“我说了，我的原告几乎没讲一句真话，或者干脆说，一句真话都没讲，而从我嘴里你们听到的将全部是真话，先生们，我可以向你们保证，这不是因为我会像他们那样流利地使用语言和精心修饰词句。不，你们听到的话将是直截了当、脱口而出的，充满着正义的自信，我不想要你们中间有人会对我的话另作他想。”

“直截了当、脱口而出的，充满正义的自信”是什么意思呢？Benjamin Jowett的英译本是这样的:for I am confident in the justice of my cause (Or, I am certain
that I am right in taking this course.)
G.M.A.Grube的英译本是这样的:for I put my trust in the justice of what I say
大概就是 因为我所说的都是正义的吧。这是什么意思呢？我没明白，也不知道问题在哪儿。后来找到了本《反讽地捍卫苏格拉底》，它把我的问题都说出来了，还做了细致的回答:作者把这个问题总结“The peoblem of truthfullness”:
By “the things I say,” does he mean the things he will say in the courtroom, the things he usually says (30b6–7,cf.Gorgias 490e9–11, 509a4–7), or perhaps even everything he has ever said (cf. 37b2–3)? Does “just” mean in accordance with the law or in accordance with natural justice (Crito51b8–c1)? Is a man who says just things necessarily one who does just things (cf. 32e2–4 with 31e4–32a3)? And if not in general, what about in the special case of a defendant who pleads innocent? Moreover, whyisn’t Socrates certain that the things he says are just? And if it is because he lacks knowledge of justice (cf. 20b4–c3), what’s the ground of his trust that the things he says are just? Important as these questions are,however, they are secondary matters. The most mysterious thing of all is that Socrates does not spell out the connection betwewn saying things that are just and a willingness to tell the whole truth in a haphazad manner.
“我所说的事情”，他是指他将要在法庭上所说的，还是他通常所说的，或者甚至是他过去说过的所有的事情？“正义”是法律意义上的正义还是自然正义？一个人所说是正义的，他的行为就必然是正义的吗？如果不一定是，那么一个在某案件上声称自己是清白的被告呢？而且，苏格拉底是怎么确定他所说的都是正义的呢？如果他缺乏关于正义的知识，他凭什么保证他所说的是正义的呢？这些虽然也是重要的问题，然而它们都是次要的，最难以理解的是，苏格拉底并没有说明所言是正义的与愿意直截了当 脱口而出地说出事实这两者有什么联系。

嗯，对，就是这样。
接着《反讽地捍卫苏格拉底》的作者又说道：
But perhaps Socrates does not need to spell this out. What he has in mind may be a simple thought that has occurred to every decent listener (and reader): a man who has done nothing wrong has nothingto hide. As long as he tells the whole truth, things will go well for him. If he is on trial, his innocence – that is, the justice of what he says (cf. 18a4–5) – will shine forth, ensuring his acquittal. Now, isn’t this what we all want to believe about justice? Don’t we think that a just man shouldn’t have to be sneaky? Even if he is a simple man,as long as he is truly good, we not only hope, but commonly expect,that things will work out for him in the end.In fact, according toordinary decent opinion, simplicity and justice are closely linked: wedoubt the justice of liars and schemers (cf. 17d3 with Republic 360e6–361a4 and 361b5–8). Justice does not seem to need the support ofsuch “cleverness.” It can stand on its own.
不过也许苏格拉底并不需要清楚地说出这两者之间的关系。他脑子里有个简单的想法，每个decent listener也会有这样的想法：一个没干坏事的人没什么需要隐藏的。只要他把所有的实情说出，问题就都解决了。如果他在受审，他的清白——也就是苏格拉底所说的正义——将会shine forth,会保证他被判无罪。这不正是我们愿意相信的正义吗？我们不都认为一个正义的人不该使诡计吗？即使他是一个天真幼稚的人，只要他真的是个好人，我们不仅希望而且通常预计最后事情都会迎刃而解。事实上，按照惯常的想法，天真率直和正义是密切联系的：我们会怀疑骗子和阴谋家是否正义。正义似乎不需要类似“聪明”的支撑，它自己就能站稳脚。
What might be called Socrates’ faith in the power ofvirtue is asserted repeatedly in the dialogue, often in more explicit andextreme terms than here (cf. 30b2–4, 30c6–d1, 41c8–d2). This faith has inspired the deepest admiration in some of the dialogue’s readers.But doesn’t it also make him look very naive? It seems to confirm Callicles’ charge in the Gorgias that the philosopher is a fool who knows nothing about the affairs of men and so is unable to protect himself. After all, Socrates’ innocence does not shine forth, at least not to the satisfaction of the jury, which votes to condemn him.
我们可以称之为苏格拉底对美德力量的信念在这篇对话中一再被申明，通常以比这更直率的极端的terms.这种信念激起了一些读者深深的崇敬之情。但是，这不会使他看起来很幼稚吗？好像这恰恰证实了《高尔吉亚篇》中Callicles所说的哲学家是不知人事的傻子，也不能保护自己。毕竟，苏格拉底的清白没有shine forth,至少在投票要判他有罪的陪审团面前是这样。

He will speak the whole truth haphazardly, he implies, because he believes the jury will recognize the justice of what he says. But he also gives us at least tworeasons to doubt that he believes this. First, he says that his accusershave spoken so persuasively that they have almost convinced Socrates himself that he is guilty (17a1–3).That is, the justice (or injustice) of what a speaker says does not necessarily shine forth. Won’t Socrates have to speak cleverly and persuasively, then, to counteract the extraor-dinary persuasiveness of his accusers? Will it be enough to speak “at random”?Second, at the end of the prooemium Socrates says that the virtue of an orator (including a defendant) is to speak the truth,while that of a judge or juror is to apply his mind to whether what the speaker says is just. These virtues complement each other; if defendantand juror exercise their proper virtue, there is some reason for confi-dence in the verdict. But as Socrates will soon make clear, the juror slack their proper virtue: most are prejudiced against him and have, in fact, been slandering him for many years (18b4–19a2, 19d5–7, 28a6–8). Isn’t clever and persuasive speech needed, then, to counteract theirdeep-seated prejudice? Will speaking at random do the trick?
他说他将haphazardly (随意无目的)地说出全部的truth, 因为陪审团将会明白他所说的都是正义的。但是他也至少给了我们两点理由怀疑他是否真的这么认为。第一，他说他的被告说得那么persuasively,以至于他都快要被他们说服而认为自己有罪了。难道苏格拉底不需要说得persuasively 和cleverly一点吗？仅仅是“speak at random”够吗？第二，在prooemium（大概是前言之类的吧）的最后，苏格拉底说一个演说家（包括被告）的美德（virtue）就是说出真相，而法官和陪审团的美德就是用智力判断他们所言是否是正义的(just)。如果被告和陪审团都实践他们应有的美德，那么是有理由对判决有信心。但是，苏格拉底很快就阐明，陪审团缺乏他们应有的美德：他们中的大部分人对他有偏见，而且诽谤(slander)了他多年。为了对抗根深蒂固的偏见，难道不需要一个clever和persuasiv的演讲吗？“speaking at radom”能成功（Do The trick）吗？

Socrates’ reason for telling the whole truth haphazardly is that he counts on the jury to recognize the justice of what he says. Yet he alsomakes it very clear that this cannot be counted on. The implication isthat he will not tell the whole truth haphazardly. But what will he do?Perhaps he will tell the whole truth cleverly and persuasively; but hedoes not tell the whole truth about how he will speak or why. Perhapsthen, in keeping with the virtue of an orator, he will tell, not indeedthe whole truth, but only the truth, scrupulously avoiding any lies(cf. 17b7–8 with 18a5–6 and Symposium 198d3–7). But in saying thathe will tell the whole truth haphazardly, he has already lied – and liedcleverly, for it was necessary to disarm the suspicion of the jurors atthe outset. However, this means that he also lied in saying that hisaccusers lied in calling him a clever speaker. And he lied in saying thatthey would immediately be refuted by him in deed. And he lied, I willargue, when he said that the virtue of an orator is to speak the truth.And this by no means exhausts the list of clever lies in Socrates’ briefaccount of his simple truthfulness.
苏格拉底能hphazardly说出全部真相他靠的是陪审团能意识到他所说都是正义的。然而他也很清楚地表明这是靠不住的。言下之意就是他不会hapharzardly地说出全部真相。那他会怎么做呢？或许他会cleverly和persuasively地说出所有真相；但是他不会说出他怎么说和为什么这么说的真相。或许为了保有一个orator应有的美德，他说的不是全部真相，而仅仅是真相，小心谨慎地避免谎话。但是当他说他将haphazardly地说出全部真相的时候，他已经说谎了，而且说谎说得很高明，因为从一开始就打消陪审团的怀疑是必要的。而这也就是说当他说他的被告说他是clever speaker是谎言时，他在说谎。他说他们很快就会被他驳斥，他也在说谎。我敢说，他说一个orator的美德就是讲真话，他还是在说谎。

In the prooemium, Socrates presents the problem of truthfulness in the guise of a claim to speak truthfully. Or, more precisely, he presentsthe problem of the relation between truth and justice in the guise of a claim that he will speak truthfully because what he says is just. If accusers never told persuasive lies and jurors were never prejudiced, or rather, if justice had the power to overcome these and other obstacles to a fair trial, an innocent defendant could speak the whole truth at random and count on being acquitted. As it is, however, he may have to tell clever lies for the sake of justice itself – that is, to keep aninnocent man from suffering an undeserved penalty (cf. 37b2–5 andCrito 54b8–c1). Thinking through the prooemium is thefirst step in thereader’s education. Some would call it thefirst step in his “corruption.”
如果正义能克服障碍到达公正的审判，那么被告就可以不假思索地说出全部真相而被判无罪。但事实上并非如此，所以苏格拉底不得不为了正义本身而说谎。

Notice, however, that Socrates does not utter, much less argue for,the “corrupt” conclusion that justice may require lying. Instead, hemakes an unquestionably decent assertion that can serve as a start-ing point for the listener’s own reflection. By emphatically connectingjustice and truthfulness in a context that reveals the connection asproblematic, he even encourages the listener to reflect. The listener,however, must think out the problem for himself. He must find hisown way to the unstated thoughts behind Socrates’ puzzling words.In doing so, he may make those thoughts his own more easily than ifSocrates had been too frank. (Frankness would have led some listeners to recoil and others to try to adopt Socrates’ conclusions prematurely,without adequate understanding.) As we will see, Socrates’ statementsin the prooemium illustrate his characteristic way of teaching. They also illustrate his defensive rhetoric.In the prooemium, the orators tands in for the philosopher, and the danger that an orator may face in speaking truthfully to a jury is the first sign of the tension, or potential for conflict, between the philosopher and the city.
然而，苏格拉底并没有直接说出这个corrupt的结论: 正义需要谎言。取而代之的是，他说了一个合理的没问题的assertion（他将不假思索地说出所有真相），这给听众自己思考的一个起点。通过强调justice和正义的关系，他激励听众去思考。听众必须自己发现问题。这是苏格拉底teaching的特点。在prooemium里，orators代表了哲学家，而orators在陪审团面前说出全部真相而面临的危险是哲学家和城邦之间关系紧张或者说潜在冲突的一个重要信号(sign)。

As we proceed through the Apology, the roots of this tension willbecome clearer. For now, I offer a few preliminary considerations. The law makes pronouncements about many things, including, in the case of Athenian law, the gods. By and large citizens take these pronounce-ments as their guide to justice. But these pronouncements are never altogether sound or true – in part because those who make the law are not completely wise (cf. Minos 314c–e; Statesman 298c–d); in part because even laws made by the wise would have to bow, in both their provisions and justifications, to the imperfect wisdom of the ruled, or,to say almost the same thing, because even laws made by the wise would have to include “noble lies” that render them acceptable to the unwise or conceal their unavoidable defects (Republic 414b–415d); inpart because laws are general rules that are not equally well suited to allthe situations they cover (Statesman 294a–295a); and in part because laws claim to be just, that is, good for all, but in some, and perhapsmany, situations covered by law there is no common good: what ben-efits one party harms another (consider Apology 19a2–3 together with Cleitophon 410b1–3). Hence, speaking the truth, or raising questionsthat are part of the search for truth, will at some point mean contradict-ing the pronouncements of the law (cf. Apology 24d9–e1; Euthyphro6a–b. Cf. Laws 624a, 628d–e, and 630d–e with 634d–635b). It willinvolve saying things that the city regards as unjust; it will look likecorruption or impiety (Statesman 296c, 299b–c). And this, of course,applies to things said outside the courtroom as well as within it. Forthese and other reasons a sensible man will not speak the whole truthindiscriminately in public (cf. Euthyphro 3d6–9). Whatever the virtueof an orator may be, it is not simply speaking the truth.
法律会公告(pronouncements)很多东西包括这个案子中的“神”。大部分的公民以这些pronouncements作为判断正义的标准。但是这些pronouncements从来都不是完善的也不是完全真实的，这一方面是因为制定这些pronouncements的人不是真正有智慧的，即使法律由有智慧的人制定，它也不得不bow to in both their provisions and justifications, to the imperfect wisdom of the ruled, or,to say almost the same thing(这句不知道怎么解)，即使法律由有智慧的人制定，它也不得不包含高贵的谎言（noble lies）以使它更好地为unwise的人接受，或者以掩盖它不可避免的缺陷；另一方面是因为法律声称是正义的，对所有人都是好的，但是在一些情况下，也许是在很多情况下，没有common good: 当一部分人受益时另一部人就会受损。因此，说真话或者提出问题是探索真相的一部分，也会在某种程度上与法律声明的pronouncements发生冲突。说真话可能会说出一些城邦认为不正义的东西，显得不敬。在法庭之外说的真话当然也是如此。不管一个orator的美德是什莫，它肯定不会是简简单单地说出真相。

后来我发现我看的这个版本是王晓朝译的，后来我又找来了王太庆译的这段话来看看：
“他们说的话里没有一点真东西，你们可以听得出，我说的只有实话，没有别的。皇天在上，雅典公民们，我的话不像他们那样字斟句酌，也没有经过仔细安排，只是*信口说出，不加选择，因为我相信我说的是正理，你们别指望有别的什么意思。”
如果用“正理”，我觉得我不会有什么疑问，但是用“正义”就真是让人费解啊。不过英译本也是用的just和justice这样的词 ，确实是正义的意识啊，只能说什么是正义本身就太让人费解了啊！