模式)
[if !supportLists]5. [endif]the scale of the supervisory burden that would be faced in all jurisdictions, but especially in developing countries, which risks undermining the effectiveness of the proposals
所有司法管辖区，特别是发展中国家，将面临的监管负担之大，可能会削弱建议的效力。
[if !supportLists]6. [endif]the scale of the compliance burden to be borneby the banking industry alongside the "capping" of some of the short-term benefits (especially in the US)
银行业在“封顶”部分短期利益(尤其是在美国)的同时，还要承担多大的合规负担
[if !supportLists]7. [endif]continuing doubts about the wisdom of embracingexternal credit assessments within the assessment régime (for some, thesafeguards designed to ensure the public interest prevails in instances whereexternal credit assessments are embraced did not go far enough; while others continued to question theaccuracy of the credit assessment ratings produced by the rating agencies, thesubsequent rating of structured products duly proving their point)
继续怀疑在评估制度内接受外部信用评估是否明智(对一些人来说，在接受外部信用评估的情况下，旨在确保公众利益的保障措施不够充分;其他人士则继续质疑评级机构所作出的信贷评等的准确性，而其后对结构性产品的评级则充分证明他们的观点)
[if !supportLists]8. [endif]concerns that, in connection with the credit calibration process, the correct balance had not been struck between, on the one hand, encouraging the take-up of the IRB approaches and, on the other, ensuring "safety and soundness"
关切在信贷校正过程中，一方面鼓励采用内部评级办法，另一方面确保“安全和稳妥”，两者之间没有取得正确的平衡
[if !supportLists]9. [endif]the Committee’s determination to treatoperational risk under Pillar 1 rather than Pillar 2
委员会决定根据第一支柱而非第二支柱处理业务风险
[if !supportLists]10. [endif]thefear that, given the dramatic increase in the scope for national discretion,the quest for a level regulatory playing field would be seriously undermined,an objective already threatened by the variability in the quality of nationalsupervision (to allay such fears, the Basle Committee set up the ‘AccordImplementation Group’ to try to ensure a high degree of consistency inimplementation)
担心,鉴于国民自由裁量权范围的大幅增加,追求公平监管竞争环境将严重削弱,客观的可变性已经威胁到国家质量监督(减轻这种担忧,巴塞尔委员会设置的协议实现集团试图确保高度的一致性实现)
[if !supportLists]11. [endif]fearsabout possible short-term adverse consequences for countries’ banking systems and economies
担心对各国银行系统和经济可能造成的短期不利后果
[if !supportLists]12. [endif]theCommittee’s determination to secure the endorsement of its proposals by all G10countries, which led to unfortunate compromises on principle, which risked undermining both the spirit and the impact of the reform package
委员会决定确保所有10国集团国家批准其建议，这导致了不幸的原则性妥协，这有可能破坏改革一揽子计划的精神和影响
Basel 3
In April 2008, the Basel Committee announced plans to strengthen the resilience of the international banking system in the light of the fallout from the sub-prime crisis.
危机中暴露的制度缺陷
1.the inadequate levels of capital generally held by banks（银行普遍持有的资本金不足）
2.the failure of VaR models to estimate true levels of market risk（VaR模型未能估计市场风险的真实水平）
3.the failure to capture major on- and off-balance sheet risks, as well as some derivative-related exposures（未能捕捉到资产负债表内外的重大风险，以及一些衍生品相关风险）
4.the failure to prevent excessive credit growth in the run-up to the crisis as a result of banks’excessive leverage（在危机爆发前，由于银行杠杆率过高，未能阻止信贷过度增长）
5.the extent to which banks had arbitraged between the trading book and banking book（银行在交易账簿和银行账簿之间进行套利的程度）
6.the scale of the induced growth in the“shadow” banking system, which led to unsustainable reintermediation during the crisis（引发“影子”银行体系增长的规模，在危机期间导致了不可持续的再中介）
7.the failure to satisfactorily address systemic risk in thesystem（未能令人满意地处理系统内的系统性风险）;
8.the failure to appreciably reduce the degree of pro-cyclicality in the regulatory framework（未能显著降低监管框架内的顺周期性程度）;
9.the unavailability of certain kinds of hybrid instruments to absorb losses during the crisis（某些混合工具在危机期间无法吸收损失）;
10.the folly of ignoring liquidity risks within the regulatory framework（在监管框架内忽视流动性风险的愚蠢行为）;
11.continuing weaknesses in banks’risk management processes (Pillar 2)（银行风险管理过程中的持续弱点(支柱2)）
12.inadequate and inconsistent disclosure of risk exposures and regulatory capital (Pillar 3)（风险暴露和监管资本的披露不充分和不一致(支柱3)
It planned to do
1.boosting capital cushions（提高资本缓冲）
2.creating robust liquidity buffers（建立稳健的流动性缓冲）
3.strengthening risk management and supervision (through further Pillar 2 guidance)（加强风险管理和监督(通过进一步的第二支柱指导)）
4.enhancing market discipline through increased transparency（通过提高透明度加强市场纪律）
Basel 3的内容
new capital requirements:
Minimum common equity capital ratio requirement to be increased from the current 2%
level (before the application of strict regulatory adjustments) to 4.5% (after
the application of stricter adjustments) by 1 January 2015.
最低普通资本充足率从2%提高到4.5%。
Minimum Tier 1 capital ratio requirement, which includes common equity and other
qualifying capital instruments based on stricter criteria, to be increased from
the current level of 4% to 6% by 1 January 2015.
一级资本充足率最低要求从4%提高到6%。
A new“conservation buffer”, to be built up outside periods of stress and designed to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress– rather than to be used to pay discretionary bonuses and dividends or buy back shares – to be introduced in 2016. By 1 January 2019, it must amount to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, to be met from common equity(after deductions). This will raise the effective minimum common equity ratio requirement to 7% by that date.
建立“资本缓冲”区去吸收损失。
A new “countercyclical buffer”, within a range of 0% to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, may also be introduced, at national discretion.
引入新的“反周期缓冲”，风险加权资产在0%-2.5%之间。
The overall minimum total ratio requirement to remain at its current level of 8% until the end of 2015, after which it will gradually increase to reach 10.5% by 1 January 2019 as a result of the phasing in of the capital conservation buffer.
资本充足率提高到10.5%。
New liquidity requirement:
After an observation period beginning in 2011, a new“liquidity coverage ratio” (LCR) requirement to be introduced on 1 January 2015 (full compliance was later delayed until 2019).
流动覆盖率
And, after an observation period beginning in 2012, a new“net stable funding ratio” (NSFR) requirement to be introduced on1 January 2018.
净稳定资金比率
Future outlook of the Basle Accord
1.For the vast majority of the world’s banks, however,little changed, either because they were not internationally-active, or because they were not sophisticated enough to move beyond the standardised approach, or because they were incorporated outside the G10/EU and their policymakers decided against immediate adoption（然而，对于全球绝大多数银行而言，几乎没有什么变化，要么是因为它们在国际上不够活跃，要么是因为它们不够成熟，无法超越标准化方法，要么是因为它们是在10国集团/欧盟之外成立的，而它们的政策制定者决定不立即采用这种方法）
2.Moreover, and notwithstanding the implementation of Basel IIIand Basel IV reforms, there must be a doubt about the Capital Accord’s future, especially with respect to the revamped (yet again!) Pillar 1 requirements,which banks always seem to successfully‘game’.（此外，尽管实施了《巴塞尔协议III》和《巴塞尔协议IV》的改革，但人们肯定对《资本协议》的未来心存疑虑，尤其是在修订后的(又一次!)支柱1的要求，银行似乎总是成功地“游戏”）
Summary and Conclusion
[if !supportLists]1. [endif]The Basle Committee is to be congratulated for moving, albeit belatedly, to address some of the long-standing flaws inherent in the original Capital Accord.
委员会的行动解决了一些最初资本中一些长期存在的固有缺陷。
[if !supportLists]2. [endif]Similarly, by responding in such a positive fashion to some of the criticisms levelled at it during the various rounds of consultation, the definitive version of Basel was, on balance, likely to prove more cost-effective than the packages proposed under CP1, CP2 and CP3.
最终成本的巴塞尔协议草案相比于CP1、CP2和CP3下提出的一揽子方案更具成本效益。
[if !supportLists]3. [endif]This did not mean, however, that the agreed reform package was without fault; a number of potentially-serious concerns remained, which duly became apparent during the global banking crisis of 2007-09.
一揽子计划依然有缺陷，并且在07-09年全球银行业危机期间暴露出来。
[if !supportLists]4. [endif]Moreover, the Committee might have done more to promote the wider use of market discipline as an integral part of bank prudential regulation and supervision.
委员会可以促进更广泛地使用市场纪律。
[if !supportLists]5. [endif]Notwithstanding these on-going concerns – BaselIII is widely condemned as doing “too little too late” - and the fact that relatively-few banks around the world will actually be required to comply with either Basel 3 or its successor Basel IV, much of value has come out of the Basel process.
Basel 3被谴责做得太少。
a) the cause of sound risk management within the banking industry has been furthered
推进银行业风险管理健康发展
b) bank supervisors around the world will be pressured into adopting accepted“best practices” sooner rather than later
世界各地的银行监管机构将面临压力，要求它们尽早采用公认的“最佳做法”
c) the Pillar 3 requirements for enhanced information disclosure have stimulated discussion of the potential benefits of market discipline, restoration of which is sorely needed in the wake of the recent global financial crisis
加强信息披露的第三大支柱要求，引发了对市场纪律潜在好处的讨论。在最近的全球金融危机之后，恢复市场纪律是非常必要的。
[if !supportLists]6. [endif]It is to be hoped that these developments can be taken forward under any future evolution of the Basel Accord
希望能够有推进。
