In other words, an action accomplished through free will constitutes an empirical action, as it may not be subject to any purposeful demands at this time, as it is purely free. However, in practice, we cannot achieve pure freedom because we must be subject to purposeful requirements. Just like the second scenario mentioned, there must be a demand for purpose, because in this situation, we can only comply with rational coercion. Therefore, none of us will do things arbitrarily in our daily behavior,
All of our moral actions require careful consideration before taking action, and this' consideration 'reflects a component of rational thinking. Therefore, only moral actions and practical activities that are driven by reason can be called moral actions.
So Kant strictly defined human practical activities.
So, Kant's definition of practice, I believe, is not our usual everyday concept of practice. So, Kant's statement in "Critique of Practical Reason", which we discussed earlier about the determination of will and the process of producing behavior, can be divided into two situations: one is the distinction between "definite" and the other is the distinction between "false". The so-called definite command, which we often refer to as the absolute command.
He said that commands, or simply a result and the sufficiency to achieve it, determine the causal conditions of rational existences as the cause of reality.
This is the first situation, which indicates that our command is for a certain purpose, and it is a false command.
For example, in a specific environment, we may require someone to complete certain tasks, which may be a purposeful request. Such commands are called hypothetical commands, and "hypothetical commands" are a type of "predictive commands".
Or it simply determines the will, regardless of whether it is sufficient to achieve this result, and this command specifies the command of words, that is, the decisive command, which is also the only practical law.
Therefore, Kant clearly emphasized the "categorical imperative", which emphasizes an absolute command that only determines the will, regardless of whether it is sufficient to achieve this result. Therefore, he only asks for the reason and not for the result.
Kant's moral theory is completely different from the moral theories provided by later scholars such as Mill and Bentham. Later on, that doctrine was called utilitarianism, emphasizing the principle of determining causes based on results.
And Kant's absolute command, based on the cause without considering the result, only asks what the reason is for the issuance of your command, without asking what the ultimate goal is. Therefore, this is the basic idea of Kant's absolute command.
So, for such pure practical criticism, it contains some propositions that are generally determined. He said that this decision has many practical rules under itself. If the subject thinks that these conditions are only effective for his will, these are originally subjective or criteria. If the subject realizes that these conditions are objective, that is, effective for every rational being, these principles are objective or practical rules.
Actual laws and regulations are different. Actual laws can form laws, so we can find that within the scope of freedom discussed by Kant, there can also be laws that must be followed. Only those behaviors that do not require an absolute will can become so-called norms (Norms). That is to say, in every society, we will set many norms for people to follow, and these norms are norms.
There are many norms that require you to do this and that, but for Kant, the truly decisive ones are these Norms, which can be understood as regulations.
For such pure practical rationality, if you want to act according to such pure practical rationality, you must ensure that the principles of your will can be regarded as a universal legislative principle at all times.
Therefore, people should act absolutely in a certain way, and this practical rule is unconditional, so that the definite proposition as practice is manifested inherently, and thus the will is absolute and direct (through the practical rule itself, which is also a rule here), and objectively determined.
Therefore, the determination of will has become a non free state here. In fact, there is a paradox here, that is, when we emphasize the freedom of will and can break free from the regulations on rational ability in the Critique of Pure Reason in the practical field, but when we think we can fully exert our rational ability in the practical field, Kant tells us that we cannot do so.
This cannot be achieved, not because he said it cannot be achieved, but because the critique of practical reason itself is based on the premise of pure rational critique, so it cannot be achieved. Because you are the Critique of Pure Reason, you have already defined our rational ability and can only act in this way. Therefore, in the field of practical rational ability, we can only define how our free will is implemented in a way that meets the requirements of our practical reason.
So, here personal freedom is not absolute, it's just that freedom of will is not absolute, but becomes relative. Just like 'no killing' just now, it sounds like an absolute command, but in the field of practical reason, we can even stipulate certain conditions under which killing is not allowed.
So, 'no killing' itself is not a completely absolute categorical order. It may instead become a false command. So, it is precisely through this way that a change has occurred between assertions and falsehoods, which led Kant to believe that it is impossible for us to truly conform to such free will absolutely.
Therefore, the will is indeed objectively determined here, and this objective determination is precisely because, of course, we have explained two meanings here. On the one hand, it is objectively determined due to the limitations of "pure reason", and on the other hand, it is objectively determined due to the limitations of practical "categorical commands".
In practice, the 'categorical imperative' has already set a certain range for us, and you can only do it this way, so it's like saying that killing is not allowed. When I wanted to kill someone, the order not to kill became a mandatory requirement. So, at this moment, I must execute and abide by such a definite command. So, the categorical command became the opposite of mine. So, when I want to exercise my free will, I am restricted. So, at this moment, my will is not free, but not free.
So, when we understand Kant's thought, we talk about how his dialectics are reflected. It's not simply about whether something is him or not, and he provides various possibilities and conditions to illustrate what kind of ideas we will form when we consider problems within this scope; What kind of ideas will we form in another scope. He will provide different conditions to illustrate this issue.
It provides some theorems to illustrate in pure rational practice, all of which are very clear in its practical field. Here, I only quoted the content of its theorems from the various principles of pure practical rationality in Chapter 1.
Theorem 1: Any object (material) that desires power is assumed to be subject. The rules of will are based entirely on empirical principles and cannot serve as any practical rules.
Object means that it is an objectivity, something independent of people's subjective cognitive activities; And the object is not, the object is precisely subjective, it is a representation formed within the scope of people's understanding of things, which represents it presented to us and then becomes our object.
'Object' means that it is the image of our opposite side, it is an image generated by our opposite side, it is the representation formed by our opposite side, so it is not a body, it is not the body of the object, it is not an objective entity. So, "object" and "object" are two concepts.
So, most of what we talk about is objects, and we don't talk much about objects because objects are things that go beyond our cognitive activities and are independent of human cognition, which is called objects.
An object is called an object within the scope of human recognition, because it is already aligned with you. Of course, it is called an object. If you are not aligned at all, it is called an object.
So, there is a difference between the two and it needs to be distinguished.
Kant stated in Theorem 1 that any practical principle that presupposes an object (material) of desire as the basis for the determination of will is all empirical and cannot serve as any practical law.
Desire ability is only the ability that practical reason needs to deal with, because pure reason deals with cognitive ability, while practical reason deals with desire ability. If we want to treat the object of desire ability as its natural aspect. That is to say, to view it not as an object of human beings, but as something beyond human cognitive activities, presupposed as a rule of will, based on practical principles. That is to say, if such transcendent things, things that are not within human cognitive activities, are regarded as practical principles, they are all empirical principles and therefore cannot serve as any rules of practice.
Theorem 2: The practical principles of all materials themselves possess the same property and are subject to the universal principle of self love or one's own happiness.
Theorem 3:
If a rational being should conceive his principles as universal laws of practice, it can only conceive these principles as principles that are not based on material, but only on the provisions of criminal law containing will.
Theorem Four:
The self-discipline of the will is the only principle of all moral laws and obligations that conform to these laws. On the contrary, all arbitrary and capricious heteronomy not only fails to establish any responsibility, but also goes against the moral principles of responsibility and will.
