Philosophical Controversies at the Seminary

The Pantheism Controversy

神学院时期哲学争论

有关泛神论争论

By the 1790s, the three friends had also devoted themselves to reading F. H. Jacobi’s works and were particularly enthralled by what came to be called the “pantheism controversy” surrounding Jacobi’s 1785 book, Uber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn {On Spinoza’s Doctrines in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn). The controversy surrounding Jacobi’s book on its own would have been enough to lead the three friends to it, but in addition the professor in charge of teaching philosophy at the Seminary, Johann Friedrich Flatt, although a “supernaturalist,” was himself an admirer of Jacobi’s work, wrote laudatory reviews of Jacobi’s books, and was even mentioned approvingly in the second (1789) edition of Jacobi’s book (the edition that the three friends no doubt read).''^ For Hegel, Schelling, and Holderlin, the widely followed controversy surrounding Jacobi’s supposed “disclosure” of Lessing’s alleged pantheism struck an experiential key.'’

    到 18 世纪90年代，黑格尔、谢林和荷尔德林这三个朋友，还专心解读F.H.雅科比著作，特别受到吸引的是开始被称作“泛神论的争论”，争论的起因在于雅科比1785年一本书 Über die Lehre desSpinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (《关于斯宾诺莎学说给莫泽斯·门德尔松先生的书信集》）。围绕雅科比书本身的争论，大概足以使这三个朋友把目光投向该书，但是，加之在神学院负责讲授哲学的约翰·弗里德里希·弗拉特教授，尽管是位“超自然主义者”，但他本人是雅科比著作崇拜者，为雅科比一些书撰写过颂扬性的评论，甚至在雅科比书第二版(1789年)中得到称赞(这一版三个朋友肯定读过了）。“在黑格尔、谢林和荷尔德林看来，雅科比作出的假定，“揭露”了莱辛的所谓泛神论，围绕这一揭露而产生的争论，铺天盖地纷至沓来，这种争论给人的印象是，带有经验性的基调。

Jacobi, a figure in German intellectual circles at the time, claimed to have befriended Lessing and to have had a series of conversations with him shortly before his death in which Lessing confided to him that he was a “Spinozist.” The charge of “Spinozism” was no light charge to throw around in Germany at the time; for many, Spinoza, a secular Jew, stood for all that was wrong in the modern world. A reliance on reason and science had led Spinoza to a denial of a personal god, and to many Germans this was tantamount to attempting to undermine (Christian) religion and moving to atheism. Since the authority of so many German princes rested on their also being the heads of the churches in their respective Lander., anything that could be construed as an attack on religion was ipso facto also to be construed as an attack on the princes’ position and authority and therefore on the political authority of the Land itself. Accusing Lessing of having admitted to being a Spinozist was therefore bound to be explosive, for Lessing was a widely venerated figure, not only for his writings but for his exemplary, self- critical character. To attack Lessing was to attack the Enlightenment itself.

    雅科比，德国知识圈中一位人物，声称与莱辛有交情，在莱辛去世前不久，作有和他的系列访谈，此时莱辛向他吐露说，他是个“斯宾诺莎主义者”。“斯宾诺莎主义”的内涵，并不为那时的德国人所知；对许多德国人来说，斯宾诺莎这位世俗的犹太人，代表现代世界中的一切错误。对理性和科学的信赖，使斯宾诺莎否定个人的上帝，对许多德国人，这就等于削弱（基督）教和转向无神论。因为德国许多王侯贵族的权力，依靠的是他们同时是各自土地(Lander)上的教堂的头人，任何可被看作对宗教的抨击，都根据事实本身同时被看作对王侯贵族地位和权力的抨击，从而都被看作对各自土地上政治权力的抨击。指控莱辛承认自己是斯宾诺莎主义者，所以这必定是爆炸性的，因为莱辛是位广受崇敬之人，这不但是由于他的作品，而且是由于他典范性的、自我批判的品格。抨击莱辛，就是抨击启蒙运动本身。

Jacobi’s “revelation” of Lessing’s alleged Spinozism was in the form of some letters written to Mendelssohn, who at the time was embarking on writing a biography of his good friend Lessing; Jacobi’s alleged motivation for the letters was to inform and warn Mendelssohn before he wrote his account of what Jacobi would have understood as the scandalous revelation that Lessing had secretly been a Spinozist. Jacobi’s strategy in all this seems to have been that if he could show that as fine a mind and character as Lessing had been led to “Spinozism” by virtue of following out the ideas of the Enlightenment, then he would have conclusively shown just how dangerous those ideas could be. By asserting that Lessing himself had “confessed” to being a Spinozist, Jacobi got the public debate with Mendelssohn that he had sought. Worrying that Mendelssohn was going into print with his own version of their correspondence, Jacobi published the letters and some other material in 1785 under the title Uber die Lehre von Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn {On Spinoza’s Doctrines in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn). Unfortunately, from Jacobi’s point of view, instead of undermining Lessing’s authority the whole affair and the publication of the book seemed to have had the opposite effect: With the authority of Lessing behind it, Spinozistic thought was legitimated and the Spinozists came out of the closet. The “pantheism controversy,” as it came to be called, was one of the most widely followed events in German intellectual life at the time, eventually pulling in even Kant himself.  Schelling in particular was impressed by this debate and was to confide in Hegel in a letter written two years after Hegel had left the university that he too had become a Spinozist (referring to Hegel in the letter as an “intimate of Lessing’s,” thereby indicating that he thought Hegel too was a secret Spinozist).'*

    雅科比对莱辛所谓斯宾诺莎主义的“揭露”，是以写给门德尔松一些信的形式作出的，孟德尔松时在着手替好友莱辛立传；雅科比声称，他所写的那些信的初衷，是为了通报和警告门德尔松，在他描述雅科比揭露莱辛已经暗中成为斯宾诺莎主义者时，也许会把这一“揭露”理解成为诽谤性的。雅科比在这一点上的策略看似在于，如果，他能证明具有良好思想品格的莱辛，由于贯彻启蒙运动理念，而被迫信奉“斯宾诺莎主义”，那么，他最后应能证明，那些理念恰恰可能是何等危险啊!借助断言莱辛本人“承认”是斯宾诺莎主义者，雅科比实现了他所寻求的与门德尔松的公开辩论。由于担心门德尔松只发表他们通信中他自己的说法，雅科比1785年以Über die Lehre vonSpinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (《关于斯宾诺莎学说给莫泽斯·门德尔松先生的书信集》）为题，发表了书信和其他材料。遗憾的是，从雅科比观点看，反倒削弱了莱辛的威信，整个事件和这本书的出版，看来是收到了相反的效果：由于借助莱辛的威信，斯宾诺莎思想变得合法化了，斯宾诺莎主义者公开地走到了前台。“泛神论争论”，像它开始时被称作的，成了那时德国生活中流传最广的事件之一，最终把康德本人也牵扯了进来。谢林对这次争论印象尤为深刻，从黑格尔在大学毕业两年后写的一封信来看，黑格尔也成了斯宾诺莎主义者（指的是黑格尔在那封信中说是“莱辛的至交”，因此表明他以为黑格尔也是秘密的斯宾诺莎主义者）。18

The “pantheism controversy” made an indelible mark on the three friends. In Hegel’s student album, there is an inscription from Holderlin, which quotes a line from Goethe (roughly translated: “Pleasure and love are / that which fits great deeds”), and below the date (1791) is added in a different pen and ink the Greek letters “S. Hen kai Pan” (“S. 8V Kai Ttav”). The “S” stands for “Symbolum,” and the “Hen kai Pan” is the expression that Lessing allegedly used when he spoke with Jacobi; it is a “pantheistic formula” and means “one and all,” that is, “God is one and is in everything,” a notion that rules out a conception of a personal God as an individual being.This shows that Hegel and his friends were clearly beginning to entertain in addition to their politically heretical thoughts certain religious ideas that were equally far away from what was being officially taught to them at the Seminary. It is probably not going too far to make out of the added script, “Hen kai Pan,” something like a shared position at the time between the three friends, namely, that of some kind of “Spinozism”: a rejection of the dualism of soul and body in favor of the view that soul and body are only aspects of the same underlying substance; and a view that true wisdom is to be attained by trying to achieve a fully objective and detached point of view (by achieving, as it were, the point of view of the universe, rather than remaining in one’s own perspectivally limited point of view).

    有关“泛神论争论”，在黑格尔、谢林、荷尔德林这三位朋友记忆中，留下不可磨灭的印象。在黑格尔大学时代签名簿里，有一段荷尔德林的题词，题词引用了歌德一句诗（粗略译成：“快乐与爱/堪称伟大行为”)，在日期(1791年)下面，是用不同的钢笔和墨水加上的希腊文“S.Hen kai Pan”(“S.ev kal.πav”)。“S”代表“象征”，“Hen kai Pan”是菜辛声称在与雅科比交谈时用的陈述；它是一句2“泛神论的套话”，意思是“太一和大全”，这就是说，“上帝是一且存在于一切事物中，”这种见解不接受个人的上帝作为个体存在者的观念。”这表明黑格尔及其朋友，除了他们已有的政治上的异端思想之外，还显然开始接受某些宗教理念，这些同样远非是神学院课堂上传授的宗教理念。可对另加的这些字，“Hen kai Pan”，作如下较为合理的理解，它们表示类似这三个朋友共同具有的立场的东西，即，某种“斯宾诺莎主义”的东西：拒绝灵魂与身体的二元论，赞成灵魂与身体只是构成相同物质的两个方面；在这种“斯宾诺莎主义”看来，真智慧应该被借助试图达到一种充分展现和不偏不倚的观点而获得（实际上应该被凭借达到宇宙的观点而获得，而非通过囿于人们有限视角的观点而获得）。

The use of the symbol “Hen kai Pan” also fit into another part of Hegel’s development during this period. Hegel, Holderlin, and Schelling began to share an admiration of ancient Greece in the period of the Athenian empire (something not uncommon at that time for German intellectuals) around the same time that they developed their enthusiasm for the Revolution, and in their minds, the two ideas fused. They continued to understand the Revolution as new kind of Reformation, and the three friends came to picture that renewal in terms of an idealized image of ancient Athenian Greece. The Greece that Hegel and Holderlin idealized was also shaped in part by their understanding of Rousseau’s idealized utopias. The idealized classical Greek polls - taken by them as a form of social life in which the individual was not alienated from the surrounding social order, and in which politics, religion, and the social conventions of everyday life served to affirm the individual’s sense of his own place in the world instead of undermining it - came to stand for what they hoped the Revolution would bring to Europe and in particular to the decrepit structure of the Holy Roman Empire. They saw in Greek art a kind of perfection that had not been attained in later Western art, and under the influence of the enormously influential writings of Johann Joachim Winckelmann, they understood this to be due in primary part to the Greek devotion to freedom. Winckelmann’s view of Greek art thus meshed well with the views of the Enlightenment authors who attracted them, and the whole form of classical Greece life came for them to be associated with the Revolution’s invocation of liberty, equality, and fraternity. In particular, it stood for them as a positive religious and social alternative to what they saw as the debased condition of contemporary Christian and German civilization. The Greeks had united divine beauty with human life, and they had done it under the banner of freedom. The “Hen kai Pan” thus symbolized their devotion to non-Christian (or deviantly Christian) ideals of thought and to the Revolution, and the way in which in their own minds they linked their ardor and hopes for the Revolution with their growing admiration for classical Greece — the Revolution had come to stand for the promise of a new dispensation, a future social order in which divine beauty and human freedom would become part of the everyday life of ordinary people (in contrast to what they saw as the authoritarian ugliness of contemporary life).

    符号“Hen kai Pan”的这个用法，同样是与黑格尔该时期思想发展的另一部分相吻合的。黑格尔、荷尔德林和谢林全都开始钦佩雅典帝国时期古希腊（某种对那时德国知识分子非同寻常的东西），约在同一时期，他们表现出对法国大革命的极大兴趣，而在他们心目中，这两种想法是融为一体难分难解的。他们继续把法国大革命理解成一种新的改革，三个朋友着手用古希腊雅典时期理想化形象，来描绘这种精神上的重生。黑格尔和荷尔德林理想中的希腊的形式，还在于部分地凭借他们所理解的卢梭理想化的乌托邦。理想化古典希腊城邦开始代表着的是，他们希望法国大革命将给欧洲带来的东西，特别是将给神圣罗马帝国的衰朽结构带来的东西，并且，理想化古典希腊城邦被他们看作一种社会生活，在这种社会生活中，个人并不疏远周围的社会秩序，在这种社会生活中，政治、宗教和日常生活中的社会习俗，被用来维护个人本身在世界中的地位观念，而非被用来削弱这种地位观念。他们在希腊艺术中看到的一种完美，是在后来西方艺术中所未能达到的，在约翰·约阿希姆·温克尔曼极具影响的作品影响下，他们把这种完美理解为应归功于，希腊人对自由的献身的主要内容。因此，温克尔曼对希腊艺术的看法，与使他们受到吸引的启蒙运动作者的看法，二者之间是密切相关的和不可分割的，在他们看来，古典希腊生活完整形式，是与法国大革命对自由、平等和博爱的祈求，紧密联系在一起的。特别是，对他们来说，古典希腊生活完整形式，代表着一种实定宗教和社会的选择，这种选择被他们看作，降低33了当代基督教文明和德国文明的地位。古希腊人使神之美与人类生活相结合，他们是打着自由的旗帜这样做的。因而，“Hen kai Pan”象征着黑格尔、荷尔德林和谢林对非基督教（或基督教异端）思想的理想的献身，对法国大革命的献身，并象征着的是，通过某种方式，在他们自己的心目中，他们把对法国大革命的热情和希望，与他们对古典希腊不断增长的钦佩接合起来。——法国大革命已开始代表对一种新的统治的承诺，已开始代表对一种未来社会秩序的承诺，由于这样的社会秩序，神之美和人类自由将构成普通人日常生活的一部分（这与他们看作的当代生活中极权主义的丑陋形成鲜明的对比)。

Diez, Storr, and the ''Kant Club”

迪茨、施托尔和“康德俱乐部”

The ties between Holderlin, Schelling, and Hegel seem to have been very close, and thus it is striking that when a group was formed in the Seminary to study Kant, Hegel did not elect to join the group, although Schelling and Holderlin were avid members. Although Hegel was certainly reading Kant during this period, Kant apparently failed to capture his imagination sufficiently for him to join the other enthusiasts at the Seminary. Hegel had most likely brought with him to the Seminary both his skepticism about Kant’s overall theory and some ideas about the implausibility of Kant’s reliance on reason as the sole motivating force behind moral action; his growing passion for Rousseau during this period perhaps only served to underscore those doubts about the final viability of Kantian theory, even though Rousseau had been one of the major influences on Kant’s own thought. But perhaps most importantly, Hegel’s own vision of his future at this point did not include becoming a philosopher in the strict sense; he was still focused on becoming a “man of letters,” a person who would apply “enlightened reason” to the study of human affairs for the purposes of moral and religious reform. For Hegel at this point, Kant was just one more Enlightenment figure, one who, to his mind, severely neglected the more experiential, “subjective” aspects of human life. He certainly found it to be important to know what Kant was saying in order to be able to incorporate some of his ideas into the rational criticism of existing social and reli- gious customs; but he did not find it especially important to study Kant as closely as Holderlin and Schelling did.

    荷尔德林、谢林和黑格尔之间关系似乎已非常密切，然而，给人的印象是，当神学院组成一个小组研习康德哲学时，黑格尔没有选择加入该小组，尽管谢林和荷尔德林渴望成为小组成员。黑格尔肯定在这期间解读过康德，但康德明显不足以使他为之神往，因为他加入了神学院其他兴趣爱好小组。黑格尔很可能在来神学院之前，就已对康德整个理论持怀疑态度，就已对关于康德令人难以置信地依赖、作为道德行为背后的唯一推动力量的理性的某些理念持怀疑态度；他在此期间对卢梭的热情有增无已，这也许只能说明他更加怀疑康德理论的终极可行性，尽管卢梭这位思想家早就对康德本人的思想产生过重要影响。但或许最重要的是，黑格尔自己这时对前途的看法，还没有把做一名严格意义上哲学家提到议事日程；他仍然在致力于做个“文人”，这样的“文人”将把“启蒙理性”用于对人类事务的研究，以达到对道德和宗教的改造。在这时的黑格尔眼中，康德恰恰是个更具启蒙性的人物，在他看来，这样的人物极端忽视人类生活的更为经验的、更为“主观的”方面。他肯定看出，最为重要的是，要晓得康德所说的那套东西，以便能用他某些理念来合理地批判现存社会的和宗34 教的习俗；但是，他没有看出，像荷尔德林和谢林那样仔细研究康德，到底有什么特别的重要意义。

This was to lead a few years later to tensions between him and Schelling. It can only be a surmise, but one suspects that in Schelling’s mind, Hegel had been the slow one to catch on to the importance of Kant’s ideas - he was too stubborn to see any of this for himself and without Schelling’s encouragement, would have never come to see the value of any of it - which in turn led Schelling continually to undervalue any possible creative contributions to philosophical debate that Hegel might make. There was also quite likely a tension in the friendship itself between Schelling and Hegel; Holderlin and Hegel were the same age and had originally become friends; Schelling joined the circle later, and he and Holderlin together became much more enamored of Kant than Hegel was at first. Schelling’s closer intellectual friendship with Holderlin at this time, together with a certain sense of haughtiness on Schelling’s part, probably irked Hegel just a bit; after they left the Seminary, Hegel continued to stay in touch with both of them, but after a few years he let the correspondence with Schelling lapse. Schelling’s rather meteoric rise a few years later to prominence in philosophical circles while Hegel was still languishing as an unpublished, unknown house tutor no doubt only further underwrote Schelling’s initial view of Hegel.

    这就导致了多年后他与谢林的失和。这只不过是推测而已，但有人怀疑在谢林心目中，黑格尔很迟才理解康德思想的重要性——他思想过于顽固，以致自己没有看到这种重要性，要是没有谢林的鼓励，他也许永远不会看到康德思想的重要价值——这反过来又使谢林继续认为，黑格尔可能做出的哲学争论，不大可能有什么创造性的贡献。在谢林与黑格尔友谊本身中，同时极有可能埋下了失和的种子；荷尔德林和黑格尔同年同岁，二人最先成为朋友；谢林后来才加入他们三人朋友圈，而较之黑格尔，他与荷尔德林二人早就倾心康德哲学。谢林和荷尔德林在知识上结成的亲密友谊，连同就谢林本人而言的某种傲慢态度，很可能使黑格尔有点恼怒；在他们三人离开神学院后，黑格尔继续保持着与荷尔德林和谢林的联系，但在几年以后，黑格尔与谢林的书信往来逐渐减少。几年中，谢林在哲学界迅速蹿红，声名显赫，而黑格尔仍然名不见经传，只是个未出版过作品的、默默无闻的家庭教师，这很可能反而进一步坚定了谢林对待黑格尔的最初看法。

Nonetheless, although Hegel was not particularly interested in joining the Kant group, he was surrounded by enthusiastic discussions of Kant, and Kantian ideas clearly made an impression on him. In particular, there was - at least among the students and certainly among Hegel’s friends - an impassioned debate between the followers of Gottlob Storr (a professor of theology and one of the handful of esteemed professors at the place) and Carl Immanuel Diez, an older student at the Seminary who was responsible for assisting in the instruction of the younger students. Diez was a theologian who had turned against the kind of theology being taught at Tubingen, in part because of Kant’s writings, and had become a radical, antireligious Kantian.^" (Diez was the son of one of the professors of medicine, which partly explains how, within the nepotism-laden structure of the university, he was able to hold such radical views within the theology faculty.)

    然而，黑格尔对加入康德学会这个团体不大感兴趣，但他置身于关于康德的热情的讨论中，康德的理念显然给他留下了深刻的印象。特别是，至少在学生中，肯定在黑格尔朋友中，出现了一场激烈的辩论，辩论双方是戈特洛布·施托尔和卡尔·伊曼纽尔·迪茨，前者是神学院少数几位受人尊重的教授之一，后者是神学院的一年长的学生，负责帮助指导年龄较轻的学生。迪茨是研究神学的，他所以反对图宾根讲授的那种神学，部分原因在于康德的作品，他成了一个激进的、反宗教的康德主义者。”（迪茨是医学教授之子，这就部分地解释了，在充满任人唯亲的大学机构中，他何以能够在神学教师中持这样的激进观点。）

Diez had reacted strongly to the teachings of the theologian Gottlob Storr. Storr was Hegel’s, Hblderlin’s, and Schelling’s teacher and a figure against whom all of them reacted. Storr embodied both a supremely imposing intellect with a manner of congeniality that led even those who disagreed with him to value and respect him; he also embodied an uncompromising attitude toward biblical interpretation; he took it as his vocation to refute the idea that the Bible represents only a historical accommodation of human beings to the times in which they lived (and thus to refute the idea that the job of the theologian is to extract the “rational truth” from the merely “symbolic” and “historical” elements of the Bible); his self-proclaimed pedagogical mission was to communicate to his students a sense of their obligation to defend orthodoxy against what he called heterodoxy. Storr’s theology was based on what he termed “supernaturalism,” by which he meant the idea that the Bible was a sacred text and was to be taken therefore as having been divinely inspired; its authority could therefore only come from revelation. Storr the “supernaturalist” classified all his opponents as “naturalists,” by which he meant all those who believed that the acceptable truths of Christianity could only be those that were also consistent with or demonstrable by the powers of “natural” human reason. Interestingly, Storr employed Kantian means to show this: Since Kant had shown, Storr argued, that we could have no knowledge of things-inthemselves, of the “ultimate metaphysical structure” of the world, he had also shown that the so-called application of reason to the critique of the dogmatic truths of Christianity by a whole generation of Enlightenment thinkers was completely beside the point. Nothing can be known by unaided reason about the ultimate nature of things; to know about the ultimate nature of things, Storr concluded (contra Kant), we therefore need a revelation from God, and Jesus’ life (along with the Bible) was exactly that sort of revelation. Storr thus tried to marry orthodoxy to the developing Enlightenment conception of reason.  (Storr’s arguments and his standing among German intellectuals were high enough to induce Kant to mention him respectfully as exercising his “accustomed sagacity” in the 1794 preface to the second edition of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alonef^

    迪茨早就对戈特洛布·施托尔讲授的那一套表示强烈的不满。施托尔是黑格尔、荷尔德林和谢林的老师，是他们三人全都反对的一个3人物。施托尔表现出天生高超而非凡的才智，这样的才智甚至赢得了对手的肯定和尊重；同时他也表现出对《圣经》的阐释的不妥协态度；他看作天职的是去驳斥这样的理念，即，《圣经》仅仅描述人们对生活于其中的历史时代的适应（因此他看作天职的是去驳斥这样的理念，即，神学家的工作，就是从《圣经》纯“象征的”、“历史的”元素中，采掘“合理的真理”)；他自称其教学使命是向学生传达要具有捍卫正统反对异端的义务感。施托尔的神学，奠基于他叫作的“超自然主义”，用此术语，他想要表达这样的理念，即，《圣经》是一部神圣的文本，所以被看作具有神圣的启示；它的权威性因此只是来自于启示。施托尔身为“超自然主义者”，把所有对手都归入“自然主义者”范畴，凭借这样的归类，他意思说，凡是相信基督教的可接受真理的人，同样只能是那样一些人，他们与“天赋的”人类理性能力相一致，或显然具有“天赋的”人类理性能力。有趣的是，施托尔使用康德的方法来证明这一点：因为康德早就证明，施托尔辩称说，我们无法认识自在之物，无法认识世界“终极的高度抽象的结构”，所以，他也就证明了，启蒙运动整整一代思想家们，所谓把理性用于对基督教独断式真理的批判，完全是不着边际的。对于事物的终极本质，无助的理性什么也认识不了；因此，为认识事物终极本质，施托尔断定（与康德相反），我们需要上帝的启示，耶稣的生活（连同《圣经》》恰恰就是那样的一类启示。施托尔因此试图使正统和启蒙运动提出的理性概念联姻。（施托尔的重要论证，他在德国知识分子中享有的崇高地位，这些足以使康德在1794年《论理性范围中的宗教》第二版序言中，以极其尊敬的口吻，把施托尔说成在使用“一贯的洞察力”。)! 

    Storr thereby brought Kant into the defense of orthodoxy, a move which found no sympathy at all among Hegel, Holderlin, and Schelling, whose reactions to Storr were themselves partly shaped by Diez. Since Kant had at this point not yet published anything specifically on religion — his book Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone was not to be published until 1793, Hegel’s last year at the university - there was little specifically in Kant’s writings to draw on except for the discussions of the practical postulates of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in the Critique o f Practical Reason, and Kant’s own claim in the Critique of Pure Reason that he was only clearing the way for reasonable faith. Diez therefore based his critique of Storr in particular and of religion in general on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, taking it much further than the orthodox Kantians had ever dared. He argued that since Kant had shown that we could have experience only of those things that conformed to the conditions under which experience was possible, and since Kant had shown that among these conditions is that all our experience must be of spatio-temporal substances interacting within a causal order, the kind of revelation of which Storr spoke was in principle impossible and the kind of knowledge that Storr imputed to Jesus’ disciples was equally impossible.

    因而，施托尔把康德引入为正统辩护，把康德引入一场完全不被黑格尔、荷尔德林和谢林同情的运动，这三人对施托尔采取的做法本身部分地决定于迪茨。因为康德这时在宗教方面仍无建树——他的书36《论理性范围内的宗教》直到1793年，黑格尔在大学的最后一年才出版——康德著作中几乎没有什么特别引人之处，这不包括《实践理性批判》讨论上帝存在和灵魂不死的实践公设，同时也不包括康德在《纯粹理性批判》中的主张，即他只是为合理的信仰扫清道路。所以，迪茨尤其是把他对施托尔的批判和把对宗教批判，建立在康德《纯粹理性批判》的基础上，并自认为他对正统的批判比康德来得更为大胆。他论证道，因为康德早就证明了，我们只能经验到那些事物，它们和经验所可能受制于的条件相一致，因为康德早已证明了，这些条件中的一个条件是，全部经验必须是关于空间时间物质的经验，这样的物质根据因果秩序而互相作用，所以，施托尔说的那种启示，原则上是不可能存在的，施托尔归于耶稣门徒的那种知识，同样也是不可能存在的。

Diez’s use of Kant against Storr’s defense of orthodoxy greatly impressed the three friends. Known among the students at the Seminary as a Kantian enrage - a term that was also used in the Seminary to characterize those with Jacobin sympathies - Diez outfitted Hegel, Schelling, and Hdlderlin with Kantian tools that could be turned against Storr’s attempt to preserve the idea of the Bible as a sacred text and therefore as something that simply had to be accepted as authoritative.  Moreover, although Diez apparently did little to move Hegel to a Kantian position at this point, he certainly inspired Schelling and Holderlin to study the great transcendental idealist, and both of them eventually took Hegel down that path. Diez himself quickly came to realize the absurdity of his continuing to study theology while holding such views and left for Jena to study medicine. He exercised some influence on the development of idealism in Jena with regard to Karl Leonhard Reinhold, the first famous “post-Kantian” philosopher in Germany; he also maintained a friendship and philosophical correspondence with another older student at the Seminary, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer (b. 1766), who was later to have a decisive influence on both Holderlin and Hegel. Diez himself died of typhus while working at a hospital in Vienna in 1796.^^

    迪茨利用康德来反对施托尔对正统信仰的辩护，这对黑格尔、荷尔德林和谢林产生了很大的影响。作为以神学院学生中康德迷——一个在神学院同时被用来描绘那些雅科比的热情支持者的术语——闻名的迪茨，用康德的工具来武装黑格尔、谢林和荷尔德林，康德的工具可用来反对施托尔的尝试，即，施托尔试图保护《圣经》是神圣文本的理念，因此他试图保护《圣经》作为某种必须被认作具有权威性的理念。而且，迪茨显然这时几乎没有使黑格尔转到康德立场上来，但他肯定激励着谢林和荷尔德林，去研究康德这位伟大的先验唯心主义者，荷尔德林和谢林最终带领黑格尔走上了这条道路。迪茨本人很快开始体会到，继续研究神学同时坚持康德的观点，实属荒谬之举，他遂去耶拿研究医学。他和德国首位著名“后康德”哲学家卡尔·莱昂哈德·赖因霍尔德一起，对耶拿唯心主义的发展产生一些影响；他同时保持着与神学院另一位高年级学生弗里德里希·伊曼纽尔·尼特哈默尔的友谊和哲学书信往来，尼特哈默尔后来对荷尔德林和黑格尔二人产生了决定性的影响。迪茨本人1796年死于斑疹伤寒，那时他正在维也纳医院行医。”

    Thus, although Hegel did not at first become a partisan Kantian at Tubingen, he was nonetheless clearly influenced by the discussions of Kant going on in Tubingen, and by the end of his stay in Tubingen, after Kant had actually published something on the topic of religion, Hegel himself switched over to using the Kantian language of the “religion of reason,” and he, Holderlin, and Schelling took to using key Kantian phrases as code words in their conversations with each other.  Kant had reconstructed Christian thought in terms of his theory of morality and autonomy in a way that the three friends came to identify with their own adoration of Greek life, support for the French Revolution (which Kant also supported), and distaste for the Christianity that was being doled out to them in the Seminary. Kant’s Christianity was exclusively a religion of morality, and for the radical Kantians, Jesus was only the foremost teacher of morality, not some supernatural Godman walking the earth: In Kant’s words, “there exists absolutely no salvation for man apart from the sincere adoption of genuinely moral principles into his disposition.”^^ The members of such a moral community, he said, form an “invisible church” as distinct from the public, institutional embodiment in a “visible church.The “kingdom of God” (one of the three friends’ code words, which was used by Hegel in his last required sermon at the Seminary) is, in Kant’s words, “the principle of the gradual transition of ecclesiastical faith to the universal religion of reason, and so to a (divine) ethical state on earth” which “is self-developing. . . which one day is to illumine and to rule the world.Hegel, Holderlin, and Schelling began to identify their youthful revolutionary aspirations with this Kantian idea of the “kingdom of God” and to speak of themselves as members of that “invisible church.”

    因此，黑格尔一到图宾根时还不是康德哲学的狂热信徒，但依然受到图宾根讨论康德哲学的影响，截至他快要结束客居图宾根时，在37康德实际上已发表了以宗教为题的某些作品后，黑格尔本人转而使用康德的“理性宗教”语言，他、荷尔德林和谢林着手在相互交谈中，把康德的关键短语用作代名词。在某种程度上，康德根据其道德和自律理论，重建了基督教思想：黑格尔、荷尔德林和谢林这三个朋友，开始认同他们对希腊人生活的崇拜，开始支持法国大革命（康德也支持法国大革命），不喜欢神学院讲授的基督教信仰。康德认为基督教信仰仅仅是一种道德宗教，在康德主义者眼中，耶稣只不过是位杰出的道德教师，而不是某个行走于人世的超自然的神人；用康德的话说，“从来就不存在人类拯救者，只有真诚地采用成为他禀赋的真道德原则。””这样的一个道德共同体中的成员，他说，构成一种“不可见的宗教”，这种宗教不同于通过公众和公共机构体现的“可见的宗教”。”用康德的话说，“上帝王国”（三个朋友的代名词之一，被黑格尔用于在神学院时最后一次被要求做的布道中）意味着，“教会信仰逐渐过渡到普遍的理性宗教原则，因此逐渐过渡到（神的）尘世的伦理国家”原则，伦理国家“是自我发展的……它到头来定光芒四射，统治世界。”5黑格尔、荷尔德林和谢林开始认为，他们年轻的革命志向就是康德关于“上帝王国”的理念，并开始把他们自己说成“看不见的基督教徒”成员。

Hegel nonetheless still remained at this early point in his life somewhat suspicious of Kantian thought, ever lagging behind his two friends in his enthusiasm for the fine points of Kantian doctrine. For him, it still seemed a bit too arid, too reliant on an intellectualized reason, neglecting, so he thought, the moral force of the passions and therefore failing to give a complete account of the living embodied human agent.  Like the good son of a pragmatic civil servant in Wiirttemberg that he was, he continued, despite his equally deeply felt Enlightenment sympathies, to be deeply suspicious of claims about “universal reason,” holding instead that what motivates people is what their surrounding social practice instills in them and what they can feel for themselves.  His Wiirttembergian upbringing, however much he was now distancing himself from it, made such Kantian ideals difficult for him fully to accept, however much they were capturing the fancy of his equally Wiirttembergian comrades. It was also clear that this tension within his own view troubled him to no small extent.

    然而，在早期生活阶段，黑格尔一直对康德思想多少心存疑虑，甚至在对待康德学说中完美观点方面，远没有他两个朋友表现出的热情。在黑格尔看来，康德学说仍然看上去有点儿过于枯燥，过于依赖理智理性，像他认为的，忽视了激情的道德的力量，所以康德哲学没有去完整地描述活生生的、具体的人类代理人。跟他作为符腾堡讲究实际的文职官员的好儿子一样，他继续深深怀疑“普遍理性”这一主张，尽管他同样深深同情启蒙运动，他反而认为，使人们激起的就是身边社会实践逐渐灌输的东西，就是人们能感受到的东西。他的符腾堡人教养，不管他现在怎样地超越它，还是使康德这些理想很难为他38 完全接受，不管它们同样引起他这个符腾堡同人多少幻想。同样十分清楚的是，他特有看法中的这种张力，使他感到大为苦恼。

Hegel’s Return to Stuttgart

黑格尔回到斯图加特

In the summer of 1793, Hegel’s continuing bouts of bad health gave him an unexpected opportunity to try to work out some of his antiKantian ideals. Hegel was continually having to go home during his student days in Tubingen because of bad health (although the nature of his maladies remains unknown); but his grounds for doing so likely had to do equally well with his desire to escape from what he regarded as the restricting environment of Tubingen. Tubingen was a small, provincial town that had become even smaller and more provincial as the university had gradually declined in status; while not a metropolis or a cosmopolitan city of any note, Stuttgart was nonetheless a “residence city,” that is, a city in which the duke made his home and which therefore attracted the kind of artisans and intellectuals who typically gather around such places. Moreover, Stuttgart had an active, Enlightenment-oriented intellectual life, whereas Tubingen seemed intent on keeping the Enlightenment firmly outside the city walls. Hegel’s preferences as a child growing up in Stuttgart stayed with him; he clearly preferred Stuttgart with its wide, open streets and its more open intellectual atmosphere to the narrow, dark, medieval and early Renaissance streets of Tubingen that seemed to accommodate themselves fully to its atmosphere of old-fashioned Pietist repression. A particularly bad bout of ill health allowed Hegel to get permission to spend his last semester at home recuperating; but while there, he indulged in much reading, the study of botany, and a thorough reading of Greek tragedy with special emphasis on Sophocles - which leads one to question just how ill he really was.

    1793年夏，黑格尔身体状况时好时坏，这使他意外地有机会去试图制定他反康德哲学的某些设想。黑格尔之所以在蒂宾根学生时代必须不断回家，原因在于他那糟糕的健康状况（虽然他的病因仍然不明)；但是，他这样做的理由很可能关乎，他同时渴望摆脱他认为的图宾根缺乏自由的环境。图宾根作为一个规模不大的地方市镇，因图宾根大学地位逐渐跌落而变得更小和更加地方化；斯图加特不是大都市或国际名城，但依然是个“王城”，依然是公爵安家落户的城市，所以，斯图加特城吸引的那类艺术家和知识分子，通常乐于居住在这样的地方。不仅如此，斯图加特具有的知识生活，积极向上，倾向于启蒙运动，然而，图宾根似乎铁心把启蒙运动拒之门外。黑格尔身为在斯图加特长大的孩子，他在那时形成的喜好为他所继续保持；十分清楚，他喜爱斯图加特宽阔的街道，喜爱斯图加特开放的知识氛围，而不喜欢图宾根狭窄的、阴暗的、带有中世纪和早期文艺复兴味道的街道，这些街道似乎完全使它们与图宾根老派的、虔诚的压抑氛围相契合。特别是，健康状况严重欠佳，使黑格尔被允许最后一学期在家休养身体；不过，虽然是在家中休养，他仍泡在书堆里，阅读植物学研究方面书籍，通览古希腊悲剧著作，尤其是情钟索福克勒斯悲剧作品，——这使人对他真正病到何种程度提出怀疑。

While recuperating at home, Hegel received an offer to be a house tutor for the children of a patrician family in Berne. Having managed to get away from Tubingen for health reasons, Hegel jumped at the chance not to have to return, and so petitioned the authoritative church body in Stuttgart (the Konsistorium) to allow him to take the theological exam early, and they concurred. Hegel easily passed his exam and thereby managed to finish his theological studies earlier than expected (and certainly earlier than his friends). This seems to have perked up Hegel’s spirits, for it meant that he could begin his career as an author and critic, and, even better from his point of view, that he would not have to return again to Tubingen to study theology. He managed to take a brief vacation before his trip, and he passed the time in Stuttgart with the poet Gotthold Friedrich Staudlin, a friend of Holderlin’s who also helped to promote Holderlin’s career as a poet. Staudlin and Hegel struck up an instant friendship; Staudlin’s enthusiasm for the French Revolution (which was to get him ejected from Wiirttemberg at the end of 1793, forcing him to flee to Strasbourg) meshed with Hegel’s own sympathies. The two made frequent trips to Cannstatt, a suburb of Stuttgart, where they would drink wine and discuss ideas, and, one can only assume, share their enthusiasm for the Revolution. Staudlin later wrote to Hegel, when Hegel was in Berne, “These serene hours were so sweet, that I know to give you, dear Hegel, my very warmest thanks for them. You are one of those upright, sincere people, who are good for me and whom I consequently would always want on my side.”^'’

    在家休养身体时，黑格尔接受了一份工作，给伯尔尼一个贵族家庭子女当家庭教师。在以健康为由设法离开图宾根后，黑格尔抓住了这个千载难逢的机会，因此他请求斯图加特权威教会团体（教会监理会）允许自己早点参加神学考试，他们同意了黑格尔的请求。黑格尔轻松地通过了考试，因此他争取早于预计时间（肯定比他朋友们更早地）完成神学研究。这看似使黑格尔精神为之一振，因为这就意味39着，他能着手去准备当作家和批评家，在他看来更乐观的是，这就意味着他将不必再回到图宾根研究神学。他设法在旅行之前作短暂的休假，他与诗人戈特霍尔德·弗里德里希·施托伊德林一起度过斯图加特的美好时光，后者是荷尔德林朋友，并促使荷尔德林走上诗人道路。施托伊德林对法国大革命（法国大革命使他1793年被逐出符腾堡，迫使他逃到斯特拉斯堡）的热情，和黑格尔对法国大革命的同情一拍即合。这两个人常去斯图加特郊区坎施塔特旅行，在那里他们常边喝酒边讨论一些思想，而人们只能假设，他们对法国大革命都怀有火一样的热情。施托伊德林后来写信给黑格尔，当黑格尔在伯尔尼时，信中说道，“这段宁静的时光是极其甜蜜的，我知道要想你，亲爱的黑格尔，表示我最衷心的感谢。你属于那些正直而诚实的人们之列，他们是我的良师益友，我因此总想要与他们为伍。”25

While at home in Stuttgart, Hegel also worked on a manuscript that was almost surely begun in Tubingen but completed in the summer of 1793 during his stay in Stuttgart. The essay (nowadays called simply the “Tubingen Fragment” or the “Tubingen Essay”) was Hegel’s first constructive attempt at doing the kind of thing he had set his heart on doing when he originally left for Tubingen: It was his attempt at writing a critical essay in the style of Lessing or of the French philosophes on the current situation facing European life. The essay is distinctly not academically philosophical in tone or argument, although it touches on many philosophical questions, broadly construed. It is Hegel’s attempt to come to terms with a set of conflicting ideas in his own mind, some of which he had brought with him to Tubingen, but most of which he had acquired while he was there. Hegel was never to publish the essay, but he was to rework various themes in it for later, also unpublished, essays. The problems he posed for himself in these essays eventually drove him out of the framework in which he had posed them and led him to become the philosopher he was later to be.

    尽管是在斯图加特的家中休养身心，黑格尔仍在致力于撰写一篇稿子，这篇稿子几乎肯定在图宾根时就已着手写了，但在他1793年夏客居斯图加特期间才得以完成。这篇论文（现今简称为“图宾根札记”或“图宾根论文”）是黑格尔首次具有建设性的尝试，所研究的那种东西，是在他最初去图宾根时就一心想要研究的：这就是他试图用莱辛风格或法国哲学风格写一篇批判性文章，文章涉及现时欧洲生活面临的形势。文章显然不带有学院式的哲学语调或论证，尽管它也触及到了很多哲学问题，广义理解的哲学问题。这篇文章反映的是，黑格尔试图去与心目中一套互相冲突理念达成妥协，其中某些理念是他来图宾根前就已形成了的，但绝大部分理念是他在图宾根时具有的。黑格尔一直未发表这篇论文，但他后来以它为蓝本重写了多篇不同主题的论文，他同样也未发表过这些论文。他在这些论文中，给自已提出的那些问题，最终迫使自己离开了基于提出它们的构架，导致他成了后来将成为的哲学家。

The essay is in one sense an attempt to reply to the Kantian enthusiasms of his two Seminary friends, Holderlin and Schelling. The key element in the essay is a discussion of the role of religion in individual and public life. Hegel sounds themes here that reverberate throughout his later works, but the tone and emphasis are all quite different in the early essay. The main distinction he draws in the paper is that between what he at that time called “subjective” and “objective” religion. Objective religion is equated with theology, with established, promulgated doctrines of belief and with institutional embodiment in a church.  Subjective religion, on the other hand, is something that informs a person’s whole life; it is a matter of the heart, not of doctrine, and it provides the individual who participates in it with motivations to act in a way that the dry doctrines of objective religion could never do. In the metaphors that Hegel uses in the essay, objective religion is “dead,” whereas subjective religion is “alive.” When one inquires therefore into the role of religion in the life of an individual or in the life of a community, one must investigate the people’s subjective religion - what the people really believe and feel - and not the established doctrines that the theologians promulgate or the official words professed by the pastors in the pulpits. The task of moral and spiritual reform falls to subjective religion - which Hegel, using the term of art of his day, calls the religion of the heart - and not to objective religion. Moral and spiritual reform therefore cannot come merely from the theologians; it must also come from the practices of a “religion of the people” (a Volksreligion), an idea that he may very well have taken over from Rousseau.

    从某种意义上说，这篇论文在于尝试去回答，神学院两个朋友荷尔德林和谢林，为何对康德哲学一往情深。论文中的关键元素，在于讨论个人与公众生活中宗教起的作用。黑格尔阐述的这些论题，贯穿于他后期著作，但是，他后期作品中的语调与重点，和这篇早期论文o中的截然不同。他在文章里作出的主要区分，在于对“主观”宗教与“客观”宗教的区分。客观宗教等同于神学，等同于已确立的、得到传播的信仰学说，等同于教会的慈善机构的体现。另一方面，主观宗教贯穿在一个人整个生活中；它是关于人心的问题，而不是关于学说的问题，它激起置身于它之中的个人，按照一定的方式做事，而这种方式是干瘪的客观宗教学说所决不能提供的。根据黑格尔在这篇论文中使用的隐喻，客观宗教是“死的”，而主观宗教是“活的”。因此，我们在探究宗教在个人生活或社区生活中起的作用时，必须研究人民的主观宗教——人民真正相信和感受到的东西——而不必去研究神学家传播的已确立的学说，或不必去研究牧师在布道坛上宣称信仰的官话。道德和精神的改造，就是开始思考主观宗教——黑格尔，用他那时艺术用语说，称作的心灵的宗教——而不是开始思考客观宗教。所以，道德和精神的改造，不只是来自于神学家；同时它还必须来自“人民宗教”(aVoksreligion)的运用，一个他极有可能借自卢梭的理念。

Interestingly enough, Hegel argues here against a purely Enlightenment understanding of religion and against Kant in particular (although the arguments are very attenuated at best). In his Religion mthin the Limits of Reason Alone^ Kant had argued in favor of a pure religion of morality, an “invisible church,” to which he opposed the “visible church”; Kant contrasted the “pure faith” of reason with the “ecclesiastical faith” of the established churches. (This was particularly easy for Kant, since he himself was never comfortable with any ceremonial religious service.) Kant’s problem in the book was to show how a religion was possible that did not rely on any form of revelation or nonrational basis; one might say that Kant posed the problem of what a “modern,” that is, a “rational” religion would look like, a problem that was to provoke Hegel for his entire career. At first blush, Hegel’s distinction between subjective and objective religion looks like a reworked version of the Kantian distinction. However, Hegel draws a sharp contrast between his ideas and the Kantian conception, claiming that a pure religion of reason could never serve as a “subjective” religion; pure reason alone cannot motivate us, cannot claim our hearts.  The idea of a “pure faith” that consists entirely of the motivation to act virtuously in light of the demands of practical reason is therefore an empty ideal; as Hegel puts it, “man needs motives other than pure respect for the moral law, motives more closely bound up with his sensuality . . . hence what this objection really comes down to is that it is altogether unlikely that humankind, or even a single individual, will ever in this world be able to dispense entirely with nonmoral promptings.”^^

    十分有趣的是，黑格尔在此极力反对宗教作纯启蒙运动式的理解，尤其是极力反对康德（尽管黑格尔充其量也就是作了极其软弱无力的论证）。在《论理性范围内的宗教》里，康德坚称赞成纯道德宗教，这种“看不见的宗教”被他使之与“看得见的宗教”相对立；康德使理性的“纯粹信仰”与已成立的宗教团体的“教会信仰”形成对比。（这样做对康德来说易如反掌，因为他本人始终讨厌礼节性的宗教服务。）康德在书中所提出的问题在于去证明，宗教怎样才可做到不依靠任何形式的启示或非理性基础；可以说康德提出了“现代”宗教，即“理性”宗教通常形象如何的问题，提出了一个将激起黑格尔毕生去研究的问题。初看上去，黑格尔对主观宗教与客观宗教的区分，看来好像是康德式的区分的修订本。不过，黑格尔对他的理念与康德的概念作出了鲜明的对照，并声称纯粹理性宗教绝不可能用作“主观”宗教；单靠纯粹理性，无法使人产生动机，无法使人具有欲4望。这个理念（即“纯粹信仰”完全是由在德性上按照实践理性要求的做事的动因组成），因此是一种空洞无物的理想；像黑格尔论证的，“人类需要动机而非纯粹地尊重道德律，动机与人类的感觉性有着更为密切的关系……所以这里的异议真正涉及的是，人类甚或单独的个人竟然将能够永远完全去除非道德的激励，这通常是完全不可能办到的事情。””

For the young Hegel, still under the influence of Rousseau (and probably, even if only indirectly, of the earl of Shaftesbury), the idea of Enlightenment reason alone motivating us was simply unbelievable. In the essay, he offers no real arguments against Kant’s idea that reason provides us with its own incentives for action; instead, he simply voices his conviction that Kant’s view is incredible. What he sees as needed instead is a union of Enlightenment reason and the human heart; the Kantian ideals of reason and human dignity require a “people’s religion” to be put into practice.

    就青年黑格尔仍然受到卢梭（很可能还受到沙夫茨伯里伯爵的纵使只是间接的）影响来说，要是认为启蒙运动理性只是促使人们产生某种动机，这种看法简直是令人难以相信的。在这篇论文里，他未切实地反对康德的想法，即理性刺激我们做事；相反，他只不过坚信康德的想法是不可信的。而他看作当务之急的，在于启蒙运动理性与人类心灵的结合；康德关于理性和人类尊严的理想，要求把“人民宗教”付诸实施。

Hegel’s criticisms of the idea of a purely detached, Enlightenment criticism of religion are, no doubt, also a bit autobiographical in tone.  Hegel claims that such Enlightenment criticism and putative reform necessarily fails. Partially echoing Aristotle, Hegel claims that Enlightenment reason can only produce a IVissenschaft, a “science” or “learned discipline,” whereas what is needed is wisdom, which can never come out of such theories, out of Wissenschaft alone.(This disparagement of Wissenschaft is, of course, another issue on which Hegel later was to decisively reverse himself) Enlightenment criticism of the practices of religion necessarily confuses the richness of heartfelt, “subjective” religion with that of superstition and fetishism; it prides itself on its detachment from such superstition, and it is the “arrogance typical of adolescents . . . having got a couple of insights out of books they begin scoffing at beliefs they had up to now, like everyone else, unquestioningly accepted. In this process, vanity plays a major role.”^’ (One suspects that Hegel is thinking of himself and perhaps also of Diez.) The work of Enlightenment is at best to assist in the production of a genuine religion of the people, a genuine sense of moral and spiritual renewal; on its own, it cannot do this. As Hegel puts it, “Part of the business of enlightening understanding is to refine objective religion. But when it comes to the improvement of mankind (the cultivation of strong and great dispositions, of noble feelings, and of a decisive sense of independence), the powers of the understanding are of little moment; and the product, objective religion, does not carry much weight either. ... It is nonetheless of the utmost importance for us to discourage any fetishistic mode of belief, to make it more and more like a rational religion. Yet a universal church of the spirit remains a mere ideal of reason.

    黑格尔对纯独立的启蒙运动对宗教批判思想的批判，毋庸置疑还带有点自传性的语调。黑格尔声称，启蒙运动所做的这种批判和推定的改革，必然会以失败而告终。通过部分地重复亚里士多德思想，黑格尔主张，启蒙运动理性只能产生a Wissenschaft，“科学”或“学科”，而我们需要的是智慧，智慧绝不可能来自这种理论，绝不能只来自科学。28（诚然，这种对科学的失望，所引出的另一问题，就是黑格尔后来作出的决定性的转向。）启蒙运动关于宗教实践的批判，必然把衷心的、“主观的”宗教的丰富性，与迷信和拜物教的丰富性混为一谈；这样的批判为它自己摆脱这样的迷信而自豪，而这样的批判表现出“典型的不成熟的傲慢……在从某些书中得到几个深刻见解后，启蒙运动思想家开始嘲笑他们和其每个人一样直到现在所盲目地接受的信仰。在这个过程中，自负起着非常重要的作用。”2（我们猜想，黑格尔在思考的，是他本人，也许还有迪茨。）启蒙运动的工作，至多促进产生真的人民宗教，至多促进人们意识到真道德感的和精神的重生；启蒙运动单靠自身，无法做到这一点。像黑格尔论述的，“具有启迪作用的理解的使命，部分地在于提升客观宗教。但是，当42 启蒙运动开始改善人类（使人类养成健全而伟大的性格、高尚的感情和当机立断的独立意识）时，这种具有启迪作用的理解的力量只能是昙花一现；由此造成的产物即客观宗教，也是可有可无的……对我们，依然十分重要的，就是去阻止任何拜物教式的信仰形式，就是去使这种信仰形式日益成为类似的理性宗教。然而，精神的普世宗教，依旧成为纯粹理性的理想。”

One can see several of Hegel’s youthful influences at work in the essay. For someone of Hegel’s upbringing, the distinction between subjective and objective religion would have been a natural way to cast Kant’s distinction between the “invisible church” and the “visible church.” Kant’s distinction echoes Pietist thought, and, as we noted, although Hegel was no Pietist, he could not help but have been influenced by the importance of Pietist ideas in the Wiirttemberg climate.  (His close friend at Tubingen, Holderlin, was, for example, raised as a Pietist.) For the Pietists, what was important was religious experience and its transformative effect on one’s life; they were deeply suspicious not simply of some of the particular theological statements of Christian faith at that time but in general of any intellectual articulation of religious faith. Moreover, in Wiirttemberg, the Pietists had come to understand their reliance on the transformative power of faith as being connected to the successful political movements of Wiirttemberg history, of a godly people who had successfully resisted the encroachments of their absolutizing Catholic monarchs. Hegel’s distinction between subjective and objective religion nicely fit into the Pietist division between real, emotional religious experience and the dry, falsifying intellectual articulation of that experience.

    不难发现，这篇论文中有若干内容在影响着青年黑格尔。就名人黑格尔思想孕育来说，区分主观宗教与客观宗教，也许成了一条通向系统阐述康德区分“看不见的宗教”与“看得见的宗教”的自然之路。康德的区分重复着虔诚派的思想，像我们注意到的，黑格尔虽然不是虔诚派教徒，可能不得已受到符腾堡氛围中虔诚派理念的重要性的影响。（譬如，他图宾根挚友荷尔德林，作为一位虔诚派教徒，就是在这种氛围中哺育出来的。）在虔诚派教徒眼中，最为重要的是宗教体验及其对人们生活产生的脱胎换骨的影响；他们不仅仅对那时基督教信仰的某些具体神学陈述深表怀疑，而且一般说来对宗教信仰的任何知识性的结合深表怀疑。再者，在符腾堡，某些虔诚派教徒已着手把自己对改变信仰的权力的依赖，理解为联系着符腾堡历史上成功的政治运动，理解为联系着一个虔诚的民族的成功的政治运动，认识到这个虔诚的民族已成功地抵抗了天主教专制君主的侵犯。黑格尔关于主观宗教与客观宗教的区分，恰恰符合虔诚派教徒对下列两方面作出的区分；真实的、情感式的宗教体验，与关于宗教体验的干瘪的、伪造式的知识结合。

Hegel himself, however, could not and would not have understood his distinction between objective and subjective religion as a Pietist recasting of Kantian thought, since he did not think of himself as a Pietist of any sort. In the essay, the problem Hegel sets for himself has to do with his understanding of the consequences of the French Revolution, namely, the issue of what conditions would be necessary to bring about a spiritual and moral renewal of “the people.” The only possible answer, so he thinks, must come from a genuine religion of the people (from a genuine Volksreligion). To show how this could take place, he constructed an idea of how such a genuine religion of the people would develop, drawing on the things he knew to do so: his Wiirttemberg past (with its implicit Pietist distinction between the true religion of subjective emotion and the dead hand of orthodoxy), the Kantian ideas he has acquired at the Seminary, his devotion to the Revolution and its cause of freedom, and, very importantly, his emerging love of ancient Greece, into which he has stirred various Rousseauian themes.

    可是黑格尔本人，不可能也不应该把他对客观宗教与主观宗教的区分，理解为虔诚派教徒对康德思想的重塑，因为他没把自己看作任何种类的虔诚派教徒。在这篇论文中，黑格尔提出的问题，与他如何理解法国大革命带来的后果有关，即，与他如何理解必须具备何种条件，才能引起“人民”精神和道德的重生问题有关。唯一可能的答案，像他认为的，必然来自真人民宗教（来自真Volksreligion）。为证明这种情况何以能够发生，他提出了这种真人民宗教将怎样发展这一想法，并充分利用在这样做时他所确信的东西：他早年符腾堡的经历（和人民宗教中虔诚派教徒，使他对主观感情的真宗教与正统信仰的不散的阴魂作出的区分)，他在神学院期间获得的康德的思想，他对法国大革命及其自由事业的热爱，十分重要的是他显露出的对古希腊的热爱，所有这些都构成了他激发起的各种不同的卢梭主义论题。

To this end, he identified a genuine Volksreligion with the religion of ancient Greece, which he in turn identified with the ideal of freedom: “The folk festivals of the Greeks were all religious festivals, and were held either in honor of a god or of a man deified because of his exemplary service to his country. ... A religion of the people (Volksreligion) - engendering and nurturing, as it does, great and noble sentiments - goes hand in hand with freedom. But our religion [i.e., orthodox Christianity] would train people to be citizens of heaven, gazing ever upward, making our most human feelings seem alien.

    说到底，他认为真人民宗教就是古希腊宗教，古希腊宗教依次被他认作自由的理想：“古希腊人民间节日，全是宗教节日，不是为敬神而举行的，就是为敬反抗者举行的，原因在于反抗者对国家作出杰出贡献……人民宗教(Volksreligion)---形成和培育伟大而高尚情操，像它通常起到的作用一样——与自由并肩而行。但是，我们的宗教〔即正统基督教]总是教育人民成为天国公民，总是使人永远凝视上苍，总是使绝大多数人感情似乎变得异化。”!

The unstated problem in the essay is that of what form the revolution in Germany - understood always as a social program of moral and spiritual renewal - ought to take. In this first stab at an answer to that question, Hegel develops the general form of what a solution would look like: It would be possible to have moral and spiritual renewal only if a genuine “religion of the people” could be developed, that is, only in a religion that would touch both people’s hearts and minds, unite the public and private sides of life, and do this for all the people, not merely for a small few of them. From his schoolboy Stuttgart readings of Christian Garve and Johann Gottfried Herder, Hegel had picked up the idea that the modern fragmentation of society into different estates and classes made modern life incapable of forming any conception of a common interest; in his essay, Hegel comes to see subjective religion, the “religion of the people,” as the means by which such fragmentation is to be overcome.

    这篇论文中未加阐明的问题，就是德国革命——始终被理解为道德和精神重生的一项社会计划——应该采取何种形式。在初次试图回答这问题时，黑格尔提出的解决方法看来好像具有的一般形式：真“人民宗教”将可能实现道德和精神的重生，其条件是只有此时真“人民宗教”能够创立出来，即，只有此时通过某种宗教，真“人民宗教”触动人民心灵与思想，把公共生活和私人生活结合起来，为全体人民而非只是为少数人做到这一点。从他，在斯图加特上中小学时，对克里斯蒂安·加尔弗和约翰·戈特弗里德·赫德作品的解读来看，黑格尔就已认为，现代社会分裂为不同社会等级和阶层，这就使现代生活不可能形成任何共同利益观；在文中，黑格尔着手把主观宗教或“人民宗教”，看作这种分裂得以被克服的手段。

However, Hegel could not explain in the essay exactly how such a subjective religion uniting all people in both their reason and their hearts could actually come about in such fragmented circumstances, nor could he point to any clear direction in which a solution could lie. Hegel had set himself a problem, he had failed to solve it, and he knew it. But he was to take up these problems again during his sojourn in Berne and Frankfurt and would raise the question of whether Christianity could be reformed so that it could serve as the vehicle for the kind of revolution Hegel had in mind. He gradually came to see that the questions he had been asking himself about were not exactly the ones he needed to raise if he was to fulfill the very general task he had set for himself, and that realization gradually took him away from his original goals.

    不过，在这篇论文中，黑格尔不可能确切解释，这种通过理性和心灵把所有人团结起来的主观宗教，实际上怎么能够产生于这种分裂的环境中，同时他也不可能指出问题的解决所能遵循的明确的方向。黑格尔给自己提出了问题，而未能解决问题，对此他心知肚明。但是，在旅居伯尔尼和法兰克福期间，他得再次研究这些问题，他将提44 出的问题是，基督教是不是能够加以改造，以便它能用作黑格尔心目中的那种革命工具。他逐渐开始看到，他自问自答的那些问题，恰恰不是他非得提出不可的，假如他要去完成早已给自己提出的极一般的任务，而这种认识逐渐使他违背初衷。