3 From Berne to Frankfurt to Jena: Failed Projects and Fresh Starts
第3章 “从伯尔尼到法兰克福再到耶拿时期：失败的计划和新的开始”(2)
Hegel gladly accepted the position and left Berne as soon as he could.
黑格尔乐意接受这个职位并尽快离开了伯尔尼。
Christianity, Modernity, and Hegel’s Bernese Kantianism
基督教、现代性和黑格尔伯尔尼时期的康德主义
Although Hegel himself was crushingly disappointed with his activities in Berne, his time there was not completely wasted. Notwithstanding that he was failing in terms of his own aspirations, in terms of where he was eventually headed he had been laying some crucial groundwork. He had begun an intense study of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling - although with some chagrin he admitted to Schelling that “you cannot expect observations from me on your writing. In this matter I am but an apprentice”^^ - which was to pay off a few years later. In his few writings in Berne, he at first continued the line of thought that he had begun in his “Tubingen Essay,” continuing to employ the distinction between objective and subjective religion, all the while spicing it up with some of his new readings and new reflections. The fragments of his work from this period show that his Enlightenment background (as tempered by his admiration for Rousseau) continued to play a role in this thought. For example, on the one hand, he claimed that any division of society into “estates” {Stdnde) is a danger to freedom, since it fragments the whole — a theme that had also been voiced in an essay written during his period at the Stuttgart Gymnasium^ in which he drew on his youthful readings of Johann Herder and the “popular philosopher” Christian Garve to explicate the difference between ancient and modern literature.He also began to echo Edward Gibbon in his discussions of how the introduction of Christianity had undermined the Roman empire; Gibbon’s irony coupled with his passionate attachment to his subject obviously made a big impression on Hegel - indeed, he was to adopt some of Gibbon’s manner in his own masterpiece, the Phenomenology of Spirit. On the other hand, he praised the individuality of Socrates and compared Jesus unfavorably to Socrates; Socrates, he says, “left behind no Masonic signs, no mandate to proclaim his name. ... He did not, in order to bring people to perfect goodness, outline some detour by way of him . . . dispensing with mediators, he led the individual only into himself.”^"* He revived the idea found in the “Tubingen Essay” of transforming an “objective” religion into a “subjective” religion, except that now he ascribed this task to the state, noting that somehow the state must do this while preserving freedom for the individual conscience.(Exactly how the state was to do this, he did not say.)
虽然黑格尔本人对他在伯尔尼的活动极度失望，但他在那里的时间没有被完全浪费。尽管他未能根据自己的志向做事，但他在自己致力于从事的事业方面，还是打下了某种至关重要的基础。他已经着手对康德、费希特和谢林进行广泛的研究——尽管他有些愧谦地向谢林承认“你不能期待我对你的著作作出评论。在这件事上我只是个学徒”——这个学徒必将在几年后取得成功。在他伯尔尼时期少量作品中，他起初继续秉持他在“图宾根论文”中开出的思路、继续使用主观宗教与客观宗教这一区分，始终以他的某些新解读和新反思来为这一区分加工润色。他这个阶段札记表明他的启蒙运动背景（作为他对卢梭的钦佩所调和的东西）继续在上述思考中发挥重要作用。举例来说，一方面，他声称任何把社会分成“等级”（Stdnde）的做法都是对自由的威胁，因为这样的做法打破了整体——一个同样早在他斯图加特高级中学阶段撰写的文章中就已被提出的论题，在那篇文章中，他把他青年时期对约翰·赫尔德和“通俗哲学家”克里斯蒂安·加尔弗的解读，用来解释古代文学与现代文学的区别。他同样也着手在探讨基督教的传入怎么削弱了罗马帝国时重复爱德华·吉本的观点；吉本的讽刺连同他对他的问题表现出的热情明显地给黑格尔留下了深刻的印象——更确切地说，他必将在他自己的杰作《精神现象学》中采用吉本的某些方式。另一方面，他赞扬苏格拉底的个性且不赞成把耶稣与苏格拉底相比；苏格拉底，他说，“没有留下共济会标志，没有命令人们去为他歌功颂德……他没有，为了把人们引向至善，从而通过他自己来勾勒出标种迂回曲折的道路……在摒弃了调解者后，他只是使他自己具有个性。”他重拾那见于“图宾根论文”把“客观的”宗教变成“主观的”宗教这一想法，只是眼下他把这个任务归于国家，他强调指出不管怎么样，国家在保护个人良知的自由时必须这样做。（国家恰恰怎么必将这样做，他没有说出具体理由。）
In making these kinds of claims, however, he once again found himself in a bind of his own making: On the one hand, he wanted to call for some way of overcoming the fragmentation of modern life and establishing some form of community without at the same time violating individual liberty of conscience; on the other, he wanted to praise the reliance on individual insight and understanding taught by Socrates without letting such self-reliant individuals go on to fragment themselves from the social whole and from each other. In his Berne fragments, just as in his “Tubingen Essay,” he still had found no concrete way to bring these kinds of conflicting claims together, to unite his ideas of a unified, unfragmented “beautiful” social whole with the idea of the preservation of the rights and practices of the individual conscience. He seemed to realize that his prescriptions ended up being only moralistic calls for “something better” without any real possibility of their being realized. And as a Wiirttemberger, he of course certainly knew the pitfalls of having a “state” simply mandate a particular religion; Duke Carl Eugen would have gladly mandated Catholicism for his subjects, if only he could have gotten away with it.
然而，在提出这些种类的主张时，他再度发觉解铃还须系铃人：一方面，他想倡导一种用以克服现代生活的断裂和建立一种形式社区的方法而同时又不侵犯个人的良知自由；另一方面，他想赞扬依赖由苏格拉底教导的个体洞察力和理解力而同时又不让这种依靠自己的个体继续割断他们自己与社会整体的联系和他们彼此间的联系。在他的伯尔尼时期札记中，正像在他的“图宾根论文”中一样，他仍然没有发现任何具体的方法可使这些种类的自相矛盾的主张融为一体，可使他关于一个统一的非碎片化的“优美的”社会整体这类想法与保护个体良知的权利和实点这一想法结合起来。他看来好像意识到他的一系列济世良方最终仅仅道德主义式地倡导“树立一种更好的东西”而根本不可能真正地使它们得以实现。而且作为一个符腾堡人，他当然肯定晓得让“国家”简单地授权一种特殊的宗教是非常危险的；卡尔·欧根公爵大概很乐意把臣民委托给天主教，但愿他可以侥幸成功。
Most significant for Hegel’s development during his Bernese period was his growing concern with what it would mean, as he had put it to Schelling, to “complete” the Kantian philosophy. Indeed, his fragments and his more developed pieces from that time bear witness to his early forays into Fichte’s writings and, more importantly, to the growing influence of Kant on his thought. In Berne, his more explicitly Rousseauian commitments began to fade as the more overtly Kantian elements came more and more to the fore, and Aristotle’s notion that the good man finds happiness in what virtue requires started to become linked with Hegel’s increasingly Kantian stance in ethics. By the very end of his stay in Berne, Hegel was beginning to redescribe everything in terms of the basic notions of Kantian ethical theory. Although there were strains of Fichte in some of the fragments from that period - his friend Schelling was clearly going in the direction of Fichtean thought at this time, and Hegel was not immune to it — it was Kantian language that began to overtake Hegel’s earlier ways of formulating things. For example, in one of the fragments from the Berne period, we find Hegel claiming, like a good Kantian, that “the effect of religion is to strengthen, by means of the idea of God as moral lawgiver, ethical life’s motives and to enhance the satisfaction we derive from performing what our practical reason demands, specifically with regard to the ultimate end that reason posits: The highest good.”^*^
对于黑格尔在伯尔尼时期思想发展最有意义的是他逐渐关注“完成”康德哲学通常意味着什么，像他那时已向谢林提出的一样。更确切地说，他那时的札记和他较为详细地阐发的段落证明他早年涉猎了费希特的作品，更重要的是，证明他的思想日益受到康德的影响。在伯尔尼时期，他的更加明晰的卢梭主义的承诺逐渐消失，其时康德哲学的要素越来越居于显要的地位。亚里士多德关于君子能够找到美德所要求的快乐这一见解同样也开始变得与黑格尔伦理学上日益趋向康德哲学立场相联系。到快要离开伯尔尼时，黑格尔在着手根据康德伦理学理论的基本概念来重新描述每个伦理问题。虽然那个阶段的一些札记带有费希特思想的色彩——他的友人谢林当时显然在沿着费希特思想方向继续前进，黑格尔不能不受费希特思想的影响——但正是康德的用语逐渐替代黑格尔早期详细论述事物的方法。举例来说，在伯尔尼时期一段札记中，我们发觉黑格尔主张，像一个虔诚的康德哲学信徒一样，“宗教的影响必定靠上帝作为道德立法者或伦理生活动机这一概念而变强，并必定提高我们从实现我们的实践理性要求的东西中所获得的满意度、特别是提高我们从在理性设定的终极目的方面所获得的满意度：最高的善。”
Hegel also began to enlist Kant in his battle against Tubingen orthodoxy. In a letter, he dismissively asked Schelling, “How are things otherwise in Tubingen? ... In truth, nowhere is the old system so faithfully propagated as there.”” Taking the Tubingen theologians as his target, he even went so far in his Berne period as to write an entire “Life of Jesus” (unpublished in his lifetime) in which Jesus’ life and teachings were redescribed so as to fit more or less the ideas articulated by Kant in his Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason Alone. In the “Life of Jesus,” Jesus emerged not as the natural/supernatural deliverer of a divine revelation (as Hegel’s theology professor at Tubingen, Gottlob Storr, had tried to demonstrate) but instead as one of the foremost exponents of Kant’s “religion of morality.”
黑格尔同样还在着手与图宾根正统观念的战斗中支持康德哲学。在一封信中，他轻蔑地追问谢林，“有些事情怎么在图宾根就变了样？说实话，在那里旧体系晨儿也找不到忠实的拥趸。”由于把图宾根神学家们当作他的靶子看待，他甚至在伯尔尼时期思想上走得如此之远，以至于他写出了一部完整的《耶稣传》（该传在他生前未发表）。在《耶稣传》中耶稣的生活和学说被作了重新描述，以便或多或少与康德在《单纯理性限度内的宗教》中系统阐述的观点相适应。在《耶稣传》中，耶稣不复以神启示的自然或超自然的拯救者面目出现（像黑格尔的图宾根神学教授戈特洛布·施托尔尝试去证明的一样），反而是以康德的“道德宗教”中最重要的阐释者之一面目出现。
Hegel did not, however, make himself over into a fully orthodox Kantian. For him the question continued to be: If Christianity is to be made into a “people’s religion” (a “subjective” religion), and if that is to be identified with a quasi-Kantian understanding of the “kingdom of God and the “invisible church” — that is, if it is to be fully reinter- preted in light of the code words used by Schelling, Hegel, and Holderlin at the Seminary in Tubingen - then it must be given a purely moral interpretation that is also compatible with Hegel’s, Holderlin’s, and Schelling’s admiration for the idealized ancient Greeks as models for what a renewed social order would look like. Thus, Hegel attempted to fuse Kant’s idea of a “religion of morality” with his own critique of the fragmentation of modern life inspired by his youthful readings of Garve, Herder, and Rousseau, and out of this he hoped to produce a “popular philosophy” that would bring about, as he had put it to Schelling, the “revolution in Germany” that would follow from the “application” of Kant’s philosophy.-^*
可是黑格尔并没有使自己变成一个完全正统的康德哲学信徒。对于他来说问题仍然是：如果基督教必将被弄成“人民宗教”（“主观”宗教），如果这必将被认为等同于对“上帝王国”和“看不见的教堂”的标准康德式解读——也即如果它必将被按照谢林、黑格尔、荷尔德林在图宾根神学院时期所使用的暗语进行全面重新阐释——那么它就必须被赋予一种纯道德上的阐释而且这种阐释也要与下列的东西相一致：黑格尔、荷尔德林、谢林所钦佩的作为榜样的理想化的古希腊人，一种脱胎换骨的社会秩序通常看起来所像的东西。因此，黑格尔尝试着把康德的“道德宗教”概念与他自己因受他年轻时解读加尔弗、赫尔德和卢梭作品的启发而对现代生活碎片化的批判融为一体，由于这样，他希望创造一种“通俗哲学”，“通俗哲学”将导致，像他向谢林论述的，一场将紧随康德哲学的“应用”而来的“德国革命”。
Indeed, at this point, Hegel was still quite explicit about his desire to be such a “popular” philosopher, noting to Schelling that the special features of Kantian and Fichtean ideas were not things he thought needed to be worked out in such a “popular presentation”; it was important for intellectuals to understand the fine points of the postKantian movement, but it was not important to make them part of the “popular philosophy”: “An esoteric philosophy will, to be sure, always remain, and the idea of God as the absolute ‘F will be part of it. . . . The philosophers are proving the dignity of man. The people will learn to feel it.”*’ In seeing his future in this way, Hegel was also quite obviously planning to carve out new ground for himself: The “popular philosophers” had until then mostly contented themselves with reproducing, reworking, and applying British (and particularly Scottish) ideas; Hegel, on the other hand, was looking to make himself into a “popular philosopher” who was going to apply Kantian ideas in light of the British ideas he had picked up along the way."^"
更确切地说，在这一点上，黑格尔仍然十分明显地渴望做这样一名“通俗”哲学家，并向谢林强调指出康德哲学思想和费希特哲学思想的特征不是某种在他看来需要被以这样一种“通俗表象”来理解的东西；黑格尔这一看法对于知识界解读后康德哲学运动的细微观点是非常重要的，但是使细微的观点构成“通俗哲学”一部分就不那么重要了：“无疑问，一种秘传的哲学终究总是保持不变的，而且作为绝对‘自我’的上帝这一概念将构成这种秘传哲学的一部分……有些哲学家在证明人类的尊严。人们应该学会感觉到人类的尊严。”在以这种方式展望未来时，黑格尔同样也非常明确地去筹划为他自已开辟出一片新的天地：“通俗哲学家”目标到那时为止还主要是满足于再造、重写和应用大不列颠的（特别是苏格兰的）思想；另一方面，黑格尔期待使他自己变成一名“通俗哲学家”，这名“通俗哲学家”将要根据被他半路学得的大不列颠思想来运用康德哲学思想。
Indeed, the “completion” of Kantian philosophy at this point meant for Hegel only the application of Kantian philosophy in a “popular” way, the construction of a more or less Kantian conception of what would be a genuinely practical stimulus to action. In commenting on his study of the philosophical movement from Kant to Schelling (and on his relative ignorance of the ways in which post-Kantians like Karl Leonhard Reinhold were developing the critical philosophy), he remarked that the more recent attempts to get to the bottom of Kant’s theory (Reinhold’s and Fichte’s) were, for him, only “speculations, rather than being of great applicability to universally usable concepts, [which] seem of more direct significance mainly to theoretical reason alone.”"^’ Hegel’s ideas on “subjective” religion and a “people’s religion” were all constructed in light of what he thought at the time was necessary to transform Kantianism into something more practical, more applicable, something that could be expressed in the kind of essay written by a Popularphilosoph. However, despite Hegel’s quantitative productivity during this period (judging from the amount of manuscript material he produced), he never thought any of it worth publishing, and he never wrote to anyone (not to Schelling, not to Hdlderlin) to ask for help or advice about getting his works into print. (The exception is the pamphlet by J.-J. Cart.) Hegel was clearly dissatisfied with what he had produced. Despite the task he had set for himself of becoming a “popular philosopher,” a man of letters, despite the fact that he had produced quite a bit of work along those lines during this time, and despite the likelihood that publication would have advanced his self-chosen career as a man of letters, he simply put those manuscripts in the drawer.
更确切地说，康德哲学的“完成”在这方面意味着对于黑格尔来说仅仅以“通俗的”方式运用康德哲学，意味着建构一个或多或少康德哲学关于应该成为对行为的真正实际激励东西的构想。在解释他对从康德到谢林的哲学运动的研究（和他相对忽视了像卡尔·莱昂哈德·赖因霍尔德一样的后康德哲学家借以阐发批判哲学方法）的时候，他评论说近来有些学者试图对康德理论（赖因霍尔德理论和费希特理论）进行刨根问底，这种尝试对于他来说仅仅是“沉思而非对普遍可用概念的了不起的应用，[这些沉思]看来好像主要对单纯的理论理性具有更直接的意义。”黑格尔关于“主观”宗教和“人民宗教”概念的建构，完全依据的是他当时认为把康德哲学变成更实用更可应用的东西所必需的东西，它就是某种可能被通俗哲学家揣写的这样论文表达的东西。不过，尽管黑格尔在这个时期极其多产（根据他所撰写的手稿数量判断），他始终认为其中没有任何东西值得发表，他也从未给任何人写信（没有给谢林写信没有给荷尔德林写信）请求帮助或出主意使他的作品得以发表。（关于J·卡特的这本小册子是个例外。）黑格尔显然对他所撰写的东西感到不满意。尽管他为自己提出了做“通俗哲学家”做文人这一任务，尽管事实上他在这个时期按照这些思路做了大量工作，尽管出版这些东西理应可能促使他主动选择做作家，他干脆还是把这批手稿束之高阁。
While at Berne, Hegel also wrote an ambitious book-length manuscript, which he clearly expanded and altered after having arrived in Frankfurt, and even worked on somewhat after arriving in Jena at the turn of the century; he never found it satisfactory, however, and it was only published long after his death, under the title “The Positivity of the Christian Religion.” In it, Hegel tried to synthesize the basic influences on his thought at the time. For example, he brought Gibbon’s account of the decline of the Roman empire and the role Christianity played in it to bear on Kant’s reconstruction of Christian religion as the “religion of morality,” as religion “within the limits of reason alone,” and tried to show how these two accounts could be reconciled in an examination of the nature of the “positivity” of the Christian religion. Hegel used the term “positivity” in a sense derived from jurisprudence: “Positive” law is that law which is in force in a particular legal and political community. In Hegel’s own time, “positive” law had come to be contrasted with what was then called “natural law.” “Natural law” had a much wider meaning than it does nowadays; it was the doctrine of the normative foundations of law in general, not just the normative foundations of law as lying in the “natural” order. For Hegel, positive religion - which is analogous to what he had been calling in his earlier efforts “objective religion” - is any religion and its associated doctrines whose normative force depends on their being the established religion of a people. Christianity was a positive religion in this sense, since both Catholics and Protestants had clear ideas about what counted as doctrine, who could take the Eucharist, who could not, and so on. Positivity, thus, in law and in religion, is that which relies only on the dictates of authority instead of on those dictates that come from “thinking for oneself’ (which, according to Kant, is the very definition of Enlightenment itself). Any positive religion, so it seems, must therefore be at odds with the demands of reason, of “thinking for oneself” Reviving some arguments from his manuscript “The Life of Jesus,” Hegel argued that Jesus never intended to institute a positive religion, at least in the sense of a religion that was to claim humanity’s allegiance by reference only to Jesus’ own authority. Instead, Jesus set out to create a religion of morality that would restore freedom to a world that had lost it, in which people would embrace virtue because they would impose it on themselves.
在伯尔尼的时候，黑格尔还写有一部雄心勃勃的长篇手稿，这部手稿显然被他到达法兰克福后作了扩充和改动，甚至被他在世纪之交到达耶拿后还在以某种方式撰写；然而，他始终认为这部手稿不尽如人意，它只是在他去世后很长时间才被人以《基督教的实定性》为题发表。在这部手稿中，黑格尔力图综合一下当时对他的思考产生基本影响的东西。举例来说，他把吉本关于罗马帝国衰微和基督教在罗马帝国扮演角色的释述，与康德把基督教重建成为“道德宗教”重建成“单纯理性限度内的”宗教联系起来，并努力表明上述两种描述怎么可以被在对基督教“实定性”本质的考察过程中达成一致。黑格尔借用了从一种源于法学意义上说“实定性”这一术语：“实定”法就是一种在特殊法定共同体和政治共同体中实施的法律。在黑格尔自己的时代，“实定”法逐渐与后来被称作“自然法”的东西形成对比。“自然法”较之今天的用法具有宽泛得多的意义；它一般是表示法律的规范基础的学说，不止表示那倚重“自然”秩序的法律规范的基础。对于黑格尔来说，实定宗教——作为类似于被他在早期成果中始终称作的“客观宗教”的实定宗教——代表任何宗教及其相关学说，它的规范力量取欧于与宗教相关学说被确立为人民宗教。基督教就是从上述意义上说的实定宗教，因为天主教教徒和新教教徒对什么被算作教义、谁可以获得圣餐、谁不可以获得圣餐等等都有着明确的看法。法律和宗教中实定性因此代表仅仅依赖于权威的需求的实定性，而不依赖来自于“独立思考”的命令（这按照康德的说法是对启蒙运动本身特有的界定）。因此可以说，任何实定性宗教都必然是与理性的要求或“独立思考”的要求相抵触的。由于他的《耶稣传》手稿复又引起了一些争论，黑格尔坚称耶稣从来无意去建立一种实定性宗教，至少从一种宗教意义上说耶稣从来无意去创立实定的宗教，这种宗教旨在主张人类的忠诚仅仅涉及耶稣自己的权威。恰恰相反，耶稣着手创立道德的宗教，道德宗教应该使丧失自由的世界恢复自由，在复得自由的世界，人们之所以总是张开双臂拥抱美德是因为他们应该把美德强加于他们自己。
The themes of freedom and the self-imposition of the law - both of them involving striking bits of Kantian language - reoccur throughout the essay.'*^ In his ethical theory, Kant had argued that the only thing that was unconditionally good in itself was a good will, which, in Kant’s well-known characterization, would if even “by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing . . . still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has full value in itself”"*^ Whereas the other great influence on Hegel, Aristotle, had argued that the only thing that was unconditionally good, that was a final end of an agent’s deliberations that is, that which rational human agents ultimately cared about it for its own sake - was Eudaimonia, happiness in terms of flourishing, prospering, and getting along well in a virtuous life, Kant argued that this unconditional good and final end had to be the free will itself Since no agent could be indifferent to freedom as a final end, as a requirement of practical reason no agent could therefore be indifferent to what was a priori required for the agent’s freedom. Kant argued that the a priori requirements of full freedom demanded that the agent determine his will according to principles that he had fully and freely adopted for himself, that is, that he act only on those principles that he has autonomously imposed on himself; and to make such self-impositions, the agent is required to determine his will only according to principles that abstract away from all contingencies that might determine his will (such as any contingent desires or needs he might just happen to have) and determine his will instead according to principles that answer to that element within him that is authoritative for him.
自由与法律自我强加——二者明显牵涉少许康德哲学用语——这两个话题复又成为贯穿于《基督教的实定性》这本论著中的一根红线，在他的伦理学理论中，康德早已坚称那本质上作为无条件的善的唯一东西就是善良意志。善良意志，借用康德有名的描绘，应该纵使“善良通过极大努力仍然一事无成……仍然会像宝石出于它自己的缘故作为一种本质上具有充分价值的东西一样闪闪发光”，尽管另一个对黑格尔产生过很大影响的人物亚里士多德论证道，唯一作为无条件善的东西，作为行动者深思熟虑的终极目的的东西——也即理性的行动者出于善自己的缘故最终关注的东西——一是Exdaizonzid，不断增加的、源源不断的和在德行生活中和共处的快乐。但是康德却坚称这无条件的善和终极目的必然是自由意志本身。因为凡是行动者都不可能对自由作为终极目的漠不关心，都不可能对自由作为实践理性的要求漠不关心，所以凡是行动者都不可能对什么是行动者自由先天要求的东西漠不关心。康德论证道，充分自由的先天要求要求行动者应该依据某些原理来确定他的意志，这些原理早已被行动者为了他自已而充分地自由地采纳，也就是说，要求行动者仅仅按照某些被他自发地强加于他自己的原理安身立命；为作出这样的自我强加，行动者常常被要求仅仅按照从所有可能确定他意志的偶然性事物（诸如任何可能恰恰被他碰巧具有的偶然欲望或需求）中抽象出来的原理来确定他的意志，而不是根据对作为他权威的他心中要素作出回答的原理来确定他的意志。
Since Kant holds that that which is authoritative for us is “selfdetermining reason” - reason that accepts no standards other than those which it can vindicate for itself, that survive the kind of self-critique that reason continually practices on itself - the only principles that can count as self-imposed are those that would hold for any rational being. The principle of principles, therefore, for practical reason is the categorical (unconditional) imperative, that the agent determine his will according to principles that he could at the same time and always determine as “universal law,” as the kinds of principles which any other rational agent would also elect to determine his will.'*^ Of course, what is striking about Kant’s doctrine — and would have been particularly striking to Hegel at this stage in his life — is that Kant might have seemed, at least at first glance, to have resolved the problems Hegel had bumped up against in the “Tubingen Essay,” namely, how to reconcile a demand for full unconditional freedom and individual liberty of conscience with the demands of a community having a unified moral voice. At this point in his development, Hegel took Kant to have shown how each individual, relying only on his own reason, would in his own conscience reach the same conclusions as all other rational individuals, and how thus a Kantian moral community would not morally be at odds with itself. A fully Kantian moral community would thus be an “invisible church,” constituting itself as a “philosophical sect” in which each individual member, in Hegel’s words, “adopts no duties except the ones imposed on himself”'*''
因为康德主张作为对我们来说权威的东西是“能自主的理性”——理性只接受某些能够被它自为地证明是正确的标准而且这些标准使某种继续被理性利用它自身实践着的自我批判得以存在——只有那些能够被算作自我强加的原理才是应该为任何理性之人所坚持的原理。所以、实践理性原理之原理是绝对的（无条件的）命令，绝对命令意味着行动者应该确定他的意志，行动者这样做时依据的原理同时且总是可以被他确定为“普遍规律”，确定为这样的一种也应该被任何其他理性行动者选作确定他的意志的原理。诚然，康德学说给人留下深刻印象的东西——大概给处于人生这个阶段的黑格尔留下了特别深刻影响的东西——就是康德可能看来好像解决了那些被黑格尔在“图宾根论文”中竭力解决的问题，可能至少乍看起来解决了那些问题，也即怎样使要求完全无条件的自由与个人良知的自由和要求共同体具有统一的道德愿望一致起来。在他阐发的这个方面，黑格尔把康德看作已经阐明每个个体，仅仅依赖于他自己理性的个体，怎样应该出于他自己的良知得出和所有其他理性个体相同的结论，一个康德式的道德共同体因此如何不应该在道德上和它自己相抵触。一个彻底地康德式的道德共同体因而应该成为“看不见的教堂”，“看不见的教堂”把自己建成“哲学学派”，在“哲学学派”中，用黑格尔的话说，除非有些人把责任强加给每个作为个体的成员，否则每个作为个体的成员都“享有放任自流的态度”。
In the “Positivity” essay as in the “Life of Jesus,” Hegel took Jesus to have been preaching a doctrine that fit those Kantian prescriptions. However, he also took the corruption of the Jewish people (a theme that he seems to have taken from Chapter 15 of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall oj the Roman Empire) to have made it impossible for them to have received such a message.'*’ The Jews, on Hegel’s understanding at this time, had transformed their religion into one of base servility to law and made it thereby into a religion from which all elements of personal freedom had been extirpated. Because Jesus’ own disciples were corrupted by the Jewish adherence to the divine law, even they found it impossible to accept Jesus’ teachings for what they were — teachings that called on them to attain “truth and freedom by their own exer- tions” and thereby to lead a life of virtue"^** - and they therefore ended up proclaiming that they accepted Jesus’ teachings not by virtue of their insight into their truth but by virtue of Jesus’ own personal authority, by virtue of his having said them. The contrast with the followers of Socrates, who had been taught to think for themselves, could not be greater: as Hegel put it, the “followers of Jesus . . . had no political interest like that which a citizen of a free republic takes in his native land; their whole interest was confined to the person of Jesus,” whereas the followers of Socrates “loved Socrates because of his virtue and philosophy, not virtue and philosophy because of him.
在《基督教的实定性》这篇论著中像在《耶稣传》中一样，黑格尔认为耶稣始终在宣讲适合康德哲学那些律令的学说。然而他同样也认为犹太人腐化堕落（一个看来好像已经被他从吉本《罗马帝国衰亡史》第15章中选取的主题）已经使他们不可能得到这样一个信息。犹太人，根据黑格尔当时的理解，把他们的宗教基本上变成法律的奴颜婢膝的宗教，由此使他们的宗教成为一种彻底摧毁所有个人自由要素的宗教。因为耶稣自己的门徒被犹太人信奉神律弄得有伤风化，甚至他们也发觉不可能接受耶稣关于他们所是的东西的教导——耶稣教导号召他们“凭借他们自己的努力来获得真理和自由”并由此过着德行生活——他们因此最终宣称他们接受耶稣的教导，这样做借助的不是他们对他们的真相洞若观火而借助的是耶稣自己的个人权威，借助的是他已经对他们说的东西。与苏格拉底的追随者被教会独立思考相比的差别不可能大到哪里去：像黑格尔指出的，“耶稣的追随者……对政治毫无兴趣，正像自由共和国公民对故土毫无兴趣一样；他们的全部兴趣只限于耶稣其人”，尽管苏格拉底追随者“因苏格拉底的美德和哲学而热爱苏格拉底而非因苏格拉底而热爱美德和哲学”。
The contrast Hegel draws is thus between Jesus, who is portrayed as a ethical-religious Kantian hero, who only wanted people to be free and to develop their own powers to impose the moral law on themselves (and thereby to become virtuous in a Kantian sense), and the founders of Christianity (the disciples, the early church fathers), who are portrayed as corrupting Jesus’ teachings and setting up Christianity as a positive religion, one whose teachings are based on authority rather than on free reason. Jesus’ own teachings are not “positive,” they are not meant to substitute a new authoritarian system for the old authoritarian system. Nonetheless, to get his teachings heard, Jesus had to confer some authority upon his own person, for, given the corrupted conditions of the time, “to propose to appeal to reason alone would have meant the same thing as preaching to fish.”^” And thus the movement was set in motion toward “positivity.”
黑格尔作出的因此是耶稣（耶稣常常被描绘成宗教伦理上康德哲学式的英雄，耶稣只想要人们拥有自由和只想要使他们自己能够把道德律强加给他们自身，由此只想要使他们成为康德意义上具有德性的人）与基督教创始人（耶稣门徒或早期教父）之间的对比，基督教创始人被描绘成他们败坏了耶稣教义和把基督教建成实定性的宗教，实定性宗教教义奠基于权威而非奠基于自由的理性。耶稣自己的那些教义不是“实定性的”，它们并不被说成用新的权威体系取代旧的权威体系。尚不止于此，为让他的教义有人听信，耶稣不得不赋予他自己这个人某些权威。原因在于，考虑到那个时代有伤风化状况，“单纯提出诉诸理性大概意味着等同向鱼宣讲教义”。故而这个运动被使得走向“实定性”。
Hegel, interestingly, does not speak of the early Christians as betraying Jesus’ teachings; instead he attributes the corruption to the context in which those teachings appeared. The Greek and Roman republics were free in the sense that “Greeks and Romans obeyed laws laid down by themselves”; each citizen found the free republic itself to be “the final end of his world,” and their religions supported this freedom.^' With the collapse of Greek and Roman freedom, Greek and Roman religion also disintegrated, and what had previously been a motivating force for the better in citizens’ lives vanished. The loss of such a good left people with nothing to inspire them except the cold ideals of protecting property and the fear of death. In this context, Christianity, which promised eternal life to those who slavishly followed its dictates, stepped into the void left by the disappearance of the Greek and Roman divinities.
黑格尔，很有趣地，并没有提及早期基督教教徒违背耶稣的教义；相反他把腐化堕落归咎于那些教义见之于的语境。希腊共和国和罗马共和国从“希腊人和罗马人遵守由他们自已亲手制定的法律”意义上说是自由的；每个公民都发觉自由共和国本身是“他的世界的终极目的”，他们的宗教支持这种自由。“随着希腊人自由和罗马人自由的坍塌，希腊人和罗马人宗教也随之土崩瓦解，早先已成为一种追求更好的市民生活的动力不复存在了。这样一个好东西的丧失丝毫没有起到激励他们的作用，留给他们的只是保护财产的冰冷的理想和对死亡的恐惧。在这种语境上，基督教，承诺使那些相目服从它命令的人们变得永垂不朽的基督教，消除了因希腊人和罗马人神只消失而留下的空虚。
The followers of Jesus and the early Christians thus were almost unwittingly led to establish Christianity as a positive religion, although in its early stages even they could not even have been aware of the commitments they were undertaking. They were a small sect, whose members joined voluntarily (and thus “imposed” the rules of the sect on themselves), and they were able thus to be a society of friends in the Aristotelian sense.But as they grew in size and influence, the “positivity” of their views became all the more apparent. As they took over the state and the realm of positive law, their religion itself became all the more “positive” in character. They eventually eliminated freedom of thought, and their positive commands to their members to feel certain ways resulted in an unspiritual society of hypocrites and self-deceived people who had lost all sense of freedom and beauty.
耶稣追随者和早期基督教教徒因而几乎不知不觉地神差鬼使般把基督教建成实定性宗教，尽管在基督教早期阶段甚至就连他们自己也完全不可能意识到他们所作出的奉献。他们形成很小的派别，派别成员自觉自愿加入（成员因而“把“该派的规章“强加“于他们自身），他们因此能够组成亚里士多德哲学意义上的友人社团。“但是随着该派成员逐渐增多和日益有影响，他们看法中的“实定性”变得更加明显。当他们主宰国家和实定法王国的时候，他们的宗教自身变得更具有“实定性”品格。基督教很多派别最终摒弃了思想自由，它们积极地要求它们的成员去感受某些方式，这样的要求导致尘世伪君子社团的面世和那些自欺欺人的早已丧失全部自由感和美感的人们大行其道。
Unlike Gibbon, however, Hegel was not content to attribute the rise of Christianity simply to a series of contingent, heterogeneous social factors. Hegel’s interest in the Kantian ideas of freedom and therefore of the self-imposition of the moral law lead him to offer a hypothesis that went far beyond the bounds of Gibbon’s Enlightenment historiography. Hegel noted in relation to Christianity’s having supplanted the great pagan religions of antiquity that “great revolutions which strike the eye at a glance must have been preceded by a still and secret revolution in the spirit of the age, a revolution not visible to every eye, especially imperceptible to contemporaries, and as hard to discern as to describe in words. . . . The supplanting of a native and immemorial religion by a foreign one is a revolution which occurs in the spiritual realm itself, and it is thus of a kind whose causes must be found all the more directly in the spirit of the times.”” The “secret revolution” of which Hegel spoke made reference to his Tubingen concerns: the collapse of ancient freedom and the possibility of a revolution-reformation in modern life that would restore the spirit of Greek freedom and lead to moral and spiritual renewal. Christianity became a positive religion in spite o/Jesus’ teaching because the “spirit of the times” in Jesus’ day and immediately thereafter had lost the ideal of freedom; what actually separated the followers of Jesus from the followers of Socrates was Greek social and religious life, which had prevented the Greeks (in Hegel’s eyes) from having any positive religion. Accusations of heresy in Greek life were, after all, virtually nonexistent; the Greeks did not seem so intent in their religious practices on propounding doctrine against which one could measure one’s “true” religiosity.
然而，和吉本不一样，黑格尔并不满足于把基督教兴起简单地归结于一系列偶然的异质的社会因素。黑格尔对康德自由思想感兴趣且因此对康德道德律自我强加思想非常感兴趣，这就致使他提出了一个远远超出吉本的启蒙运动史学著作范围的假设。黑格尔在关于基督教取代了大量古代异教这个问题上强调指出，“那些乍一看就使人留下深刻印象的大革命想必后于一种平静和秘密的时代精神革命，想必后于一种并非每个人都能看到的革命，特别是不被当代人察觉到的革命，这样的大革命像很难用词语描述一样几乎是难以觉察的……本土的古老宗教被外国宗教取代，这是一场发生在精神王国自身的革命，这场革命的原因因而想必更加直接地见于时代精神。”那被黑格尔提到的“秘密革命”涉及他在图宾根时期关注的东西：古代自由的坍塌和革命性地重塑现代生活的可能性将会恢复希腊人自由精神和致使人们道德重生和精神重生。撇开耶稣教义，基督教变成实定的宗教，因为耶稣时代的“时代精神”和紧随其后的“时代精神”丧失了自由的理想；实际上把耶稣追随者和苏格拉底追随者分开的是希腊人的社会生活和宗教生活，希腊人的生活使（黑格尔眼中的）希腊人不复具有任何实定的宗教。毕竟希腊人生活中实质上并不存在对异端的指控；希腊人看来好像并不一心根据他们的宗教习俗提出教义以反对可以判断人们“真”宗教的东西。
Despite Hegel’s own description of himself as wanting to “apply” Kant’s thought, in the “Positivity” essay he was also clearly trying to develop it in light of his own interests. In “What Is Enlightenment?”, Kant had called for an end to mankind’s “self-incurred tutelage.”^'* In the “Positivity” essay, Hegel took this a step further, explaining this self-imposed tutelage as having come about because of the loss of Greek and Roman freedom, and attributing the transformation of Christianity into a positive religion to that loss; Hegel “applied” Kant’s notion of freedom as self-legislation to history to explain how Christianity became a “positive religion.” Echoing Kant’s essay, Hegel noted that “every day anyone can see examples of how far men can renounce their own native powers and freedom, how they can submit to a perpetual tutelage with such willingness that their attachment to the fetters they place on reason is all the greater the heavier these fetters are. In addition to recommending a virtue religion, Jesus was also bound continually to bring himself, the teacher of this religion, into play; he had to demand faith in his person, a faith which his virtue religion required only for its opposition to the positive doctrines.
尽管黑格尔自己把他自已描述成想“运用”康德的思想，在《基督教的实定性》这篇论著中他还是明显地努力根据他自己兴趣来阐发康德的思想。早在《什么是启蒙运动？》中，康德就已在倡导人类“自己招致守护”的目的。在《宗教的实定性》这篇论著中，黑格尔在这一点上走得更远，把自己招致守护出现的原因解释成在于希腊人和罗马人自由的丧失，并把基督教变成实定宗教归因于希腊人和罗马人自由的丧失；黑格尔把康德关于作为自我立法的自由概念“应用于”历史以解释基督教怎么变成“实定的宗教”。在重复康德论著中观点时，黑格尔强调指出“每天任何人都能看到一些事例，它们是人们怎样更大程度上抛弃他们自己与生俱来的权力和自由、他们怎样屈从于带有下列的这种意愿的永久守护：他们作为他们给理性带上的镣铐的附属品意味着这些镣铐将变得更加巨大更加沉重。除了举荐德性宗教之外，耶稣同样也不断地必然发挥他自己作为德性宗教导师的作用；他不得不要求人们信仰他这个人，这样的信仰是他的德性宗教仅仅出于它与实定教义分庭抗礼所需要的。”
The unspoken but clear implication of the essay is that the question of whether Christianity could therefore cease to be a positive religion and become again a “religion of freedom” was necessarily connected with the issue of whether the French Revolution would succeed in restoring freedom and spirituality to modern life. But, oddly enough, the question of whether Christianity actually could be this new “religion of freedom” was left unanswered in the essay, and the reason seems to be that Hegel simply had not made up his mind on the issue. He suspected that Christianity might simply be inadequate to the role of a “religion of freedom.” At one point he noted that its imagery does not lend itself to the kind of “poetic adaptation” that is capable of “refining our people,” because the images of “positive” Christianity have been so inculcated in people’s minds in such a “positive” manner that they “carry a sense of uneasiness running counter to that enjoyment of beauty which arises from the free play of our mental powers.”^* (The notion of beauty as arising from the “free play of our mental powers” is, of course, an indirect reference to Kant’s notion in his Critique of Judgment that beauty results from the sensuous embodiment of our spontaneity, that in enjoying beauty, we are really enjoying the spontaneous free play of our mental powers.) If because of its cultural and historical baggage, “positive” Christianity is incapable of being beautiful, then it is incapable of motivating people to be free, and, if that is true, “positive” Christianity simply cannot satisfy the demands of modern European life.
这篇论著未言明而显然暗含的问题是基督教因此是否可能不复成为实定宗教和是否可能再度成为“自由宗教”这个问题必然是与法国大革命是否将会成功地还现代生活以自由和精神性这个问题密切相关的。可是，十分奇怪地，基督教实际上是否可能成为新的“自由宗教”这个问题在这篇论著中并未作出回答，原因看来好像是黑格尔根本没有决定解决这个问题。他怀疑基督教可能根本不胜任扮演“自由宗教”这个角色。在这个关键问题上，他强调指出它的表象没有使它自身成为一种“能够浑化我们国民”的“诗化的适应”，因为“实定”基督教的表象已经被以这样一种“实定”方式如此反复灌输进人们的脑子里，以至于他们“产生与美的享受背道而驰的焦虑不安感，这样的感觉源自对我们智力的自由应用。”（作为源自“自由地应用我们智力”的美这个概念当然间接地涉及康德《判断力批判》中的概念，这个概念大意是美源自我们自发性的感性体现，在享受美时，我们确实在享受我们自发而自由地应用我们的智力。）如果，由于“实定”宗教的文化和历史包袱，“实定”基督教不能够成为优美的宗教，那么它就不能够促使人们去争取自由，如果说上述假设成立的话，“实定”基督教就根本无法满足现代欧洲人的生活要求。
At that point in his development, though, Hegel could not bring himself to conclude authoritatively that Christianity could not satisfy such demands. However, the lack of a definitive answer to that crucial question was, as Hegel surely came to see, fatal for the “Positivity” essay, and without an answer to that question, the “application” of Kant had not really succeeded, for the basic practical question remained unanswered.
尽管这样，在他阐发这个关键问题时，黑格尔不可能让他自己以权威姿态断定基督教不可能满足这样的要求。然而，这个至关重要的问题缺乏确定的答案，像黑格尔想必逐渐看出的，这样的缺乏是《基督教的实定性》这篇论著的致命伤，而假如这个问题没有答案，对康德哲学的“应用”就不会早就真正地取得了成功，因为这个基本的实际问题仍然没有得到回答。
Even worse for Hegel’s point of view, the answer that was coming from France, as it were, was not encouraging: In 1793, the revolutionaries had officially “abolished” Christianity and replaced it with Robespierre’s “cult of reason,” something that was as silly as it was uninspiring. Indeed, Christianity of any sort did not seem to be playing a critical role in the development of revolutionary events. The “Positivity” essay thus ended without really coming to grips with the very problems that had inspired it.
甚至对于黑格尔的观点更为糟糕的是，可以说这个可能来自于法国的答案并不是令人鼓舞的：早在1793年，法国一系列革命就已正式“废除了”基督教，取代基督教的是罗伯斯比尔的“理性神拜”，它像无启发性东西一样的荒谬可笑。更确切地说，任何种类的基督教看来好像都没有在革命事件发展过程中发挥关键的作用。《基督教的实定性》这篇论著因而最终没有真正地认真解决激起“理性崇拜”的特有问题。
Hegel was almost without doubt discouraged by his attempts at “popular philosophy.” He had written much, but none of it he deemed suitable to see the light of day. His position seemed, furthermore, to be more syncretic than synthetic: He was pasting together bits and pieces of Kantian practical philosophy, his theological training at Tubingen, and his interest in what he took to be the problems and promises of the Revolution, and the result was a whole that not only looked cobbled together but also failed to provide crucial answers for the basic problems it was written to address. Hegel’s attempt to “complete” the Kantian philosophy by applying it to the problems of a “people’s religion” thus seemed to be coming to a dead end.
黑格尔几乎无疑对他在“通俗哲学”方面作出的尝试感到心灰意冷。他确实写了不少东西，但是其中没有一件东西被他认为适合于拿出去见世面。此外就是，他的立场看来好像倾向于调和而非综合：他在把康德实跋哲学中零零散散的东西、他在图宾根时的神学训练、他对被他认为的成为法国大革命问题和承诺的兴趣这三个方面内容精合在一起，这三方面内容结果形成的整体不仅看似被草草拼凑起来而且未能为讲演中被记下的有关整体的基本问题提供关键答案。黑格尔试图凭借把康德哲学应用于“人民宗教”问题进而“使”康德哲学“臻于完美”，这样的尝试因此看来好像将要走进死胡同。
It was, in part, the failure of his efforts to “apply” Kant to practical life that eventually would lead him to question even more fundamentally just what the completion of Kantian philosophy would imply. At first, however, the failure of his efforts simply left him depressed and at odds with himself; but he had reason to be hopeful: He was escaping Berne for the more cosmopolitan community of Frankfurt, apparently to work for a more congenial family and for a reunion with his close friend Holderlin.
从特定程度上说，是他努力把康德“应用”于实际生活的失败，最终致使他对使康德哲学臻于完美恰恰应该暗示的何种更为基本的东西产生怀疑。然而，起初由于他的努力以失败告终而简直令他十分沮丧和不知所措；但是他有理由抱有希望：他将逃离伯尔尼去世界化大都市法兰克福，显然是为更为和谐的家庭而工作，为跟他挚友荷尔德林的重聚而工作。
Stopover in Stuttgart: Flirtation and Politics
在斯图加特的短暂逗留：调情与政治学
At the end of the year of 1796, Hegel set off from Berne to Frankfurt. He had to get permission from the Konsistorium (the church authorities) in Wiirttemberg to take his position as Hofmeister with the Gogel family, since he still technically owed them service as a pastor. However, because there were many other young men who actually wanted the few church positions that were available, and who were obviously better suited for them than Hegel (who was in any event hardly the darling of the theological faculty at Tubingen), his permission to go to Frankfurt seemed a sure bet. Playing the odds, Hegel began his service with the Gogel family at the beginning of January, although his official permission from the Konsistorium to do so was not granted until January 10, 1797.
在1796年底，黑格尔从伯尔尼启程前往法兰克福。他必须得到符腾堡Komsistorixmr（教会当局）的许可才能担任戈格尔家家庭教师，因为他法律上仍然没有完成教会当局牧师服务。然而，因为有很多其他年轻人实际上想获得教会提供的少量职位，而且他们明显比黑格尔更适合这类职位（黑格尔无论如何几乎不是图宾根神学院的宠儿），所以他将被获准去法兰克福看来好像没有什么悬念。幸运的是，黑格尔一月初就开始在戈格尔家服务，尽管教会当局直到1797年1月10日才正式批准他在戈格尔家当家庭教师。
On the way home, Hegel stopped off to visit his family in Stuttgart for a few weeks. Even with the brighter prospects of Frankfurt ahead of him, his sister remembered him as sad and withdrawn. After all, although he was moving to a better city, and would be in the company of Holderlin once more, he was simply trading one Hofmeister position for another. He was not, for example, going on to edit a journal or even to write for one, nor was he going to a university to assume a position as a salaried intellectual. However, as things turned out, two things during his stay in Stuttgart helped him to recover himself and get his feet planted again: he became involved with the growing revolutionary movements in his home state of Wiirttemberg, and he became involved in a flirtation with a young woman by the name of Nanette Endel, who was living at the time with his sister and father.
在去戈格尔家路上，黑格尔为看望当时在斯图加特家人的中途逗留了几个星期。甚至当法兰克福更为光明的前景展现在他面前的时候，他的妹妹不会忘记他仍然表现出郁郁寡欢。毕竟，尽管他将移居一个更好的城市，尽管他大概会复又同荷尔德林交往、他却只不过是利用家庭教师这个职位作为跳板。举例来说，他不打算去当编辑甚或成为杂志撰稿人，他也不打算去大学做担任拿薪水的知识分子职位。然而，像有些事情证明的，在他小住斯图加特期间有两件事助他焕发青春和再度站稳脚跟：他卷入他家乡符腾堡州正在兴起的革命运动、他同样也卷入与芳名纳内特·恩德尔这位年轻貌美女郎的调情，这位女郎当时跟他妹妹和父亲住在一起。
Nanette Endel was apparently a friend of Hegel’s sister, Christiane. She later became a milliner, and she was probably engaged in training to become a milliner while she was living and working at the Hegel household to earn her keep and to pay for her training. Nanette Endel was five years younger than Hegel and a devout Catholic. Although Hegel arrived at Stuttgart feeling quite low, it seems clear that he and Nanette became good friends rather quickly. The two teased each other quite a lot and carried on an extended flirtation (much to the consternation of Hegel’s sister, whom Hegel jokingly characterized in a letter to Nanette Endel as the “privy councilor” who had accused Nanette of being a bit “roguish” in her relations with him).” Hegel, whose own distaste for Catholicism was to last for the greater portion of his life, no doubt at first reacted strongly to Nanette Endel’s devout adherence to it. However, Nanette Endel was good-spirited enough to joust with Hegel on these matters. She teased him about his dour nature and his Protestant high-mindedness, gently poking fun at his self-important, self-appointed task of becoming an “educator of the people” and establishing a “people’s religion.” She teased him by calling him Saint Alexis, a Christian saint from the year 400, who fled on the day of his wedding and renounced all his worldly possessions in order to live the life of a monk. He teased her by calling her Sister Jacqueline, a reference to Jacqueline Arnauld, the abbess of the Jansenist cloister of Port Royal. It seems that she at least tried, however good-naturedly and maybe even half-heartedly, to get Hegel to consider becoming a Catholic or at least going to Mass or undertaking some Catholic practices; he in turn tried to get her to convert to Protestantism.
纳内特·恩德尔看似是黑格尔妹妹克里斯蒂亚娜的好友。她后来成了一名礼帽设计师，她很可能在训练自己做礼帽设计师，其时她住在黑格尔家并为黑格尔家做家务以挣钱维持生活和缴纳培训费。纳内特·恩德尔比黑格尔年轻5岁，是个虔诚的天主教教徒。尽管黑格尔到达斯图加特时情绪非常低落，但是他和纳内特看似显然闪电般地成了知己，她被黑格尔致纳内特·恩德尔信中开玩笑地描述成是“私人顾问”，她早就责备纳内特在与黑格尔关系方面有点“耍流氓”。黑格尔、他自己对天主教的厌恶可能持续了他大半生，无疑起初对纳内特·恩德尔虔诚信奉天主教作出强烈的反应。不过纳内特·恩德尔有着足够精力在这些事上与黑格尔展开争辩。她取笑他秉性执拗和他作为新教徒的高傲心气，委婉地嘲弄他自我持重自我指定将来当“人民教育家”和创立“人民宗教”的任务。她借助把他称作圣亚历克西斯而戏弄他，圣亚历克西斯是400年前一名基督教圣徒。他在婚礼那天逃走和放弃了所有世俗家产以便出家修行。他靠把她称作修女杰奎琳来取笑她，修女杰奎琳与杰奎琳·阿瑙尔德这位罗亚尔港詹森派修道院院长有染。看来好像她至少试图，不管她生性多么善良甚或多么杨花水性，想使黑格尔考虑做天主教徒或至少去做弥撒或从事某些天主教活动；他反而力图使她皈依新教。
