CHAPTER 4 第四章
RESURRECTING BRIDGEWATER
复兴桥水基金
By late 1983,Bridgewater had six employees. Up until then, I hadn’t done any marketing; thebusiness we got came from word of mouth and from people reading my dailytelexes and seeing my public appearances. But clearly there was a growingdemand for our research, and I realized we could sell it to supplement ourconsulting and trading income. So I hired a seventh employee, a formerdoor-to-doorBiblesalesman named Rob Fried, and we hit the road, lugging around a projector and ahuge stack of slides, hawking a $3,000-per-month research package with my dailytelexes, weekly conference calls, biweekly and quarterly research reports, andquarterly meetings. Over the next year, Rob brought in a number of institutionsand institutional investment managers, including General Electric, KeystoneCustodian Funds, the World Bank, Brandywine, Loomis Sayles, Provident CapitalManagement, the Singer Company, Loews Corporation, GTE Corporation, andWellington Management.
At thatpoint, our business consisted of three main areas: consulting for fees,managing companies’ risks forincentive fees, and selling the research packages. We workedwith all sorts of corporate, financial, and government institutions that hadmarket exposures—banks, diversified international businesses, commoditiesproducers, food producers, public utilities, and more. For example, we wouldbuild a plan to help a multinational company deal with the currency exposure itfaced from operating in different countries.
译文：1983年末，桥水基金已经有了6位雇员。直到那时，我还没有做任何市场业务；我的业务都来自嘴巴和人们阅读我的每日电报以及我的工种表现。但是很明显的我们的研究存在增长的需求，我意识到我可以出售以供应咨询和交易收入。所以我雇佣了第七个雇员，一位交罗波、菲尔德的前走家串户圣经销售人，于是我们上路了，拉着一位设计师以及巨量的资料，极力推销一款3000美金每月的基于我的每日电报内容的定制研究杂志。周讨论电话，半月刊和每季度研究报告，季度会议。下一年罗博开始和一些协会和公共性质的管理人，包括通用电气、拱顶石托管基金、布兰迪全球投资管理、勒斯基金公司、公积金管理、辛乐公司、洛兹公司、GTE公司、还有威灵顿管理公司合作。
那时候，我们的业务由三个主要区域组成：付费咨询，激励公司风险管理，出售研究报告。我们和各种团体、金融资本、拥有市场风险信息的政府协会—银行、众多的跨过商业机构、商品生产、食品制造商、公众视野、以及其他很多机构很作。举例，我们会组建一个计划去帮助跨过公司处理在不同国家见面临的货币风险。
读后感：作者的计算机以及个人分析后的报告开始变现了，而且成了主营业务。
Hawking==极力推销
General Electric==通用电气
Keystone Custodian
Funds==托管基金。
Brandywine=布兰迪全球投资管理
Provident Capital
Management==公积金管理
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My approachwas to immerse myself in a business until I got to a point where I felt thatthe strategies I was handing off were the ones I would use were I running thecompany myself. I would break each company down into distinct logicalcomponents and then come up with a plan for managing each part, using a varietyof financial tools, especiallyderivativeinstruments. The most important components toseparate were the profits coming from the core business and those that werespeculative profits and losses coming from price changes. We would do this toshow them what a “risk-neutral” position would look like, which is to say, theproperly hedged position one would take if one didn’t have a view of themarkets. I would advise them to deviate from this position only when theywanted to speculate, which they should only do in measured ways and with fullknowledge of the effects it could have on their core business. This approachwas eye-opening for most of the firms we worked with. It gave them clarity andcontrol, and yielded them better results. Sometimes they wanted us tospeculatefor them, whichwe would do for a share of the profits.
译文：我开始沉浸于业务中直到我发现那些我已经放手的策略实际上都是我过去运营自己公司使用过的。我会把每家公司分成每个独特的逻辑部分，然后提出一个计划用于管理每个分部，使用多样的金融工具，尤其衍生资产。最重要的组成部分的分解是来自于核心业务中利润-那些投机收益和随着价格变化产生的损失。我们做这些是为了向客户展示“风险中性”是怎样的，也就是说，如果客户还没有市场视角那么客户应该持有的正确的对冲位是什么。我会建议他们只做定量方法并使用所有能给核心业务带来影响的知识。对于大多数我们合作的公司这种措施是如此的令人大开眼界。让他们清晰和可控，并提供更好的结果。有时他们会要求我们投机-这样我们就可以从利润中分一杯羹。
读后感：利润分析，并提供健康、可持续的发展计划，剥离不良资产，应用系统帮助其他公司成功，桥水显然做的不错。但是投机作者会做吗？
eye-opening==大开眼界
speculate==投机
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Thisapproach to establishing a “risk-neutral”benchmarkposition and deviating from it withmeasured bets was the genesis of the style of investment management we wouldlater call “alpha overlay,” in which passive (“beta”) and active (“alpha”)exposures are separated.
The return of a market(such as the stock market) itself is called its beta. Alpha is the return thatcomes from betting against others. For example, some people outperform thestock market and others underperform it; they are said to have positive ornegative alpha. With alpha overlay, we were offering a way of making betsindependent of underlying market performance. Approaching the market in thisway taught me that one of the keys to being a successful investor is to onlytake bets you are highly confident in and to diversify them well.
One of our clients inthe mid-1980s was Alan Bond, an audacious entrepreneur who was one of therichest people in Australia. A self-made man, he was famous for being the firstnon-American to win the America’s Cup yacht race in its then 132-year history. LikeBunker Hunt, he eventually bet badly and was forced to declare bankruptcy. Iadvised him and his team on their way up and stayed on through his downfall, soI watched thetragedyunfold from up close. His was a classic case of confusing business with speculationand only hedging when it was too late.
Bond borrowed U.S.dollars to buy assets like breweries in Australia. He did that because U.S.interest rates were lower than they were in Australia. Though he didn’t realizeit, he was speculating that the U.S. dollar, in which he would have to pay backhis loans, would not rise. When the U.S. dollar did rise against the Australiandollar in the mid-1980s and his Australian-dollar beer-sales earnings weren’tenough to pay his debts, his team called me for advice. I calculated what BondCorp’s position would be if they hedged on currencies and saw that doing sowould lock in losses that would ruin them, so I advised them to wait. When theAustralian dollar rallied, I advised them to put the hedges in place, but theydidn’t because they believed the currency problem had gone away. Before long,the Australian dollar plunged to new lows and they called me in for anemergency meeting. There wasn’t much they could do without locking in ruinouslosses, so they again did nothing, and this time the Australian dollar didn’trally. Seeing one of the richest and most accomplished men on the planet loseeverything made a huge impression on me.
We also did one-offconsulting projects related to the markets. In 1985, I worked with Paul TudorJones, a good friend and a great trader, to design a U.S. dollar futurescontract (a tradable index tracking the price of the U.S. dollar against abasket of foreign currencies) that traded (and still trades) on the New YorkCotton Exchange. I also worked with the New York Futures Exchange to helpdesign and market their CRB futures contract (a tradable index that tracks theprice of a basket of commodities).
Unlike most people whowork in the markets, I never had any desire to build investment products,especially conventional ones, just because they would sell well. All I wantedwas to trade the markets and build relationships, doing for our clients exactlywhat I would do if I were in their shoes. But I also loved building brand-newthings, especially if they were great and revolutionary. By the mid-1980s, acouple of things were clear to me: First, we were making good calls in theinterest-rate and currency markets, and the institutional investment managerswho were buying our research were using it to make money. Second, we weresuccessfully managing companies’ interest-rate and currency exposures. Withthose two things going as well as they were, I figured we could becomesuccessful institutional investment managers ourselves. So I made the pitch tothe people who ran the World Bank’s pension
That was a hugeturning point for us, as it was the start of Bridgewater as we know it today.The strategy we used for the World Bank shifted between holding cash andholding twenty-year U.S. Treasury bonds, because these positions would give usleveragedbets on thedirection of interest rates. When our systems indicated that the pressures oninterest rates would cause them to fall, we would hold twenty-year Treasurybonds, and when the system pointed to rates rising, we would stay in cash. Wedid very well, and before long other large institutional investors gave usmoney to manage as well. Mobil Oil and Singer were our next two accounts andothers followed in rapid succession. We went on to become the top-performingU.S. bond manager in the world.
译文：这项措施在于建立“风险中性”基准位，可测量的业务一旦超越基准位，我们称这一种投资管理叫“ALPHA 压制”，这当中“消极beta”和“积极ALPHA”是分离的。
市场回报（例如股票市场）被称为beta。Alpha 是来自于其他方面的赌博。举例，一些人在股票市场表现相当突出，而另一些人则很糟糕；他们被称为积极或消极alpha。随着alpha压制，我们都在市场表现下独立的赌博。用这种方法接近市场教会我成为一名成功的投资人的唯一方法是加注在你自信的领域并分散投资。1980年代中期一个我们的客户叫阿兰邦德，一位大胆的企业家-他是澳大利亚最富有的人之一，一个靠自己努力发家的人，他因为第一个非美国人赢得在132年历史上的美洲杯帆船赛事而出名。像邦克、亨特一样，他最终加注失败面临宣布破产。我建议他和他的团队坚持自己的路，挺过失败，我总是看着悲剧上演落幕。他是一个典型乱中取利，并两边下注最终失败的人。
邦德借美元购买类似澳大利亚的酿酒厂这样的资产。他这样做因为美元在美国的利率比澳大利亚低，这样他就能及时偿还债务，当美元开始在1980年代中期利率上升，超过澳大利亚的美元利率时，他的澳大利亚酒厂的利润不足以偿还债务，他的团队打电话给我寻求建议。我计算了邦德公司的及时止损位并建议他们及时止损，所以我建议他们等待。当澳大利亚元开始恢复，我建议他们扎进篱笆，但他们觉得货币问题已经过去。不久，澳大利亚元跌倒新低，他们叫我参加一次紧急会议。除了严重损失外他们能做的不多，所以再一次他们没有任何动作，这一次澳大利亚元没有回升，看着这个星球上最富有最有才能的人失去所有东西给了我极大的震撼。
我们也做一次性的和市场相关的咨询项目。1985年，我和保罗工作，一个非常好的朋友和一个伟大的贸易家，去设计美元期货契约（与不同国家货币的美元价格交易索引）-在纽约棉花交易市场进行贸易（现在仍旧在）。我还和纽约期货贸易合作以帮助设计和规划他们的crb期货交易（一个可交易的索引-依照一揽子商品价格）。
我不像其他多数在市场工作的人，我从来没有兴趣去建立投资产品？，尤其是传统的产品，仅仅因为他们都卖的很好。而我想要的仅仅是在市场交易并建立良好关系，做我该做的。但是我也热衷建立新品牌，尤其如果是伟大和革命性的事情。1980年代中期有两件事已经很明显了，第一，我们已经确立很好的名声在利率和货币市场，那些公共事务管理人通过购买我们的研究都赚到了钱。第二，我们在管理公司利率和货币风险方面做得很成功。随着这两件事的良好运行，我觉得我们自己应该成为成功的公共事务投资人。所以我开始关注运营世界银行退休金的人。
对我们来说这是个巨大的转折点，就像你今天知道的一样，桥水基金的开始，我们应用于世界银行的战略在持有现金和持有二十年美元债券之间摇摆，因为这些会帮助我们利率风向的杠杆赌注。当我们的系统提示利率压力可能导致下调，我们回持有二十年美元债券，当系统提示利率上升，我们会保有现金。我们做的很好，早在其他大型公共事务投资人付钱让我们管理同时。美孚石油和辛乐使我们的下两个账户并且其他人开始跟随进入快速致富。我们开始成为世界顶尖的美元债券管理人。
读后感：本章很杂，而且有大量的金融术语，翻译很困难，我尽量让自己和大家能明白。
现在的经济情况下，也建议大家像作者那样，持有现金或者长期国债，别轻易投资或者买不动产，比如房子之类的，捂紧钱袋子，高筑墙，广积粮，缓出手。
Benchmark==基准 参照。
Mobil Oil==美孚石油
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我是007李小军，以上是我自己的翻译，也许不会太准确，我能保证也不会偏离作者的意思太远，不至于误导各位，谢谢观看。
007-4478李小军
2018-6-20
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