Two Early Ideals
第二章 早期理想
THE ROMANTIC LEGACY
浪漫主义的遗产
To introduce Hegel it is not sufficient to consider the problems he faced; it is also necessary to know the ideals he wanted to achieve. What were Hegel’s basic values? How did he think philosophy should help us to achieve them? These questions are the most important that we can ask about any philosopher, especially Hegel. We cannot understand his philosophy if we interpret it simply in technical terms, as if it were only a set of arguments, a series of deductions, or a systematic structure; for we still need to ask the more basic question: What were all these arguments, these deductions, and this system for? Although Hegel sometimes writes as if philosophy were an end in itself, serving no higher goal than contemplation, a consideration of his intellectual development shows that he became a philosopher to serve moral, political and religious ends.
对介绍黑格尔而言，仅仅考虑他所面对的那些问题是不够的；还必须了解他想要去达成的那些理想。黑格尔的基本价值有哪些？他是如何设想哲学能够帮助我们实现这些价值的？这些是我们可以询问任何哲学家的最重要的问题，尤其是黑格尔。如果我们仅仅从术语的角度去解释黑格尔哲学，是不能理解它的，好像它仅仅是一套论证，一系列推论，或者一个体系性的结构；我们还需要问一些更基本的问题：所有这些论证、推论和体系究竟是为了什么？尽管黑格尔有时候写道，仿佛哲学就是目的本身，不再服务于比沉思更高的目标，但细想一下他的思想发展历程就可以显示，他之成为一个哲学家，是服务于道德、政治和宗教目的的。
Hegel’s early ideals grew out of early German romanticism, the period sometimes called Frühromantik.1 This intellectual movement flourished from 1797 to 1802 in Jena and Berlin. Among its leading lights were Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher, Ludwig Tieck and, though somewhat on its fringes, Hölderlin. The romantic circle would hold meetings at the literary salons of Rahel Levin and Henriette Herz in Berlin, and at the household of A.W. Schlegel in Jena. Though Hegel never attended these meetings, and though he came to Jena only after its ‘literary frenzy’ had faded, he was still greatly influenced by the romantics. The crucial channels of influence were his close friends, Schelling and Hölderlin. Some of Hegel’s Frankfurt writings, especially the 1797/8 Sketches on Religion and Love and the 1797–9 Spirit of Christianity, are typical of the romantic spirit.
黑格尔的早期理想产生于早期德国浪漫主义，这个阶段有时候被称作Frühromantik（早期浪漫派）。1这场思想运动自1797年到1802年在耶拿与柏林蓬勃发展。它的中流砥柱（leading lights）有弗里德里希·施莱格尔、弗里德里希·冯·哈登贝格（诺瓦利斯）、弗里德里希·威廉·约瑟夫·谢林、弗里德里希·丹尼尔·施莱尔马赫、路德维希·蒂克，以及虽然有些边缘的荷尔德林。浪漫派的圈子会在柏林拉赫尔·莱温（Rahel Levin）和亨列特·赫茨（Henriette Herz）的文学沙龙，以及在耶拿A. W.施莱格尔家里举行集会。尽管黑格尔从未出席此类集会，并且尽管他只是在其“文学狂飙突进运动”消退之后才去的耶拿，但他还是受到了浪漫主义者的极大影响。影响他的至关重要的通道，是他最亲近的朋友——谢林和荷尔德林。黑格尔法兰克福时期的部分著作，尤其是1797~1798年的《论宗教与爱的残篇》和1797~1799年的《基督教精神》，都充满了典型的浪漫主义精神。
Although the importance of the romantic legacy seems obvious, it has lately become unpopular even to associate Hegel with romanticism. Walter Kaufmann, Shlomo Avineri and Georg Lukács, to name a few, have argued strenuously against any conflation of Hegel with the romantics, even in his early years.2 There is an important element of truth to this. Hegel came into his own only in his later Jena years (1804–7) when he reacted against some of the central ideas of the romantic circle. The preface to the Phenomenology is his Abschiedsbrief, his settling of accounts with the romantics. We can see some of these critical tendencies even in the early fragments, so it would be a mistake to see Hegel as a romantic pure and simple even in his Frankfurt years.
尽管浪漫主义遗产的重要性看起来是显而易见的，但是，甚至是将黑格尔和浪漫主义联系起来不久前也变得不流行了。举例来说，瓦尔特·考夫曼、所罗门·阿维内里和乔治·卢卡奇，已经强烈反对任何把黑格尔和浪漫主义者糅合在一起的做法，即便是黑格尔早期也是如此。2就这一点而言，有一些重要的真理要素。黑格尔仅仅是在他的耶拿晚期（1804-1807），反叛了浪漫派圈子的某些核心理念之后，才成为他自己的。《精神现象学》序言就是他的分手信（Abschiedsbrief），是他和浪漫派之间的清理账户。甚至是在早期残篇中，我们也能看到这些批判的某些倾向，因此，即便把法兰克福时期的黑格尔视为纯正的浪漫派，也会是一个错误。
Nevertheless, it is also a mistake to treat Hegel as a figure apart, as if we can understand him without the romantics, or as if he were fundamentally opposed to them. This would be anachronistic for the early Hegel; but it would also be inaccurate about the later Hegel, who never entirely freed himself from romantic influence. His distinguishing features are still within a common genus. What seems to be a difference in quality is very often only one of quantity or emphasis. It is indeed a very common mistake of Hegel scholarship to regard ideas as distinctly Hegelian that are in fact common to the whole romantic generation. Hegel’s absolute idealism, his organic conception of nature, his critique of liberalism, his communitarian ideals, his vitalized Spinozism, his concept of dialectic, his attempt to synthesize communitarianism and liberalism – all these ideas are sometimes seen as uniquely Hegelian; but they were part of the common romantic legacy.
然而，把黑格尔当作一个孤立的人物，好像我们可以离开浪漫派来理解他，或者仿佛他和浪漫派在根本是相互对立的，这也是一个错误。这对早期黑格尔来说将是一个时代错误；它对于后期黑格尔来说也是不准确的，他从未完全摆脱浪漫主义的影响。他的独特特征也还是在一个共同的种属之内的。看起来是质上的差异，经常不过是一种量的差异或侧重点上的不同。把那些事实上是整个浪漫主义的一代人共同具有的理想认作黑格尔独有的，这的确是黑格尔的研究者一个非常常见的错误。黑格尔的绝对唯心主义、他的有机自然概念、他对自由主义的批判、他提倡社群主义的理想、他对斯宾诺莎主义的重新激活、他的辩证法概念、他综合社群主义和自由主义的努力——所有这些理念有时被视为黑格尔独具的；但它们其实是浪漫主义共同遗产的一部分。
Hegel scholars have often been led astray by Hegel’s own polemics. They accept these polemics as infallible, as if what Hegel says about his differences with the romantics had to be true simply because Hegel knew himself best. But sometimes the polemics distance Hegel from the romantics only at the cost of obscuring or disguising his own affinity with them. When, for example, in the preface to the Phenomenology Hegel states that his own view is that the absolute is not only substance but also subject, Hegel scholars take this as a distinguishing feature of Hegel’s philosophy over Schelling’s and the romantics. But what Hegel claimed as his own project – the attempt to combine substance and subject, Spinoza and Fichte – was a common enterprise of the romantic generation.3
黑格尔的研究者经常被黑格尔自己的论战所误导。他们接受这些论战，认为它们是绝对可靠的，仿佛黑格尔就他和浪漫主义者的区别所言必定是真的——很简单，因为黑格尔最了解他自己。但有时候，论战使黑格尔与浪漫主义者拉开的距离，不过是以模糊或掩饰他自己与他们的亲缘性为代价的。比如，当黑格尔在《精神现象学》序言中陈述他自己的观点“绝对不仅是实体而且是主体”时，黑格尔的研究者把这当作是黑格尔哲学超越了谢林哲学和浪漫主义者的一个显著特征。但是，黑格尔宣称的他自己的规划——尝试着把实体与主体、斯宾诺莎与费希特连接在一起——也是浪漫主义那代人共同的事业。3
The reason many scholars have separated Hegel from the romantic generation is that they have a very anachronistic conception of Frühromantik that virtually equates it with the later more reactionary tendencies of Spätromantik. Their conception of Hegel’s intellectual context rests upon a neglect of the early philosophical works of the romantics, the unpublished fragments of Schleiermacher, Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel and Hölderlin, most of which have been accessible in critical editions only in the last fifty years. A careful study of these fragments is a fundamental desideratum of Hegel studies; it alone will allow us to locate him historically and to determine his individuality.
许多学者将黑格尔和浪漫主义那代人分开来的原因，是他们对早期浪漫派（Frühromantik）抱有一种时代错误的观念，实际上将它同后来更具保守倾向的晚期浪漫派（Spätromantik）等同起来了。他们关于黑格尔思想背景的观念，是建立在对于早期浪漫主义的哲学著作的忽略的基础之上的，施莱尔马赫、诺瓦利斯、弗里德里希·施莱格尔和荷尔德林等人的未出版的残篇，大多数只是在近五十年间才因为收入了历史考证版而可以利用。对这些残篇进行细致的分析，是黑格尔研究中一项根本性的迫切需要；唯有这样，我们才能在历史上给黑格尔定位并确定他的个体性。
THE HIGHEST GOOD
至善
To know Hegel’s fundamental values, it is necessary to go back to a classical but neglected question of ethics: What is the highest good? This question concerns the ultimate values in life, and indeed the purpose of life itself. Aristotle had explicitly defined the concept in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.4 He argued that the highest good has two fundamental components: finality and completeness. The highest good is final in the sense that it is always an end and never a means; and it is complete in the sense that it cannot be made better by the addition of any other good. Although Aristotle’s question had been central to ancient and medieval ethics, it had lost much of its importance in the early modern era. Locke and Hobbes had belittled it, claiming that what is good is simply relative to the desires of the agent.5 But the question never disappeared in German philosophy. It was always implicit in the Protestant tradition as the question ‘What is the vocation of man [die Bestimmung des Menschen]?’ With the revival of classical learning in mid-eighteenth-century Germany, the question took on a whole new lease of life. It was an important issue for the early romantic generation, especially for Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher and Hegel himself.6
为了了解黑格尔有哪些基础性的价值，有必要回到伦理学的一个经典但为人忽略的问题：什么是至善？这个问题关注的是生命的终极价值，实际上关注的是生活本身的目的。亚里士多德在《尼各马可伦理学》第一卷中对这个概念下过明确的定义。4他认为至善有两个基本成份：终极和完满。就其总是目的而从不是手段的意义而言，至善是终极的；就其不能经由任何其它善的添加而得到改进的意义而言，至善是完满的。尽管亚里士多德的问题在古代和中世纪的伦理学里居于中心地位，但在现代早期，它的重要性已经极大丧失了。洛克和霍布斯轻视它，声称“什么是善”仅仅与行为者的欲望（the desires of the agent）相关。5但这一问题从未在德国哲学中消失。它一直以“何为人的规定[die Bestimmung des Menschen]”这一问题形式暗含在新教传统当中。随着古典学术在十八世纪德国的复兴，这一问题完全重获新生。对于早期浪漫派，尤其是对于弗里德里希·施莱格尔、施莱尔马赫和黑格尔本人来说，这是一个重要的问题。6
We can formulate the highest good of Hegel and the young romantic generation in a single phrase, one they would often use and constantly imply: unity of life (Einheit des Lebens). The highest good, the end of life, consists in achieving unity, wholeness or harmony in all aspects of our being. This unity holds on three levels: with oneself, with others, and with nature. The main threat to such unity consists in division (Entzweiung) or alienation (Entfremdung). Though the self should live in unity with itself, others and nature, it finds itself divided from itself and from them. Its goal is to overcome these divisions and achieve unity, so that it is again ‘at home in the world’ (in die Welt zu Hause).
我们可以用一个短语，一个他们经常使用或不断暗示的短语，来明确概括黑格尔和青年浪漫派的至善观点：生活的统一性（Einheit des Lebens）。至善、生活的目的，在于统一性、整体性，或者我们存在的所有方面的和谐一致。这种统一性一以贯之地体现在三个层面：与自己、与他人，以及与自然。对这种统一性的主要威胁在于二元分裂（Entzweiung）和异化（Entfremdung）。尽管自我应当生活在与自我、他人和自然的统一中，但它又常常发现自己被迫同自己、他人和自然分裂开来。它的目标就是克服这些分裂以达成统一，由此重新获得“在世界中就是在家”（in die Welt zu Hause）的状态。
The ultimate source for this ideal of the unity of life was classical antiquity, and more specifically the works of Plato and Aristotle.7 One crucial fact about Hegel, Hölderlin, Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel, and Schleiermacher is that, from an early age, they were enthusiastic students of the Greek classics, all of which they read in the original. In the Tübinger Stift Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling formed a reading club that often read Plato. Rosenkranz informs us of how Hegel had mastered Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics by the age of 18.8
这种有关生活统一性的理想，其最终渊源是古典时代，尤其是柏拉图和亚里士多德的著作。7有关黑格尔、荷尔德林、谢林、弗里德里希·施莱格尔和施莱尔马赫的一个至关重要的事实是，从很早的时候开始，他们就是热衷于古希腊经典的学生，所有这些著作他们都是用原文阅读的。在图宾根神学院，黑格尔、荷尔德林和谢林组织了一个读书会，经常阅读柏拉图。罗森克兰茨告诉我们，黑格尔18岁的时候对亚里士多德的《尼各马可伦理学》已经精熟到何种程度。8
The ideal of unity is present in Plato and Aristotle in many ways. First, Plato’s and Aristotle’s ideal of human excellence requires that the self be a whole, a harmony of reason and passion. Second, Plato and Aristotle insisted that the polis be an organism, where the whole cares for each part and each part lives for the whole. While they notoriously differed over how much diversity there should be in the state, both held that the ideal state should be an organic unity, having a single religion, art, morality, education and language for all citizens. Third, Plato and Aristotle understood nature in organic terms, as ‘a single visible living being’.9 In all these respects Plato and Aristotle presented the sharpest contrast with the modern worldview, whose self is divided into soul and body, whose state is a contract between self-interested parties, and whose concept of nature is mechanical. It was the great achievement of Hegel and the romantic generation to have reaffirmed the classical ideal of unity against the modern worldview.
统一性的理想，在柏拉图和亚里士多德的著作中有多种呈现方式。首先，柏拉图和亚里士多德关于卓越人性的理想，要求自我是一个整体，是理性与激情的和谐一致。其次，柏拉图和亚里士多德主张，城邦（polis）是一个有机体。在城邦中，整体关心每一个部分，而每一部分为整体而活着。尽管关于国家中应当在多大程度上保留多样性的问题，他们发生了众所周知的分歧，但是他们都认为，理想的国家应当是一个有机整体，所有公民有着唯一的宗教、艺术、道德、教育和语言。再次，柏拉图和亚里士多德以有机的方式，把自然理解为“一个单一的、可见的活物”9。在所有这些方面，柏拉图和亚里士多德与现代世界观之间形成鲜明的对照：现代世界观的自我被划分为灵魂和肉体，其国家是各个自私自利的政党之间的契约关系，而其自然的概念是机械论的。重新肯定古典的统一性理想以反对现代的世界观，是黑格尔和浪漫一代的伟大成就。
The young Hegel and the romantics had a very idealistic conception of ancient Greek life. Their paradigm for unity of life was that of fifth-century Athens. They had their own theory about the ancient Greek: that he lived in harmony with himself, with others and with nature. We scarcely need to bother about the historical accuracy of such a fanciful theory: it is a myth whose value entirely lies in what it tells us about the Germans rather than the ancient Greeks. The romantic conception of Greek life came from several sources: from Rousseau, Wieland, Herder and Schiller. But its ultimate source was that Homer of German myth, ‘the divine’ J.J. Winckelmann. It was Winckelmann who taught the Germans that Greek culture was an aesthetic whole. Winckelmann’s constant refrain that Greek life was ‘natural’ stemmed from his political conviction that the Greeks were a free people who could express their humanity. The political message behind Winckelmann’s classicism was never lost on a public weary of absolutism: we could all become Greeks if we were only free.
青年黑格尔和浪漫主义者，对古代希腊的生活持有一种十分理想主义的观念。他们关于生活统一性的范型，是公元前五世纪的雅典。关于古代希腊人，他们有着自己的一套理论，认为他生活在与自己、与他人，以及与自然的和谐一致中。我们几乎用不着去操心这种想象出来的理论的历史准确性：它是一种神话——这种神话的价值，全在于他们向我们讲述的有关德国人而非古希腊人的那些东西。关于希腊生活的浪漫主义概念，有几个来源：卢梭、维兰德（Wieland）、赫尔德和席勒。但它的最终根源是讲述德国神话的“荷马”——“圣”温克尔曼（J. J. Winckelmann）。正是温克尔曼教导德国人说，希腊文化是一个审美的整体。温克尔曼反复吟诵的是，希腊人的生活是从其政治确信中“自然”产生的：他们确信希腊人是一个能够表达他们人性的自由民族。温克尔曼古典主义背后的政治信息是，决不要迷失在一种对专制主义的社会厌倦中：只要我们是自由的，我们都能成为希腊人。
We can have a more definite idea of Hegel’s early ideals only if we consider each aspect of his highest good: unity with oneself, others and nature. This requires having a basic idea of romantic ethics, politics and religion.
只有当我们考虑到黑格尔至善观念的各个方面时——与自己、他人和自然的统一，我们才能对黑格尔的早期理想有一种更加确定的观念。这需要我们对浪漫主义的伦理、政治和宗教观念有基本的了解。
ETHICAL IDEALS
伦理理想
Romantic ethics has its source in the classical ideal of selfrealization or excellence. The romantic ideal was articulated by Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, Schleiermacher and Hölderlin. But the ideal had a long history before them, and was part of the legacy of German humanism. It is also found in Schiller, Herder, Wieland, Goethe, and Wilhelm von Humboldt.
浪漫派的伦理学，在自我实现或卓越这一古典理想中有其渊源。浪漫主义的理想是由弗里德里希·施莱格尔、诺瓦利斯、施莱尔马赫和荷尔德林等人系统阐述出来的。但在他们之前，这一理想有一段很长的历史，是德国人文主义遗产的一部分。在席勒、赫尔德、维兰德、歌德和威廉·冯·洪堡那里，我们也可以发现它。
The romantic ideal of excellence, of unity with oneself, consists of three basic components: (1) totality, that a person should develop all his or her characteristic human powers, (2) unity, that these powers be formed into a whole or unity, and (3) individuality, that this whole or unity should be individual or unique, characteristic of the person alone.
浪漫主义关于卓越、关于与自我相统一的理想，包含三个基本的方面：（1）总体性（totality），也就是说，一个人应当发展他所有的独具特色的人类能力；（2）统一性（unity），也就是说，这些能力组成一个整体或统一体；（3）个体性（individuality），也就是说，能力的整体或统一体，应当是个体性的或独一无二的，是这个人所单独特有的。
The demand for totality means that we should overcome all onesidedness, that we should not neglect any side of our being, because we are as human in our sensibility as in our reason. The demand for unity means that we should form all these powers into a single organic whole. The romantics would sometimes formulate the demand for unity in aesthetic terms. They insisted that we should make our lives into novels. Like all works of art, they should show unity in multiplicity, where the unity must be spontaneous, deriving from within rather than being imposed from without. The demand for individuality means that each person should develop not only those powers characteristic of humanity in general, but also those distinctive of her or his individuality; each work of art should be unique, expressive of the individual alone.
总体性的要求意味着，我们应当克服所有的片面性，我们应当不忽视我们存在的任何方面，因为我们既是凭借感性也是凭借理性而作为人存在的。统一性的要求意味着，我们应当将所有这些能力塑造成一个有机的整体。浪漫主义者有时以美学的方式来明确表达这种统一性的要求。他们坚称，我们应当把我们自己的生活变成小说。像所有的艺术作品一样，生活应当展示出一种多样性的统一，此处的统一性必须是自发的，源生于内而非从外部强加于其上的。个体性的要求意味着，每一个人不仅应当发展人性一般所特有的那些能力，而且应当发展那些使他的个体性得以彰显的那些能力；每一件艺术品都应当是独一无二的，是独特个体的表达。
The romantic ethic of self-realization has to be conceived in contrast against its two main alternatives: the utilitarianism of Bentham and Helvetius, which defined the highest good as happiness and happiness in terms of pleasure; and the ethics of duty of Kant and Fichte, which made the highest end in life the performance of moral duties. The romantics rejected utilitarianism because it sees human beings as passive consumers of pleasure and neglects the active development of characteristic human powers. They objected to the Kantian–Fichtean ethic because it divides human beings into reason and sensibility and develops rationality at the expense of sensibility.
浪漫主义自我实现的伦理，应当放到与它的两个主要替代选项的对照中来加以理解：一个是边沁（Bentham）和爱尔维修（Helvetius）的功利主义，他们以幸福定义至善，又根据快乐来理解幸福；另一个是康德和费希特的义务伦理学，他们把履行道德义务作为人生的最高目的。浪漫主义者拒绝功利主义，因为它把人类视为快乐的被动消费者，而忽略人所独具的能力之积极发展。他们反对康德—费希特主义的伦理学，因为它将人的存在区分为理性和感性，并以牺牲感性为代价来发展理性。
To achieve unity with oneself, the romantics, true to name, laid the greatest importance on the experience of love. They were greatly inspired by Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium where love unites the two sides of the soul, reason and need. They saw an ethics of love as indeed superior to an ethics of duty. Love supersedes duty because in acting from love we do our duty from rather than contrary to inclination. Although we act from self-interest in love, the self no longer separates its essential interests from others; rather, the self finds itself in others; it becomes what it is only through others, which it perceives as equal to and independent of itself.
为了实现与自我的统一，浪漫主义者名副其实地赋予了爱的经验以最大的重要性。他们受到柏拉图《斐德若篇》（Phaedrus）和《会饮篇》（Symposium）的极大启发，在这些篇章中，爱把灵魂的两个方面——理性与需要——结合在一起。他们认为爱的伦理学比义务伦理学的确要稍胜一筹。爱取代了责任，因为在以爱为取向的行为中，我们在履行我们的义务之时，是顺从而不是违逆我们的天性。尽管在爱中，我们是按照一己的利益而行动，但这个自我不再把它的根本利益与其他人区分开来；相反，这个自我在其他人中发现他自己；唯有通过那些他视为平等和独立于自己的那些他者，他才能成为它自己。
This ethic of love appears in Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Novalis and Hölderlin. Its father was Schiller, who had suggested it in his Philosophical Letters and Grace and Dignity.10 Perhaps its most enthusiastic exponent was Hegel himself. In his Spirit of Christianity he argued that love should be the fundamental principle of ethics, and that only love could overcome the dualisms of Kant’s ethics. In some early Frankfurt fragments he had developed a whole metaphysics of love, maintaining that the unity of subject and object, the identity of the self with the universe, is attained only through the experience of love.
这种爱的伦理，在弗里德里希·施莱格尔、施莱尔马赫、诺瓦利斯和荷尔德林那里都出现过。它的父亲是席勒，席勒在他的《哲学书简》（Philosophical Letters）与《秀美与尊严》（Grace and Dignity）中都提及过。10或许，这一伦理最激情满怀的阐释者是黑格尔本人。在《基督教精神》中，黑格尔论证了，爱应当是伦理学的基础性原则，并且唯有爱才可能克服康德伦理学的二元论。在某些早期的法兰克福残篇中，黑格尔发展了一整套爱的形而上学，断言唯有通过爱的经验，才能达到主客之间的统一，达到自我与宇宙的同一。
Although Hegel had great debts to the romantic ethic, he would later distance himself from it in two respects. First, Hegel did not lay the same high value on individuality. For Hegel, to be an individual means to have a specific place or role within society and the state.11 Hegel would later criticize Friedrich Schlegel’s concept of ‘divine egoism’ for its perverse and presumptuous separation of the individual from the social world. Second, despite his initial enthusiasm, Hegel abandoned the ethic of love. He began to realize that the feelings and inclinations of love are insufficiently universal to serve as the basis of moral and political life. I love my parents, my siblings, and my friends, perhaps, but not my compatriots, still less humanity in general. Hegel already knew this in the Frankfurt years; but he drew the full consequences from it only in his Jena years; by the time of the Philosophy of Right he had confined love to the ethical life of the family.12
尽管黑格尔极大地受惠于浪漫派伦理学，但他本人后来在两个方面与它保持了距离。首先，黑格尔不再赋予个体性以同样高的价值。对黑格尔来说，成为一个个体，就意味着在社会和国家中占据一个特殊的位置或扮演一个特殊的角色。11黑格尔后来对弗里德里希·施莱格尔的“神圣利己主义”（divine egoism）提出了批评，因为它刚愎自用，自以为是，将个体与社会世界分离开来。其次，尽管他早先满腔热情，黑格尔后来放弃了爱的伦理。他开始意识到，爱的情感和天性，不足以充当道德和政治生活的普遍基础。我爱我父母、我的兄弟姐妹，以及我的朋友，但是我爱的不是我的同胞（同国人），更不用说一般意义上的人了。在法兰克福时期，黑格尔已经认识到这一点；但只是到耶拿时期，他才从中推断出整个的后果；到了写作《法哲学》的时候，他已经把爱限定在家庭伦理生活的范围之中了。12
POLITICAL IDEAL
政治理想
The romantic ideal of unity with others is their concept of the organic state. The model for their organic state was the ancient republics of Greece and Rome. The romantic republic consists in (1) the right to participate in public affairs, to elect rulers and to determine public policy, (2) the freedom of its individual members, i.e. rights for equal protection of their property, freedom of speech and press, and (3) care of the state for the education and development of its citizens.
体现浪漫主义与他者合一的理想的，是他们的有机国家概念。他们的有机国家的模型，是希腊和罗马的古代共和国。浪漫主义的共和国有这样一些内涵：（1）参与公共事务、选举统治者和决定公共政策的权利；（2）共和国个体成员的自由，亦即平等保护他们财产的权利、言论和出版的自由；（3）关心国家对公民的教育与培养。
The romantic republic was, in part, a reaction against ‘the machine state’ of enlightened absolutism, where the command of the prince would set all wheels in motion If everything in enlightened absolutism was done for the people, it was never done by the people. Contrary to the machine state, the organic state would develop from the participation of its citizens. The romantic republic was also a reaction against the atomistic state of liberalism, which was held together by a contract between self-interested individuals. The romantics rejected this state as an attempt to square the circle: if agents act always on their self-interest, they will disobey the laws whenever they can avoid punishment, so that the only remedy would be total tyranny.
在某种程度上，浪漫主义的共和国是对启蒙专制主义“机械国家”的一种反拨；在“机械国家”中，君主的命令让所有的车轮转动起来。如果说在启蒙专制主义中所有的事情都是“为”人民而做的，那么，它从来都不是“由”人民来做的。与机械国家相反，有机国家将通过它的公民们的参与而得到发展。浪漫主义的共和国，也是对自由主义原子主义国家的一种反拨；这种原子主义国家，是通过自私自利的个人彼此之间订立契约而联结起来的。浪漫主义者拒绝这种国家，因为它是一种圆凿方枘的尝试：如果行为主体总是依照他们自己的利益行事，那么只要能够避开惩罚他们就会不遵从法律。因此，作为唯一的补救之道，就将是全面的暴政。
In the late 1790s and early 1800s the romantic ideal of the organic state underwent some transformation as a result of the course of the French Revolution. In response to the anarchism and chronic instability in France, Hegel and the romantics began to qualify their original classical ideals. They stressed the importance of historical continuity, the role of independent groups within the state, the value of a mixed constitution, and the importance of a central ruler (the monarch). The organic state became more historical, more pluralistic and more centralized. In all these respects it lost its classical inspiration. It is not surprising that in the early 1800s we find Hegel, Schlegel and Novalis looking back to the Middle Ages rather than classical antiquity. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the organic state never lost its democratic element, its constitutionalism and its belief in fundamental rights. This is true of Novalis, Schlegel, Schleiermacher until at least 1801; it remained true of Hegel throughout his life.
18世纪90年代末和19世纪初作为法国大革命进程的后果，浪漫主义的有机国家理想经历了一些变形。为了回应法国的无政府主义和长期的不稳定，黑格尔和浪漫主义者着手对他们初始的古典理想进行限制。他们强调历史连续性的重要性，强调国家内部独立团体的作用，强调混合宪政的价值，强调核心统治者（君主）的重要性。有机国家，变得更为历史化、更为多元化和更为中央集权化。在所有这些方面，它都丧失了其古典的灵感。因此，如果我们发现，19世纪初黑格尔、施莱格尔和诺瓦利斯把眼光投向了中世纪而不是古典古代，这是毫不足怪的。然而，如果说有机国家从未丧失它的民主因素、它的立宪主义，及其对基本权利的信念，这倒是公正的。对诺瓦利斯、施莱格尔、施莱尔马赫来说，至少到1801年，这一点是真实的；而对黑格尔来说，终其一生都是如此。
Although the romantics’ ideal state was inspired by classical Greece and Rome, there is one respect in which it was, from the very beginning, modern. This was the romantics’ insistence on freedom of the individual. The romantics wanted to have not only the classical freedom of democratic participation, but also the modern freedom of the rights of man. They knew all too well that the ancient republics did not value tolerance and individual freedom. They also realized that it was impossible to go back in history and to revive the ancient republics or the medieval constitution. Their ideal was to achieve a synthesis of the ancient ideal of community with the modern ideal of freedom. This was not a unique Hegelian ambition but the common goal of all romantic political thought.
尽管浪漫主义者的理想国家受到古典希腊罗马的启发，但这个理想自始就包含一个现代的方面。这便是浪漫主义者自始至终主张个体自由。浪漫主义者不仅想要民主参与意义上的古典自由，还想要人权意义上的现代自由。古典共和国并不认可宽容和个体自由的价值，对此他们实在太了解了。他们也意识到，开历史倒车，复兴古代的共和国或者中世纪的宪法，是绝无可能的。他们的理想，是实现古代共同体理想和现代自由之间的一种综合。这一点，不是黑格尔主义独有的雄心，而是所有浪漫主义政治思想的共同目标。
RELIGIOUS IDEAL
宗教理想
If we place the romantic ideal of the highest good in general historical perspective, it immediately becomes apparent that it is entirely immanent or this-worldly. The romantics held that the highest good is to be attained in this life, not in a world beyond it. If we achieve unity with ourselves, others and nature in this life, we have achieved the purpose of life, which serves no end beyond itself. The romantic conception of the highest good is therefore the negation of the classical Christian conception, according to which the highest good consists in eternal salvation. In Book XIX of the City of God Augustine had argued that the classical Aristotelian ideal of the highest good could not be realized in this life, which is only a vale of death, disease and distress. Famously, Augustine saw life on earth as a pilgrimage, a rite of passage, to an eternal destination. Selfconsciously, firmly, and passionately, Hegel and the romantics broke with the Augustinian tradition. It is indeed noteworthy that Hegel, along with Hölderlin and Schleiermacher, explicitly denied personal immortality and excoriated the entire ethic of salvation based on it. From his early Berne manuscripts to his 1831 lectures on the philosophy of religion Hegel attacked the ethic of salvation for its self-centered concern for the fate of the soul.13
如果我们把浪漫主义的至善理想放到普遍历史的视野之下，那么下面这一点立即变得显而易见：它是完全内在的或此世的。浪漫主义者认为，应当在此生而非彼岸来达成至善。如果我们在此生实现了与我们自己、他人以及自然之间的统一，那么我们就实现了人生目的，而这种人生目的并不为一个超越此生的目标服务。因此，浪漫主义的至善概念是对古典基督教至善概念的一种否定，按照后者，至善在于永恒的救赎。奥古斯丁在《上帝之城》第十九卷中提出，亚里士多德主义的古典至善理想并不能在此生实现，此生不过是一条由死亡、疾病和不幸汇成的溪流。奥古斯丁有一个著名的见解，把地上的生活看作一场通向永恒终点的朝圣之旅和死亡之旅。黑格尔和浪漫主义者自觉地、坚定地和满怀激情地与奥古斯丁的传统决裂。十分值得注意的是，黑格尔沿着荷尔德林和施莱尔马赫的路子，明确否认了个人的不朽，严厉斥责了建基于这种不朽之上的一整套救赎伦理。从其早期的伯尔尼手稿到1831年的宗教哲学讲演，黑格尔都对救赎伦理进行了抨击，抨击它以自我为中心对灵魂命运的关切。13
True to his immanent ideal of the highest good, Hegel believed that the meaning of life could and should be achieved in the community alone. We find satisfaction and purpose in our lives, he argued, when, like the ancient Roman and Greek, we contribute to the common good and help to create its laws. The ancient Greeks found immortality and meaning in their lives by living for the polis, which was a whole greater than themselves, and which they knew would survive them; they had no concern for their individual salvation, for the fate of their soul after death. In Hegel’s view, the Christian ethic of personal salvation was only a cry of desperation, a feeble Ersatz, after the loss of community. This ethic arose in the first place only because of the decline of the ancient republics. When people lost their freedom to govern themselves, they could no longer find meaning by participating in communal life; and so, out of despair, they sought the source of meaning in a world beyond the earth.
忠实于其内在的至善理想，黑格尔相信，生活的意义能够并且应当只是在共同体中才能实现。他论证说，当我们像古代罗马和希腊人那样，为“共同善”作出贡献和创立其法则的时候，我们就在我们的生活中获得满足和发现了目的。古希腊人通过为城邦而活，建立他们的不朽和人生意义。城邦是比他们自己更伟大的整体，并且他们知道城邦比他们能存活得更长久；他们不关心他们自己的个体救赎，不关心他们死后灵魂的命运。在黑格尔看来，基督教个人救赎的伦理，不过是失去共同体之后的一种绝望的哭喊，一种微不足道的补偿（Ersatz）。这种伦理的兴起，首先仅只是因为古代共和国的没落。当人们失去了支配自己的自由时，他们就不再能够通过参与公共生活来发现意义；因此，出于绝望，他们在超世间中寻找意义的源泉。
Hegel and the romantics were stalwart opponents not only of the Christian ideal of the highest good but also of the traditional forms of Christian theology. They abhorred both theism and deism. The source of their animus against theism was essentially political: theism had been part of the ideology of the ancien régime, a pillar of the old alliance of throne and altar. Because of the legacy of enlightened criticism, they also had little faith in the Bible, the mainstay of theism. The source of their antipathy to deism was more cultural: it had been a powerful force in alienating the self from nature. Because the deist still clung to the old dogma of a supernatural soul, he placed the self outside nature, which he saw as nothing more than a gloomy machine. Since God existed in a supernatural realm and had abandoned nature after its creation, the natural realm lost its divine significance.
黑格尔和浪漫主义者坚持不懈地反对的，不仅是基督教的至善理想，而且还有基督教神学的传统形式。他们既痛恨一神论，也痛恨自然神论。他们对一神论产生敌意的根源本质上是政治的：一神论曾经是“旧制度”（ancien régime）意识形态的一部分，是王座和祭坛之间古老联盟的支柱。由于启蒙运动批判的遗产，他们也几乎不信仰《圣经》这根一神论的中流砥柱。他们反感自然神论的根源更多地是文化的：自然神论曾经是造就自我与自然相异化的强大力量。因为自然神论者紧抱着“超自然的灵魂”这一古老教条不放，他把自我置于自然之外，而自然在他看来不过是一架黯淡无光的机械。既然上帝存在于超自然的王国，并且由于上帝创造自然之后就抛弃了它，自然王国也就因此失去了它神圣的意义。
Although their ideal of the highest good was entirely immanent, and although they were opposed to traditional forms of theology, Hegel and the romantics were still religious. Their conception of the divine, like their conception of the highest good, was entirely immanent. They held on to the traditional concepts of the infinite – the ens realissimum, that of which nothing greater can be conceived – but they interpreted them in immanent terms to be the universe as a whole. Only such an immanent conception of the divine, they believed, would overcome the self’s alienation from nature. The self would identify itself with nature only if it were a mode of the single infinite substance, a part of the universal whole.
尽管他们的至善理想是完全内在的，尽管他们反对神学的传统形式，但黑格尔和浪漫主义者的思想仍然是宗教性的。他们关于神圣的概念，如同他们关于至善的概念一样，是完全内在的。他们坚持传统的无限概念——最实在的存在者（ens realissimum），不能设想任何比它更伟大的事物——但他们按照内在的方式将它们解释成为一个整体的宇宙。他们相信，唯有这一内在的神圣概念，才能克服自我与自然之间的异化。唯有当自我是宇宙整体的一个部分，是那个唯一无限的实体的一种样式的时候，才能将自己与自然等同起来。
The most important forebear and model for this immanent conception of the infinite was, of course, Spinoza, whose doctrines underwent a dramatic renaissance in Germany as a result of the pantheism controversy. Growing up in the 1790s, the young romantics were inevitably drawn into the vortex of this dispute. Their notebooks give more than ample evidence of their study of, and sympathy for, Spinozism. For them, Spinoza was ‘der Gott betrunkene Mensch’ (the man drunk with God).14 To write ‘Hen kai pan’ – ‘Eins und Alles’ (one and all) – in Stammbücher became something of a fashion. Famously, in his Speeches on Religion Schleiermacher asks us to make an offering to ‘the holy rejected Spinoza’.15
当然，这种内在的无限的思想最重要的先驱和典型是斯宾诺莎。作为泛神论论辩的结果，斯宾诺莎的学说在德国遭遇了一种戏剧性的复兴。18世纪90年代成长起来的青年浪漫派，不可避免地卷入了这场争论的漩涡当中。他们的笔记充分表明，他们不仅研究斯宾诺莎，而且同情斯宾诺莎。对他们来说，斯宾诺莎是“der Gott betrunkene Mensch”（沉醉于上帝之中的人）。14在留言册（Stammbücher）中写上“Hen kai pan”——“Eins und Alles”（一与一切）——成为了某种时尚。施莱尔马赫在他的《宗教演讲录》中，发出一个著名的号召，要求我们献祭于“一位圣洁的、被拒绝的斯宾诺莎”。15
What did Hegel and the young romantics get from Spinoza? What they saw in him was first and foremost his attempt to rationalize religion. Spinoza’s famous dictum deus sive natura, his identification of God with the infinitude of nature, seemed to resolve the conflict between reason and faith that had preoccupied philosophers and theologians throughout the Enlightenment. Spinoza’s dictum divinized nature as much as it naturalized the divine, and so it seemed to make a religion out of science, a science out of religion. If God were the same as ‘the one and all’ – if the divine were the creative force of nature, the dynamic unity behind all its laws – then there would be no reason to oppose reason and faith. Instead, the objects of religion and science would be one and the same. The case for Spinozism seemed only strengthened by the weakness of its traditional rivals, theism and deism, which, by the end of the eighteenth century, were on their last legs. Theism not only rested its case on miracles, which were hard to square with science, but it also suffered greatly from the new biblical criticism. For its part, deism had simply collapsed under the relentless barrage of Hume’s and Kant’s criticism of the traditional proofs of God’s existence. Only Spinoza’s pantheism did not seem in danger of such obsolescence. The reality of Spinoza’s God was as palpable as that of nature itself. Rather than being a mysterious spirit, like the God of traditional theism, or an irrelevant abstraction, like the God of deism, Spinoza’s God is the whole of nature, and so equally present within everyone alike. Since we are all modes of the single infinite substance, we only have to reflect upon ourselves to find the divine within us.
黑格尔和青年浪漫派从斯宾诺莎那里获得了什么呢？他们在他身上看到的，首先和主要是他将宗教理性化的意图。斯宾诺莎的著名格言deus sive natura（神即自然），将上帝等同于自然之无限性，似乎解决了那曾经倾注了整个启蒙运动时期所有哲学家和神学家心力的理性与信仰之间的矛盾。斯宾诺莎的格言，在将自然神圣化的同时也将神圣自然化，因而它似乎创造了一种出自科学的宗教和一种出自宗教的科学。如果上帝无异于“一与一切”——如果神圣者就是自然的创造性力量，就是它所有法则背后的动力——那么，就没有理由去把理性与信仰对立起来。取而代之的是，宗教和科学的对象将是同一回事。对于斯宾诺莎主义的支持仿佛仅仅是由于其传统对手（一神论与自然神论）的弱点而得到增强，而到了十八世纪末，一神论和自然神论已经到了崩溃的边缘。一神论不仅不能把它的基础建立在神迹之上，因为神迹已经很难与科学调和，并且它也遭到了新圣经批判的极大挑战。另一方面，在休谟和康德对上帝存在的传统证明毫不留情的密集炮轰的抨击之下，自然神论也彻底土崩瓦解。唯有斯宾诺莎的泛神论似乎可以免于这种陈旧过时的危险。斯宾诺莎的上帝的实在性，就像自然本身一样可感知。不是像传统一神论的上帝那样作为神秘的精神，也不是像自然神论的上帝那样作为一种不相干的抽象，斯宾诺莎的上帝是自然之整体，并且同样如此平等地呈现在每一个人之中。既然我们都是唯一无限实体的不同样式，那么我们只需反思我们自身就可以发现在我们之中的神圣者。
It is important to see that the romantic attraction to Spinoza was not only religious but also political. To understand these political factors, it is worthwhile to keep in mind a famous remark of Heinrich Heine: that pantheism had always been the secret religion of Germany, the faith of its cultural underground.16 Heine knew whereof he spoke. Since the end of the seventeenth century in Germany, Spinoza had become the patron saint of radical Protestants, of all those discontented reformers who accused Luther of selling out to the princes and betraying his two grand ideals: religious liberty and the priesthood of all believers. These radicals embraced Spinoza for a variety of reasons, all of them perfectly Protestant. They saw Spinoza’s separation of church and state as a guarantee of religious liberty; they embraced his critique of the Bible because it freed Lutheranism from its biblicism, its deadening emphasis upon the letter as a rule of faith; and they loved his pantheism because it seemed to justify the equality and priesthood of all believers. After all, if God is infinitely present within everyone alike, we are all equal; and then there is no need for a priest or spiritual authority to mediate our relationship with God. Of course, Spinoza was a Jew, at least by background; but for these radical Protestants, who were ecumenical to the bone, that was all the more reason to embrace him. What could better show their universalist credentials? And, in any case, did Spinoza not live with the brethren at Rijnsberg? Was the affinity in doctrine that accidental after all?
重要的是，我们要看到，斯宾诺莎对浪漫主义的吸引不仅限于宗教方面，也包括政治方面。为了理解这些政治的因素，我们有必要花一点时间来回顾一下亨利希·海涅一段著名的评论：泛神论一直以来就是德国的秘密宗教，是德国文化背景中的信仰。16海涅知道自己说的是怎么回事。在德国，自从17世纪末以来，斯宾诺莎就已经变成激进新教徒，以及那些心怀不满的改革者的保护神。他们控诉路德投靠了君主，背弃了他自己的两个伟大理想：宗教自由和所有信仰者都是神职人员。这些激进者出于各种原因拥抱斯宾诺莎，所有这些人全都是新教徒。他们视斯宾诺莎把教会和国家相分离为宗教自由的保障；他们拥抱他对圣经的批判，因为这一批判将路德主义从它的圣经主义、从麻木地强调福音书是信仰的规则中解放出来；他们喜欢斯宾诺莎的泛神论，还因为它似乎为平等和每一位信仰者的祭司身份提供了辩护。毕竟，如果上帝是同样无限地呈现在每一个人之中的，那么我们所有人就是平等的；因此，也就不需要一位牧师或者一个精神的权威来充当我们与上帝关联的中介。当然，斯宾诺莎是一位犹太人，至少从出身背景来说是如此；但是这些激进的新教徒是彻底普世化的，这就是拥抱他的最好的理由。还有什么东西（比斯宾诺莎的学说）能够更好地为他们的普救说提供凭证呢？并且，不管怎样，斯宾诺莎不是和里津斯堡（Rijnsberg）的同胞们生活在一起吗？难道教义上的亲缘关系只是一个意外？
Despite constant persecution, the flames of religious radicalism in Germany never died out; and clandestine editions of the Ethica and Tractatus never ceased to circulate. The radical ideals lived on well into the eighteenth century, when they found their foremost exponents in writers like Gottfried Arnold, Conrad Dippel, Johann Edelmann, and finally Lessing and Herder. When the romantics embraced Spinozism in the late 1790s they were – somewhat unwittingly – carrying on the tradition of the radical reformers. The Spinoza revival of the 1790s was nothing less than the last great manifestation of the radical reformation. Its finest literary and philosophical expression was Schleiermacher’s Speeches.
尽管迫害不断，但德国宗教激进主义的火苗从未熄灭；《伦理学》（Ethica）和《神学政治论》（Tractatus）的秘密版本也从未停止过流通。这些激进理想鲜活地进入了18世纪，并在诸如戈特弗里德·阿诺德（Gottfried Arnold）、康拉德·迪佩尔（Conrad Dippel）、约翰·埃德尔曼（Johann Edelmann），以及最后在莱辛（Lessing）和赫尔德（Herder）等作家中间找到它们最重要的倡导者。当浪漫主义者在18世纪90年代末拥抱斯宾诺莎主义的时候，他们在某种意义上是不知不觉地继承了激进改革者的传统。斯宾诺莎在18世纪90年代的复活完全是激进改革的最后一场伟大的示威。它最出色的文学和哲学表达，就是施莱尔马赫的《讲演录》。
Eventually, Hegel too was taken up by the wave of enthusiasm for Spinoza. In his writings during the Berne period (1793–6) he seems almost immune to it. He endorses Kant’s idea of moral faith, according to which belief in a supernatural God is justified on moral grounds. But he abandoned this doctrine in his Frankfurt years and developed instead an immanent conception of God. In his 1801 Differenzschrift Hegel defended Schelling’s Spinozism (see pp. 58–9). Although Hegel rightly resisted any conflation of his absolute idealism with Spinozism, he never ceased to regard Spinoza’s philosophy as the foundation for modern philosophy and religion. In his History of Philosophy he wrote of Spinoza’s substance: ‘When one begins to philosophize one must be first a Spinozist. The soul must bathe itself in the aether of this single substance, in which everything one has held dear is submerged.’17
最后，黑格尔也被这股对斯宾诺莎的热情浪潮所感染。在伯尔尼时期（1793-1796）的作品中，黑格尔看起来对此还几乎完全免疫。他崇尚的是康德道德信仰的理念，按照这一理念，对超自然的上帝的信仰，可以在道德的地基上被证成。但在法兰克福时期，黑格尔放弃了这一学说，并发展了一种内在的上帝的思想。在1801年撰写的《费希特与谢林哲学体系的差别》中，黑格尔为谢林的斯宾诺莎主义做了辩护（参看第58-59页）。尽管黑格尔恰当地抵制了任何将他的绝对唯心主义和斯宾诺莎主义归并起来的做法，但他从未停止认为斯宾诺莎哲学是现代哲学与宗教的基础。在《哲学史讲演录》中，黑格尔这样来描写斯宾诺莎的实体：“谁要开始研究哲学，谁就必须首先做一个斯宾诺莎主义者。灵魂必须在唯一实体的以太中洗个澡，人们所珍视的一切都浸没在这唯一的实体之中。”17
THE CHALLENGE OF DIVISION
分裂的挑战
Although the romantic ideal of unity of life is beautiful, it also seems unattainable. It seems romantic in the popular sense of that term: an unrealistic dream. The classical ideals of Hegel and the romantic generation came into sharp conflict with modern reality. While the classical ideals demanded unity, modern society seemed to create division, and on every level: division within oneself, with others and with nature. For Hegel and the young romantics, the fundamental challenge was how to legitimate their ideal of unity of life in face of the growing divisions of modern life. The need for philosophy arose, as Hegel famously put it, from division (Entzweiung) (D II 20/89).
尽管生活统一性这一浪漫派的理想是美好的，它似乎也是难以企及的。“浪漫派”一词就其通俗意义而言，似乎是一种不切实际的梦想。黑格尔和浪漫主义那一代人的古典理想与现代的实在之间形成了一种尖锐的冲突。在古典理想需求统一性的地方，现代社会似乎则在所有的层面上都创造分裂：自我之内的分裂、与他人的分裂和与自然的分裂。对黑格尔和青年浪漫派来说，基础性的挑战是，面对现代生活不断增长的分裂，如何使他们有关生活统一性的理想具有正当性。正如黑格尔的一句名言所指出的那样：对哲学的需求起源于分裂（Entzweiung）（D II 20/89）。
Each ideal of unity seemed to be undermined by some aspect of modern life. The ideal of unity with oneself was threatened by the growing division of labor, the need for each individual to specialize and devote himself to a narrow task. The more production became rationalized or efficient, the more he would have to cultivate specific skills and talents. Rather than realizing all their powers, people could develop only one narrow side of themselves. Acutely aware of this problem, the romantics agreed with Schiller’s famous lament:
每一种统一性的理想，似乎都遭到了现代生活某些方面的暗中破坏。不断增长的劳动分工，每个个体将自身专门化以便献身于一个狭隘任务的需要，威胁着人与自身统一的理想。生产越是变得理性化和高效，人们也就越是不得不去培养专门的技艺和才能。并非人们的所有能力都得到实现，而是他们只能发展其中某些狭隘的方面。由于清醒地意识到这个问题，浪漫主义者赞同谢林著名的悲叹：
Always chained to a single little fragment of the whole, man himself develops into only a fragment; always in his ear the monotonous sound of the wheel that he turns, he never develops the harmony of his being; and instead of putting the stamp of humanity upon his nature he becomes nothing more than the imprint of his business or science.18 (NA XX, 323)
人由于总是被束缚在整体的一个小小片段上，于是也将他自己仅仅发展成为碎片；由于耳朵里总是他所转动的齿轮的单调声音，所以他从未发展出他的和谐的生命；他没有给他的自然盖上人性的图章，而是仅仅变成所从事的商业和科学的印记。18（NA XX, 323）
Of course, in classical culture the division of labor had not been such a danger. This was not only because of the lack of technology, but also because of the entrenched institution of slavery. Free from the realm of economic necessity, the citizens of the Greek and Roman republics had more time and energy to spend on civic affairs. But slavery was not acceptable to the modern world; and so the claims of the economic world became inescapable. The problem for Hegel and the young romantics was how to achieve the classical ideal of excellence without the classical institution of slavery. This seemed all but unattainable when modern forms of production and exchange seemed only to enslave everyone.
当然，在古典文化中，劳动分工并不构成这种威胁。这不仅是因为技术的匮乏，而且是因为奴隶制的根深蒂固。由于从经济必然性的王国解放出来了，希腊罗马共和国的公民可以把更多的时间和精力放在公共事务上。但现代世界是不接受奴隶制的；因此，经济世界的各种要求就变得无法逃避了。黑格尔和青年浪漫派要面对的问题是，在没有古典奴隶制的情况下，如何达成“（人性）卓越”这一古典理想。当现代生产和交换的形式似乎不过是使每一个人都奴隶化时，这一理想看起来的确是高不可攀了。
The ideal of unity with others also faced grave dangers in the modern world. The fundamental trends of modern civil society seemed to be toward atomism and anomie, the decomposition of society and the state into a multitude of separate individuals who sought only their self-interest. Rather than joining together for the common good, individuals were forced to compete in the market place. There was no hope for participation in the community of a republic because of the sheer size and scale of the modern state, its increasing centralization and bureaucratization. The modern individual saw the state as a hostile and alien being, whose purpose was to dominate and control him. These atomistic trends of civil society were clearly perceived in Germany toward the close of the eighteenth century. Writers complained about the decline of the village community and parish from growing urbanization, and they deplored unemployment among urban masses.19
与他人之间的统一性理想，在现代世界同样面临着重大危险。现代市民社会的根本趋势似乎朝向原子论和无序状态发展，社会与国家的分裂造就了大量只追求私利的分离的个体。这些个体被迫在市场中相互竞争，而不是为了共同善联合在一起。由于现代国家的绝对大小和规模，它的不断增长的集中化和科层化，共和国层面的共同体参与是无法指望的。现代个体视国家为敌对的和异化的存在，国家的目的是控制和支配他。在十八世纪末的德国，可以清楚地察觉到市民社会的原子化趋势。作家们抱怨农村公社和教区在不断增长的城市化进程中的衰落，他们为城市中的失业大众发出哀叹。19
Finally, the ideal of unity with nature also seemed unattainable. The ancients would identify themselves with nature, because they saw it as a living whole of which they were a part. But the whole realm of nature had become disenchanted through the growth of modern science and technology. Rather than seeing nature as an object of contemplation, as a realm of beauty, mystery and magic, the technologist gave it only an instrumental value. He was engaged in a struggle against nature, which he wanted to dominate and control by a machine. Since nature is only a machine, it can be controlled to serve us.
然而，如果现代社会创造的只是这些分裂，那么又如何可能获取生活的统一性呢？对黑格尔和青年浪漫派来说，这是至关重要的时代议题。仿佛浪漫主义的宏伟理想一经制定就被废弃了，而这些理想看起来不过是对不可避免的“进步力量”的一种抗议性的哭喊。尽管现代生活存在种种分裂，但是，显示这些理想的正当性，建立整全的可能性、实际上是必要性，这就是哲学的任务。首先必须向反思哲学（Reflexionsphilosophie）开战，这种哲学似乎赋予了所有现代生活的分裂以正当性。与笛卡尔、康德和费希特相反，必须表明世界不能分裂为主体与客体、心灵与肉体、自我与他人。青年黑格尔相信，向二元论开战和展现整全的可能性，是哲学的一个特殊门类亦即形而上学的任务。20我们即将要谈到的就是这种形而上学。
How, then, was it possible to achieve unity in life if modern society only creates divisions? For Hegel, and the young romantic generation, that was the crucial issue of the age. It seemed as if the grand romantic ideals were obsolete as soon as they were formulated, that they were only a cry of protest against the inevitable ‘forces of progress’. It was the task of philosophy to show the legitimacy of their ideals, to establish the possibility, indeed the necessity, of wholeness despite the divisions of modern life. It was necessary first of all to do battle against Reflexionsphilosophie, which seemed to legitimate all the divisions of modern life. It was necessary to show – against Descartes, Kant and Fichte – that the world is not divided into subject and object, mind and body, self and other. The young Hegel believed that doing battle against dualism and showing the possibility of wholeness was the task of one special field of philosophy: metaphysics.20 It is to that metaphysics that we must now turn.
然而，如果现代社会创造的只是这些分裂，那么又如何可能获取生活的统一性呢？对黑格尔和青年浪漫派来说，这是至关重要的时代议题。仿佛浪漫主义的宏伟理想一经制定就被废弃了，而这些理想看起来不过是对不可避免的“进步力量”的一种抗议性的哭喊。尽管现代生活存在种种分裂，但是，显示这些理想的正当性，建立整全的可能性、实际上是必要性，这就是哲学的任务。首先必须向反思哲学（Reflexionsphilosophie）开战，这种哲学似乎赋予了所有现代生活的分裂以正当性。与笛卡尔、康德和费希特相反，必须表明世界不能分裂为主体与客体、心灵与肉体、自我与他人。青年黑格尔相信，向二元论开战和展现整全的可能性，是哲学的一个特殊门类亦即形而上学的任务。20我们即将要谈到的就是这种形而上学。
