Nonetheless, during this period Hegel was trying to fit such ideas into his newly developing “logic and metaphysics” of “unity and multiplicity,” and “universality and particularity,” and he was also still trying to squeeze all of this into a Schellingian theory of the “potencies.” His idea was that nature’s processes, which lead to the dispersal of all things into a “multiplicity” of entities, also lead to nature’s capturing this “multiplicity” in a “unity.” Out of this “logic” of unity and multiplicity, universality and particularity, Hegel then tried to show that the heavenly bodies maintain their unity as individuals within a “universal,” the solar system; that the earth is a single thing only insofar as it unites all the differences (physical, chemical, and biological) within itself; and that ultimately these relative identities can only be comprehended by spirit^ by something that comes to mirror all this motion in itself through the medium of language and consciousness. The result of all this was a set of notes that constitute some of the densest prose Hegel ever wrote.
然而，在这个阶段，黑格尔在尝试使得这些想法符合于他新发展出的关于“统一与杂多”和“普遍与特殊”的“逻辑学和形而上学”，他同时仍然还在尝试把这一切硬塞进谢林关于“潜能”的理论。他的看法是，自然过程既致使所有事物消散成为“实有”的“杂多”，同时也导致自然在“统一体”中俘获“杂多”。从统一与杂多、普遍与特殊的“逻辑”出发，黑格尔接着试图阐明：某些天体作为个体维持着它们的“普遍”或太阳系中的统一；地球仅仅就它结合一切差异（物理差异、化学差异和生物差异）在它自身中而言是单一的东西；最终这些相对的统一只能够借助精神加以理解，只能够借助事物加以理解，事物逐渐通过语言与意识的中介来反映它自身中的一切运动。上述所有这些想法结果形成一套笔记，这套笔记构成黑格尔曾经写出的一些最难读懂的散文。
In the draft of his “Logic” in 1804, Hegel returned again to the philosophy of nature, taking up the same themes, such as the appeal to a dynamic of an “aether” or “absolute matter.” There is, however, a new ordering of the parts (motion as studied by the science of mechanics comes to play a more important role) and a new treatment of details, none of which, however, are important enough to recount here. If “logic” is about the standards for correct thought, and “metaphysics” is about the primordial unity of thought and being, then “philosophy of nature” would be about the way in which the natural world must be constituted for the kinds of agents that are explained in metaphysics really to be possible. That is, the essence of nature itself must be shown not to exclude the possibility of what has been claimed in “logic” and “metaphysics.” Nature must be shown in its own dynamic (as studied by the sciences) to lead to spirit, even to require it.
在他1804年的“逻辑学”草稿中，黑格尔再度回到自然哲学，重拾诸如诉诸于“以太”动力学或“绝对物质”这样的论题。不过，有些部分被作出新的安排（力学研究的运动逐渐扮演更加重要的角色）和有些细节被作了新的论述，然而其中没有什么十分重要的东西需要在这里加以详细叙述。如果“逻辑学”将成为正确思想的标准，如果“形而上学”将成为思想与存在的原始统一，那么“自然哲学”就大概将成为这样的一个方面，由于这个方面，物质世界必须是为种种行动者而构成，这些行动者确实可能被以形而上学加以解释。这也就是说，自然本身的本质必须被证明不排除已被“逻辑学”和“形而上学”所主张东西的可能性。自然必须被它自己的动力学（由那些科学所研究的动力学）证明转向精神，甚至导致需要精神。
Why then is “philosophy of nature” not simply a part of “metaphysics”? Hegel’s answer seems to be that “metaphysics” studies the struc- ture of the unity of “subjectivity” and “objectivity” (the subjective and objective points of view), whereas “philosophy of nature” studies the way in which nature must metaphysically develop within itself such “minded” creatures in the first place. As Hegel puts it, nature’s “existence as much as its ideality, or its coming to be absolute spirit is the metaphysical coming to be or the coming to be of cognition as selfcognition.Nature itself is unaware of this aspect of itself; only human agents as “minded” natural beings have this awareness of nature’s dynamic: “The spirit of nature is a hidden spirit, it does not step forth in spirit’s shape; it is only spirit for the cognizing spirit; or, it is spirit in itself but not for itself.”'®’ The “philosophy of nature” thus regards the “whole,” the “absolute,” as the primordial unity of mind and nature.
那么，为什么“自然哲学”不只是“形而上学”的一部分呢？黑格尔的回答看来好像是“形而上学”研究“主观性”与“客观性”（主观观点和客观观点）的统一的结构，而“自然哲学”研究这样的一个方面，在这个方面，自然首先必须形而上地在它自身中发展这些“具有思想的”生物。像黑格尔论述的，自然的“存在”同它的“理性”或它将要到达的“绝对精神”一样，都是形而上地达到作为“自我认识的认识”或达到作为“自我认识的认识”。自然本身没有意识到它自己的这一方面；只有作为“具有思想的”自然存在者的人类行动者才能意识到自然的动力学：“自然的精神是一种隐藏的精神，它不能越出自然的形式；它作为精神只是为了认识精神；或者说，它是自在的精神而非自为的精神。”“自然哲学”因而把“整体”和“绝对”当作心灵与自然的原始统一看待。
What remains of the 1804—05 manuscript, however, abruptly ends with introduction of the concept of “the organic.” Hegel, it would seem, simply and suddenly ceased working on the manuscript and put it aside. His earlier work and other fragments from that period suggest he had intended to follow the “philosophy of nature” with something like a philosophy of “existing spirit” in the manner of the System of Ethical Life. It was, however, apparently clear to Hegel that the whole enterprise simply did not hold together. On his own terms, the final division of the “system” would have to be self-contained, it would be the logical stopping point that articulated all the conditions under which each of the prior divisions were themselves necessary; but, as Hegel puts it in his notes to himself, the idea that there would be such a final section which in the notes he calls an “absolute proposition” - would amount to saying that the relation between it and the other divisions would have “just as well either the form of an infinitely extending straight line or that of a circular line returning back into itself.”'®® If that were the case, though, then either the third division, “philosophy of nature,” would have to be self-contained (and there is no reason to think that Hegel thought it could be), or there would have to be a fourth division, which could only be that of something like the doctrine of “ethical life,” which would then entail that metaphysics, even the whole of logic, would be relative to a particular “people’s” intuition of the “absolute.” If so, then he needed an argument as to why any particular “people’s” point of view could take priority over any other “people’s” points of view. Running out of time and money, in desperate personal circumstances and suffering from depression, Hegel started over again to see if he could actually produce what he had long been promising. That led him to a new conception of the history of such formations of “spirit” and to the final establishment of his own, authentic voice in philosophy.
不过，1804年至1805年的手稿一直在论述的东西，到了“特定有机体”这一概念的引言部分戛然而止。似乎黑格尔索性不再继续撰写这部手稿而把它放在一边。他更早的著作和这个阶段其他著作残篇表明他早就打算在“自然哲学”之后以《伦理体系》中的方式来论述像“现存精神”哲学一样的东西。不过黑格尔显然十分清楚整个体系完全捏合不到一起。用他自己的术语说，“体系”的最终划分必将是独立自足的，它应该成为系统阐述所有条件的逻辑上的终点，在特定条件下，先前划分中每一划分自身都是必需的；但是，像黑格尔在他笔记中为他自己论述的，他设想应该具有这样的最后部分——这最后部分在他的这些讲稿中被他称作“绝对命题”——他的这个设想也许等于说这种划分与其他划分之间关系应该“正好要么构成一条无限延伸的直线，要么构成一种回到它自身的环形的线”。尽管这样，如果说上述这种划分有什么问题的话，那么或者第三部分“自然哲学”将必须是独立自足的（没有理由认为黑格尔认为第三部分可能是独立自足的），或者必将具有第四部分，第四部分可能仅仅构成像“伦理”学说一样的东西，第四部分于是当然需要形而上学甚至整个逻辑学，应该和特定的“人们”对“绝对”的直观有关。如果说是这样的话，那么他就需要去论证关于任何特定“人们”的观点为什么可能会比任何其他“人们”的观点优先这一问题。由于耗费了大量的时间和金钱，由于个人处在绝境中，由于遭受抑郁之苦，黑格尔再度着手去看看他实际上可不可能兑现他长期以来所许下的诺言。这就致使他提出“精神”的这些形成史的新概念，最终确立他自己的本真的哲学声音。
1805-1806: Hegelian Idealism: The Penultimate Shape
1805年至1806年：黑格尔的唯心主义：倒数第二的形式
Sometime around the fall or summer of 1805, Hegel began work on yet another manuscript for use in his lectures. Preserved in relatively good condition, it presents a kind of snapshot of Hegel’s thought about what would be necessary for the proposed “system” that he had been promising to publish for some time. The manuscript is known to us as the Third Jena System Draft: Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit {Jenaer Systementwiirfe III: Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes), and like the preceding ones, it was never published in Hegel’s lifetime.’*'^ But in it, Hegel suddenly appears as Hegel, almost in his full voice, much as he was to appear for the rest of his life.
大约在1805年夏秋之交，黑格尔还在着手撰写另一部手稿以作他讲课使用。这部保存得相对完好的手稿，简要地描述了一种被黑格尔思考的、大概成为他计划中的、被他长期以来一直向外界承诺将要暂时发表的“体系”所必须的东西。这部手稿就是众所周知的《耶拿体系草案三：自然哲学和精神哲学》（ **Jenaer Systementwurf III: Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes** ），像先前的那些手稿一样，这部手稿在黑格尔生前从未发表过。但在这部手稿里，黑格尔突然表现为的黑格尔，几乎以他完满的声音，如同他将在他余生表现为的黑格尔。
Nature and Spirit
自然与精神
Quite significantly, in the 1805-06 draft of the “system,” the Schellingian language of the “potencies” dropped out completely. In the preserved draft, Hegel opened the section on nature with the statement that his conceptions of “absolute matter or the aether . . . [are] equivalent in meaning to pure spirit, for this absolute matter is nothing sensuous but is rather the concept as pure concept within itself, spirit existing as such.”””* “Absolute matter,” that is, is not something that we empirically encounter in the observation of nature; it is a “posit,” an “ideality,” the “totality” presupposed by the more determinate explanations offered by the physicists. The promise made in the “Oldest System Program of German Idealism” to give “some wings again” to physics, to understand the scientific account of nature in terms of the deeper experience of nature as a “whole,” seems to be driving the account. What is at stake are the ways in which we must conceive of nature as a whole - not just in terms of what the scientists say about it but in terms of our various experiences of it and how it matters to us.
极具重要意义的是，在1805年至1806年的“体系”草案中，谢林的“潜能”这一用语完全消失了。在现已保存下来的草案里，黑格尔在开篇论自然部分阐述了他关于“绝对物质或以太”的想法……其意义等于纯粹的精神，因为，“绝对物质”不是一种被我们在观察自然时经验上遭遇的东西；它是“设定”，是“理想性”，是由物理学家提供的更加确定的解释所假定的“总体”。这一允诺（在《德国唯心主义最早体系纲领》中作出的，以便“再度”给物理学装上“一些翅膀”，以便根据作为“整体”的自然更深程度的经验来理解对自然的科学描述的允诺），看来好像在推动着上述这样的描述。问题在于某些方式，我们必须借助这些方式——不只根据某些科学家就自然所说的东西，而根据我们关于自然的各种不同经验和自然对我们怎么至关重要——从而把自然设想成是一个“整体”。
After having written a new Naturphilosophie, Hegel went on to sketch out a new section about Geist for his lectures.The manuscript on spirit is much less polished than the one on nature. Much of it is completely telegraphic, consisting of short phrases, often with little explanation as to how they are supposed to connect with each other. Indeed, the whole set of notes on spirit have the obvious shape of cribs for Hegel to use in his lectures. Hence, one must often read between the lines to reconstruct what Hegel’s arguments must have been.
在制定出一种新的自然哲学后，黑格尔马不停蹄地勾画出关于精神的新部分以用作他的讲稿。关于精神的手稿较之关于自然的手稿粗糙得多。其中很多内容完全是电报式的，由一些短语组成，常常几乎没有解释它们怎么被假定是彼此关联的。更确切地说，关于精神的整套笔记显然是黑格尔用作他讲稿的内容提要。所以，人们必须经常解读字里行间的含义以重新建构黑格尔的论证想必包含的东西。
His introductory sections on Geist develop in a more extended fashion the point made in the System of Ethical Life, that our basic “stance” toward nature is spontaneously determined by ourselves but that this does not occur in one fell swoop, that our “mindedness” emerges out of natural determination and progressively distances itself from such natural determination as it gradually determines itself from within its own resources. Hegel’s own chosen examples are colorful: While asleep, we are at our least self-determining; we passively combine images in our mind following both the so-called laws of association and the associations of phantasmorgoric images that appear in sleep and which defy being put into the form of any so-called laws: “A bloody head shoots up, there another white shape, only to suddenly disappear.”'*'^ Our “waking up” and bringing our judgmental capacities into play depends, as he also earlier argued, on our acquisition and use of language.’” Likewise, the employment of our judgmental capacities takes place in the practical context we share with others of trying to accomplish something, out of which emerges the practices of human labor and the creation of tools to accomplish those ends.
他关于精神的引论部分以更加扩展的方式阐述了《伦理体系》中论证的下列观点：我们对自然的基本“态度”自发地决定于我们自己，而这并非一蹴而就。我们的“精神”出于自然的确定，并逐渐地使它自己远离这种自然的确定，因为我们的“精神”逐渐地用它自己的力量确定它自身。黑格尔自己所选择的例子丰富多彩：当睡着时，我们处在最低的自决状态；我们被动地既按照所谓联想律又按照幻觉镜像联想结合我们心中的镜像，幻觉镜像在睡眠期间出现且不可能被纳入任何所谓规律的形式：“一个血淋淋的头喷出血来，另一个头苍白无血，只是刹那间不见了。”我们的“惊醒”和利用我们的判断力取决于，像黑格尔早期也坚称的，我们获得物和语言的使用。“同样，我们在实际语境中运用判断力，在实际语境中，我们与其他人都在试图得到某种东西，从达到那些目的的人类劳动实践和工具的创造中出现的东西。
Recognition and Sexual Union
认识与性联合体
The creation and use of tools gives one an implicit grasp of oneself as a rational goal-setting agent, but the mere use of tools is not enough to make that implicit self-awareness into a fully explicit self-awareness. To be reflectively aware of oneself as having a point of view, one must be able to contrast it with some other point of view. To make such a contrast presupposes, however, that one is already aware of another agent as being reflectively self-aware, and thus in the manuscript, Hegel introduces his notion that when two agents who are only implicitly reflectively self-aware come to encounter each other, the unity between them, the rational will, splits itself into two types. The will, as he puts it, disrupts {entzweit) itself into “two powers, two characters.”’”
工具的创造和使用让人们能够含蓄地把他们自己理解成是理性的设定目标的行动者，但仅仅工具的使用还不足以使内隐的自我意识变成充分地外显的自我意识。为反思式地意识到作为具有观点的人们自己，人们就必须能够使这种观点与其他某种观点形成比照。不过，要作出这样一种比照，就要预先假定一个行动者已经意识到另一反思式地自知的行动者。因此在这部手稿中，黑格尔初次提出他的看法：当两个只是含蓄地反思式自知的行动者碰巧彼此遭遇的时候，他们两人间的统一体或唯理的意志自身分裂成两类东西。唯理的意志，像黑格尔论述的，一分为二（ **entzwei** ），变成“两种力量”“两种品格”。
Hegel returned to his notions of “recognition” to articulate this generation of self-consciousness, and, quite strikingly, in the 1805-06 manuscript he employed a theorized sexual encounter between man and woman to make that point. In the use of tools, agents encounter nature as a means to satisfy their impulses, but in the encounter of the sexes, “impulse comes to an intuition of itself. . . becomes knowledge (JVissen) of what it is,” and in being naturally aroused by the other, each agent thereby acquires a new “impulse” for the union with the other, which also results in a “tension” in each agent. Hegel quaintly describes this by saying that at first, each approaches the other “with uncertainty and timidity, yet with trust, for each knows itself immediately in the other.”'®’ In the union with the other, each cancels and preserves his and her individuality, each comes “to have his essence in the other,” and each comes to self-knowledge in being “external to self ”'®^ Each, that is, comes to know him- or herself as an agent in the union of the sexes; mindedness emerges out of nature through a natural attraction. The primordial unity of self-consciousness thus divides itself into (for Hegel, the always sharp) divisions between men and women.
在1805至1806年手稿中，他系统阐述自我意识的产生，十分惹人注目地，他使用被理论化的男女间的性遭遇来阐述这种观点。以工具的使用、行动者遭遇作为满足他们冲动手段的自然，但在两性的遭遇过程中，“冲动等于对它自身的直观……变成对它是什么的了解（ **Wissen** ）”，由于他者自然地引起的东西，每个行动者都因此获得新的“冲动”以与他者组成联合体，这也就导致了每个行动者的“紧张”。黑格尔借助下列这番话对此作了奇特的描述：起初，每个行动者都“带着忐忑不安和十分胆怯的心情”走近其余的行动者，“然而每个行动者同时也都是心怀信任，因为每个行动者都迅速知道他自己在其余的行动者心目中的地位”。在跟其他人组成的联合体中，各个行动者都抵消且保持他的和她的个性，各个行动者都逐渐“具有他的别人的本质”，每个行动者都等于自知“自我之外”的存在者。也就是说，各个行动者都逐渐认识到他自己或她自己是性联合体的行动者；精神通过自然的吸引而出之于自然。自我意识的原始统一从而把它自身划分成（就黑格尔而言始终明显的）男子与女子两个部分。
In such sexual union, both agents participate in the basics of creating a common point of view, which in “love” has its first and most immediate shape as a type of cognition. Sexual union makes explicit the very perspectival nature of the consciousness of such embodied agents. Selfconscious sexual union is thus more than the “natural,” biological attraction of the sexes; each understands that both their own radically perspectival, subjective point of view and the recognition of each by the other together fashions the beginning of a point of view that is not so perspectival yet not divorced from human individuality and embodiment. As Hegel puts it, in such self-conscious sexual union, his or her “uncultured {ungebildetes) natural self is recognized.”’®’
在这种性联合体里，男子和女子这两个行动者参与创造基本的共同观点，“性爱”的联合体使得它最早的最直接的形式成为一种认识。性联合体使得这些被具体化的行动者意识的特有视角禀性尽显无遗。自我意识的性联合体因此不仅仅是“自然的”、生物学上的两性吸引；每个性联合体都明了，它们自己的完全地恰当的主观的观点，与每个联合体借助其他性联合体所形成的认识，这两个方面共同构成性联合体起初的观点，起初观点不是十分恰当的，因为它依然没有被使得脱离人类的个性和化身。像黑格尔论述的，在这种自觉的性联合体里，他的或她的“未经教养的（ **ungebildetes** ）自然自我通常得到认可”。
Much of Hegel’s characterization of the sexes in this manuscript is also consistent with the views he had held since his youth about men and women, and which he continued to hold with only slight modifications until his death. The differences are almost always put in terms of a duality of activity and passivity, knowing and not knowing, animal and plant, and so on. In the margins of the manuscript, for example, Hegel revealingly wrote: “The man has desires, impulse; the feminine impulse is rather to be only the object of impulse; to entice, to awaken impulse and to allow it to satisfy itself in it.”'®* Why he had such trouble with Caroline Schlegel Schelling should be no great mystery; on the whole, Hegel simply could not entertain the idea of independent, active women, even if he did come later in life to endorse a very weak version of women’s equality and even if he does speak in this manuscript of the “positing oneself as the same” as the other, and of the opposition of the sexes being converted into an “equality.One can hardly help speculating about whether it is only coincidental that around the time that Hegel was composing these notes, he was also engaging in a sexual liaison with Christiana Charlotte Johanna Burkhardt, his landlady and housekeeper, which resulted in the birth on February 5, 1807, of his illegitimate son, Ludwig Fischer.
黑格尔在这部手稿中对两性特性的很多描述也是与某些看法一脉相承的，这些看法就是他自青年时代以来所始终持有的对男子和女子的看法，这看法在这部手稿中被他继续秉持，只不过是被稍稍作了修正，他余生一直秉持着这些看法。性联合体间的差异几乎总是被黑格尔根据主动性与被动性、认识与不认识、动物与植物等二元性加以论述。举例来说，在这部手稿页边处，黑格尔赤裸裸地写道：“男子有欲望有冲动；恰恰相反，妇女冲动只是冲动的对象；只是诱使男子冲动，只是激起男子冲动，只是允许男子以冲动来满足他自己。”“为什么他同卡罗利内·施莱格尔、谢林发生这样的纠纷，个中缘由应该没有什么秘密可言；总的看来，黑格尔简直不可能想到去取悦具有独立见解的自主的女子，即使他在后来生活中确实逐渐稍加认可妇女平等的说法，即使他确实在这部手稿中论及‘假定自己等同于’他人和论及两性的对立正被转化成‘平等’。”一个人几乎不得不去思考出现下列的事情是否只不过是个巧合：大约在黑格尔正在撰写创作这些讲稿时，他也正忙于跟他的女房东兼女管家克里斯蒂安娜·夏洛特·约翰娜·布克哈特的私通，这导致1807年2月5日他的私生子路德维希·菲舍尔的降生。
Life-and-Death Struggles for Recognition:
Families, Property, and Social Life
认识的生死斗争，家庭，财产和社会生活
Hegel lectured on how the establishment of sexual union creates the notion of a family, a social unity whose normative status is more than that of a contract between individuals, and then went on to discuss the struggle for recognition, a notion that had played such an important role in earlier manuscripts and which continued to play a crucial role in later works. Speculating in a very Rousseauian mode, he argued that the confrontation of independent families in the state of nature, with men as the heads of families, would eventuate in the “struggle” for recognition, which begins as a struggle over claims to family possessions. Each male head of a family seeks to exclude other male heads of families from his own domain; each therefore demands from the others a recognition of his own status as having the right to lay claim to such and such as possessions; each seeks, that is, “to count {gelten) for the other.In demanding to be recognized by the other as having rightful claims on the other’s possessions, each insults, so Hegel says, the other, challenges not the other’s impulses or desires but the other’s “self-knowledge. But in coming to see that they have thereby committed themselves to a struggle over life and death, each agent comes to see that more is at stake than he had thought, that he is putting himself, in Hegel’s words, in danger of committing suicide.^^ These life-and-death struggles for recognition thereby lead the agents to grasp that what is at stake in such struggles is not the same as what is at stake in the satisfaction of various impulses: What is at stake now is “that taking cognizance becomes recognition,” “willing without impulse,” as Hegel puts it, acting on the basis of a conception of what ultimately matters in life and not just on the basis of impulses that each happens to have. In the manuscript, Hegel surprisingly assumes that the confrontation with their possible deaths would simply lead each immediately to offer recognition to the other.
黑格尔讲授性联合体的确立怎样创造家庭这一概念，怎样创造社会统一体这一概念，讲授社会统一体的规范性地位不只是个体间契约的规范性地位，他接着继续探讨认识的斗争，斗争这一概念在早期手稿中已经扮演这样一种重要的角色，并且在晚期著作中继续扮演着一种至关重要的角色。以卢梭特有的方式思考，他辩称自然状态中由男子作为家长的独立家庭所面对的东西应该归结为认识的“斗争”，这种斗争起初表现为争夺家庭财产所有权。每个男性家长都试图阻止其他男性家长进入他自己的领地；每个男性家长因此都要求其他男性家长认可他因自己所拥有的地位而有权对某种财产提出所有权要求；也就是说，每个男性家长都想方设法“算计（ **gelier** ）其余的男性家长”。在要求得到其他男性家长承认可以合法拥有其他男性家长的财产过程中，每个男性家长都攻击，黑格尔也说，其余的男性家长，都不是指责其余男性家长的冲动或欲望，而是指责其他男性家长的“自知”。但是，在逐渐看出他们因此承诺为生死一搏时，每个行动者都逐渐看出，很成问题的远不止他事前想象的他正在使自己，用黑格尔的话说，置身于自杀的危险中。这些为得到认可而进行的生死搏斗从而致使行动者去把握，在这些斗争中成问题的东西不同于在满足各种不同冲动过程中成问题的东西：眼下成问题的是“察知变成认可”，变成“不带冲动的愿意”，像黑格尔说的，变成基于生活中最终至关重要东西的概念做事，不只变成基于每个行动者都正好具有的冲动来做事。在这部手稿中，黑格尔令人惊奇地假定行动者们可能面对的死亡简直总是致使每个行动者都迅速作出对其余行动者的认可。
Becoming such explicitly recognized social beings, they also become property holders, bearers of property rights and not merely heads of families in possession of certain family goods. This in turn leads them to establish lawful relations of exchange, to set up a system of punishment and enforcement of rights, and so on.
在成为这些明显地得到认同的社会存在者后，他们同样也成了财产的持有人，成了财产权的持有人，不仅仅成了拥有某些家庭利益的家长。这反过来致使他们去建立合法的交换关系、致使他们去制定一套处罚制度和权力的行使制度等。
Commercial Society, the Revolution, and the Task of Philosophy
商业社会，法国大革命和哲学的任务
In his lectures, Hegel applied his systematic idealism to his longstanding interests in the shape of a revolutionized Germany. The text shows that he was presenting to his students a series of arguments about the benefits and dangers of the emerging commercial society championed by the Scots and the forms of political freedom championed by the French. Freedom, he argued, is realizable only in a modern, lawgoverned commercial society and is also fundamentally threatened by the institutions and practices of that very same commercial society. For example, even though tastes become refined and wealth increases in modern industrial society, there are the dangers of machines taking over much of production, of a growing disparity of wealth and poverty. Like the mixture of hometowner and reformer that he was, Hegel claimed that the state has a duty to make sure that the suffering classes - he uses the term “Klassen"' and not ''Stdnde" in this connection - find alternative employment and to exercise a “universal oversight” in these matters. On the other hand, as a good reader of Scottish political economy, he also argued that state intervention in markets should be restrained and unobtrusive and that using taxes to prevent consumption is counterproductive. (His example is that of taxes on wine; presumably, that struck home for him.) He even made some passing remarks on the rationality of the idea of fashion; the emergence of the practice of changing fashions in clothing and decoration (itself part of the multiplication of needs in modern commercial society) is a social condition for the realization of freedom, for it gives individuals the opportunity to participate in a “free use of forms,” a way to relate to each other that “excites impulse and desire,” in which the very fluidity of modern life is made evident to their consciousness.-”'^
在他的讲课过程中，黑格尔把他唯心主义体系应用于他长期关注的以使德意志革命化形式出现的利益。这个文本显示他在向学生描述一系列关于被苏格兰人捍卫的正在兴起中的商业社会好处和危险的争论，以及一系列关于被法国人捍卫的政治自由形式的争论。自由，他坚称，只有在现代法制的商业社会才可实现，同样也本质上受到这相同的商业社会公共机构和风俗习惯的威胁。举例来说，虽然鉴赏力在现代工业社会得到提升和财富有所增加，但仍然有机器取代众多生产者之虞，仍然存在着财富与贫穷的日趋悬殊。像他作为乡下人和改革者一身兼二任一样，黑格尔声称我们的国家有责任确保受苦阶层——他在这一上下文联系中使用术语“ **Klasse** ”而没用术语“ **Stände** ”——找到可选择的工作和感到在这些事情上得到“普遍的照料”。另一方面，作为一位苏格兰政治经济学的良好读者，他同样也坚决主张国家对市场的干预应该受到限制和考虑周到，利用税收防止挥霍浪费通常会产生相反的结果。（他举了酒税为例；大概酒会使他产生顿悟。）他甚至对时尚概念的合理性也作了一些粗略的评论：改变衣着和装饰方式做法的出现（它本身构成现代商业社会需求倍增的一部分）是实现自由的社会条件，原因在于，出现这种现象使个人有机会参与“自由形式的应用”，提供个人一种彼此联系的、“引起欲望冲动”的方式，由于这种方式，使得人们明显地意识到现代生活特有的流动性。
Hegel’s great worry at this time was clearly about what could and could not be preserved in the transition to a reformed, modernized Germany. He noted that “freedom of commerce” must be maintained and that the state cannot “wish to save that which cannot be saved” it cannot artificially prop up local artisanal means of production that are doomed to extinction in the competition with more efficient modes of production in the emerging capitalist economy.But he also noted in a short fragment that this most likely meant for Germany the “sacrifice of this generation,” the “increase in poverty,” and hinted that therefore “poor taxes and institutions” for the support of those who suffer in this transition must also therefore multiply.
黑格尔当时极其担心的显然涉及什么东西可能在向一个经过改革的现代化德国过渡过程中得到保存，以及什么东西不可能得到保存。他注意到，“贸易自由”必将得以维护，国家不能“希望去挽救不能被挽救的东西”——国家不能人为地维持地方工匠式的生产方式，因为这种生产方式在与蓬勃兴起的资本主义经济效率更高的生产方式竞争时注定是要灭亡的。但是他在一条很短的残篇中同样也注意到，这种情况对德意志很可能意味着“这代人的牺牲”和“贫困的增加”，暗示着为支持那些在这种过渡中遭受痛苦的人所设的“穷人税和公共机构”因而也必须数量上成倍增加。
The third division of the manuscript, following “Spirit According to Its Concept” and “Actual Spirit,” is simply labeled “Constitution”; there Hegel discussed his systematic conceptions of how the “universal will” is to be rationally embodied in a particular “people,” a Volk. He used it, moreover, to update himself and his students on what he saw as the deeper significance of the French Revolution now that Napoleon was emperor and France was an empire. Certainly the Revolution had taken a different course during his stay in Jena. Napoleon, having already abolished the Directory and made himself first consul, managed on August 2, 1802 (16 Thermidor on the revolutionary French calendar), to have himself proclaimed consul for life; and then on May 18, 1804, after a decisive plebiscite, Napoleon was made hereditary emperor of the French and on December 2 staged his coronation. (The vote in the plebiscite was 3.6 million for, 2,569 against.)
这部手稿的第三部分，接在“概念的精神”和“实际精神”后面的，仅仅是被称之为“宪法”这一节；在那里，黑格尔探讨了他关于“普遍意志”应该如何被合理地表现在一个特定的“民族”（ **Volk** ）中的系统构想。不仅如此，由于拿破仑称帝和法兰西成为帝国，他所看作的法国大革命在更深层次的意义上，他利用“宪法”这一节来拓展他和他的学生的视野。毫无疑问，法国大革命早在他客居耶拿时期就已表现出不同的进程。拿破仑，在废除了督政府并使自己成为首任执政官后，想方设法在1802年8月2日（法国革命时期热月16日）宣布自己为终身执政官；接着在1804年5月18日，经过一次具有决定性意义的公民投票后，拿破仑被拥戴为法国世袭君主，并在当年12月2日登基加冕。（这一次公民投票的结果为360万票赞成，2569票反对。）
By 1805-06, Hegel thus was of two minds about the Revolution, and his manuscripts of that period clearly show it. He had still not given up his hopes for a “revolutionizing” of Germany, but his conclusion that the structure of the old Holy Roman Empire was simply incapable of accommodating itself to those changes had only become better founded. Although France itself had at first presented the odd spectacle of a country gradually drifting into anarchy while at the same time seemingly growing stronger in foreign affairs, it had apparently stabilized itself by Bonaparte’s seizure of rule; indeed, the so-called Code Napoleon went into effect on March 21, 1804, not only in France but also in Luxembourg, the German Palatinate, parts of Rhenish Prussia and Hesse-Damstadt on the left bank of the Rhine (which France had won from Germany in the treaty of Luneville), and in Geneva, Savoy, Piedmont, and the duchies of Parma and Piacenza. The new code embodied many of the goals of the Revolution, indeed, of modern life in general: It favored freedom of contract, underwrote modern ideas of property and inheritance, and, in a move that expressed Napoleon’s own feelings on the matter, put an end to revolutionary ideas about women’s equality by making wives subordinate to their husbands as a matter of the civil law. France thus seemed to be stabilizing itself in a way of which Hegel could partially approve and with which he could partially identify. Like many people in France, who had become tired of the anarchy, Hegel too continued at this time to be seduced by the idea of a strong leader, a “Theseus,” a Napoleon of the Germans who would do the equivalent of founding a new Athens in Germany, and he said as much in his lectures.
到1805至1806年，黑格尔对法国大革命怀有两种心情，他在那个阶段的手稿也清楚地表明了这一点。他依然没有放弃他对德意志“革命化”的希望，但他得出的结论是：过时的神圣罗马帝国结构简直不能使自己适应那些变革——只不过已经有了更好的根基。虽然法兰西本身起初呈现出一个逐渐流于无政府状态，而同时表面上在对外事务中变得日益强大的国家这一奇特景观，但法兰西却显然因波拿巴颁布的规章制度而使自己站稳了脚跟。更确切地说，《拿破仑法典》在1804年3月21日开始实施，这部法典不仅在法兰西实施，而且在卢森堡、德国巴拉丁领地、莱茵河流域的普鲁士部分地区以及莱茵河左岸的黑森-达姆施塔特实施（上述这些地区均为法兰西凭借《吕内维尔条约》从德国夺得），以及在日内瓦、萨瓦、皮埃蒙特、帕尔马与皮亚琴察公国实施。因此，这部新法典大体上体现了法国大革命的很多目标，更确切地说，体现了现代生活的许多目标：这部新法典赞同婚约自由，支持财产与继承权的现代概念，以及——采用体现拿破仑自己对问题的看法的措施——按照民法有关条款，终止男女平等的革命概念，使妇女服从她们的丈夫。法兰西从而似乎在以一种可能被黑格尔部分地赞成、部分地认同的方式来巩固自己的地位。像许多早已对国家无政府状态感到厌倦的法国人一样，黑格尔在这个时期同样也继续被一个强有力的领导人的想法所打动（这个领导人是“忒修斯”这位德国拿破仑，要去做的相当于在德国创立一个新雅典），黑格尔同样在他讲课中重复着这个领导人这一想法。
Hegel was not, however, completely taken in by the French example. Despite his ongoing high regard for the Revolution, Hegel’s Wiirttemberg past made him uneasy about many parts of it. Although Napoleon had effectively put into practice the new civil code, he had done so at the price of effectively dismantling representative government. Hegel was struggling to bring together what he saw as the affirmative aspects of the French upheaval with his other studies in Scottish political economy and his belief that something like the system of “estates” had to be preserved in Germany if freedom were to be adequately realized there. For example, whereas the Abbe Sieyes had sharply distinguished the “nation” from what the Scottish philosophers had called “commercial society,” Hegel took a different line; he distinguished between the “constitution” of a Volk (which made up their Geist, formed them as a “people”) and “actual spirit,” which corresponded very roughly to “commercial society” (and included marriage and the family).
不过，黑格尔对接受法国人为榜样有所保留。尽管他继续高度关注法国大革命，黑格尔的符腾堡早年经历仍然使他对法国大革命的很多东西感到担忧。虽然拿破仑有效地实施了新的民法典，但他这样做所付出的代价是实际上废除了代议制。黑格尔在竭力使他所看作的法国变革的积极方面与下列的东西融为一体：他在苏格兰政治经济学方面的其他研究，以及他所坚信的某种像“等级”制度一样的东西必将被德意志保持，如果自由要想在德意志得到适当的实现的话。例如，尽管阿贝·西哀士神父早已对“国家”和被苏格兰哲学家们称作的“商业社会”作了鲜明的区分，黑格尔仍然采取了不同的思路；他区分了“人民”（ **Volk** ）的“宪法”（“宪法”组成他们的精神，使他们构成“民族”）和“实际精神”，“实际精神”大致相对应于“商业社会”（并包含婚姻和家庭）。
Sieyes had insisted that (in his words) “the nation is prior to everything. It is the source of everything. Its will is always legal; indeed it is the law itself.”^”’ Hegel at first seemed to speak similarly when he said that the state “is the simple absolute spirit that is certain of itself and for which nothing counts but itself.”^®*^ However, from Hegel’s point of view, Sieyes’s conception simply failed to comprehend the way in which modern individualism takes root within the normative structures of a “people.” Hegel calls this a “Nordic essence,” the “principle of absolute individuality,” “absolute being-within-selP’^’; and he claimed that individuality emerges as the “higher principle of modern times” in the way in which individuals “return back fully into themselves,” which, as he noted, contrasts modern life with ancient Greek life.^'°
西哀士早就坚持（用他的话说）：“国家先于一切。它是一切事物之源。它的意志总是合法的；实际上它本身就是法律。”黑格尔起初似乎也说过类似的话，当时他说道：“国家是简单的绝对精神，绝对精神肯定是它自己，被算作绝对精神的只有绝对精神自身。”然而，从黑格尔的观点看，西哀士的构想根本未能领会这样一种方式，借此方式，现代个人主义植根于“人民”的规范结构。黑格尔称这一点为“日耳曼民族的本质”“绝对个性原理”“自我领域的绝对存在”；他主张个性按照某种方式显露为“现时代的更高原则”，以这种方式，个体重新完全成为他们自己，这使得现代生活与古希腊生活形成对照。
In phrasing it that way, Hegel set up the problem as one of combining “Germanic” freedom (with representative government), Scottish commercial society, and French revolutionary politics. (In the lectures, he scathingly remarks on what he took to be the utter boneheadedness of the Germans with regard to the momentous changes that were being required of them, returning to his claim that the “great man” must come along who is “to know the absolute will, to express it, to gather everyone under his banner.”)^" The estates, he argued, were crucial for such a combination to have any validity. Hegel simply rejected Sieyes’s solution for modern life - that the third estate was “everything” — but, more importantly, by 1805-06 Hegel had divided the estates in a revealingly different way than he had in 1803-04. In the 1805-06 ordering, the aristocracy dropped out altogether as an essential estate, and instead Hegel ordered things into an estate of peasants, of trade and law {Stand des Gewerhes und des Rechts), and of merchants (the Kaufmann) - and then, in addition to all these, he introduced what he called the “universal estate,” his new characterization of what he had earlier called the “absolute estate.” This included three very different types of groups: the soldier, who puts his life on the line in the name of the “people”; the businessman {Geschdftsmann), who deals in goods and monetary transactions from all over; and “those who work for the state.
在以上述方式叙述“现时代的更高原则”时，黑格尔提出的问题成了如何使“日耳曼人”自由（及代议制）、苏格兰商业社会和法国政治革命融为一体的问题。（在一些讲课中，他对下列内容作了尖刻的评论：那被他看作的德国人在某些重大变革方面表现出“无精打采”的态度，而这些重大变革正是他们所需要的东西，以及他所重申的“伟人”应该横空出世，因为“伟人”注定“晓得绝对意志，体现绝对意志，把大家聚于他的麾下”。）“等级”，他辩称，对这样一种完全合法的融合是至关重要的。黑格尔全盘拒绝西哀士对现代生活的解决办法——第三等级就是“一切”——而更重要的是，到1805至1806年，黑格尔已经用发人深省的不同方式来划分等级，而非用他1803至1804年采用的方式来划分等级。在1805至1806年的社会秩序中，贵族完全不再作为一个基本的等级，恰恰相反，黑格尔把某些东西分成农民等级、手艺人与执法者等级（ **Stände des Gewerbes und des Rechts** ）以及商人（ **Geschäftsleute** ）等级——接着，除了所有这些之外，他还引入了被他称作的“普通等级”，对他早先称作的“绝对等级”的新描述。上述这些内容包含三个截然不同的团体类型：战士，准备为了“人民”而献出生命的战士；商人（ **Geschäftsleute** ），到处经营货物和货币交易的商人；以及“那些为国家劳作的人们”。
