读纯粹理性批判,发现必须要有哲学基础啊,讲真我看不懂(想想自己高中好歹是个理科生,虽然哲学当初上过几节课,但是忘光了),我一开始还看英文版,因为那时候找错中文翻译版本了,现在看的这一版本(李秋零主编)好多了,不过还是看不懂,自己智商有限。
以下摘录部分,只看到了第五章
一、Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge.
How is pure mathematical science possible?
How is pure natural science possible?(这两句之前不知道哪看到的,现在回过头再找找不到了= =)
「关于纯粹的自然科学,某些人可能对这种证明还持有怀疑。然而,只要看一看在真正的(经验性的)物理学的开端出现的各种定理,例如关于物质的量保持不变的定律,关于惯性、作用与反作用相等的定理等等,人们就会马上确信,它们构成了一门Physicam puram[纯粹物理学](或者retionalem[理性的]物理学),这门科学很值得作为独特的科学以其或窄或宽但却完整的范围独立地得到创建。」
But the expression, ''à priori," is not as yet definite enough adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started. For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known ''à priori," because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience.
E.g. if a man understand his house, we say, "he might know à priori that it would have fallen;" that is, he needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall. But still, à priori, he could not know even this much. For, that bodies are heavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been known to him previously, by means of experience.(第一章的例子还能看懂,后面基本上就晕了)
接下来开始看的就是中文了。。
二、我们拥有某些先天知识,甚至普通的知性也从不缺少它们
三、哲学需要一门规定一切先天知识的可能性、原则和范围的科学
纯粹理性自身的这些不可回避的课题就是上帝、自由和不死。
轻盈的鸽子在自由飞翔时分开空气,感受到空气的阻力,也许会想象在没有空气的空间里可以更好地飞翔。同样,柏拉图因为感官世界给知性设置了如此狭窄的界限而离开了感官世界,冒险在感官世界的彼岸鼓起理念的双翼飞入纯粹知性的真空。
我们理性的工作的一大部分、也许是最大的部分,就在于分析我们关于对象已经拥有的概念。
四、论分析判断与综合判断的区别
要么谓词B属于主词A,作为(以隐蔽的方式)包含在概念A中的某种东西;要么B虽然与概念A有关联,但却完全在它之外。在第一种场合里,我把判断称为分析的,在第二种场合里我则把它称为综合的。
五、在理性的所有理论科学中都包含着作为原则的先天综合判断
1. 数学的判断全部是综合的。
2. Physica在自身包含着作为原则的先天综合判断。
3. 在形而上学中……至少就其目的而言纯粹是由先天综合命题组成的。
(哲学是文科中的数学吧,这思维逻辑简直了,目前尚无法理解...有些名词还需借助哲学方面的参考书来理解)
六、The Universal Problem of Pure Reason
How is metaphysics(形而上学), as a natural disposition, possible? In other words, how, from the nature of universal human reason, do those questions arise which pure reason proposes to itself, and which it is impelled by its own feeling of need to answer as well as it can?