英文早读第103篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。
Our purchases of Berhshire started at a price of 7.60 per share in 1962. This price partially reflected large losses incurred by the prior management in closing some of the mills made obsolete by changing conditions within the textile business (which the old management had been quite slow to recognize). In the postwar period the company had slid downhill a considerable distance, having hit a peak in 1948 when about 29 1/2 million was earned before tax and about 11,000 workers were employed. This reflected output from 11 mills.
我们购买伯克希尔开始于1962年以每股7.60美元。这个价格部分反映了大额损失由之前的管理团队关闭一些由于纺织行业环境变化导致过时的工厂引起的（老的管理层很缓慢才意识到这些）。在战后时期这家公司下坡路很久，在1948年的顶峰当税前2950万美金盈利和大约11000名工人被雇佣。这是11家工厂的结果。
At the time we acquired control in spring of 1965, Berkshire was down to two mills and about 2,300 employees. It was a very pleasant surprise to find that the remaining units had excellent management personnel, and we have not had to bring a single man from the outside into the operation. In relation to our beginning acquisition cost of 7.60 per share (the average cost, however, was 14.86 per share, reflecting very heavy purchases in early 1965), the company on December 31, 1965, had net working capital alone (before placing any value on the plants and equipment) of about 19 per share.
在1965年春天我们获得控制席位时，伯克希尔减少到2家工厂和大约2300名雇员。这是一个非常令人满意的惊喜发现剩下的部分有卓越的管理层，我们不需要从外界引入任何一个人去运作。相比于我们开始7.60每股的获得成本（平均花费，然而是14.86美金每股，反映了1965年早期非常重量级的购买），在1965年12月31日，单单这家公司的净运营资金就有大约19美金每股（在包含任何工厂和设备价值前）。
Berkshire is a delight to own. There is no question that the state of the textile industry is the dominant factor in determining the earning power of the business, but we are most fortunate to have Ken Chace running the business in a first-class manner, and we also have several of the best sales people in the business heading up this end of their respective divisions.
伯克希尔是令人高兴的去拥有。毫无疑问纺织行业现状是决定这个业务盈利能力的首要因素，但是我们非常幸运拥有肯 查思以一流水平运营这个业务，并且我们也拥有几个最佳销售人员在这个业务中带领他们各自的部门。
While a Berkshire is hardly going to be as profitable as a Xerox, Fairchild Camera or National Video in a hypertensed market, it is a very comfortable sort of thing to own. As my West Cost philosopher says," It is well to have a diet consisting of oatmeal as well as cream puffs."
尽管伯克希尔很难像Xerox，Fairchild Camera或者National Video一样在高压的市场具备的盈利能力，他也是非常舒适的类型去拥有。如我的西海岸哲学家所说，“最好饮食结构包含燕麦片和奶油泡芙。”
Because of our controlling interest, our investment in Berkshire is valued for our audit as a business, not as a marketable security. If Berkshire advances 5 per share in the market, it does BPL no good - our holdings are not going to be sold. Similarly, if it goes down 5 per share, it is not meaningful to us. The value of our holding is determined directly by the value of the business. I received no divine inspiration in that valuation of our holdings. (Maybe the owners of the three wonder stocks mentioned above do receive such a message in respect to their holdings - I feel I would need something at least that reliable to sleep well at present prices.) I attempt to apply a conservative valuation based upon my knowledge of assets, earning power, industry conditions, competitive position, etc. We would not be a seller of our holdings at such a figure, but neither would we be a seller of the other items in our portfolio at yearend valuations - otherwise, we would already have sold them.
因为我们的控制股份，我们在伯克希尔的投资对于我们的审计以业务来估值，而不是以市场化证券。如果伯克希尔在股市每股涨5美元，对巴菲特合伙基金没有好处——我们的股份不会被出售。类似的，如果每股下跌5美金，对我们也没有意义。我们的股份价值直接由业务价值决定。我不会从我们股份的市值上带来任何激励。（或许上面提到的这三家美妙的股票持有者考虑到他们的持股需要收到这样的信息——我觉得我至少需要一些信息即以现在的价格还可以睡得好）。我试图运用一个保守的估值基于我对资产、盈利能力、行业状况、竞争位置等等的知识。我将不会以这个数值作为我们持股的卖家，但也不会以年末估值作为我们组合中其他项目的卖家——否则，我们已经卖过了。
53.mill：磨坊；工厂；面粉厂
54.obsolete：过时的；淘汰的；废弃的
55.postwar：二战后的；战后不久的
56.slid：滑行；滑动；贬值；逐渐降低
57.downhill：下坡的；下山的；下斜的
58.personnel：全体人员；职员；人事部门；人事科
59.in relation to：涉及；关于；与……相比较
60.plant：工厂；设备；植物
61.delight：高兴；快乐；乐趣；令人高兴的事
62.hypertensed：高压的；令人紧张的
63.oatmeal：燕麦片
64.cream puff：奶油泡芙
65.divine：神圣的；天赐的；绝妙的；极美的
