As Niethammer’s power and influence over educational matters grew, Hegel began more and more to complain (always politely, although sometimes a bit obsequiously) to Niethammer of looking forward to his “deliverance from the yoke of journalism”’^'* and to being able to “break away from my journalistic galley.^lose to the breaking point when he was investigated by the state for violating some security measures by virtue of an article he published containing information on various French troop movements. In Hegel’s eyes, this was just plain insanity, since the information in the article had already been published in other Bavarian newspapers. He complained that he would actually prefer prior censorship of the newspapers to this kind of interference, since at least with censors one would know in advance where one stood, whereas in the situation in which he found himself, the authorities could simply step in after the fact and threaten to suspend the whole operation of the newspaper if they found it offensive. Adding to Hegel’s worries about his own continued livelihood was the fact that his sense of responsibility to others was also deeply offended: In his complaint, he noted that “the newspaper provides a considerable part of the income of one family; my subsistence depends entirely on it as also that of two married workers and a few other people. All that is put in jeopardy by a single article which is found offensive.”**
随着尼特哈默尔在教育事务中的权力和影响越来越大，黑格尔开始不断地（始终彬彬有礼地，虽然有时有点卑躬屈膝地）向尼特哈默尔倒苦水，盼望他（黑格尔）早日“摆脱新闻工作的羁绊”，能够“离开新闻业这块是非之地”。他当时正处于人生关键时刻，因为他由于一篇他所发表的含有关于法国军队各种活动信息的文章而受到政府调查，因为他违反了国家安全措施。在黑格尔看来，政府这一举动显然是太荒唐了，因为这篇文章中的信息早已被刊登在巴伐利亚其他报纸上。他抱怨道，他实际上倒是宁可预先对报纸进行审查，而不愿碰上这种干扰，因为，至少由于书报检查官的审查，一个人将会预先知晓自己持有何种立场。然而，在一个人发觉自己所持有的立场的情况下，有关当局可以直接介入事件的调查，并可以责令整个报纸运营工作进行整改，如果有关当局发觉这家报社有违规之处的话。更加让黑格尔担心的是他接下来的生计问题，事实上在于他对别人的责任感同样也遭到深度的攻击：在他诉苦时，他强调指出，“从事报纸工作能够为一个家庭提供绝大部分收入；我同样也像两个已有妻室的工人和几个其他工作人员一样，完全靠从事报纸工作提供的报酬养家糊口。所有这些都仅仅因一篇其中可见出开罪当局的文章而被置于危险的境地。”
In July of 1808, Hegel told his friend Friedrich Frommann that “God willing, in Bavaria a new world will arise. This has long been the hope. And I shall find a niche for myself in Bavaria even should the old world remain.”*^ But it was becoming more and more clear to him that his niche was, or at least so he hoped, not to be in the newspaper business, especially in Bavaria. The investigation for breach of security had taken place in September 1808, and by October 1808 he was again pleading with Niethammer: “If you believe yourself unable to do something immediately for me regarding a university, do not let the reorganization of the gymnasiums or lyceums pass by in the uncertain hope of achiev¬ ing something better for me later” and making clear his own specific anxiety: “The future is uncertain, and will be even more so should you leave the educational system to go over to the church.”** Niethammer had come to seem to be Hegel’s guardian angel, and Hegel feared that if Niethammer left the educational field or was forced out, he would be without protection or contacts, adrift in a world in which the kind of philosophy he did was not in fashion among the people who were making the decisions.
在1808年7月，黑格尔函告友人弗里德里希·弗罗曼：“假如天赐良机，在巴伐利亚一个新的世界就将会出现。这长久以来始终是希望所在。我会在巴伐利亚谋得一个合适的位置，纵使旧世界依旧岿然不动。”可是，在他看来越来越明朗的是，他合适的位置不应该，或至少他希望不应该，在新闻行业，特别是巴伐利亚新闻行业。1810年9月，当局对他违反国家安全措施展开调查。到这年10月，他再次恳求尼特哈默尔：“如果你相信你自己不能够直接把我调入大学，请不要让大学体育馆或讲演厅修缮工作弄得你忽视我惴惴不安地怀着日后我能弄到更好工作的希望。”并表明他自己具体的焦虑：“前途难以预料，前途将会更难以预料，所以你应该离开教育系统转到教会工作。”尼特哈默尔逐渐看似成了黑格尔的守护天使，而黑格尔担心，如果尼特哈默尔离开或被迫离开教育领域，他将会失去保护者或有影响的熟人，他将会漂泊在这样一个世界里，在这个世界中他秉持的那种哲学与决策层者的哲学稍有不合。
The Reception of the Phenomenology
Schelling’s Response
《精神现象学》接受情况
谢林的反应
While Hegel was living in Bamberg, his long-awaited volume, the Phenomenology of Spirit, appeared. Since he had finally broken with Schel- ling in that book, he had some reason to be anxious about Schelling’s response. He thus wrote to Schelling on May i, 1807, to complain, typically, about what he saw as the lack of culture in Bavaria, to apologize about the confusions involved in the distribution of copies of the book (which was supposed to explain why Schelling had still not received a copy), and to make the usual expressions of regret authors typically make about the various infelicities in their work and how it all could have been better phrased. (He also helped to start the legend of the book’s creation by telling Schelling, “I actually completed the draft in its entirety in the middle of the night before the battle of Jena.”)*'^ Hegel tried to soothe what he correctly thought would be Schelling’s adverse reaction to Hegel’s criticism of him by explaining away those criticisms - including the (in)famous description of Schelling’s “identity philosophy” as the “night in which all cows are black” - as aimed not at Schelling himself but at unnamed others who supposedly misused Schelling’s ideas, at “the shallowness that makes so much mischief with your forms in particular and degrades your science into a bare formalism,” as he put it to him.^“ He also told Schelling, of course, how much he would like his approval of the Phenomenology, a sentiment he no doubt personally and deeply felt, even if it was also true that a famous personage like Schelling could have helped to bolster Hegel’s career if he had seen fit to publicly extol the book’s virtues.
当黑格尔住在班堡的时候，他期待已久的著作《精神现象学》问世了。由于他在该书中最终与谢林决裂，他有某种理由对谢林将要作出的反应感到焦虑不安。他因此在1807年3月1日象征性地致信谢林，信中他抱怨依他（黑格尔）之见巴伐利亚缺乏文化，对涉及该书分发册数方面的混乱情况深表歉意（这应该可以解释为什么谢林仍然没有收到该书），以及对作者通常在作品中使用各种各样不适当的言辞和作品如何完全可以更好地遣词造句例行地表示遗憾。（他同样还情不自禁地向谢林讲述创作该书的传奇故事：“我实际上是在耶拿战役前的三个午夜里写完了全部草稿。”）黑格尔努力就他对谢林的批评作出下列安慰性的说明：他正确思考的东西应该是谢林就黑格尔对他（谢林）的批评作出敌对的反应，通过解释后消除那些批评——包括把谢林（臭名）昭著的“同一哲学”描述为“在黑夜中所有的牛都是黑的”——这一陈述不是针对谢林本人，而是针对某些据称误用谢林思想的匿名学者，而是针对“某些浅薄的平庸之辈，因为他们对你的具体文体造成这么多损害并让你的科学降格为赤裸裸的形式主义”，像黑格尔对谢林诉说的一样。黑格尔当然还向谢林诉说道，他多么想得到谢林对《精神现象学》的嘉许，字里行间无疑流露出他个人对谢林深深的感激之情，纵使同样也千真万确的是，一个像谢林这样的名人本可能伸出援手支持黑格尔的哲学事业，假如他已经看出适宜公开宣扬这部著作的优点。
Schelling’s reply came in August, 1807, and the tone was perhaps what Hegel had feared: “Insofar as you yourself mention the polemical part of the Preface,” Schelling told Hegel, “given my own justly measured opinion of myself I would have to think too little of myself to apply this polemic to my own person. It may therefore, as you have expressed in your letter, apply only to further misuse of my ideas and to those who parrot th^m without understanding” - and here one can virtually hear the icy tone in Schelling’s voice - “although in this text itself the distinction is not made.”^' Schelling goes on to express some exasperation at Hegel’s abandonment of their joint (that is, Schelling’s own) position vis-a-vis “intellectual intuition,” since, as far as Schelling was concerned, concept and intuition were both just aspects of “what you and I have called the Idea - which by its very nature is concept in one of its aspects and intuition in another.”''^ Schelling concluded the letter, however, on a conciliatory note: “All the best; write me again soon and keep me in your mind as your true friend, Schelling.””
谢林在1807年8月写了回信，信中语调大概是黑格尔早就担心的语调：“就你自己提到前言中争论部分”而言，谢林告诉黑格尔说：“考虑到我对我自己作了恰如其分的评判，我当然必须不去高估我自己，以致不会把这个有争议的东西加到我自己身上。这个有争议的东西因此可能，像你已在信里表述的，只不过适用于对我某些思想的进一步滥用，只不过适用于那些对它们作鹦鹉学舌般复述而没有对它们作出真正理解的人们”——在这里人们实际上能够听出谢林话中冷冰冰的语调——“虽然在《精神现象学》这个文本自身中没有作出区分。”谢林接下来对黑格尔抛弃他们两人（即谢林自己）关于“理智直观”的关键立场表达某种愤怨，因为，就谢林而言，概念与直观恰好是“你和我已经称作的观念”的两个层面，“观念本质上一个层面是概念，另一个层面是直觉”。不过，谢林在信的结尾以一种平和的口气写道：“祝一切顺利；盼尽快给我回信，记住我是你患难之交谢林。”
Hegel did not reply. Schelling was clearly not happy, he obviously felt somewhat betrayed and a bit insulted by the old friend whom he had given a job, and it was clear that if Hegel had been hoping that Schelling would help to promote his book and further Hegel’s cause, he was going to be disappointed. Indeed, Schelling’s tendency at this point was in the opposite direction: By July of 1808, he wrote to Karl J. H. Windischmann, who was preparing a review of the Phenomenology, to say that “I am very curious to see what you have been getting along with Hegel. I’m dying to find out how you have disentangled the rat’s tails; hopefully you . . . will not just wink at the way in which he wants to erect as a universal standard what is only suitable to, and been granted for, his individual nature” - hardly the words of a man who had any intention of promoting his old friend’s career.” The friendship between the two men at that point began, understandably, to change its form, and the two were to be rivals for the attention of the German public for the rest of Hegel’s life. The two did not by any means become enemies, but the friendship of their youth was clearly over. They were two very different personalities, and their original friendship had been based on what they had taken to be a common project. That common project had been defined at first mostly by Schelling, but as Hegel began to make his own way in the world and to separate his own project from Schelling’s, the relationship between the two men also changed. Hegel continued to inquire about Schelling in letters to mutual friends and to send his regards via intermediaries, and Schelling would say kind things to others about Hegel. Schelling even visited Hegel in Nuremberg in 1812, which Hegel described as a “friendly visit” although, not surprisingly, as Hegel put it, “philosophical matters were not touched.”” Schelling did apparently become slightly more irritated as his star began to sink and Hegel’s began to rise, and he often grumbled to associates that Hegel was simply making good on ideas he had pilfered from him. Finally, in a grand historical irony, Schelling later finally became Hegel’s successor at Berlin, with the terms for his ap- pointment calling for him to “stamp out the dragon seed of Hegelian pantheism in Berlin.”’*
黑格尔没有回信。谢林明显很不高兴，他显然感觉到这位他为其提供了工作的老友有点辜负了他并且有点侮辱了他。十分清楚的是，如果黑格尔一直以来希望谢林应该伸出援手宣传《精神现象学》这部著作并促进黑格尔的事业，那么黑格尔就将会大失所望。实际上，谢林在这时的倾向是跟黑格尔的倾向相对立的：到1808年7月，谢林在致信卡尔·J.J.H.温迪施曼（此君时在准备为黑格尔《精神现象学》撰写书评）信中写道：“我好奇地很想知道你一直以来和黑格尔相处得怎么样。我极想弄清你是怎么忍受得了他这个尖酸刻薄的狂妄者；但愿你……不会恰恰对一种方式视而不见，这种方式他想将其设立作为一条普世的只适合他个人秉性的理所当然的标准。”——这个男子话里几乎没有提携他老友事业的意向。完全可以理解的是，谢林和黑格尔这两个人之间的友谊在这时开始变了样，在黑格尔余生，他和谢林两个人必将成为德国大众关注的竞争对手。两人无论如何没有变成不共戴天的仇敌，但他们自年轻时就已结下的友谊显然寿终正寝了。他们两人具有两种截然不同的个性，他们原初的友谊奠基于他们看作的一项共同规划。这项共同规划起初主要由谢林制定，但是在黑格尔开始崭露头角和使他自己规划脱离谢林规划的时候，他们两人间的关系同时也发生了微妙的变化。黑格尔继续在致他和谢林的朋友信中询问谢林情况并拜托中间人捎去他对谢林的问候，谢林同样也总会当着别人面夸赞黑格尔。谢林甚至在1812年还拜访过当时在纽伦堡的黑格尔，这次拜访被黑格尔描述成是“朋友般的拜访”，尽管，毫不令人惊奇的是，像黑格尔说道的，“没有触及哲学问题”。谢林显然确实变得有点更加恭顺，因为他这颗学术明星开始陨落，但黑格尔作为学术明星开始冉冉升起，谢林常常向同仁抱怨道黑格尔完全是在论证从他那里一次一次偷来的思想。最终，具有极大历史讽刺意味的是，谢林后来最终成了黑格尔在柏林大学的继任者，在他的任命期要求他“在柏林消灭黑格尔哲学泛神论的龙种”。
Anonymous Reviews: Hegel as Schellingian
匿名评论：作为谢林哲学信徒的黑格尔
Schelling was clearly going to be no help, so Hegel was of course quite eager to see how the book would be received by others. The initial reviews that appeared while he was still in Bamberg were not, however, encouraging. On August 6, 1807, a hostile anonymous review appeared in the Munich Oberdeutsche Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung {South German General Literary Newspaper)^ The reviewer more or less refused to see that Hegel had changed his position since his Difference book and since his and Schelling’s collaborative work on the Critical Journal of Philosophy. Instead, the Phenomenology was taken to task as being a thoroughly Schellingian piece. The reviewer, assuming on his own part what he took to be a more or less Fichtean position, laid out a charge that has followed Hegel and Hegelianism ever since, namely, that Hegel had tried to swallow up everything in “the absolute” and that he had put too much emphasis on the all-consuming power of theory. Hegel was rebuked for not having recognized that there is much “that is not known., which thus cannot be ordered into a system ... a suspicion said also to have been expressed by Shakespeare.” The reviewer even accused Hegel of succumbing to the kind of “French revolutionary rage” that had recently been in evidence, and lumped Hegel together with, of all people, Jacobi.’^ Since Hegel was, if anything, well known at the time only as a fierce critic of Jacobi, and Jacobi was, if anything, well known as not exactly being one of the French Revolution’s greatest admirers, that polemic was all the more odd and striking, since the only halfway plausible reason for the reviewer’s putting Jacobi and Hegel into one pot had to do with Jacobi’s impassioned defense of the sciences in his inaugural address as the president of the Munich Academy of the Sciences in 1807. (Small wonder then that Hegel soon started describing himself as being in “Jacobi’s party.”)
谢林显然不打算帮助黑格尔，因此黑格尔无疑非常渴望看到《精神现象学》这本书将会怎样得到其他人的接受。然而，最初一批评论并不是令人鼓舞的，它们发表时黑格尔仍然在班堡。在1807年8月6日，一篇充满敌意的匿名书评面世于慕尼黑《德国南部文学总汇报》。书评作者或多或少无视黑格尔自他《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》这本书以来和自他与谢林合作编辑的《哲学评论杂志》以来已经改变了他的立场。相反，《精神现象学》被指责成是一本彻头彻尾的谢林哲学著作。书评作者，由于站在他自己或多或少看作的费希特哲学立场上，从当年批评《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》这部作品起直至今日始终在对黑格尔和黑格尔哲学进行猛烈攻击，也即对黑格尔企图把一切事物都纳入“绝对”和他过于强调理论具有消融一切的力量进行猛烈攻击。黑格尔被指责没有认识到有很多东西“不能被认识，它们因而不可能成为体系中有条理的内容……一种同样也可说成早已被莎士比亚表述过的怀疑”。书评作者甚至指责黑格尔屈从于一种近来已得到证明的“法国大革命的狂怒”，并且恰恰把黑格尔与雅科比完全混为一谈。因为，黑格尔，如果有什么区别的话，当时只是以雅科比的猛烈批评者闻名，而雅科比，如果有什么区别的话，当时恰恰不是以一名法国大革命最大仰慕者闻名，所以，关于这个问题的争论更加离奇更加引人注目，因为，不过把书评作者将雅科比混同于黑格尔当作喻贬不一的貌似真实的理由，很可能和雅科比1807年在他任慕尼黑科学院主席作就职演说时满怀激情地为某些科学门类辩护有关。（之后略微让人感到惊讶的是黑格尔不久开始把他自己描述成“雅科比派”成员。）
An anonymous reply to the review was published shortly thereafter (August 1807), which defended Jacobi but still attacked Hegel for being too “intellectualistic” in his dismissal (in the Preface to the Phenomenology) of those who strove to make philosophy “edifying” instead of “scientific,” and accused Hegel, oddly enough, of falling back into the outmoded formalism of Christian Wolff.’’ The controversy stimulated yet another anonymous reply (also in August 1807) to the first anonymous reply, which criticized the original review and the reply for not making it clear that Hegel had in fact broken from Schelling’s point of view and, while not exactly praising Hegel, somewhat ironically noted that in Hegel’s criticisms of Schelling, we had an example of someone versed in the misguided Schellingian system, a “master [commenting] on his art,” showing us just how wayward the Schellingian system really was."” (If Schelling himself read this review, it would certainly have heightened his already negative feelings about the Phenomenology.)
此后不久（1807年8月）有人发表对上述这篇书评的匿名回应，该回应替雅科比作辩护但依然抨击黑格尔在《精神现象学》前言中对那些力图让哲学变得具有“启迪”而非让哲学变成“科学”的人们进行谴责的时候过于“理智主义”，并谴责黑格尔极其令人惊奇地落入了克里斯蒂安·沃尔夫过时的形式主义窠臼。这场争论还激起了另一位匿名作者对第一位匿名作者的回应的回应（同样也在1807年8月），另一位匿名作者的回应批评原初书评和后来的回应没有弄清黑格尔其实早已摆脱谢林的观点，并且，其时恰恰不是赞扬黑格尔，反而带点冷嘲热讽口吻强调指出，在黑格尔对谢林的批判中，我们看到的是一位榜样式人物精通被引人歧途的谢林哲学体系或堪称一位[评论]谢林艺术的“大师”，这位“大师”恰恰向我们昭示谢林哲学体系确实是多么难以捉摸。（假如谢林本人读过这篇评论，当然也许会强化他对《精神现象学》本已怀有的消极看法。）
Salat’s, Koppen’s, Windischmann’s, and Bachmann’s Reviews
扎拉特、克彭、温迪施曼和巴赫曼的评论
Other reviews began to appear that only heightened the controversy surrounding Hegel’s book. Some of the negative reactions were explainable as reactions to Hegel’s own sharply polemical attacks on other philosophers in his and Schelling’s Critical Journal of Philosophy. However gregarious Hegel’s personality was in social settings, it also had a very aggressive side that clearly emerged from time to time in his writings. Indeed, when it came to such polemics, Hegel cut no corners and made no attempt to soften the blows he inflicted. In 1802, he had reviewed a piece by Jacob Salat (a Catholic Bavarian theologian and moralist, and an intimate of Jacobi’s) in the Critical Journal of Philosophy., calling Salat, variously, “Bavaria’s apostle,” the self-appointed “Knight against the darkness,” and accusing him of completely misrepresenting the Berlin Enlightenment (that is, Kant) and uttering only mistaken banalities about the Enlightenment itself Salat had insisted against post-Kantian idealism that instead of its barren “formulas” (by which he surely meant Schelling’s Naturphilosophie)., we need instead the “spirit and not the letter.” Of that, Hegel sarcastically remarked, “Spirit, only not the letter, is Salat’s cry, spirit, spirit, not the formulas, not a determinate concept,” which, he said, just boils down to the idea that “for him, just hand-waving is what is most spiritual {das Geistigste), since in hand-waving there is the least such letter.” With Salat, Hegel said, we have only a shallow moralism that amounts to a scorning of morality itself, “which covers its scornfulness with a moral cloak of the better and the more perfect and which under this cover ordains by decree its unrecalcitrant vanity to be virtue . . . one cannot do otherwise than hold this camouflage of morality to be the very worst in which vain ignorance has hidden itself.”‘°'
其他评论也开始问世，这只是强化了围绕黑格尔《精神现象学》这本书的争论。一些消极反应可以解释成是对黑格尔自己在他与谢林合编的《哲学评论杂志》上对其他哲学家作出的犀利地争论式抨击的回应。不管黑格尔个性在社交舞台上表现出是多么合群，他的个性同样也显然不时地从他作品中显露出非常夸张的一面。实际上，当出现这样的争论时，黑格尔总是挺身而出且绝不试图减轻他所遭受的打击。1802年，他对刊载于《哲学评论杂志》上雅各布·扎拉特（一名巴伐利亚信奉天主教神学家、伦理学家兼雅科比挚友）的文章作了评论，把扎拉特称作在不同场合的“巴伐利亚第一个传教士”、自我的“反抗黑暗的骑士”，批评他错误地描述了柏林启蒙运动（即康德）并谴责他只是彻底地误认为启蒙运动自身陈腐不堪。扎拉特反对后康德唯心主义而坚持认为，我们不需要后康德哲学贫乏的“准则”（借此他肯定意指谢林的自然哲学），反倒需要“精神而无需文学”。关于这一点，黑格尔尖刻地评论道：“精神而唯独非文学成为扎拉特的呐喊，精神，精神，不是这些准则，不是一个确定的概念。”精神，黑格尔说道，恰好表明是下列这样的观念：“对于他来说，仅仅挥挥手就意味着成为最为精神（das Geistigste）的东西，因为通过挥挥手至少就出现这样的文学。”和扎拉特在一起，黑格尔说道，我们只具有一种浅薄的无异于道德自嘲的道德主义，“这种道德主义以一个更好的、更加完美的道德幌子掩盖它的嘲弄，并在这样的掩盖下用法令规定它那作为美德的容易对付的虚荣心……一个人能够做的只是阻止道德的伪装成为极其糟糕的徒劳的无知已经藏身于其中的东西。”
Hegel therefore had reason to fear Salat’s getting a turn to review him. Salat had already coauthored a book in 1803 with another conservative Bavarian Catholic entitled Der Geist der allerneusten Philosophie der Herren Schelling, Hegel und Companie. Eine Ubersetzung aus der Schuhprache in die Sprache der Welt {The Spirit of the Very Latest Philosophy of Mr. Schelling, Hegel and Company: A Translation from the Language of the School into the Language of the World), which could not exactly be described as friendly toward Schelling and Hegel. In 1804, Salat on his own had sharply responded to Hegel’s rather contentious attack on him in 1802. In 1808, he then took on Hegel’s Phenomenology in his book Vernunft und Verstand {Reason and Understanding) and, surprisingly, softened his tone a bit. Understanding better than most others that Hegel had indeed decisively broken with Schelling, he nonetheless managed to misread the Phenomenology as criticizing Schelling exclusively and not himself as well. (Since the articles in the Critical Journal of Philosophy were unsigned, he had perhaps come to think that Schelling was the principal or sole author of the piece attacking him.) But he certainly wasn’t ready to endorse what Hegel had to say in the Phenomenology. Although Hegel, Salat proclaimed, “has now powerfully declared himself against the pious talV of the idealist school (meaning Schelling), one nonetheless still encountered in his system “the old or well-known spirit of the idealists,” and in his thought the “old idealist game” of “transferring absoluteness, perfection to humanity” was only being played out again in a different form.’“ In any event. Salat noted, Hegel’s writing had at least improved since Hegel’s entries in what Salat pithily characterized as that “unforgettable journal.” (Luckily for Hegel, an equally sharp review by him of another book by Salat had originally been scheduled by Niethammer to appear in the Allgemeine LiteraturZeitung, but it was for some reason never published; it would almost certainly, had it ever appeared, have been aggressively negative, and Salat might not have been so generous to Hegel.)
黑格尔因此有理由担心扎拉特将反过来评论他。扎拉特早在1803年就与另一位巴伐利亚保守派天主教徒合作撰写了一部名为《谢林先生、黑格尔及其伙伴最新的哲学精神：把学派语言翻译成世界语言》的著作，这部著作恰恰可以被说成是对谢林和黑格尔怀有敌意的。1804年，扎拉特独自对黑格尔1802年对他扎拉特颇具争议的抨击作出了犀利的回应。1808年，他接着在他的《理性与知性》这部著作中对黑格尔的《精神现象学》做了评论。令人惊讶的是，他在评论中的语气略有缓和。尽管他比绝大多数其他人能够较好地理解到黑格尔确实早已思想上与谢林彻底决裂，他仍然千方百计把《精神现象学》误读误解为丝毫不含对谢林的批判，同样也不含对他本人的批判。（由于那组刊发在《哲学评论杂志》上的文章没有署名，他最终很可能认为谢林是对他发起攻击的文章的主要作者或唯一作者。）但他当然不愿意承认黑格尔必然在《精神现象学》中所论述的东西。虽然黑格尔“现已掷地有声地宣布他本人反对唯心主义学派（意指谢林）的虔诚空谈”，人们却依然在他体系中遭遇“唯心主义者古老的或著名的精神”，在他的思想中，“让绝对或完美过渡到人性”的“古老唯心主义游戏”只是以不同形式在被重新玩耍而已。无论如何，扎拉特强调指出，黑格尔自着手编辑被扎拉特简练地描述为“难以忘怀的杂志”以来，写作水平至少有了提高。（对于黑格尔来说幸运的是，他就扎拉特另一部著作所写的同样非常犀利的评论，最初被尼特哈默尔计划安排刊发在《文学总汇报》上，但出于某种原因这篇书评始终没有发表；假如它真的被刊出了，那么它几乎肯定会是消极和挑衅性的，扎拉特就不可能对待黑格尔如此宽宏大量。）
Those were all the reviews to appear while Hegel was still in Bamberg. However, in 1809, shortly after his departure for Nuremberg, an anonymous review (but almost certainly authored by another follower of Jacobi, Friedrich Kbppen) appeared in the Allgemeine LiteraturZeitung. That one of Jacobi’s insiders was doing the review made it all the more important for Hegel — indeed, in ways Hegel himself could not have known - since Jacobi, by assuming the presidency of the Munich Academy of Sciences, had become a powerful man in Bavarian intellectual circles, and one who, without Hegel’s knowing it, was getting contradictory messages from various people about Hegel’s qualifications. In August of 1809, the author, Jean Paul (Johann Paul Friedrich Richter), had wTitten to Jacobi praising the Phenomenology^ saying that, given all the nasty things Hegel had said in earlier writings about Jacobi, he found himself “surprised” at Hegel’s “new philosophical system” with its “clarity, style, freedom, and force,” noting also that Hegel had finally freed himself from “father-polyp Schelling.”'“ On the other hand, Jacobi had written to Hegel’s old nemesis, J. F. Fries, in November of 1807, asking him about the Phenomenology (“about which Niethammer had spoken with interest,” he added), noting in passing that his student Koppen was in the process of writing a review of it.'®'* Fries wasted no time in responding to Jacobi’s inquiry, informing him that there was not much to Hegel’s book, just a “universal history of the human spirit,” nothing more than “Schelling’s Naturphilosophie carried out on the side of spirit,” and that the whole thing was in any event completely self-contradictory since it declared all knowledge to be in flux and relative, while at the same time declaring itself to speak from the absolute standpoint.'"^
以上这些就是当黑格尔仍然住在班堡时问世的全部有关《精神现象学》的评论。不过，在1809年，在他离开班堡去纽伦堡后不久，一篇匿名评论（而几乎可以肯定作者是雅科比的另一追随者弗里德里希·克彭）刊发在《文学总汇报》上。雅科比随从中的一位写出这篇评论，这使这篇评论对黑格尔来说显得更为重要——实际上，在某些方面黑格尔本人不可能知道这篇评论出自何人之手——因为雅科比，由于担任慕尼黑科学院主席职务，早已成了巴伐利亚知识界的权威。费希特这个人，在黑格尔不知情的情况下，从不同人物那里搜集关于黑格尔人品的自相矛盾的信息。在1809年8月，作者耶安·保罗（约翰·保罗·弗里德里希·里希特）在致雅科比信中赞扬《精神现象学》，说道，考虑到黑格尔在早期著作中对雅科比所说的全都是些令人讨厌的东西，他发觉他自己对黑格尔的“新哲学体系”“清晰、得体、自由和有力”感到非常惊讶，同样还强调指出黑格尔终于使他自己摆脱了“寄居生物父亲般的谢林”。另一方面，雅科比在1807年11月致信黑格尔宿敌J.F.弗里斯，向他询问关于《精神现象学》这部著作的信息（“尼特哈默尔对《精神现象学》很感兴趣”，他补充道），附带说道他学生克彭正在撰写一篇关于《精神现象学》的书评。弗里斯及时回复雅科比的询问，告知他没有多少关于黑格尔《精神现象学》这部仅仅作为“人类精神共相史”的著作的信息，有的只是关于“谢林在精神方面完成的自然哲学”的信息，并告知他整本《精神现象学》无论如何都是完全自相矛盾的，因为它宣称所有的知识都是不断变化的和相互联系的，而同时宣称它自己是从绝对的观点言说的。
In his review, Koppen showed that he too understood that Hegel’s break with Schelling was indeed real, and that “Hegel was doing battle with his old philosophical self.”'"" But he claimed that although Hegel had thus exposed the false formalism of the Schellingian Naturphilosophie, he had fallen into the opposite error of trying to make “all speculative philosophy into logic” and in doing so, had failed to understand what Kant had demonstrated, that logic on its own is empty and that we require the experience of particular things in order to develop any particular content for our ideas. The error into which Hegel had fallen, he said, was typical of all philosophical thought: This “blunder of the philosophers is not new, to hold the logical ahstractum of the universal for the truth of things,” as Koppen put it.'"’ Of the new Hegelian speculative system, moreover, Koppen blithely said, “we wish [it] well but cannot, in light of former logic, come to declare such a thinking of contradictions to be a supersession (Aufhebung) of logical thought in general.”'"^
在他的书评中，克彭说明他也意识到黑格尔与谢林的决裂是千真万确的，他说明“黑格尔在与他旧有的哲学自我进行战斗”。不过他声称，尽管黑格尔因此揭露了谢林自然哲学虚假的形式主义，他还是落入了试图将“所有的思辨哲学变成逻辑”的这一相反的错误巢穴。在这样做过程中，他未能理解康德早已证明了的东西：逻辑自身是空洞无物的，我们需要具体事物的经验以便阐发我们观念的任何具体内容。这一为黑格尔所犯下的错误，他说道，是一切哲学思维犯下的典型错误：“把共相的逻辑抽象当作事物的真理看待”，哲学家们犯下的这个大错已经不是什么新东西了，像克彭指出的。尚不止于此，关于黑格尔新的思辨体系，克彭漫不经心地说道，“我们希望[它]非常管用，但我们不可能，按照以前的逻辑，最终宣称这样的矛盾思维将扬弃（Aufhebung）一般逻辑思维”。
That theme was picked up by another anonymous reviewer for the Neue Leipziger Literaturzeitung {New Leipzig Literary Newspaper) in 1809. Hegel had failed to “refute Kant,” he said, and without such a refutation, the conversion of speculative philosophy into “logic” could only be a false start.That reviewer, however, curiously failed to see how Hegel had genuinely broken with his old Schellingian position, saying at one point that “next to these strange logical games we find the author’s old idea of the emergence of a being out of itself.”"® Indeed, the author finds the seemingly paradoxical passages of the book to be unintelligible, offering up as an example a quote from Hegel that “the truth of independent consciousness is the vassal’s consciousness,” something that obviously struck the reviewer as so odd that it did not require any explication for its oddness to be apparent.
这个话题在1809年被另一匿名评论者在《新莱比锡文学报》上重新提起。黑格尔未能“驳倒康德”，他说道，在这种情况下，把思辨哲学变成“逻辑”可能只不过是一个错误的开始。然而，令人奇怪的是，这位匿名评论者竟然未能看出黑格尔怎样真的已经与他旧有的谢林哲学立场决裂。他在这一点上还说道，“透过这些奇怪的逻辑游戏，我们发现《精神现象学》作者旧有的思想出现脱节现象”。实际上，这位匿名作者发现《精神现象学》这本书中表面上悖论式的段落令人难以理解，并列举了引自黑格尔的一个例子：“独立意识的真理是仆人意识”，这一陈述明显给评论者留下了深刻印象，它是如此奇特以致它无需对它表现出的奇特性作出任何解释。
K. I. Windischmann finally published his review of the book in 1809 in Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung. Contrary to what Schelling had hoped, Windischmann’s review emerged as an enthusiastic endorsement of everything Windischmann took Hegel to stand for. Unfortunately, Windischmann also misunderstood just about everything about Hegel’s book. Windischmann, a Catholic physician and enthusiast of mesmerist cures, saw the entire book as more or less a mystical religious treatise. Windischmann seemed to understand, for example, the dialectic of mastery and servitude as a proof that we must learn to trust and fear the Lord God. Hegel had made a pun in that section of the book about wisdom beginning with the fear of the lord - the Herr, the master and Windischmann had taken the pun literally, thinking that Hegel had thereby shown that out of the “fear of the Lord” in the earthly sense comes the impulse to “give our whole essence an everlasting form {Gestalt) from its own resources.”"' Windischmann interpreted the passages on the “moral worldview” in the Phenomenology as concerning not the completion of the Revolution in the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and the Romantics but instead a demonstration that everything, including moral consciousness itself, constitutes only the various forms of appearance that religion takes. Indeed, his only criticism of the book was that voiced by everyone except Jean Paul, namely, that the book was obtusely written. (Jean Paul claimed to find it delightfully clear.) On the basis of his reading of the Phenomenology, Windischmann became, if only for a while, an enthusiastic Hegelian, even telling Hegel in 1810 that his book was destined to become “the book of elements for From Jena to Bamberg 263 the emancipation of man, the key to the new gospel that Lessing prophesied. Hegel, wisely, did not point out or press the differences between himself and Windischmann in his letter replying to him and thanking him for the review.
1809年，K.I.温迪施曼终于在《耶拿文学总汇报》上发表对《精神现象学》这本书的评论。与谢林期望的相反，温迪施曼评论中表现出对他看作的黑格尔主张的一切东西都热情赞同。令人遗憾的是，温迪施曼同样也几乎误读误解了黑格尔书中的一切东西。温迪施曼，一位天主教医生兼催眠疗法忠实信徒，或多或少把整本书当作一份神秘的宗教契约看待。举例来说，温迪施曼看来好像把主人与奴隶的辩证法理解成是我们必须学会信任和敬畏老天爷的证据。黑格尔在书中以对上帝（先生或主人）的敬畏开始的智慢这个部分中用了个双关语，温迪施曼从字面上理解这个双关语，认为黑格尔由此表明的是，出于从世俗意义上说对“上帝的敬畏”就会产生某些冲动，这些冲动必将“赋予我们的整个本质持续不断源自它自己的形式（Gestalt）”。温迪施曼对《精神现象学》中论述“道德世界观”的一些相关段落作了以下的解释：它们涉及法国大革命在康德、费希特和浪漫主义者哲学中的完成，反而它们涉及证明一切东西，包括道德意识自身，都仅仅构成宗教所采用的现象的各种不同形式。实际上，他对《精神现象学》这本书作出的唯一批评就是除了耶安·保罗之外每个人都表达的东西，也即它被写成了晦涩难懂的著作。（耶安·保罗声称他本人发现《精神现象学》清晰得令人读来极有兴趣。）基于他对《精神现象学》的解读，温迪施曼成了一个满腔热情的黑格尔信徒，他甚至在1810年还告知黑格尔，《精神现象学》这部著作注定将成为“人类解放原理的著作，荷辛所预言的新福音书的扛鼎之作”。黑格尔没有在他对温迪施曼作出回应和对温迪施曼的评论表示感谢的信中指出或表达他本人与温迪施曼之间的不同看法，这样的做法看来是非常明智的。
Hegel was not exactly pleased with Koppen’s and Salat’s reviews, since he regarded them as second-rate thinkers at best and was indignant about what he took to be the continuing injustice of their securing the university positions that he himself so desperately wanted (and that he thought he also more richly deserved). In 1807, two years prior to the review, he had exclaimed about Salat’s appointment at the newly formed university of Landshut, “How is one to keep from breaking out in howls over such a situation.^ It is just too much!”"^ Of Koppen’s appointment to the same university, he could only remark at the same time - with unconcealed antipathy - that it “is, of course, quite characteristic; and what seems to me his complete incapacity for any solid thought is all the more shocking because it shows how great is the power [Jacobi] has courted.”""*
黑格尔恰恰没有因克彭和扎拉特的评论而感到自鸣得意，原因在于，黑格尔认为他们两人充其量也就是二流思想家。黑格尔对他自己一直受到不公正的待遇感到愤愤不平，因为他们两人弄到了大学职位，这样的职位是他本人极其想要获得的（他认为他也完全应该得到这个职位）。在1807年，这篇评论问世两年前，他强烈抗议扎拉特受到新组建的兰茨胡特大学任命：“一个人怎么可能忍住不爆发对这样一个职位的大笑？这件事恰恰太离谱了！”关于克彭也受到兰茨胡特大学任命，他只能同时带着毫不掩饰的反感谈论道这件事：“当然是非常富有特征的；在我看来更令人震惊的是他完全不能把握任何真正的思想，因为这件事表明[雅科比]所企图获得的权力是多么大。”
Some general and important themes nonetheless began to crystallize out of the early reviews of Hegel’s book. Almost everyone complained about the turgid, dense style of the book, something Hegel himself acknowledged but nonetheless continued all his life to defend as necessary for the presentation of such a “rigorous” {wissenschaftlich, “scientific”) undertaking; for Hegel, the dense, compact presentation of a complete thought — the style developed by Kant - was the only suitable form for rigorous speculative philosophy. In a letter to his friend Karl Knebel about the Phenomenology^ Hegel contrasted the kind of clarity he could achieve in the reporting of news - “that Prince so and so passed through today, that His Majesty went boar hunting” - with, as he put it, the kind of “abstract subject matter [that] does not permit that clarity of exposition which discloses the object in a finished state and clear light at first approach, and which is possible in the case of a concrete subject matter.”'" In an 1812 letter to Peter van Ghert, he said with reference to what van Ghert had characterized as the “ponderousness” of the presentation in the Phenomenology that “it is . . . the nature of such abstract subjects that treatments of them cannot assume the ease of a common book for reading. Truly speculative philosophy cannot take on the garb and style of Locke or the usual French philosophy ... I must be satisfied for the time being with having broken new ground,” adding that he was aware that much of his philosophy had to strike the ordinary reader therefore as “the topsy-turvy world.
不过，一些一般而重要的论题开始从对黑格尔《精神现象学》这本书早期评论中浮出水面。几乎每个人都抱怨该书文体上的浮夸和晦涩，这种文体得到黑格尔本人的认可，但他耗费毕生精力为作为描述这样一项“严肃的”（wissenschaftlich，“科学的”）任务所必需的文体进行辩护；对黑格尔来说，对全部思想作浓缩的简洁的描述——这种由康德开先河的文体——是唯一适合严密的思辨哲学的形式。在他就《精神现象学》这部著作致友人卡尔·克内贝尔信中，黑格尔把一种被他可能从新闻报道——“大公如此这般地度过了今天，外出捕野猪”——中获得的清晰和像他指出的一种“不适合清晰显露的抽象论题进行对照，清晰显露处于完成状态中和处于最初临近明亮光线中的对象，显露清晰就具体论题来说是完全有可能的”。在1812年致彼得·梵·格尔特信中，他在提到格尔特所刻画的表现在《精神现象学》中“冗长无味”的特点时说道：“论述这样的抽象问题不可能被设想成像解读普通书籍一样容易，这就是……这样的抽象问题的本质。真正地思辨的哲学不可能采用洛克或法国通常哲学的外表和文体……我必须对我花费时间开辟了的新领域感到心满意足”，他补充道，他意识到他哲学中很多东西因此必然以“颠倒的世界”给普通读者留下深刻印象。
More important, though, was the issue of the continuing status and development of post-Kantian idealism in the Phenomenology, a theme on which almost all the reviewers picked up, even though as a rule they either continued to see Hegel as a Schellingian or simply confessed to being puzzled by how one was to relate Hegel’s apparently new, apparently non-Schellingian views to his older, presumably Schellingian standpoint and, more broadly, to post-Kantian idealism in general. Salat in particular had insightfully seen that Hegel was breaking with Schelling but was also continuing to play the “idealist game” in a different form; more than others, he saw the continuities and discontinuities in Hegel’s version of post-Kantian idealism.
尽管如此，更重要的是后康德唯心主义在《精神现象学》中继续占有的地位和继续发展的问题，这个论题几乎被所有的评论者都提到过，尽管通常他们要么继续把黑格尔看作谢林哲学信徒，要么干脆承认被下列的这种做法弄得迷惑不解：人们通常怎么可能把黑格尔那显然新的、显然非谢林哲学的见解与黑格尔那旧有的大概谢林哲学的观点挂起钩来，较之其他人更胜一筹，他看到了断断续续的黑格尔的后康德唯心主义版本。
The initial controversies about the book served it well. The issue of what to do “after Kant” was still very much alive in German circles, even if the idea of developing the Kantian idealist point of view had fallen out of favor. The controversy surrounding Hegel’s book thus established him as a central figure in the idealist line of thought, even for those who held that particular line of thought to be mistaken. Since many philosophers and thinkers at the time, including Schelling himself, were moving away from any further development of idealist philosophy, Hegel found himself almost by default coming to be regarded as the representative exponent of what had only a few years before been the vogue but which had in the intervening years come to seem to many German intellectuals an unsustainable intellectual project.
关于《精神现象学》最初争论可用来对上述问题作出绝妙的诠释。“在康德之后”可用来做什么，这个问题仍然在德国学界常常被人谈起，纵使阐发康德唯心主义观点这一想法早已失宠。围绕黑格尔《精神现象学》的争论因此把他确立为唯心主义思想路线的核心人物，甚至对于那些持有将遭到误解的独特思想路线的人们来说也概莫能外。因为，当时很多哲学家和思想家，包括谢林本人在内，都对进一步发展唯心主义哲学躲之不及，所以，黑格尔发觉他本人几乎因没有随波逐流而逐渐被人当作是个具有代表性的唯心主义哲学鼓吹者看待，他被人看作宣扬仅仅在几年前就已广为流行的东西，而这种东西在过去几年间终于在德国很多知识分子看来变成一项无法支撑的知识计划。
Perhaps most importantly, though, what had not emerged was any generally agreed upon interpretation of the book, a matter that paradoxically was to prove quite fortunate for Hegel. Koppen and Salat had made it clear to the public that Hegel had broken with Schelling’s views and taken idealism in a different direction, although neither of them approved of that new direction nor could they even agree about how it was to be characterized. In a later, famous review of the Phenomenology published in 1810, a former student of Hegel’s at Jena, K. F. Bachmann, drove that point home, saying that it had always been a mistake to equate Hegel’s and Schelling’s views, that a “more precise look” at the essays published by Hegel in the Critical Journal of Philosophy showed that the two had always had differing points of view. Now, he said, they were almost “complete opposites.” Hegel’s work, instead, pointed the way to “a new epic in the history of philosophy,” which would invite attacks on itself from both the Kantian and Schellingian camps, and, in a famous comparison, Bachmann said that if Schelling was the Plato of modern philosophy — a characterization that had already been widely applied to Schelling while he was at Jena — then Hegel was modern philosophy’s “German Aristotle.””^ In a turn of phrase that was to prove prophetic, Bachmann said that Hegel’s students, “suffused with the truth of the system,” have set it as the “goal of their lives” to work together to bring about the “realization of the truths contained in his system,” adding that that common effort must take “another, more practical path” than that taken by Hegel.
尽管如此，大概最重要的是，当时已经出现的是对《精神现象学》见仁见智的解释，这件事必将证明对于黑格尔是很幸运的，这种情况相当具有悖论意味。克彭和扎拉特向公众阐明，黑格尔已经与谢林的见解决裂并已经把唯心主义引向不同的方向，尽管他们两人都既不赞成这个新方向，甚至也不可能在它的特点将被这样刻画问题上达成一致意见。在一篇更晚的对出版于1810年的《精神现象学》著名评论中，黑格尔以前在耶拿时的学生K.F.巴赫曼对克彭和扎拉特的上述观点做了充分说明，巴赫曼说道，把黑格尔和谢林的看法等量齐观，这种做法始终是错误的，对黑格尔发表在《哲学评论杂志》上文章的“更为精确的考察”证明谢林和黑格尔始终具有不同的观点。现在，他说道，他们两人几乎持有“完全对立的观点”。黑格尔的研究反而开辟了一条“哲学史中新的史诗”般的路径，这当然招致康德哲学阵营和谢林哲学阵营对这条路径自身的攻击。在一个著名的比较中，巴赫曼说道，假如谢林堪称现代哲学的柏拉图——一种当谢林在耶拿时就已被广泛地应用于谢林的特性描述——那么黑格尔就堪称现代哲学的“德国亚里士多德”。在诉诸这个将被证明具有预言性质的用语时，巴赫曼说道，黑格尔的弟子们，“笼罩在黑格尔体系真理光环下的”弟子们，完全把促使人们去“认识他体系中包含的真理”确立为“他们终身”奋斗的“目标”，并补充道，这样的共同努力必然开辟“另一更加实际的路径”而非由黑格尔开辟的路径。
Within three to four years after the Phenomenology’’s appearance, the general view had thus begun to emerge that Hegel had broken with Schelling, that he had now assumed the mantle of being the foremost proponent of developing post-Kantian idealism in Germany, and that nobody was quite sure in what direction he was proposing to take it. Once the initial waves of enthusiasm for Romanticism and its aftermath had begun to die down after the downfall of Napoleon in 1813, that lack of an agreed-upon interpretation of his work allowed Hegel to begin to be seen as someone around whom both anti-Romantics and Romantics could rally, since without there being a definitive interpretation of Hegel (and with Hegel slyly refusing to play all his cards and publicly rule out definitively any interpretation), all the sides in the debates found that they could read into “Hegel-the-post-Kantianidealist” a good bit of what they already wanted to see, which, naturally enough, was usually themselves. Even Schelling himself, in a moment of good-spiritedness, said in 1809 that Hegel as a “pure exemplar of inward and external prose must be held sacred in our overly poetical times,” and that against the times’ constant tendency to “sentimentality . . . such a negating spirit is an excellent corrective.”"’ Fortunately for Hegel, it turned out, the times were soon to favor a sober “German Aristotle,” a person of “inward prose” more than they were an overpoetic “Plato.” But that time was not to come for several more years.
在《精神现象学》问世后的三四年里，下列的这种普遍看法因此开始面世：黑格尔思想上已经与谢林决裂，他现已继承后康德唯心主义衣钵以杰出辩护者身份去阐发德国后康德唯心主义，人们根本吃不准他打算把后康德哲学引向何方。一旦浪漫主义初期的巨大热情和浪漫主义的成果已经在1813年拿破仑垮台后开始逐渐消失，对黑格尔著作见仁见智的解释就容易让黑格尔开始被人看作是某个可以既被反浪漫主义者又被浪漫主义者居于其下的哲学家，原因在于，如果不能形成对黑格尔的确定性的解释（由于黑格尔巧妙地拒绝把他自己的思想和盘托出并公开表示不接受任何确定性的解释），那么所有的争论各方就都会发觉他们可能把好多已经被他们想看到的东西解读成是“黑格尔-后康德-唯心主义”，这些东西通常代表他们自己对黑格尔哲学的解释，这是一件十分自然而然的事情。甚至就连谢林本人在1809年这个时刻也兴冲冲地说道，黑格尔作为“内外兼修的十足的典范必将被人认为献身于我们过度诗化的时代”而有悖于时代始终倾向于的“多愁善感……这样一种否定的精神起到矫枉过正的作用”。结果表明，对于黑格尔十分幸运的是，时代不久必将垂青一个头脑清醒的“德国亚里士多德”，一个“内外兼修”的人物，而注定不将垂青那些过度诗化的“柏拉图”。但是这个时刻还要等到若干年后才能到来。
