CHAPTER 4 第四章
SYSTEMIZING OURLEARNING FROM MISTAKES
从错误中系统化学习
Of course we continuedto make mistakes, though they were all within our range of expectations. Whatwas great is that we made the most of our mistakes because we got in the habitof viewing them as opportunities to learn and improve. One of our mostmemorable mistakes happened in the early 1990s, when Ross, who was in charge oftrading at the time, forgot to put in a trade for a client and the money justsat there in cash. By the time the mistake was discovered, the damage wasseveral hundred thousand dollars.
It was a terrible andcostly error, and I could’ve done something dramatic like fire Ross to set atone that mistakes would not be tolerated. But since mistakes happen all thetime, that would have only encouraged other people to hide theirs, which wouldhave led to even bigger and more costly errors. I believed strongly that weshould bring problems and disagreements to the surface to learn what should bedone to make things better. So Ross and I worked to build out an “error log” inthe trading department. From then on, anytime there was any kind of bad outcome(a trade wasn’t executed, we paid significantly higher transaction costs thanexpected, etc.), the traders would make a record of it and we would follow up.As we consistently tracked and addressed those issues, our trade executionmachine continually improved.
Having a process thatensures problems are brought to the surface, and their root causes diagnosed,assures that continual improvements occur.
For that reason I insistedthat an issue log be adopted throughout Bridgewater. My rule was simple: Ifsomething went badly, you had to put it in the log, characterize its severity,and make clear who was responsible for it. If a mistake happened and you loggedit, you were okay. If you didn’t log it, you would be in deep trouble. This waymanagers had problems brought to them, which was worlds better than having toseek them out. The error log (which we now call the issue log) was our firstmanagement tool. I learned subsequently how important tools are in helping toreinforce desired behaviors, which led us to create a number of tools I willdescribe later.
This culture ofbringing problems and disagreements to the surface generated a lot ofdiscomfort and conflict, especially when it came to exploring people’sweaknesses. Before long, things came to a boil.
译文：当然我们也在继续犯错，尽管都在我们的预期范围内。最伟大的地方时我们犯的绝大多数错误我们都见他视为一次学习和进步的机会，而且我们有点形成习惯了。我们记忆中最深刻的一次是在1990年早期，当时罗斯—他那时候负责交易，忘记一笔交易，当时现金刚好就在那里。错误发现时，大概损失了好十几万。
非常可怕、代价很高的一次错误，我本可以做点什么比如辞掉罗斯以便于树立一个基调这样的错误是不能容忍的。但是既然错误已经发生了，那就只能鼓励其他人避免再犯更大更高代价的错误。我深信我们应该把问题和不一致摆到桌面上来谈看看我们怎么能做的更好。所以落实和我开始着手建立一个错误日志。从那时候起，任何时候如果发生任何类型的不好的后果（例如一个交易不能进行，我们付出了比预期高得多的交易成本等等），交易员会做一个记录，我们也会跟随。当我们步调一致的跟踪和定位那些文件，我们的交易执行机器得到了持续的提升。
确保有一个流程能将问题表面化，判断根源，确保那套持续进步有效运作。
因为那个原因我坚持在桥水基金采纳了结果日志。我的原则很简单：如果有些事往坏处发展，你应该放入日志中，严格分类，明确责任。如果一个错误发生并记录日志，你就没问题额。如果你没有，你可能有大麻烦。这样管理人员可能会因此遇到问题-本可以更好的解决的。错误记录（现在我们叫它结果日志）使我们第一个管理工具。我陆续才知道工具在增强期望行为方面是多么的重要，这也导致后来我们制作了一系列的工具，我后面会描述的。
这种将问题和不一致公开化和表面化的问题带来了大量的冲突和矛盾。尤其当揭示人们的弱点时。没多久，事情就到了沸点。
读后感：建立错误日志和档案，并计入系统，让系统来分类和提供专家知识库，以指导后来的操作。虽然不是计算机行业但是作者很显然有很多计算机的知识和思维。
个人也可以建立错误日志，并自建纠错系统和预警系统。你说那？
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我是007李小军，以上是我自己的翻译，也许不会太准确，我能保证也不会偏离作者的意思太远，不至于误导各位，谢谢观看。
007-4478李小军
2018-7-10
觉得好，就点赞，就转发， 谢了！
