第11章 黑格尔的《法哲学原理》：自由、历史和现代欧洲国家(2)
What the “highest good” as the union of morality (or virtue) and personal satisfaction reveals is that its rational articulation requires more than “morality.” In undertaking a commitment to a conception of “the good” as the unity of the “universal and the particular” (as the integration of particular aspirations with what is required by “universal ’ reason), the agent finds himself committed to something like a conception of a pattern of action for which no determinate “rule” can be given. General rules are appropriate to the “universal”; but there are no rules or principles for the “particular.” Hegel thus brought to bear his longstanding admiration for Aristotle in his criticism of Kant; just as Aristotle had argued that “practical wisdom” was, in Aristotle’s phrase, “concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience,” Hegel argued that an agent acting on the basis of “the good” and for the sake of duty would be committed to a conception of moral judgment that relates a “universal” principle to a “particular” case without there being any rule for how such judgments make that relation.® And this, Hegel argues, is exactly what the intrinsically modern appeal to conscience is supposed to do. Conscience is always the conscience of a particular individual and is the way in which that agent judges whether the reasons behind his actions are indeed morally satisfactory, whether they are indeed the kind of reasons that can be shared by all agents.
作为道德（或美德）与个人满足的统一的“至善”揭示的是对它合理的系统阐述还需要比“道德”更多的东西。在试图作出关于作为“共相与殊相”（作为把特殊抱负与被“共相”理性所要求的东西相整合）的统一的“善”概念的承诺时，行动者发觉自己承诺某种像行动模式概念一样的东西而且不可能赋予这概念确定的“规则”。一般规则适合于“共相”；但是“殊相”是不存在规则或原则的。黑格尔因此开始在他对于康德的批评中写出了自己长期以来对亚里士多德的钦佩之情；正像亚里士多德已论证道“实践智慧”（用亚里士多德的短语说）“不仅关注为经验所熟悉的共相而且还关注为经验所熟悉的殊相”一样，黑格尔也坚称一个建立在“善”的基础上和出于责任的目的而做事的行动者总是会承诺一个道德判断的概念，道德判断使得一条“普遍的”原理跟一个“特殊的”案例联系起来，而对于这样的判断如何形成这种关联则没有任何规则可言。而且黑格尔论证道，这恰恰是真正的现代人对良心的诉求被说成要去做的东西。良心总是一个具体的个人的良心，并意味着以特定方式某个行动者判断他行动背后的理由是否确实是符合道德的，它们是否确实是一种能为所有行动者共享的理由。
Because modern “morality” necessarily commits us to a conception of the priority of conscience as a way of preventing the tensions between “right” and “welfare” from bringing down the moral enterprise altogether, it also commits itself to something more than an appeal to conscience, since the appeal to conscience generates its own tensions. On the one hand, as Hegel puts it, “true conscience is the disposition to will what is good in and for itself; it therefore has fixed principles”; but since it is the conscience of an individual, it also reflects his own personal valuations of things.’ The appeal to conscience, therefore, can just as well license acts that are otherwise forbidden by the rest of our practical commitments as it can lead to individuals doing the right thing, and it can also promote the most brazen forms of self-deception and hypocrisy. Nor could one eliminate those tensions within the modern appeal to conscience by eliminating the appeal to conscience altogether. Modern agents must think of themselves as practically committed to making judgments based on their own conscience; eliminating the ap- peal to conscience simply cannot be an option for “we moderns,” for “conscience,” Hegel says, “is a sanctuary which it would be a sacrilege to violate.”'"
因为现代“道德”必然使我们赞同良心优先的观念作为一种防止“权利”与“安康”之间的张力完全毁掉道德事业的方式，所以现代“道德”也赞同比对良心的诉求更多的某种东西，这是因为对良心的诉求产生了它自己的张力。一方面，如黑格尔所言，“真良心是希求自在自为的善的东西的心境；所以它具有固定的原则”；但是因为它是个人的良心，它也就反映了他自己关于事物的个人愿望。因此，对于良心的诉求，只能致使个人做正事，以及只能够确保我们不去做出被自己的其他实践承诺所禁做的举动，而且对良心的诉求还能够使人摆脱自欺欺人和伪善的最无耻的形式。一个人借彻底消除对良心的诉求，也并不可能消除现代人对良心的诉求的那些内在张力。作为现代人的行动者必须把自己看作是实践上赞同作出基于他们自己的良心的判断；消除对良心的诉求，根本不能成为“我们现代人”的一种选择，因为“良心成了一个总是作为悖理逆天行为的避难所”，黑格尔如是说。
To the extent that a “moral” agent can successfully make such appeals to conscience, he must instead learn to orient himself in light of some idealized community of like-minded agents, in terms of the ways in which other “like-minded” agents would also ideally judge. But that means that the appeal to conscience is both necessary for the standpoint of “Morality” and also involves, at first apparently paradoxically, an appeal to something that cannot itself be contained within the standpoint of “Morality.” The practical judgments required by “conscience” cannot consist in any straightforward application of general principles to particular cases; there can be no universal rule for applying the universal rule to particular cases. Such conscience-guided practical judgments instead require that we be trained into practices that are themselves sustained by public institutions so that in being so trained into those practices and in internalizing the way of life embodied in them, we thereby acquire a certain type of skill, a character, a virtue^ a way of orienting ourselves in social space, a kind of practice-oriented ethical “know-how,” that, as Hegel characterized it in his lectures, amounts to a kind of “ethical virtuosity.”" This sphere of practices and institutions within which we learn to orient ourselves, in which we acquire such “ethical virtuosity,” is modern SittHchkeit, “ethical life,” the basic category of Hegel’s mature ethical and political thought. In it he thought he had found something deep and, to some extent, surprising about the modern world.
在一个“道德的”行动者能够成功地作出这样的良心诉求程度上，他反倒必须学会根据由具有类似心性的行动者组成的某种理想化的共同体、根据其他“具有类似心性的行动者”通常也理想地借以作出判断的方式来引导自己安身立命。但是，这就意味着对良心的诉求，既是对“道德”的观点是必要的，也牵涉到对某种自身不能被包含在“道德”观点中的东西的诉求，这样的说法起先显然是悖论式的。“良心”要求的实践判断不可能在于把一般原理直接应用于具体个案；不可能存在着把普世规则应用于特殊个案的普世规则。这样的良心引导下的实践判断转而要求我们应该被训练进入由公共机构所维持的实践，所以在被经过这样的训练之后进入这些实践且把这些实践体现的生活方式内在化过程中，我们由此能够获得一种确定的技能，一种品格，一种美德，一种社会领域自我引导的方式，一种实践引导的伦理的“认知方式”，这就等同于一种“伦理上的造诣”，像黑格尔在讲演中对其特征所描述的一样。这种实践和机构的领域（在其中我们学会引导自己，我们获得这样的“伦理上的造诣”）反映着现代人的Sittlichkeit或“伦理生活”这一黑格尔成熟的伦理和政治思想的基本范畴。在这个领域中，黑格尔自认为找到了关于现代世界的某种深层次的且在某种程度上使人惊奇的东西。
If we are to have any concrete first principles for moral reasoning that specify what is ultimately good and best for us, we must grasp them not as specifications of some “master rule” but as elements of a social practice, ways in which we prereflectively learn to orient and move ourselves around in the social world. Such prereflective selfsituating gives us an implicit grasp of our sense of who we are, our “project” for our lives, without our having first chosen, explicitly or implicitly, that project; and the “ethical life,” SittUchkeit, within which we orient ourselves must then be capable of sustaining allegiance to itself when put under the glare of reflection on its rationality, which for “we moderns” means that it must be capable of being understood also as a realization of freedom. “Moral” individuals exercising their “ab- stract rights” thus require a “location” in these kinds of social practices since these “ethical” practices embody within themselves determinate conceptions of what is “ultimately best,” namely, as the way in which individuals exercise their rights, manage their moral obligations, and come to be “at home” in the social world by virtue of acquiring a kind of “ethical virtuosity” in being brought up and socialized in these practices.
假如我们必须拥有关于道德推理的任何具体首要原理，且这些原理能详细说明什么最终对我们而言是善与至善的话，那么，我们绝不能将它们理解为对某种“主导规则”的阐释，而应将其视作社会实践的要素，视作我们借以通过反思学会在人世中自我定位与激励自己的方式的因素。这种前反思的自我定位，让我们对自身身份的观念有了模糊的领会，对我们尚未明确或含蓄选择的生活“计划”也有了模糊的领会。对于“我们现代人”来说，这种我们必须在其中自我定向的“伦理生活”（Sittlichkeit），在被赋予对其合理性的反思时，必须有能力保持对自身的忠诚，这意味着“伦理生活”必须同时能被理解为自由的实现。“道德的”个体行使自身“抽象权利”，需要在这类社会实践中占据“一席之地”，因为这些自我体现的“伦理”实践，以这样一种方式确定了关于什么是“最终的最好的”东西的概念：个体通过在这些实践中获得一种经过培养与社会化的“伦理造诣”，从而行使自身权利，履行自身道德义务，开始在社会世界中“如鱼得水”。
There are three such institutionalizations of Sittlichkeit in the modern world, each serving to give individuals a concrete specification of this ultimate good (the union of “morality” and satisfaction) about whose more specific realization they can then rationally deliberate. These are the modern family, civil society, and the constitutionalist state. Together they form a social “whole” in terms of which individuals orient themselves and which reconciles them to modern social life, gives them good grounds for believing that modern life really is, although imperfect and finite, nonetheless for the best.
在现代世界，存在三种这样的伦理制度，每一种都为个体提供了关于终极善（“道德”与满足的统一）的具体阐述，个体随后能够对这种终极善的较为特殊的实现进行合理思考。这三种制度即现代家庭、市民社会和立宪主义国家。它们共同构成一个社会“整体”，个体依据这个“整体”进行自我定向，该“整体”协调个体与现代社会生活的关系，让个体有充分理由相信，尽管现代生活并不完美且存在局限，但确实仍是最理想的社会形态。
In Hegel’s view, in the modern family, founded on the mutual free choice of the husband and wife, agents discover a good - romantic love (that just this other person is the right one for me), and the ideal of family life as a refuge from civil society - which in turn also embodies certain obligations (such as; raising children to be free, independent adults; and mutual respect in the marriage). Rational reflection, so Hegel thought, would show that the individuals in such a modern family are able to experience these obligations not as imposed on them from outside of themselves (such as by “mere” social convention) but as embodying norms that sustain a full, mutual recognition without which freedom could not be possible. Modern families give modern individuals a common project; the family is not a contractual collection of private wills but is a unity on its own possessing a common purpose.
在黑格尔看来，在现代家庭中，基于夫妻双方的自由选择，个体能发现一种美好的状态——浪漫主义的爱情（即认定对方就是与自己般配的那个人），以及将家庭生活视为市民社会庇护所的理想。这反过来也体现了某些义务（例如：将孩子培养成自由、独立的成年人；在婚姻生活中相互尊重、关爱）。所以黑格尔认为，理性反思会表明，在这样的现代家庭中，个体所体验到的这些义务并非外部强加（比如“纯粹的”社会习俗之类），而是具体体现了某些规范，这些规范维持着一种全面的相互认知，没有这些规范，自由便无从谈起。现代家庭为现代个体提供了一个共同的规划；家庭并非私人意愿的契约式集合，而是基于共同目的的联合。
Nonetheless, although Hegel explicitly thought of his conception of the family as nonpatriarchal and even somewhat egalitarian in its dynamic, he also strongly believed that the biological differences between the sexes entailed complementary psychological differences that made a crucial difference in the way the family was to be run.'^ Women, Hegel thought, simply were not equipped by nature for the higher sciences, for philosophy and certain artistic productions which require a universal element,” for “their actions are not based on the demands of universality but on contingent inclination and opinion.”'^ Thus, although a man has “his actual substantial life in the state, in Wissenschaft, etc., and otherwise in work and struggle with the external world and himself,” a woman “has her substantial vocation in the family, and her ethical disposition consists in this piety.”''^ Women’s very “estate” was to be “housewife” and mother, and the man finds in the family a “peaceful intuition of this unity and an emotive and subjective ethical life” that he would otherwise not be able to find in the harsh male world of careers and competition.'^
不过，黑格尔虽显然将自己的家庭观念视为非家长制的，甚至带有一定平等主义色彩且充满活力，但他坚信，性别间的生理差异需要心理差异作为补充，这种心理差异在维系家庭方面至关重要。黑格尔认为，女性天生不适合“研究高深的科学、哲学以及从事某些艺术创作，因为这些都需要一种普遍的原理”，原因是“她们的行为并非基于普遍性的要求，而是基于偶然的倾向与意见”。因此，“男性在国家、科学等领域拥有其真实的物质生活，或者说男性在对外界以及对自我的工作与奋斗中拥有其真实的物质生活”，而女性“在家庭中有其本质使命，其伦理意向在于虔诚”。女性特有的“角色”注定使她们成为“家庭主妇”和母亲，男性则在家庭中寻得“对这种统一的宁静直觉与情感上的主观伦理生活”，而这种感受通常是他们在其他职业及竞争激烈的男性世界中难以寻觅到的。
Given that he held those views, it cannot be surprising that quite a few of the women in Hegel’s circle of friends complained of the way he would refuse to discuss ideas with them. Even his good friend Varnhagen von Ense noted with regard to Hegel’s attitude to his wife, Rahel Varnhagen - a leader of the Berlin salon culture, a figure in Berlin’s Jewish circles, and a woman of no small intellect — that “Hegel knew Rahel as a clever, thoughtful woman and treated her as such, but only with great difficulty did he recognize her authentic spiritual essence.”'* She herself had “difficulty” with the fact that Hegel would not discuss his ideas with her.
鉴于黑格尔持有上述观点，他朋友圈中的许多女性抱怨他拒绝在这方面与她们探讨看法，也就不足为奇了。就连他的好友瓦恩哈根·冯·恩泽也注意到黑格尔对其妻子拉埃尔·瓦恩哈根（柏林沙龙文化的引领者、柏林犹太教圈子中的人物，极为聪慧的女性）的态度，“黑格尔知道拉埃尔是一位聪明且有思想的女性，也如此对待她，但却费了很大力气才认识到她真实的精神本质”。拉埃尔本人所面临的“困扰”是，黑格尔从不与她讨论自己的思想。
Hegel also argued that the purpose of raising children was to educate them to freedom and independence; as he put it, “The services which may be required of children should therefore contribute solely to the end of their upbringing; they must not claim to be justified in their own right, for the most unethical of all relationships is that in which children are slaves.”'’ In his lectures, he complained about the extent of child labor in England and the way in which in manufacturing towns the children were effectively denied all right to education, a practice he found shocking and abhorrent."* The children within the family also serve, Hegel argued, to make the “subjective” love of husband and wife “objective,” to give an anchor to what might have been only a chancy emotional relationship through the common commitment to the education of the children.
黑格尔同样强调，培养子女的目的在于让他们具备自由和独立的人格。正如他所说：“子女所可能需要的照料，应当仅服务于养育子女这一目的；这些照料不应声称因其自身目的就具有合理性，因为所有关系中最不道德的，就是因这些关系而使子女沦为奴隶。”在他的演讲中，黑格尔对英国滥用童工以及制造业小镇上孩子们实际上被完全剥夺受教育权利的做法表示震惊与憎恶。黑格尔主张，家庭中的孩子也可促使夫妻的“主观”爱情转变为“客观”爱情，还可通过夫妻对子女教育的共同承诺，维系一种原本可能不太稳固的情感关系。
Families, however, dissolve and form anew with the death of one or both of the parents, or with the adult children going out to form new families. This leads them into “civil society,” in which, with its modern market institutions, individuals have a social space in which the pursuit of their own private interests (as in “abstract right”) is allowed full play and is counted as something legitimate on its own. Hegel does not completely identify civil society with market society, although he holds that the free market is essential to civil society’s functioning. Indeed, what makes such civil society “ethical,” sittlich, what makes it a common enterprise, has to do in the first place with the way in which the structures of the market compel individuals to take account of the particular needs and wants of others, so that the individual’s pursuit of his private interests turns out to require a mediated form of mutuality in order for that pursuit to be successful.
然而，由于父母一方或双方离世，或者子女长大成人组建独立的新家庭，原有的家庭便会解体并形成新的家庭。这就促使他们进入“市民社会”。在市民社会中，借助其现代市场制度，个人拥有了一个社会空间，在这个空间里，对自身私人利益（如同对“绝对权利”）的追求不仅完全被允许，而且本质上被视为合理合法。黑格尔认为，市民社会并不完全等同于市场社会，尽管自由市场对市民社会起着至关重要的作用。实际上，要使市民社会具备“伦理”（sittlich）属性，使其拥有一个共同规划，首先与某种方式相关，通过这种方式，市场结构迫使个体考虑他人的特殊必需品与需求，所以个体对私人利益的追求，被证明需要一种相互关系的中介形式，以确保这种追求能够成功。
The discipline of the market requires of each participant that he bend his will to the requirements of others, and the laws of the market produce a harmony out of this reciprocal pressure each has put on the other. (Hegel drew on his readings of Adam Smith to make that point.) Civil society’s harmony thus comes about not in the seemingly effortless, “beautiful” manner of the ancient Greeks. As Hegel put it, modern civil society “affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the physical and ethical corruption common to both.”''^ However, whatever civil society lacks in classical beauty, it gains in rationality and efficiency, in its accommodating a place for the modern individual, and it thereby acquires a kind of modern, more fragmented beauty and Sittlichkeit on its own.
市场准则要求每一位参与者都要让自己的意愿服从于他人的需求，而市场规律通过每个人对他人施加的相互压力创造出一种和谐。（黑格尔借助对亚当·斯密的解读来阐释这一观点。）因此，市民社会的和谐并非产生于古希腊人那种看似轻松的“优美”处事方式。如黑格尔所说，现代市民社会“既呈现出奢侈与贫困的景象，也展现出两者所共有的身体与伦理上的堕落之态”。不过，尽管市民社会缺乏古典之美，但它获得了合理性与效率，为现代个体提供了一个空间，进而形成了一种现代的、更为碎片化的美以及其独特的伦理。
Hegel’s defense of civil society as “ethical” firmly took its stance against that line of thought, widespread in his day, that was deeply suspicious of the mores of a market society, seeing it only as crass, commercial, disrespectful of tradition, and thus completely lacking in any kind of “beauty.” Indeed, nowhere was this suspicion more deeply grounded than in Prussia itself, where xht Junker, the landed aristocratic gentry of traditional eastern Prussia, had sternly set itself against anything that challenged their authoritarian rule over their domains. Hegel’s robust defense of civil society thus set him firmly at odds with the Junker and their allies in Prussia.^
黑格尔对“合乎伦理的”市民社会的辩护，坚决反对他那个时代广泛流传的思想倾向，即黑格尔所怀疑的市场社会的道德观念，他认为这种观念只会使传统变得粗俗、商业化且对传统缺乏敬意，完全没有任何“优美”可言。实际上，最受质疑的当属普鲁士本身，在普鲁士，传统的东部普鲁士容克贵族，即拥有土地的绅士阶层，极力反对任何挑战他们对领地独裁统治的事物。黑格尔对市民社会的大力辩护，使他与容克贵族及其在普鲁士的同盟分道扬镳。
The participant in civil society is not yet a citizen ; he is a bourgeois, a Biirger, in pursuit of the satisfaction of his own personal interests, bending his will to the will of others, since his own satisfaction depends on others finding something in him that satisfies their interests. As such, the bourgeois presents a stock and somewhat comic modern figure. He fiercely defends his right to count for as much as the next person, which thus forces him to seek a kind of equality with others, which in turn leads to the modern phenomenon of bourgeois conformism, in which each imitates the other not out of tradition but out of the need simply to make himself like others. Hegel, for example, explains the modern phenomenon of the European interest in rapid change in fashion as the need to conform to social opinion in a way that also gives the appearance of distinctiveness, of “particularity” in appearance. Hegel himself, who was never exactly a slave to fashion, made his own views most clear in his Heidelberg lectures: “Fashion is one aspect of this, and to dress according to fashion is the most rational course, whereas we can leave it to others to bother about new fashions: one should not take the lead oneself, but one should avoid idiosyncrasy . . . One asserts oneself in order to be equal to others.”^' Thus, conformism takes over and in the end, as Hegel puts it, “everything particular takes on a social character; in the manner of dress and times of meals, there are certain conventions which one must accept, for in such matters, it is not worth the trouble to seek display of one’s own insight, and it is wisest to act as others do.”^^
市民社会的参与者并非“市民”，而是资产者（Bürger），他们追求个人利益的满足，使自己的意愿服从于他人的意愿，因为他们自身的满足依赖于他人是否觉得他们所提供的东西能满足自身利益。就此而言，资产者可被描述为一种平凡且略带滑稽的现代人物。他们强烈捍卫自己所认为的权利，就像其他人一样，这进而迫使他们寻求与他人的“平等”，这又导致了资产者因循守旧的现代现象，以至于每个人都模仿他人，这并非出于“传统”，而完全是出于让自己与他人一样的需求。例如，黑格尔以某种方式将时尚的快速变化解释为人们需要遵从社会舆论，社会舆论展现出自身的独特性，也凸显了现象的“特殊性”。黑格尔本人从未完全成为时尚的奴隶，他在海德堡的演讲中清晰地阐述了自己的观点：“时尚是此时此地事物的一个方面，根据时尚穿着打扮是最合理的做法，尽管我们可能因他人为新时尚所困扰而舍弃时尚；一个人不应过于出风头，但应避免怪癖……一个人坚持自己的权利是为了与他人平起平坐。”因此，因循守旧随之而来，最终如黑格尔所说，“一切个别事物都呈现出一种社会特征；在穿着打扮和用餐时间方面，存在着人们必须接受的某种习俗，因为在这类事情上，没必要自找麻烦试图彰显自己的真知灼见，随大流才是最为明智的做法。”
Indeed, precisely because of the pressures of the market on the members of civil society, the demands to pursue their own interests and to conform, Hegel argued forcefully, as he had been doing since his arrival in Jena, for the continued legal recognition of the estates and some of the corporate structures of the ancien regime, since, so he argued, only they could serve as mediating bodies for the structures of mutual and equal recognition in the newly emerging market societies. As he had done in Jena, he gave these structures a very modern twist by interpreting them not in purely economic or even “natural” but in “ethical” terms. The estates were to be determined not by virtue of a “natural” division in society but in terms of the kinds of goods and styles of reasoning that modern individuals assumed for themselves. Each estate gives its members a kind of project for themselves, a nonprudentially determined sense of identity, a “standing” in civil society as a whole. (The very German term for an “estate” - a “Atawi” — nicely captures that sense.) Without the estates, individuals would have only the “moral” standpoint to guide them, only a very general sense that they satisfy their “universal” obligations; with the estates, individuals have a much more concrete sense of how to orient themselves in life. Thus, on Hegel’s view, the peasant estate, because of its ties to the land, finds that what is good and best for itself has to do with tradition and trust in nature, and it reasons out its life project accordingly.^^ The “reflective” or business estate finds that what is good and best for it is the rational, “reflective” calculation of what is most efficient for producing and exchanging goods. The “universal” estate of civil servants has as its good the overall flourishing and proper functioning of civil society as a whole, and it thus reasons out its life projects in terms of the virtues involved in a career in public service. The fact that one must determine for oneself which estate is to be one’s own estate marked, for Hegel, the crucial difference “between the political life of. . . the ancient and modern worlds” and, so he also thought, between the political life of the “East” and the “West.”^^ Even if one stays in the estate into which one is born, one’s birth and family simply cannot - in a modern civil society - determine one’s estate for oneself (with the exception of the nobility).
更确切地说，黑格尔极力主张，正是由于市场对市民社会成员施加的压力，市民社会成员才追求并满足自身利益，正如他自抵达耶拿后一直所认为的那样，原因在于社会等级和旧政体的某些社团结构在法律上不断得到认可。所以，如他所坚称的，只有这些结构才能充当新兴市场社会中相互平等认可的媒介。如同他在耶拿时期所做的那样，他以一种非常现代的方式对这些结构进行了曲解：不是从纯粹经济或“自然”的角度，而是从“伦理”的角度来阐释它们。通常，社会等级的确定并非基于对社会的“自然”划分，而是依据现代个体为自己设想的各种利益和推理风格。每个等级都为其成员提供一种属于他们自己的规划，一种关于身份的当下明确观念，以及在整个市民社会中的“立场”。（一个独特的德语术语“等级”——“Stand”——精准地表达了这个意思。）倘若没有等级，个体大概只能以“道德”的视角来引导自己，大概仅拥有一个非常笼统的观念，即他们要履行“普遍的”义务；而有了等级，个体就能更具体地明白在生活中如何给自己定位。因此，在黑格尔看来，农民阶级由于与土地的联系，发现对他们自身而言，好的和最好的事物实际上与传统和信任相关，他们据此推断自己的生活规划。“反思的”阶层或商业阶层则发现，对他们来说，好的和最好的事物，就是合理地、“反思式地”算计怎样能最有效地生产和交换商品。文职官员这一“普遍的”阶层，因为他们对整个市民社会的全面繁荣有益并发挥着适当作用，所以依据公共服务事业涉及的优点来推断自己的生活规划。事实上，对于黑格尔来说，个体必须自行确定属于自己的阶层，这一阶层标志着“古代世界与现代世界政治生活之间”的关键差异，并且如他所认为的，也标志着“东方”与“西方”政治生活之间的关键差异。“即便一个人处于他出生时所在的阶层，但在现代市民社会中，他的出身和家庭根本不能——除贵族阶层外——决定他所属的阶层。”
A simple organization into estates, however, cannot be sufficient to sustain the sittlich, the ethical order of civil society. The business estate has particular tensions within itself that must be mediated by further institutional conditions; in the pursuit of riches and efficiency, the members of that estate have a tendency to fall back into a blind pursuit of self-interest and thus to undermine the overall “ethical” bonds that hold civil society together. Within the business estate, therefore, there should be various “corporate” orders gathered around common interests that are to “police” their members. However, since the “corporations” cannot be expected to do that fully and completely successfully, civil society also requires a whole set of regulatory and legal bodies to oversee its infrastructure and day-to-day life so that it maintains the necessary equilibrium within itself to function properly. Likewise, for the regulatory and legal bodies to function fairly and efficiently, there had to be a codified set of laws subject to rational review; keeping the laws uncodified, as Savigny had insisted, would be, Hegel said, irrational and unconscionable - “to deny a civilized nation or the legal estate within it the ability to draw up a legal code would be among the greatest insults one could offer to either.”^'' Neither Savigny nor any of his followers could have mistaken that jab Hegel took at them; in an equally sharp jab at the attempts by the Junker to maintain their traditional patrimonial courts, Hegel argued equally forcefully for public courts; and he even broke with many of his juristic colleagues in arguing for trial by jury, noting, “it is possible that the administration of justice in itself could be managed well by purely professional courts . . . but even if this possibility could be increased to probability - or indeed to necessity - it is of no relevance, for on the opposite side there is always the right of self-conscwusness which retains its claims and finds that they are not satisfied.
然而，仅有简单的阶层组织并不足以维持市民社会的伦理与伦理秩序。商业阶层自身存在特殊的张力，因此必须进一步通过制度条件加以调节。在追求财富和效率的过程中，该阶层成员往往会陷入对自身利益的盲目追求，从而常常损害维系市民社会的所有“伦理”纽带。所以，在商业阶层内部，应该存在各种围绕共同利益形成的“社团”秩序，以此来“管理”其成员。不过，由于不能期望“社团”完全成功地做到这一点，市民社会同样需要一整套起调节作用的合法组织来规范其基础结构和日常生活，以便市民社会在内部保持必要的平衡，从而发挥适当的功能。同理，为了使这些起调节作用的合法组织能够公平有效地发挥作用，就必须制定一套经得起理性检验的法律。黑格尔说，像萨维尼所坚持的那样让法律一成不变，此举既不合理又昧良心——“否认一个文明民族及其法学界具备编纂法典的能力，这大概是对这个民族及其法学界的莫大侮辱。”萨维尼及其追随者不可能误解黑格尔对他们的抨击。同样，在尖锐批判容克贵族努力维持其传统世袭法庭时，黑格尔极力主张设立公众法庭。他甚至与许多主张陪审团审判的司法同仁产生分歧，并指出，“很有可能，司法部门本身通过纯粹的职业法庭便能得到很好的管控……但即便这种可能性可以提升为盖然性——甚至确实可提升为必然性——这样的做法也是不合适的，因为在另一方始终存在着自我意识的权利，这种权利保留其主张，并发现其主张得不到满足。”
Hegel was also acutely aware of the problem that extreme poverty and extreme wealth generated by industrial society poses for civil society as a whole, since at both ends of the spectrum of wealth, individuals lose their sense of obligation to the “whole” — the poor because they have no stake in it, the rich because they tend to think that they can buy themselves out of its obligations. The issue of poverty was particularly acute in Prussia; the Napoleonic wars had devastated Prussian agriculture, and the legal emancipation of the peasantry had the unintended consequence that the nobility bought up the peasants’ land and ejected the peasants, who had traditionally worked on it, so as to be able to institute more efficient modes of agricultural production; the result was the creation of a “rabble” of unemployed and unemployable peasants throughout Prussia. Hegel quite candidly admitted that his speculative philosophy contained no answer to the problem of modern poverty, and he tended to see it as the great unresolved issue in modern life. Expansion of markets abroad, he speculated, might prove to be the only practical way of even beginning to address the issue, although he did not think it could completely resolve it.
黑格尔敏锐地意识到工业社会所导致的极端贫困与极端富有给整个市民社会带来的问题，因为在财富的两端，个体不再意识到自己对“整体”的义务——穷人因缺乏履行义务的资本而贫困，富人则因易于思考能用义务为自己买到什么而富有。贫困问题在普鲁士尤为尖锐。拿破仑战争给普鲁士农业造成了巨大破坏，而农民的合法解放带来了意想不到的后果，贵族占有农民土地，使传统的耕地农民流离失所，从而形成了更为高效的农业生产模式。结果，整个普鲁士失业和无法受雇的农民沦为“暴民”。黑格尔坦率地承认，他的思辨哲学并未为现代贫困问题提供解决方案，他倾向于将其视为现代生活中尚未解决的重大难题。黑格尔推测，国外市场的扩张甚至可能被证明是开始解决这一问题的唯一实际办法，尽管他认为国外市场扩张无法完全解决该问题。
However, no matter how prosperous it may be and how much its structures tend to check the excesses of other structures, civil society cannot on its own establish the point of view of the “whole” that is necessary for the various legal, regulatory, and corporate structures to have the “ethical” authority they must have. The political point of view, which is concerned explicitly not with private interests but with the collective goal of freedom that the people of modern life are trying to achieve, is embodied in the “state.” Whereas civil society is the sphere of free individuals^ political life has for its purpose the establishment of the conditions necessary for a free people. For this goal to be actualized, the state must be articulated into a set of appropriately modern governmental institutions, whose legitimating principle is again that of freedom, not efficiency or preference satisfaction.
然而，无论国外市场多么繁荣，无论其结构多么能抑制其他结构的过度膨胀，市民社会自身仍无法让人们确立“整体”的观念，而“整体”对于不同的合法、具有调节功能和社团的各种结构获得它们必须具备的“伦理”权威而言是必不可少的。政治观点体现在“国家”之中，它显然不涉及私人利益，而是关乎现代生活中人们努力实现的自由这一集体目标。市民社会是自由个体的领域，而政治生活的目的是为一个自由的民族确立必要的条件。为了实现这一目标，国家必须被系统阐述为一整套合适的现代政府机构，其合法原则仍然是自由，而非效率或满足偏好。
Hegel defended a form of constitutional monarchy for the modern state, although he restricted the monarch’s duties to nothing more, as he put it, than dotting the “i’s” on legislation presented to him by his ministers. (The Prussian royals, almost needless to say, were not amused when told what Professor Hegel was saying in his lectures about their proper political role.) The function of the modern monarch is only to express the ungrounded (or, rather, the self-grounding) nature of the modern state, the idea that its legitimacy rests on nothing else than the collective goal of establishing the conditions under which a “people” can be free. Moreover, the monarch is as contingent as the state of which he is the monarch; his blank assertion, “I will this,” serves as the expression of that element of ungrounded sovereignty that distinguishes modern states. No further appeal to God’s will or to natural law serves to legitimate it; only the “moral and ethical law” as freely and collectively established by rational individuals can count and put restrictions on its activities.
黑格尔为现代国家的君主立宪制形式进行辩护，不过他将君主的职责严格限定为，如他所说，审阅大臣呈交给他的立法事项。（几乎不消说，普鲁士王室听闻黑格尔教授在演讲中对他们应扮演的适当政治角色的评论时，肯定不会高兴。）现代君主的作用仅在于体现现代国家无根（或者更确切地说是自我奠基）的本质，这种观点意味着现代国家的合法性仅依赖于确立一个“民族”得以实现自由的集体目标。不仅如此，君主及其所代表的国家同样具有偶然性；君主空洞地宣称“君临天下”，仅仅是为了展现区分现代国家的无根的最高权威要素。进一步诉诸上帝意志或自然法，根本无法使君主的宣称更具合法性；唯有理性个体自由且集体确立的“道德法则与伦理法则”，才能赋予君主行为价值并对其加以约束。
Constitutional protection of basic rights must be insured if people are to identify with the collective aim of such a political society. The modern state must incorporate the specifically modern sense of humanism, in which “a human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc.”^’ Quite strikingly, Hegel nowhere invokes anything strongly resembling a classical doctrine of the “common good” in his theory of the state. Although the state must embody the collective aspiration for the free life of a “people,” nowhere does Hegel say that it ought to prescribe some one way of life or set of virtues that would be common to all. His insistence on the plurality of estates and his “ethical” interpretation of them was intended to make clear that a modern state must incorporate within itself a plurality of ways of life and even of virtues. As ever, the nationalists who wanted to prescribe an authentic “German” way of life for all those in the former Holy Roman Empire - the people he had in Nuremberg called the Deutschdumm — were anathema to Hegel.
倘若人们必须与这样一种政治社会的集体目标保持一致，那么就必须确保宪法对公民基本权利的保护。现代国家必须包含明确的现代“人文主义”观念，在现代国家中，“一个人被视为人，是因为他是人，而非因为他是犹太人、天主教徒、新教徒、德国人、意大利人等等”。显然，黑格尔在其国家理论中并未借助与“共同利益”这一古典学说极为相似的内容。国家必须体现“民族”对自由生活的集体热切向往，但黑格尔在任何地方都未表明国家应规定适用于所有人的唯一生活方式或一系列美德。他坚持等级的多元性并从“伦理”角度对等级进行阐释，旨在阐明现代国家自身必须包含生活方式乃至美德的多元性。一如既往，黑格尔极为厌恶民族主义者，因为他们试图为所有前神圣罗马帝国的人——在纽伦堡这类人被称作德国傻瓜——规定一种所谓本真的“德国式”生活方式。
Likewise, the modern state had to keep its distance even from religion. Even though the modern state and modern Protestant Christianity share the same general aspiration (that of realizing freedom), their interests in the conditions under which freedom is actualized diverge. The rational, legal constitutional state simply cannot base its actions on “authority and faith” as religion must do.Letting religious matters into state affairs only leads to fanaticism; when religion becomes political, the result can only be “folly, outrage, and the destruction of all ethical relations,” since the piety of religious conviction when confronted with the manifold claims of the modern political world too easily passes over into “a sense of grievance and hence also of selfconceit” and a sense that the truly faithful can find in their “own godliness all that is required in order to see through the nature of the laws and of political institutions, to pass judgment on them, and to lay down what their character should and must be.”^® Indeed, the plurality of modern religions is itself a condition for the modern state assuming the kind of complex unity that it has: The historic split in Christendom should therefore not be lamented, Hegel argued — it is in fact ‘ the most fortunate thing which could have happened to the church and to thought as far as their freedom and rationality is concerned.”^"
同理，现代国家甚至必须与宗教保持距离。现代国家与现代新教基督教有着共同的一般诉求（对实现自由的渴望），但在实现自由的条件方面，它们的利益存在显著差异。合理合法的宪政国家绝不能将其行动建立在宗教所依赖的“权威与信仰”基础之上。“让宗教问题介入国家事务只会引发狂热；当宗教涉足政治，结果只能是‘使人变得愚蠢、遭受侮辱，以及所有伦理关系遭到破坏’”，因为宗教定罪的虔诚在面对现代政治世界的各种主张时，极易让人产生“委屈感”，进而滋生“自负感”，以及这样一种观念：真正的信仰能够在“自身的虔诚中”找到“看透法律和政治制度的本质、对其作出评判并阐明其应然特征所需的一切”。实际上，现代宗教的多元性本身构成了假定自身具有这种复杂统一体的现代国家的条件。黑格尔认为，基督教世界历史上的分裂不应令人惋惜——就宗教和思想的自由与合理性而言，它“或许恰恰是宗教和思想领域发生的最幸运之事”。
If such rights and the recognition of pluralism are to be effectively insured, then a modern state must also have some form of representative government. Hegel rejected, though, democracy and voting by geographical district: In a democracy, a majoritarian parliament may simply ignore the minority’s interests; and selecting representatives on the basis of geography means selecting people without any regard to whether they represent the basic and important interests of the “whole” society or even of the people whom they are supposed to represent. Thus, to the extent that people actually identify with their estates and corporations, a system of representation based on the estates and corporations will more likely ensure that all legitimate voices are heard at the “state” level. Hegel also opted for a bicameral legislature, with a house of “lords” and a house of “commons” as a way of ensuring that society’s basic interests would be heard and society’s stability be maintained.
若要切实保障这些权利并认可多元论，现代国家就必须具备某种代议制政体。即便如此，黑格尔并不赞同基于地理区域的民主和投票方式：在多数主义民主议会中，很可能会忽视少数派的利益；基于地理区域选举代表，意味着选出的代表可能并未考虑能否代表“整个”社会的基本重要利益，甚至可能未考虑能否代表他们本应代表之人的基本重要利益。因此，在人们事实上认同自身所属阶层和社团的程度上，基于阶层和社团的代议政体更有可能确保在“国家”层面听到所有合法诉求。黑格尔还选择了一种设有“参议院”和“众议院”的两院制立法机构，以此确保社会基本利益始终有人倾听，社会稳定得以维持。
The executive portion of government should be staffed by a cadre of trained civil servants who will emerge as men of Bildung by virtue of their university education. The protection against what he called the “arbitrariness of officialdom” would come, Hegel seemed to think, from the pressure that would be exerted by the monarch (although how a monarch who only dotted the “i’s” was supposed to do that was never explained) and by the estates from which the various individual civil servants emerged.^' Hegel also concluded that the executive should consist in something like Baron von Stein’s sense of a set of “collegial bodies,” with no one official having an authoritative office over the whole set of them. In an implicit criticism of Hardenberg - only voiced in his lectures after Hardenberg’s death - Hegel argued that no just state should have the position of chancellor that Hardenberg had managed to obtain for himself Although the position of chancellor, Hegel said, “is associated with a high degree of facility, speed, and effectiveness in measures adopted for the universal interests of the state,” it tends nonetheless to “have the result that everything is again controlled from above by ministerial power,” and however attractive such justifications in terms of efficiency and “centralization” might be, they miss the point that the ethical authority of the modern state lies in the way it secures the satisfaction of the common aspiration for freedom, to which efficiency, although not being ignored, must always be subordinated. For the goal of actualizing freedom to be achieved, Hegel argued, “civil life shall be governed in a concrete manner from below . . . [even though] the business in question shall be divided into abstract branches and dealt with by specific bodies.
政府行政部门应配备训练有素的公务员队伍，这些公务员因接受高等教育而举止文雅。黑格尔似乎认为，他所谓的对“官场霸道”的制衡，通常来自君主施加的压力（尽管仅宣称“君临天下”的君主无需解释其行为）以及个体公务员所属的不同阶层。黑格尔还断言，行政官员应重视诸如巴龙·冯·施泰因关于一套“大学章程”的理念，且任何官员都不能凌驾于整套大学章程之上。在对哈登贝格的隐晦批评中——这种批评直到哈登贝格去世后才在黑格尔的演讲中出现——黑格尔坚称，国家恰恰不应设立哈登贝格试图为自己谋取的总理职位。黑格尔表示，总理职位“与符合国家普遍利益的便利、令人满意且有效的措施在更高程度上相关联”，但它仍容易“导致一切事务再次受制于上层部长的权力”。无论从效率和“中央集权”角度来看，这种辩护多么具有吸引力，关键问题在于，它们忽略了现代国家的伦理权威在于保护人们对自由的共同渴望这一方面，而现代国家的效率虽不容忽视，但必须始终被视为次要因素。黑格尔论证道，就实现自由这一目标而言，“市民生活从具体意义上说应由下层支配……[尽管]正在讨论的事务将被划分成抽象的分支，并由特定的主管机关处理”。
The Philosophy of World History Since the modern state appeals to neither God nor natural law for its legitimacy, it must appeal to some sense of what a “people” collectively establish as rational. This drives political philosophy into a philosophy of history, since the kind of critique that reason performs on itself (as Kant had said was reason’s highest goal) can, if Hegel’s other arguments are correct, only be performed historically. Hegel thus concluded the Philosophy of Right with some short paragraphs on the philosophy of world history, which he later expanded into a series of popular and well-attended lectures. Those lectures were posthumously published in his collected works under the simple title The Philosophy of History. (The first edition was edited by Hegel’s friend Eduard Gans, and the second edition by his son Karl Hegel.) Although not actually worked up for publication by Hegel himself, those lectures have since become probably his most widely read and widely known work, showing Hegel at his least obscure and in his most dazzling manner. In them, he laid out his ideas on the progressive nature of history and advanced some views that were, to say the least, quite controversial in his own day.
世界历史哲学
鉴于现代国家在合法性方面既不诉诸上帝，也不诉诸自然法，它就必须诉诸作为“民族”集体构建的某种合理性观念。这就迫使政治哲学演变为历史哲学。倘若黑格尔的其他论断正确，那么对理性自我表现的批判（康德认为这种批判并非理性的最高目标）只能从历史角度展开。因此，黑格尔在《法哲学原理》的结尾以几段关于世界历史哲学的简短论述作结，随后他将这些内容扩充为一系列通俗易懂且广受欢迎的演讲。这些演讲在他身后以简洁的《历史哲学》为题结集出版。（第一版由黑格尔的朋友爱德华·甘斯编辑，第二版由黑格尔之子卡尔·黑格尔编辑。）尽管这些演讲实际上并非黑格尔本人整理发表，但它们很可能成为自那时起他最广为传阅、流传最广的著作，展现出黑格尔极少有的通俗易懂且极为精彩的行文风格。在这些演讲中，黑格尔阐述了他对历史发展本质的观点，并提出了一些至少在他那个时代极具争议的见解。
The progress of world history was, Hegel argued, best understood as progress in understanding and actualizing the commitments that follow from humanity’s collective undertaking to realize freedom for itself in political life along with religion, art, and philosophy. In making that point about history, Hegel cited some lines from a poem by Friedrich Schiller (“Resignation”) to the effect that world history is the “final court of the world,” the “last judgment” on those states whose development makes up world history itself.As with many of Hegel’s other pronouncements, particularly in the Philosophy of Right, this only inflamed many of those who read it as offering a kind of carte blanche to all kinds of historical immorality and as being perhaps even a cynical invocation of historical relativism, of the idea that winners in historical struggles are right simply by virtue of the fact that they have won. In truth, it was only Hegel’s restatement of his own brand of radical modernism that he had already argued at length in the Phenomenology of Spirit: If there were no truths of natural law to which our ethical actions had to conform, then the ultimate justification of our actions had to be elaborated internally within the development of our own “mindedness” and “like-mindedness.” If the authority of the modern state lies not in its fulfilling some ecclesiastical or merely traditional doctrine but in institutionalizing itself in terms of the pursuit of freedom for its own sake, then such a state could be judged only by standards internal to what is necessary to realize the dynamic of freedom itself. Hegel’s notion that “world history is the world court” amounts to his fundamental conception that there is no firm and fast way of saying that any state has any authority except in terms of whether it can rationally justify itself, and, no matter how convinced it may be of its own righteousness, other people, arriving on the scene later in history, have the right to pronounce it to have been irrational if it failed on those terms, even implicitly.
黑格尔认为，世界历史的发展最适宜理解为对承诺的理解与兑现的发展，这些承诺源于人类集体为在政治生活、宗教、艺术及哲学领域实现自由而作出的努力。在阐述其历史观时，黑格尔引用了弗里德里希·席勒《顺从》一诗中的几句，大意是世界历史是“世界的最终法庭”，是对那些构成世界历史本身的国家的“最后审判”。如同黑格尔的许多其他观点，尤其是《法哲学原理》中的观点一样，这一论述引发了众多阐释者的热烈讨论。有人认为它为各种历史上的伤风败俗行为提供了一种完全诉诸历史的借口，甚至有人觉得它体现了一种历史相对主义和犬儒主义的诉求，还有人认为它传达了这样一种看法：历史斗争的胜者仅仅凭借所取得的胜利而称王称霸。事实上，这不过是黑格尔对自己激进现代主义的重申，早在之前的《精神现象学》中他就对此做过详尽论述：倘若不存在我们的伦理行为所遵循的自然法则的真理，那么对我们行为的终极辩护就必须从本质上在我们自身“心智”或“类心智”的发展中加以详细阐释。也就是说，如果现代国家的权威并非在于实现某种教会的或仅仅是传统的学说，而是在于依据对自由的追求为自身利益实现制度化，那么，评判这样一个国家的优劣，可能只能借助实现自由本身所必需的内在标准。黑格尔“世界历史是世界的法庭”这一观念，等同于他的基本思想：除了国家能否从理性上证明自身的合理性之外，不存在明确可靠的方式来判定国家具有权威。无论国家多么确信自身的正确性，但如果在这方面出现错误，即便错误不明显，历史上后来出现的人也有权判定该国家已不合理。
There is therefore in history, as Hegel explicitly put it, no “irrational necessity of a blind fate” directing the destinies of states.'*'* For Hegel, understanding what is now authoritative and possible for us in our political lives necessarily involves locating ourselves within history, understanding our possibilities in terms of an interpretation of what has happened and is happening and why it happened. What is at stake is always up for grabs, and it is never settled by some historical fiat or even by some social agreement that it has been settled. The shape that a state must assume depends on what it takes to be rational for it in light of that kind of historical understanding of what has happened and of what that now rules in and rules out. We simply cannot understand history as a set of “contingent” events, or even as a contingent play of human passions, as if the great issues about reason and truth in history could be settled by our or somebody else’s simply declaring them to be settled or by our just waiting to see who “wins.”
黑格尔明确指出，历史上不存在“盲目命运的无理性的必然性”来决定国家的命运。对他而言，要理解在我们的政治生活中，当下什么具有权威性以及可能实现什么，就必然涉及在历史中找准自身定位，必然需要依据对已发生、正在发生以及为何发生之事的解释，来理解我们可能面临的状况。存在的问题始终是可以解决的，但绝不能由历史上的某种法令或已达成的社会协定来解决。国家必须采用的形式，取决于国家自身被视为理性的东西，这就要求人们对已发生的、当前占主导地位的以及已被淘汰的事物，形成一种历史性的理解。我们绝不能将历史理解为一系列“偶然”事件，甚至不能将其看作人类激情的偶然游戏，仿佛历史中关于理性和真理的重大问题，能够通过我们或其他人简单宣布解决，或者仅仅通过等待看谁“获胜”就能解决。
