英文早读第105篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。
Diversification
Last year in commenting on the inability of the overwhelming majority of investment managers to achieve performance superior to that of pure chance, I ascribed it primarily to the product of :"(1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia. "
去年在评论到绝大多数投资管理者无法做到实现超过那个纯粹机会的表现，我归因于主要是以下的产物：“（1）集体决策-我一个偏曲的观点是他几乎接近不可能有一个突出的表现来自于集体，如果任何一派都会参与决策（2）期望满足其他大型广受赞誉机构的策略（3）一个组织框架平均要求安全并且个人独立行动不可能相称与风险要求（4）坚持认为多样化策略是不合逻辑的；最后且最重要的（5）惰性。”
This year in the material which went out in November, I specially called your attention to a new Ground Rule reading," 7. We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment."
在这年11月份的材料中，我尤其唤起你的注意对一个新的基本准则说到，“7.我们多样性大幅少于大多数投资运作。我们或许会投资至多我们净资产的40%在单一股票上当条件和我们的事实与推理高度符合可能性并且有非常低的可能性有任何事会彻底改变这个投资的内在价值。”
We are obviously following a policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that of practically all public investment operations. Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have 50 different investment opportunities, all of which have a mathematical expectation (this term reflects the range of all possible relative performances, including negative ones, adjusted for the probability of each - no yawning, please) of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by, say, fifteen percentage points per annum. If the fifty individual expectations were not intercorelated (what happens to one is associated with what happens to the other) I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would be very close to such a fifteen percentage point advantage.
我们明显遵循一个政策在考虑到多样性上显著地不同于几乎所有公开投资运作。坦白说，我也喜欢有50个不同的投资机会，其中所有的都有数字上的预期（这条反应了所有可能相关表现的范围，包括亏损的，经过每个可能性调整后的——请不要打哈欠）实现表现超过道琼斯，也就是说，每年15个百分点。如果这50个单独的期望都没有相互关联（一个发生的事隔离与其他发生的事），我可以给每一个都放我们资金的2%并坐拥相当高的可能性我们整体结果会很接近这样的15个百分点领先。
It doesn't work thay way.
他不是这样方式运作的。
We have to work extremely hard to find just a very few attractive investment situations. Such a situation by definition is one where my expectation (defined as above) of performance is at least ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. Among the few we do find, the expectations vary substantially. The question always is, "How much do I put in number one (ranked by expectation of relative performance) and how much do I put in number eight?" This depends to a great degree on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical expectation of number one versus number eight." It also depends upon the probability that number one could turn in a really poor relative performance. Two securities could have equal mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of performing fifteen percentage points of more worse than the Dow, and the second might have only .01 chance of such performance. The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the desirability of heavy concentration in it.
我们必须非常努力工作去找到仅仅一些有吸引力的投资场景。这样的场景被定义为一个我的预期（上面定义的）表现至少每年领先道琼斯10个百分点。在这些我们找到的中，期望差别很大。问题经常是，“我该在1号放多少钱（由相对表现的预期排名）和我该在8号放多少钱？”这取决于在1号对8号在数字预期上大幅度的差异。两个股票可以有同样的数字预期，但是1号或许有5%的可能表现比道琼斯差15个百分点，而第二个可能仅有1%这样表现的可能性。在第一个案子中更大的预期范畴减少了在它上面重度集中的意愿。
The above may make the whole operation sound very precise. It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and reason to such facts to reach expectations. Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may be, that is what the business is all about. The results of many years of decision-making in securities will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such calculations - whether you consciously realize you are making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his thought process is following.
上面这些或许让整个运作听起来很精准。并不是。然而，我们的业务是那种查明事实然后运用经验和推理这些事实去达到预期。不精准和感性影响着我们的尝试，这是这个业务的一切。多年在股票上做决策的结果将诠释你在做这类计算上做的多好——无论你是否严肃地意识到你正在做计算。我相信投资者将以明显地优势运作当他意识到他思维进程遵循的路径。
69.drastically：彻底地；激烈地
70.markedly：显著地；引人注目地
71.yawning：打哈欠的；张大嘴的
72.intercorelated：相互关联地
73.ascertain：查明；弄清
74.distinct：不同的；明显的
75.encompass：包含；包括；涉及；包围；围绕
76.compensate：补偿；赔偿；弥补
77.inclusion：包括；包含；被包括的事
