第14章 对现代生活的全面思考：自然、宗教、艺术和绝对(3)
Greek conceptions of divinity thus were essentially aesthetic conceptions of the divine, and the attempts by the Greek philosophers to articulate in explicit form what was only implicit in the commitment to such religious practices had the effect of fully undermining all belief in them and thereby undermining the very structure of Greek life itself. Greek deities were, as Hegel put it, not fully “holy” in the sense that they were limited and “finite”; reflection on them only made this “finitude” and the contradictions contained in such a conception more explicit.
所以，希腊关于神性的观念本质上是神的审美观念，而希腊哲学家试图以明确形式系统阐述仅暗含于对这种宗教实践承诺中的内容，这一尝试最终完全削弱了对这种宗教实践的所有信仰，由此也逐渐损害了希腊人生活本身特有的结构。正如黑格尔所指出的，从希腊人的神是受限制和“有限的”意义上讲，希腊人的神并非完全“神圣”；对希腊人的神的反思，只是使包含在这种观念中的“有限”和矛盾更加明晰。
Judaism
Hegel’s Berlin “phenomenology” of religions thus recapitulated (with much more detail and subtlety) some key themes of the earlier Jena Phenomenology. However, by 1827, Hegel had come to new conclusion about what followed from that. The problems of Greek religion, he now thought, required it to “elevate” itself into something more coherent, which he now for the first time identified as the Jewish religion characterized as the “religion of sublimity.” The Greek gods were the embodiments of human perfection in beautiful, sensuous form; the Jewish God, however, was freed from this kind of “finite” conception of the divine and was instead conceived as “infinite,” purely spiritual, without shape. The Jewish God thus is “subjectivity that relates itself to itselfi”'^
犹太教
黑格尔在柏林时期的宗教“现象学”，因此（更加细致、精妙地）概述了早年耶拿时期《精神现象学》中的某些关键主题。不过到1827年，黑格尔最终根据之前的概述得出了新的结论。他现在认为，希腊人的宗教问题需要将希腊人宗教自身“提升”为某种更连贯的东西，这是他首次认为希腊人宗教等同于具有“崇高宗教”特征的犹太教。希腊诸神以优美且感性的形式体现着人类的完美；然而，犹太人的上帝摆脱了这种关于神的“有限的”观念，转而被设想为“无限的”、纯粹精神的、没有具体形状的。犹太人的上帝因此成为“明哲保身的主观性”。
In his earlier writings on Judaism, Hegel had seen it as merely a religion of legalistic servility. In the Phenomenology., except for a few passing comments, Judaism was simply left undiscussed, as if it did not even matter in the history of humanity’s self-consciousness. However, since arriving in Berlin, Hegel had clearly been mulling over and rethinking his stance on Judaism, and the impetus for this reevaluation was almost certainly his close friendship with Eduard Gans. For his own part, Hegel remained, as far as we can tell, fully ignorant of all the nonbiblical writings of Judaism (such as the Talmud), and he seems to have been more or less ignorant about the development of Judaism since Roman times.Gans was himself, however, intensely interested in questions regarding Judaism and the relation of the Hegelian philosophy to them; and Hegel almost certainly began to change his mind about the status of Judaism in history in light of Gans’s queries.
在他关于犹太教的早期作品中，黑格尔曾把犹太教仅仅看作是一种墨守成规、奴颜婢膝的宗教。在《精神现象学》中，除了几处粗略评论外，犹太教几乎未被深入讨论，仿佛它在人类自我意识史上甚至无足轻重。然而，自抵达柏林以来，黑格尔显然一直在仔细思考并重新审视他对犹太教的立场，而促使这次对犹太教的重新评价，几乎无疑与他和爱德华·甘斯的友谊密切相关。就我们目前所知，就黑格尔本人而言，他对犹太教所有非《圣经》作品（如托拉）仍然全然不知；他似乎对自罗马时期以来犹太教的发展也知之甚少。然而，甘斯本人对犹太教问题以及黑格尔哲学与这些问题的关系怀有浓厚兴趣；由于甘斯的质疑，黑格尔几乎无疑开始改变他对犹太教历史地位的看法。
Judaism presented a distinct problem for Hegel’s views. Given his view of history, Judaism should have vanished along with Egyptian, Greek, and Roman religions; like them, having once played its role on the stage of history, it had no longer had any reason for existing, since its own internal problems (which Hegel saw as resolved in Christianity) should have gradually undermined the ability of the Jews to sustain their religion - just as the problems with Greek religion had inevitably undermined the Greeks’ ability to maintain their religious beliefs and way of life.
犹太教让黑格尔的观点面临一个独特的问题。鉴于他对历史的见解，犹太教应当与埃及人宗教、希腊人宗教和罗马人宗教一同消失；如同它们一样，犹太教在历史舞台上扮演过自己的角色后，就不再有继续存在的理由，因为它自身的内在问题（在黑格尔看来已被基督教解决）可能逐渐削弱了犹太人维持他们宗教的能力——就像希腊人宗教的问题不可避免地逐渐削弱了希腊人维持他们宗教信仰和生活方式的能力一样。
At first, Hegel had seemed to attribute the survival of Judaism simply to the Jews’ own stubbornness in holding on to dead legalistic practices. In his first lectures on Judaism in his Berlin period in 1821, Hegel still argued that Jewish religious consciousness was essentially servile, since God was represented as an “abstract” power for whom absolute obedience was required and whose commands, because of the abstractness of both the Jewish conception of God and the commands themselves, could not be rationally comprehended. By the time he was again lecturing on the topic in 1824, however, things had dramatically changed, in 1824, Hegel suddenly presented the Jewish God as being more “spiritual” than were the previous religious conceptions of divinity, and “wisdom” had come to be seen as one of the defining features of the Jewish divinity. Indeed, what had seemed only servile in 1821 (the “fear of the Lord”) had by 1824 - after the friendship with Gans had started - come to be seen as the “beginning of wisdom” (although Hegel had much earlier cited that same biblical passage in his section on mastery and servitude in the Phenomenology). By 1827, Hegel described the Jewish God as the embodiment of “goodness and wisdom,” and, in an even more striking development, he ranked Jewish religion as “higher” than that of the Greeks, a complete reversal of his earlier positions.
起初，黑格尔似乎把犹太教的延续仅仅归因于犹太人自己顽固坚持过时的律法实践。在他1821年柏林时期关于犹太教的首次讲演中，黑格尔仍然辩称，犹太人的宗教意识本质上是奴性的，因为上帝被描述为一种要求人们绝对服从的“抽象的”权力，由于犹太人上帝观念和上帝命令本身的“抽象性”，人们无法合理理解上帝的命令。然而，到1824年他再次就此话题讲演时，情况发生了戏剧性的变化；1824年，黑格尔突然把犹太人的上帝描述为“精神性的”，而非之前的神性宗教观念，并且“智慧”已开始被看作犹太人神性的明确特征之一。实际上，1821年还仅仅被视为奴性的东西（“对上帝的恐惧”），到1824年——在与甘斯开始交往之后——已开始被看作是“智慧的开端”（尽管黑格尔早在《精神现象学》统治与奴役部分就已引用过《圣经》中的相同段落）。到1827年，黑格尔将犹太人的上帝描述为“善良和智慧”的化身，并且，以一种更引人注目的阐述，他将犹太教列为“高于”希腊人宗教的范畴，这是对他早期立场的彻底颠覆。
Indeed, the Jewish religion is represented in 1827 as the point where the “divine” and the “natural” along with the “ideal” and the “real” were to be conceived as existing in a “unity. As such, the natural world in Judaism was to be conceived as a “manifestation” of the divine “subject,” although this manifestation can never be adequate to that of which it is the manifestation. It is in that sense, Hegel argued, that Judaism is the religion of “sublimity,” of the unimaginable power of the divine over all else. Because of this conception, Hegel also argued, Judaism was able to conceive of nature as a “prosaic” state of affairs existing in a set of lawful connections; indeed, the whole concept of a “miracle,” he argued, would not have made any sense without such a conception; and thus Judaism prepared the way for the scientific treatment of nature in terms of its lawfulness.Thus, in Judaism the true “miracle” - the appearance of spirit, Geist, in nature — is made the explicit object of reflection, and the “true” appearance of spirit as the “spirit of humanity and the human consciousness of the world” is implicitly, although not fully, brought forth as an object of religious reflection.^’ Indeed, in Judaism, God is seen as the “creator” of the world, not as something subject to a yet higher “necessity,” as were the Greek divinities. As created by God, the world is basically “good”; interpreted in that way, the Jewish religion is seen as laying the groundwork for something like Hegel’s speculative philosophy of nature itself. Thus by 1824 and then decisively in 1827, Hegel had completely reversed himself, conceiving in 1827 of Judaism as the first great religion of freedom, instead of the religion of servitude, the view he had taken of Judaism for almost his entire life.
实际上，1827年犹太教被描绘为包含这样一种观点：按照此观点，“神”和“自然”连同“理想”和“现实”应被设想为存在于一个“统一体”中。因此，犹太教中自然世界注定被设想为神圣“主体”的“显露”，尽管这种显露绝不可能满足其作为显露之显露的要求。黑格尔论证道，正是从这种意义上讲，犹太教才是“崇高”的宗教，是神拥有其他难以想象力量的宗教。黑格尔还论证道，基于这个概念，犹太教能够将自然设想为处于一系列受自然规律支配的联系中的“平凡的”事态；他辩称，实际上，“奇迹”的全部概念若缺少这个概念，也许不会具有任何意义；因此，犹太教为依据其合法性科学地对待自然铺平了道路。所以，在犹太教中，真实的“奇迹”——自然中精神（Geist）的显露——被当作明确的反思对象，而精神的“真实的”显露作为“人类精神和世界的人类意识”虽然含蓄，但并非完全未被作为宗教反思的对象提出。实际上，在犹太教中，上帝被视为世界的“创造者”，不像希腊人的神性那样被视为隶属于一种更高的“必然性”的东西。作为上帝的创造物，世界基本上是“美好的”；以这种方式解读犹太教，犹太教被视为为像黑格尔思辨自然哲学本身一样的东西奠定了基础。因而到1824年以及之后具有决定性意义的1827年，黑格尔彻底转变了自己的看法，在1827年把犹太教设想为史上第一个伟大的自由宗教，而非他几乎一生都认为的具有奴役性的宗教。
Hegel was, however, clearly not fully at ease with this analysis of Judaism, since it potentially threw into question so much of his emphasis on Christianity’s claim to be the exclusively modern religion. In his final 1831 lectures on the philosophy of religion, he returned to the point about Judaism as the religion of freedom, but, much more than he had done in 1827, he stressed what he saw as its fatal internal contradictions and why it could not serve as an appropriately modern religion. Judaism remained one-sided, Hegel concluded, in the sense that it still represented the divine as a national deity; this was the basic contradiction, so Hegel thought, in Judaism, since it held that God was the Lord of all at the same time that it maintained that God was also the deity only of a particular, “chosen” people. Moreover, the Jewish conception of God, although sublime and deep, nonetheless was still of sufficient abstractness that “the laws do not appear as laws of reason but as prescriptions of the Lord.”-’® Thus, divine and human law are not sufficiently differentiated, and a legal formalism remained intrinsic to the Jewish religion and way of life.
不过，黑格尔显然并不完全满足于对犹太教的分析，因为这样的分析很可能带来一个问题，即他过分强调基督教作为现代宗教的排他性主张。在他1831年最后关于宗教哲学的讲演中，他回到犹太教作为自由宗教的观点，但比1827年更加强调他所认为的犹太教致命的内在矛盾，以及犹太教为何不可能充当恰如其分的现代宗教。黑格尔断言，从犹太教仍然把神描绘为一个民族的神这一意义上讲，犹太教仍旧是片面的；因此黑格尔还认为，这就是犹太教的基本矛盾，因为犹太教坚信上帝是一切事物的上帝，同时主张上帝同样还是一个具体的“上帝的选民”的唯一的神。不仅如此，犹太人的上帝观念尽管崇高而深沉，但仍然十分抽象，即“法律不表现为理性的法律，而表现为上帝的意旨”。如此一来，神和人类法律没有被充分区分，并且一种合法的形式主义仍旧是犹太教和犹太人生活方式的根本。
Roman Religion as Preparing the Ground for Christianity
Roman religion appeared consistently throughout Hegel’s lectures as the proper successor to Greek and Jewish religions, although the emerging characterization of Jewish religion as the first religion of freedom made that original division difficult to maintain. The analysis of Roman religion also remained within the overall view he had first articulated in the Phenomenology). It was the religion of Zrveckmdfiigkeif. “expediency” or “purposiveness.” As Hegel had originally thought of the matter, Roman religion was the conceptual successor to Greek religion; but as he came to think of it in Berlin, Roman religion emerged as the unsuccessful unity of the principles of the Greek and Jewish religions, in which, however, what was peculiar to both religions disappeared. The beauty of the multiple Greek divinities was relinquished in favor of a conception of multiple prosaic divinities who were little more than means for achieving secular purposes, and the unity of the Jewish God was replaced by an abstract although comprehensive and unified state purpose. For the Roman way of life, the divine was essentially thus only a manner of achieving dominion and dominance in the world for the Roman people, and the essentially practical character of the Romans expressed itself in subordinating all other peoples to their own empire and assembling their various national gods into a “pantheon,” which itself could amount only to a kind of hodgepodge subordinated to the one “Jupiter Capitolinus,” just as all the nations were subordinate to the will of Rome.^'^ The Roman religious conception itself was virtually devoid of all meaning, having no way to conceive of the unity of the pantheon (since it was little more than an unprincipled conglomeration), but this had the effect of creating the possibility of a “world religion,” which was finally to be realized in Christianity. The Romans, as Hegel puts it, believed that “God is served for the sake of... a human purpose. The content does not, so to speak, begin with God.”^" The alienation from the whole, the lack of a sense of any concrete common purpose, however, left individuals free to develop their own contingent projects and subjectivity. The content of Roman religion was therefore “abstract inwardness,” the development of individual subjectivity as a sense of individual consciousness being the seat of normative authority, of each “selP’ being normatively independent of one s place in the social world of the empire.'*'
罗马人宗教为基督教奠定了基础
在黑格尔的全部讲演中，罗马人宗教自始至终被视为希腊人宗教和犹太教合适的继承者，尽管犹太教最初展现出自由宗教的特征，使得原有的划分难以维持。对罗马人宗教的分析，也依旧保留在他首次在《精神现象学》中系统阐述的总体观点里。它是一种实用的宗教：“适宜”或“有目的”。正如黑格尔最初对这个问题的看法，罗马人宗教在概念上是希腊人宗教的接替者；然而，当他在柏林时期重新审视罗马人宗教时，发现它是希腊人宗教和犹太教原理失败的统一体，不过在这个统一体中，构成这两种宗教的独特之处已消失不见。希腊诸神的优美被舍弃，转而认同一种近乎将平凡的神仅当作达成世俗目的手段的观点，而犹太人上帝的统一性被一种抽象之物取代，尽管世俗目的是可理解的，且是统一国家的目的。就罗马人的生活方式而言，神本质上只是他们支配和统治罗马世界的手段。罗马人本质上的务实特征，体现在让所有其他人臣服于他们的帝国，将不同民族的神纳入“万神殿”，但这实际上只是一种将所有神都隶属于唯一的“朱庇特·卡皮托利努斯”的大杂烩，就如同所有民族都服从罗马的意志一样。罗马人的宗教观念本身实际上毫无意义，无法构建出万神殿的统一性（因为它只是一个缺乏原理的混合体），但这却产生了创造“世界宗教”的可能性，而“世界宗教”最终注定由基督教实现。正如黑格尔所说，罗马人相信“上帝被用来为人类目的服务。可以说，这种满足并非源自上帝” 。然而，与整体的疏离、具体共同目的感的缺失，使个人能够自由地拓展自己带有偶然性的计划和主体性。于是，罗马宗教的内容具有“抽象的本质”，个人主体性被阐发为作为规范权威中心的个人意识感，被阐发为作为道德上不依赖自己在罗马帝国社会世界中地位的每一个“自我”感。
The universality of the empire and the development of “abstract inwardness,” however, made it necessary for some content to be given to the idea of a divine purpose. Roman religion was virtually no religion at all, but the de facto universality of the empire and the abstractness of its religion made it therefore all the easier for one of the many “national” religions of the Roman world to elevate itself to become the official religion of Rome (and therefore of the world). The result was what Hegel had called the “unhappy consciousness” with its accompanying “anguish” in the Phenomenology, in his 1831 lectures he reprieved that description, describing Roman religion as the “monstrous unhappiness and anguish that were to be the birthpangs for the religion of truth.That “unhappiness” created “the impulse, generated by the shattering of the particular folk-spirits and of the natural deities of the people, to know God in a universal form as spiritual.
然而，罗马帝国的普适性和对“抽象本质”的阐发，使某些内容必然被赋予神的目的思想。罗马人的宗教本质上算不上真正的宗教，实际上，罗马帝国的普适性及其宗教的抽象性，使得罗马世界众多“民族”宗教中的某一个很容易将自己提升为罗马官方宗教（进而升格为世界宗教）。结果便是黑格尔在《精神现象学》中所称的伴随着“痛苦”的“苦恼意识”；在1813年的讲演中，黑格尔没有采用这样的描述，而是把罗马宗教描述为“那应该成为宗教真理阵痛的怪异的苦恼和痛苦”。这种“苦恼”催生了一种“动力，想要以一种普世的形式把上帝理解成是精神性的东西，这种动力是因损害特殊的平民精神和民族的自然神而产生的” 。
However, for such a religion to succeed, it had to be a religion within which the alienated, now “subjective” members of the empire could find themselves at home, and that in turn implied that it had to be something that reflective subjects, thinking for themselves, could rationally affirm. This came on the scene as Christianity, in which the divine fully “reveals” itself. In Hegel’s understanding, that meant that what was thus “revealed” in Christian religious practice was that God was not a “beyond,” not something over and against the world, not an entity existing outside of the world, but the divine “principle” itself of which human self-conscious life was the “realization.” The “principle” which is implicit in nature - that the universe is so ordered so as necessarily to produce and sustain the appearance of self-conscious life on earth is the “divine,” and a human religious community in coming to understand that fully realizes in its figurative way that the divine is thereby “present” in them, that they are at one with the divine. As Hegel put it, for Christianity, “the community itself is the existing spirit, the spirit in its existence, God existing as community.The implicit awareness of such a unity of the divine and the human sets the stage for a “reconciliation” between God and man; in Christianity, the divine loses its strangeness and “otherness” to mankind, and it becomes clear that humanity’s highest interests and the divine itself are not at odds. In all other religions, divinity remains something strange and beyond human concerns, having, as it were, its own interests that do not necessarily coincide with those of humanity, or, when they do, coinciding with only a portion of humanity (as is the case with all “national” gods). However, since in Christianity the divine principle of the universe is that which leads to the appearance of self-conscious life on earth (the appearance, that is, of “spirit”), there can he no exclusion of anybody from the religious community. It is self-conscious human life as such, not the life of a particular nation, that embodies the divine principle. Christianity is thus the first true religion of “humanity” and not just of a particular community or tribe.
无论如何，对于这样一种承继而来的宗教，它必须成为罗马帝国那些已然疏离的“主观的”成员能够在其中找到自在之感的宗教，这转而意味着这种宗教必须蕴含某种内容，使具有反思能力的主体在独立思考时能够理性地予以断言。这就产生了一种类似基督教的情形，在基督教中神完全“显露”自身。按照黑格尔的理解，这意味着在基督徒宗教实践中被“启示”的内容是，上帝不是一个“彼岸”，不是某种凌驾于世界之上、与世界对立的东西，不是一个存在于世界之外的实体，而是关于作为“实现”的具有自我意识的人类生命这条神圣“原理”本身。自然中固有的“原理”——即宇宙被如此安排，以致必然产生和维持地球上具有自我意识生命的出现——就是“神”，而“一个人类宗教共同体开始理解这一点，这个人类宗教共同体以比喻的方式充分意识到神因此‘出现’在人们面前，充分意识到因此人们跟神和谐一致” 。正如黑格尔所说，就基督教而言，“共同体本身是存在着的精神，精神是共同体的存在，上帝作为共同体而存在” 。含蓄地意识到神和人的这种统一体，从而为上帝与人类的“调和”创造了条件；在基督教里，神丧失了对人类的陌生性和“他性”，人们明白了人的最高利益和神本身是和谐一致的。在所有其他宗教中，神对人类来说仍然是陌生的，超越人类关注的，也就是说，神自身的利益未必与人类的利益相一致，或者即便神和人的利益相一致，也仅仅是部分一致（就像所有“民族”的神的情况那样）。不过，由于基督教中宇宙的神圣原理意味着导致地球上具有自我意识的生命的出现（即“精神”的出现），所以没有人能够被排除在宗教共同体之外。是自觉的人类生活本身，而非某个特殊的民族生活，体现了神的原理。基督教因而是第一个真正的“人类”宗教，而不只是一种特殊共同体或部落的宗教。
This raised all the questions that were increasingly raised against Hegel’s philosophy - in particular, that it was not really a Christian philosophy at all. Hegel vehemently defended his conviction (which was surely also genuine) that this was not only a variety of Christian thought, it was itself Christianity pure and simple, Christianity “in its truth.” In making that claim, Hegel was also fully aware of how his views differed from what was then being taught as orthodox Christianity. Against the criticisms, for example, that charged him with failure to match his views with scripture, Hegel simply replied that such criticisms rested on indefensible conceptions of what it means to read a text, arguing that doctrines require interpretation and that the text of the Bible is not a set of self-evident statements of Christian faith. As Hegel put it in his lectures, “It helps us not at all to say that one’s thoughts are based on the Bible,” since “just as soon as religion is no longer simply the reading and repetition of passages, as soon as what is called explanation or interpretation begins, as soon as an attempt is made by inference and exegesis to find out the meaning of the words in the Bible, then we embark upon the process of reasoning, reflection, thinking, and the question then becomes how we should exercise this process of thinking, and whether our thinking is correct or not.” Hegel went on to note that “the interpretation of the Bible exhibits its content, however, in the form of a particular age; the form of a thousand years ago was wholly different from that of today.”^^ good portion of Hegel’s lectures, therefore, had to do with his always-controversial reinterpretations of traditional Christian doctrine in light of his idealist conception of religion. This required him, of course, to see many Christian doctrines, such as that of “creation” and of God’s “begetting a son,” as only metaphors for the “deeper” truths about Geist contained within them.
这就引发了所有逐渐出现的与黑格尔哲学对立的问题——特别是，这就引发了关于黑格尔哲学是否根本不是一种基督教哲学的问题。黑格尔竭力为自己的信念辩护（这同样也是事实）：这不仅仅是一种基督教思想，它本身就是纯粹而简单的基督教，是基督教“的真理” 。在提出这种主张时，黑格尔也充分意识到他的观点与当时正在讲授的正统基督教思想有多么不同。例如，针对那些指责他的观点与基督教教义不相符的批评，黑格尔简单回应说，这样的批评依赖于解读文本含义这种站不住脚的概念，他还论证说有些学说需要阐释，而《圣经》这个文本并非一套对基督教信仰不证自明的陈述。正如黑格尔在讲演中指出的，“这一点根本无助于我们说一个人的想法奠基于《圣经》，既然，‘恰恰宗教一旦不再简单地是对段落的解读和复述，所谓的解释或阐释一旦着手进行，一旦借助推断和诠释来试图弄清《圣经》中话语的意义，那么我们就要着手进行推理、反思和思考的过程；之后的问题就变成了我们应该如何进行这个思考过程，就变成了确定我们的思考是正确的还是不正确的’” 。黑格尔继续强调说，“不过，对《圣经》的阐释，以特定时代的形式展示了它的内容；十年前的形式截然不同于当今的形式” ，所以，黑格尔讲演中的精彩部分，与他按照自己的唯心主义宗教观念，总是充满争议地对传统基督教教义的重新诠释有关。当然，这就要求他把基督教的许多教义，诸如“创世”和上帝“得有一子”这样的教义——仅仅看作是包含在基督教教义中精神的“深层”真理的比喻。
Jesus and Christianity
Hegel also realized that he had to spell out what he took to be the doctrine of Jesus as mediator and savior and to articulate what was entailed in such a conception of God and in the Christian doctrine of the humanity and divinity of Jesus of Nazareth. Regarded merely as a person, Hegel argued, Jesus can only be seen as a great teacher (like Socrates) and a martyr to the truth. As a teacher, Jesus “lives only for the truth, only for its proclamation; his activity consists solely in completing the higher consciousness of humanity.”"^* By being so focused on the proclamation of the “truth,” Jesus sets aside all his normal interests and behaves “as a prophet,” through which “God speaks”; Jesus is “God’s working in a human being, so that the divine presence is essentially identical with this human being,” but “not as something suprahuman.””^’
耶稣和基督教
黑格尔同样意识到，他必须详细说明他所认为的作为中保和救世主的耶稣的教义，并必须系统阐述在上帝这样一个概念和关于拿撒勒人耶稣的人性与神性的基督教教义中需要些什么。黑格尔坚称，如果耶稣仅仅被看作一个人，那么耶稣只能被看成是（像苏格拉底一样的）一名伟大的老师和真理的殉道者。作为一位老师，耶稣“只是为真理而活着，只是为宣传真理而活着；他的行为唯独在于使人类更高的意识臻于完美” 。凭借专注于“真理”的宣传，耶稣完全抛开自己正常的兴趣，一举一动“宛如一位先知”，上帝通过“先知”来进行言说；耶稣象征“上帝在为人类劳作，所以神在场本质上与人类完全一样” ，而“不是作为某种超人的东西” 。
But that is only the doctrine of Jesus as human. It is only in his death that the truly religious element of Jesus’ life comes to its realization. In his death, it becomes clear that he was indeed human; to his followers, he has shown the fragility and contingency of all that is finite and limited and thus the fragility of all that we hold most dear and valuable; and in his attachment to the proclaimed truth, he showed that what was at stake was not some particular teaching, not even about morality or conscience (as important as such teaching are to Christianity), but “the infinite relationship to God, to the present God, the certainty of the kingdom of God.”*** This only comes about in the formation of the Christian community giving his death a “spiritual interpretation” to the effect that “the human, the finite, the fragile, the weak, the negative are themselves a moment of the divine, that they are within God himself . . . the meaning attached to death is through death the human element is stripped away and the divine glory comes into view once more.”'^'’ Hegel cited John 16:13 - “He will guide you into all truth” - and interpreted it to mean, “only that into which spirit will lead you will be the truth.”™ Likewise, Hegel interpreted the idea that Christ died for all as “not a single act but the eternal divine history: it is a moment in the nature of God himself; it has taken place in God himself.”^' What is revealed, that is, is the implicitly divine structure of rational selfconscious life, within which individuals necessarily die and new ones are born; and the fact that this is part of a divine “history” of the world. not a contingent accident. Christ’s death thus reveals the nature of God as (as Hegel put it in 1831) the “course of life that consists in being the universal that has being in and for itself, yet in so doing, being identical with itself: to be this syllogism,” to be the unity of the “universal” and the “individual.Jesus is divine in that his death reveals the divinity in him and, implicitly, in all. Jesus is thus more than merely a prophet; by virtue of his devotion to the “truth” and his prompting the community to interpret his death in a spiritual way, he embodied and “revealed” the divine structure of the world expressing itself in himself and in the interpretation given to his death by his followers.
然而，这仅仅是作为人的耶稣的教义。正是仅仅由于耶稣的死，耶稣生活中的真正宗教成分才最终得以实现。由于他的死，显然表明他确实是人；在他的追随者们看来，他身上展现出一切有限和受限制的东西的脆弱性和偶然性，因此也展现出一切被我们认为是最珍贵和最有价值的东西的脆弱性；由于对他所宣传的真理的忠诚，他阐明成问题的不是一些特殊的教义，甚至也不是关于道德或良心的东西（尽管这样的教义对基督教来说同样重要），而成问题的是“与上帝的无限关系，与现在的上帝的无限关系，与上帝王国的确定性的无限关系” 。赋予上帝的死一种“精神上的诠释”，这只是在基督教共同体形态中才会产生，大体意思是：“人类、有限、脆弱、软弱、消极这些东西本身就构成神的环节；这些东西存在于上帝自身中……与死亡连在一起的意义就是通过死亡来剥夺人类因素，而神的荣耀就会再一次出现。” 黑格尔引用《约翰福音》第16章第13句话中的一部分——“他要引导你们明白一切的真理” ——并把它解释成意味着“只有精神将引导你明白的东西才是真理” 。同样地，黑格尔把耶稣为全人类而死这个想法解释成“不只是一个单独的行为而是永恒的神的历史：它构成上帝本身本质的一个环节；它发生在上帝本身” 。也就是说，黑格尔以上的论述所揭示的是理性的自觉生命的潜在的神的结构，在理性的自觉生命领域个人必然会死亡而新人必然会诞生；事实上这是世界中神的“历史”的一部分，绝非偶然事件。耶稣之死因此揭示了上帝的本质是（像黑格尔1831年指出的）“生命过程”，在于那具有自在自为存在的共相的存在，然而在这样解释过程中黑格尔指出“生命过程”在于就是它自身：成为这样的“推论”，成为“普遍”与“个体”的统一 。耶稣是神，因为他的死显露他本身的神性并且潜在地显露一切事物的神性。耶稣因而不只是先知；由于他为“真理”而献身和他促使宗教共同体以精神的方式来解释他的死，他体现并“显露”世界的神圣结构，这样的结构通过他自身得以表达，通过他的追随者对他的死赋予的阐释得以表达。
What is revealed in Jesus’ life is the everlastingness of life itself, and reconciliation is experienced when this is taken as both necessary and good. Hegel explicitly ruled out personal immortality as part of this doctrine. The “wish to live eternally,” he told his audience in 1827, “is only a childlike representation. Human being as a single living thing, its singular life, its natural life, must die. . . . The fact of the matter is that humanity is immortal only through cognitive knowledge, for only in the activity of thinking is its soul pure and free rather than mortal and animallike.”” The Christian community experiences this truth expressively as the communion of fellow worshippers who regard the divine (everlasting rational self-conscious life) as what is of absolute value and importance for them and who see themselves therefore mirrored in the structure of divinity and at one with it.
耶稣的生命显露的是生命本身的永恒，而人们在把这件事看作必要的和有益的时候就体验到了神与人的调和。黑格尔显然没有把个人的不朽算作这个学说的一部分。黑格尔1827年告诉听众，这个“想要永世长存的愿望只不过是一种幼稚的表述。人作为单个的生物，其独特的生命，其自然的生命，都有一死……这个问题事实上意味着人类只有通过认识知识才能做到不朽，因为只有在思考活动中人类灵魂才是纯洁的和自由的而非有死的和动物般的” 。基督教共同体把体验到的这个事实表述成是跟作为人的敬神者之间的沟通，敬神者把神（永恒的理性的自觉的生命）看作是对他们绝对有价值的和十分重要的，因此敬神者将人类看作反映在神性的结构中且与神性相一致。
In Jesus’ death, Hegel said, we encounter the “most frightful of all thoughts,” that “god is dead,” that everything we hold to be of value is gone or will pass away, so that a “despair as to any higher truth sets in. That thought is, however, quickly put to rest by the “resurrection,” that God rises again to life, that “God maintains Himself in death, so that this process is rather a putting to death of death, a resurrection into life.”” Geist, that is, eternally renews itself, although the individual agents who make it up are born and die. It is the representational intuition of this in the Christian community, which institutionalizes itself in a church with a doctrine, that provides the reconciliation of the human and the divine. Christian doctrines like that of the “holy communion” mean therefore that the “conscious presence of God, of unity with God ... the feeling of God’s immediate presence within the subject” come to pass in those rites and rituals.(Hegel interestingly rejects the interpretation of communion as a merely symbolic act of remem- brance; in Christian communion, he thought, the believer really is in that ritual moment at one with the divine order of the world; the “body” and “blood” of Christ that is consumed is the “spirit of the religious community” itself, since Christ’s physical body has been “spiritualized” in the community of faith.) But Hegel makes it clear that what is at stake is the everlastingness of life itself and the faith that life - and most importantly self-conscious rational life - is not some cosmic accident but intrinsic to the structure of the universe itself.
黑格尔说，由于耶稣之死，我们遭遇了“所有想法中最恐怖的想法”，这就是“上帝死了”，一切被我们认为是有价值的东西都一去不复返了或烟消云散了，所以一种“关于更高真理的绝望”就此来临了。不过这个想法很快因“耶稣复活”而被打断，上帝复又获得生命，“上帝因死亡而维持自己的存在，所以这个过程恰恰是抛却致死，恰恰是生命的复活” ，也就是说，精神永远使自己获得新生，尽管作为个体的行动者有生有死。是基督教共同体中通过宗教教义使自己制度化的“表象式的”直觉，使人与神之间形成了调和。因此，和“神圣沟通”教义一样，基督教教义意味着的是，“上帝的自觉在场，上帝统一体的自觉在场……关于上帝在主体领域的直接在场的感觉”，所有这一切都出现在这些礼拜和仪式中。（非常有趣的是，黑格尔拒绝把沟通诠释成是一种纯粹象征的回忆行为；他认为，在基督教沟通过程中，善男信女真正地置身于宗教仪式环节中且跟世界的神圣秩序相一致；基督那被消耗的“躯体”和“鲜血”象征着“宗教共同体”自身的“精神”，因为基督的躯体已经在信仰的共同体中被“精神化”了。）可是黑格尔清楚地阐述道，成问题的是生命本身和信仰的永恒，这里的信仰指的是生命——最重要的是自觉的理性生命——不是宇宙中的某种偶然事件，而是世界本身结构所固有的东西。
Christian religion thus was “universal.” It was not the national religion of any one “people” or any culture but was instead the religion of humanity, the mode by which humanity could come to understand itself as it truly was; and it was also thereby the religion of realized freedom. The Christian God, interpreted as Hegel did, was not an entity outside of humanity giving it commands but was the basic principle of “subjectivity,” of rational self-conscious life itself, which although already discernible in outline in nature, comes to a full awareness of its own selfdetermining essence in Christian religion. This was a religious attitude, so Hegel thought, because it expressed itself in a reverential attitude toward life and divinity in general; we could be “thankful” that we existed, we could realize that our own particular lives were only part of the divine course of life, that we were dependent on that divine course of life for our own existence and for the realization of our highest interests; we could rise above our own finite interests and elevate ourselves to a reconciling unity with the divine, understanding our own deaths as a necessary part of the divine course of life that was itself intrinsically good. What is divine is not humanity as such but the “principle” of self-determining “spirit” which humanity brings to full consciousness about itself, and the Christian religious community is thus the form by which God Himself first becomes fully conscious of His nature - that God fully reveals Himself by virtue of our coming to a reflectively self-conscious understanding of the divine nature of the universe. In light of this conception, Hegel concluded, there need be no cleavage between the acceptance of a Christian outlook and a fully modernist sensibility. Christianity was thus indeed the only fully modern religion and the only one compatible with the kind of free institutions necessary for modern life to work. Faith in God was faith in the everlastingness of life (though not of one’s own individual life) and the goodness of being, in the conviction that what was absolutely good in life was written into the structure of things and that we, humanity as a whole, were collectively capable of gradual realizations of that good and of substantial realizations in our own lives.
因而基督教是“普世的”。它不是任何一个“民族”或任何文化的宗教，反倒是人类的宗教，凭借基督教这种方式人类能够逐渐认清自身的真面目；因此它同时是实现了的自由的宗教。正如黑格尔阐释的，基督教上帝不是在人类之外向人类发号施令的实体，而是“主体性”的基本原理，而是理性的自觉生命本身的基本原理，人类虽然本质上总是可以辨别出上帝的轮廓，但是逐渐充分意识到人类自己的有自决能力的基督教本质。因此黑格尔认为，这是一种宗教的态度，因为一般说来它是以对生命和神性的虔敬的态度表达自己的；我们可以因我们的生存而“感激涕零”，我们可以认识到我们自己的特殊生命只构成生命的神圣过程的一部分，我们可以认识到我们自己的生存和我们最高利益的实现依赖于生命的神圣过程；我们可以超越自己有限的利益，可以把我们自己提升到与神的和谐统一体的水平，可以把我们自己的死亡理解成是自身本质上作为善的生命的神圣过程的一个必要组成部分。神圣的东西不是人类自身，而是有自决能力的、人类借以充分意识到自身的“精神”的“原理”，基督教共同体因此是上帝自身借以最初充分意识到自己的本质的形式，——这就意味着上帝凭借我们达到反思式地自觉理解宇宙的神圣本质来充分地显露自身。黑格尔断言，根据这个概念，在对基督教观点的赞同与完全现代主义的感觉力之间未必存有裂痕。基督教因此确实是唯一完全现代的宗教，是唯一与对现代生活正常进行所必需的那种自由制度相一致的宗教。信仰上帝就是相信生命的永恒（尽管不是相信一个人自己的个体生命的永恒）和善的存在，就是坚信生活中的绝对的善被写入事物的结构，就是坚信我们人类作为整体应该能够同心协力地逐渐把我们自己生活中的善和重要的需要实现的东西变为现实。
In a remark oddly prescient in ways that Hegel could not have understood, he thus assured his readers in the Encyclopedia and the audiences at his lectures on the “philosophy of nature” that it was not possible, for example, for comets to strike the earth because the solar system is a system, and the planets in the system “protect themselves against them, i.e., that they function as necessary organic moments of the system and as such must preserve themselves.”^* Dismissing the notion that it is merely “improbable” that comets might devastatingly strike the earth because of the vastness of space, Hegel assured his audience that comets “do not come as alien visitors but are generated in the solar system, which fixes their orbits; since the other bodies in the solar system are equally necessary moments, these therefore preserve their independence in face of the comets.”” Life itself, Hegel thought, was so important to the structure of things that it was not possible that it too was a finite, fragile thing which might pass away or be wiped out in some cataclysmic event.
针对一篇在某些方面使人极难猜透的甚至就连黑格尔都不可能理解的评论，黑格尔因此向他的《哲学科学全书》读者和他关于“自然哲学”讲演的听众断言，举例来说，彗星所以不可能撞击地球是因为太阳系是一个系统，该系统内的行星“保护自己免受彗星的撞击，也即行星作为太阳系中的必需的有机环节而发挥作用，行星本身必须保护自己” 。在不再考虑以下这个绝对“不可能的”想法（即彗星由于体积的巨大而可能毁灭性地撞击地球）之后，黑格尔深信不疑地对听众说，彗星“不是一位不速之客而是由太阳系产生的，这就固定了它们的轨道；因为太阳系中其他天体同样是必需的环节，这些天体在彗星面前因此保持着自己的独立性” 。黑格尔认为，生命本身对事物的结构如此重要，以至于生命不可能是一种过于有限的非常脆弱的东西，以至于生命不可能因大灾变事件而消失或被摧毁。
The Philosophy of Art
Art as “Idea"
Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics also counted as one of his most successful and best attended series, and it was clearly a subject as near and dear to him as anything else. It was also a matter about which he probably developed more new ideas during his Berlin period than about any other subject.
艺术哲学
作为“观念”的艺术
黑格尔关于美学的讲演同样被视为他最成功、最受欢迎的系列讲演之一，而美学讲演显然是黑格尔最为青睐和珍视的主题。相较于其他主题的内容，美学讲演还是关于他在柏林期间可能阐发出新观点的内容。
Art is one of the forms of “absolute spirit,” the practices by which humanity collectively reflects on its “highest interests.” Although art can be used to satisfy other ends, such as entertainment, amusement, and relaxation, its genuine significance has to do with the way in which it provides such reflection on our highest interests. The “universal need for art,” as Hegel put it, was not just to have some relaxation at the end of a tiring day, although art also sometimes serves that need; the specific need for something that was more than entertainment was man’s “rational need to lift the inner and outer world into his spiritual conscious- ness as an object in which he cognizes again his own self.”^* Art therefore cannot be merely a craft, the result of possessing certain skills that can be put to use to satisfy certain pre-given ends (like the need for diversion or amusement). In itself, it must set it own ends, and, like the other forms of absolute spirit, fulfill its vocation, in Hegel’s words, of “bringing to our minds and expressing the divine, the deepest interests of mankind and the most comprehensive truths of spirit.
艺术是“绝对精神”的诸多形式之一，是人类借以对自己的“最高利益”进行集体反思的实践。艺术能被人用来满足其他目的，诸如娱乐、消遣、放松之类，但是艺术真正的重要意义与它为我们提供对最高利益反思的方式相关。正如黑格尔指出的，“对艺术的普遍需求”不只是在令人疲惫的一天结束后的放松身心，尽管艺术有时也会满足这样的需求；对某种不止是娱乐的东西的特殊需求，就是人类必须合理地“使精神和外部世界变成自己作为对象的精神意识，这样一来人类就能复又认识人类自己的自我” 。因此，艺术不可能只是工艺，不可能只是拥有某些技巧的结果，这些技巧能够被用于满足某些预先给定的目的（比如对娱乐或消遣的需要）。本质上，艺术必须设定自己的目的，并且，用黑格尔的话说，像绝对精神的其他形式一样，艺术要去完成的使命，就是“开启我们的心灵，就是表达神圣的心灵深处的人类利益和包罗无遗的精神真理” 。
Art did that, Hegel argued, by standing, as it were, midway between “immediate sensuousness and ideal thought” and thereby giving us an exhibition of the “Idea” in sensuous form.“ The “Idea” in this sense is the normative “whole” in terms of which we situate ourselves, and in art (as in religion and philosophy), we get a reflection of where we stand in relation to that normative “whole.” The means by which art accomplishes this is the shaping and configuring of sensuous elements (of stone, clay, oil on canvas, sounds and tones, words, and so on) into forms that permit such an “Idea” to be reflectively grasped by those who perceive the artworks and whose imaginations are thereby stimulated into thinking about that “whole.” When a work of art is, moreover, fully successful in accomplishing this aim, it offers up the (virtually untranslatable) ‘’'’sinnliche Scheinen der Idee,’’' the “sensuously seeming-to-be of the Idea,” and it is thereby also beautiful.'’^ (Nature particularly, living nature - can also be beautiful but only in a derivative way; its beauty lies in our perceiving the “Idea” at work in it.)
黑格尔认为，艺术通过在“直接的感性与理想的想法”之间采取中庸之道来完成自身使命，以感性形式为我们呈现“观念”。这里的“观念”是我们用以定位自身的规范化“整体”。在艺术中（如同在宗教和哲学里），我们反思自身所处位置与这一规范化“整体”的关系。艺术达成此任务的方式，是将（石头、黏土、帆布上的颜料、声音与语调、文字等）感性元素塑造并形成特定形式，使这些形式能让某些人通过感知艺术品，以反思的方式把握“观念”，进而激发他们的想象，促使其思考“整体”。不仅如此，当一件艺术品完美达成这一目标时，它会呈现出（实际上难以翻译的）“sinnliche Schein der Idee”，即“感觉上似乎是观念”，此时它亦是美的。（自然——尤其是充满生机的自然——同样是美的，但只是以一种派生的方式；自然之美源于我们感知到自然中起作用的“观念”。）
In Hegel’s terminology, therefore, the content of art is the “Idea,” and the form of a work of art is the specific way in which the sensuous material is shaped and configured.“ (The form of sculpture is thus, for example, shaped stone.) In subscribing to such a conception of art, Hegel argued, one thereby also implicitly commits oneself to a norm having to do with what it would mean for a work of art to be totally successful: It would present us with (what Hegel called) the “Ideal,” namely, when the work would not only be “beautiful,” but the particular “gestalt” or configuration of sensuous materials shaped by the artist would be perfectly adequate to the conception of the normative whole that gives it its meaning - when, that is, “form” and “content” would fully mesh and be appropriate to each other, and the work would present us with a full, complete, reflective understanding of the normative whole, the “Idea.” Art as a social practice therefore has a teleology inherent to it, which has to do with whether it can successfully achieve the “Ideal.”
所以，用黑格尔的术语来讲，艺术的内容是“观念”，而艺术品的形式是塑造和构造感觉材料的一种特殊方式。（例如，雕塑品的形式就是被塑造成特定形状的石头。）黑格尔坚信，认同这样的艺术概念，就会含蓄地承认遵循一种与艺术品圆满成功通常所指相关的规范：艺术当然会向我们呈现（黑格尔所称的）“理想”，即当艺术作品不仅“优美”，而且艺术家所塑造的特殊“格式塔”或感觉材料的外形与赋予作品意义的规范化整体概念极为契合——也就是说，当“形式”与“内容”完全协调、彼此适配时，艺术品自然会向我们呈现对规范化整体或“观念”的充分、完美且具反思性的理解。艺术作为一种社会实践，自身具有目的论意义，这与它能否成功达成“理想”相关。
The Problem of Modern Art
As always, Hegel was especially concerned with the status of modern art and what role art could play in modern life. Hegel could not shake his conviction that somehow the Greeks had raised art to its highest level of achievement, to the “Ideal,” and that Greek sculpture, tragedy, poetry, and comedy were superior to what the moderns could produce; but he was as equally convinced that it nonetheless would be hopeless and senseless for moderns to attempt to revivify Greek art. The question then for Hegel was what role art would play in modern life that only art as art could play.
现代艺术问题
黑格尔一如既往地特别关注现代艺术的地位，以及艺术在现代生活中所能扮演的角色。他或许坚信，从某种程度上说，希腊人早已将艺术成就提升到最高水平，使其达到“理想”层面，希腊人的雕塑、悲剧、诗歌和喜剧超越了现代人所能创作的艺术作品；但他同样确信，现代人试图复兴希腊艺术，终究是徒劳且无意义的。对黑格尔而言，问题在于艺术在现代生活中应扮演何种独一无二的角色。
