4 Texts and Drafts: Hegel’s Path to the Phenomenology from Frankfurt to Jena
Part One Philosophy in Frankfurt:
Hegel’s and Holderlin’s New Position
The Background: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism
第4章 文本与草案：黑格尔从法兰克福到耶拿时期《精神现象学》之路(1)
第一部分
法兰克福时期哲学：黑格尔和荷尔德林的新立场
背景：康德的先验唯心主义
IN THE Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had taken up Hume’s challenge to the very authority of reason itself. Hume, a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment, had quite ironically thrown much of Enlightenment thought into doubt: The idea that there was an order to the world that “reason” could discover - unaided, on its own - was undercut by Hume’s powerful arguments for the claim that there was in fact no necessary order to our ideas other than the ways in which they were combined in our minds according to habit and the laws of association. In light of Hume’s criticisms, Kant had tried to redeem reason’s claims for itself, arguing that there were indeed rationally necessary rules for the combination of ideas, and that these rules could be derived from the conditions for an agent’s coming to be conscious of himself. In one of the most important and darker passages of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claimed that for any “idea” or “representation” {Vorstellung, in Kant’s German vocabulary) to be a representation of mine, I had to be able to ascribe it to myself, to be able to say of it (roughly put) that it was a representation of mine, something that I actively took as mine by virtue of ascribing it to myself.' An “idea” or “representation” that I could not ascribe to myself would, of course, be unthinkable; it would be, for all practical purposes, a “representation” that would not even exist for me. It therefore followed that all “ideas,” “representations,” had to fit the conditions under which they could be ascribed to myself as a self-conscious agent (that is, as an agent who is not only aware of “representations” but who is also capable of becoming aware that such “representations” are his “own,” belong to “his” experience of things).
早在《纯粹理性批判》中，康德就接受了休谟对理性自身特有权威的挑战。休谟，作为苏格兰启蒙运动中的关键人物，对启蒙运动的许多思想冷嘲热讽，大加怀疑：这样的想法——存在着“理性”可能独立发现的世界秩序——受到了休谟为下面这个主张所做的有力论证的削弱：其实存在着我们的理念所必需的秩序，这样的秩序不同于那些方式，借助这些方式，我们的观念在我们心中被按照习惯和联想律加以组合。由于休谟的批判，康德试图拯救理性自身的主张，坚称观念的组合确实有着合理的必要的规则，坚称这些规则的起源可以追溯到行动者逐渐意识到他自己的条件。在《纯粹理性批判》最重要且较为晦涩的段落之一里，康德声称，就任何“观念”或“表象”（Vorstellung，用康德的德语词汇说）都是“我的”之表象而言，我必须能够把表象归因于我自己，必须能够述及表象（粗略地论述）表象是我的之表象，是一种被我主动地借助把表象归因于我自己而看作我的之东西。诚然，一个不可能被我归因于我自己的“观念”或“表象”也许是不可思议的；它实际上当然是一个对于我也许完全不存在的“表象”。所以由此得出，所有的“观念”或“表象”都必须符合某些条件，在这些条件下，它们可以被归因于作为具有自我意识的行动者的我自己（也就是说，我自己作为行动者不但意识到了“表象”，而且能够意识到这些“表象”是“他的”，属于“他的”事物的经验）。
Kant’s notoriously difficult argument was meant to buttress something like the following claims. First, there are ways in which our “representations” must be combined; it cannot all be just a matter of habit and association; we make judgments on the basis of those representations, and judgments can be right or wrong, unlike associations of ideas, which merely happen or do not. Second, those modes of combination depend on what is necessary for beings like ourselves to become self-conscious; it follows that the necessary ways in which we combine our “representations” fully constitute the structures in which the world can experientially appear to us, and Kant calls these structures the necessary “categories” of experience. Kant called these categories “transcendental” in something like the following sense: Although Hume was correct to assert that we do not experience any kind of “power” of causality but rather regularities of events, categories such as “causation according to necessary law” are nonetheless the conditions without which we could not have experience of objects at all. Such categories “transcend” experience in the sense that they are not capable of being empirically validated, but as the necessary conditions of experience, they are “transcendental,” part of the necessary “structure” of our experience.
康德的上述论证被说成是支持某种类似下列主张的东西。首先，存在着某些必须借以组合我们的“表象”的方式；这完全不可能只是关于习惯和联想的问题；我们在表象基础上作出判断，判断可能是对的或错的，判断不像观念的联合，它只是被作出或不被作出。其次，联想的那些方式仰赖于像成为有自我意识的我们自己一样的存在者所必需的东西；由此得出，那被我们借以组合我们的“表象”的必需的方式充分地构成那能被世界借以经验上展露在我们面前的结构，并且康德称这些结构是经验必需的“范畴”。康德将这些范畴叫作某种类似在下列意义上说的“先验的”东西：休谟正确地断言我们没有经验到任何种类因果律的“力量”，而宁可说经验到事件的规律性，但是，范畴，如“受必然规律支配的因果关系”范畴，依然构成那些条件，如果没有这些条件，那么我们就根本不可能具有关于对象的经验。这些范畴从下列意义上说“超出”经验的“范围”：它们不能被经验上加以证实，但是，作为经验的必需条件，它们是“先验的”，构成我们经验必需的“结构”的部分。
The complex act of identifying oneself as the same subject of experience of an objective world of objects in space and time distinct from those experiences of it - that act, Kant argued, was neither a “given” nor a matter of “habit” or “association.” Just as much as this selfconsciousness was necessary^ it was, as Kant put it, therefore also “original,” underived from anything else: It could not be a matter of applying “criteria” to discover that we are the same “I,” the same point of view in all our experiences. Kant drew the conclusion that the activity of combining these representations can therefore only be that of full spontaneity, an activity that does not rest on anything else but itself - it is, as Kant put it, a “self-activity,” a Selbsttdtigkeitd The unity of selfconsciousness could not be produced by the objects of experience, since our various “representations” had already to be combined for there to be objects for us at all. As spontaneous, this activity of combination was “self-bootstrapping”; there was no further agent behind the agent, no man behind the curtain, who could be doing the combining for us. Each agent had to combine his own experience himself according to the rules of combination universally valid for all rational agents.
认为自己等同于处于时空中的有别于世界经验的客观对象世界的经验主体，这是一个复杂的认识行为——这个行为，康德认为，既不是一个“给予物”问题，也不是“习惯”或“联想”问题。正像自我意识是必需的，这个行为因此也是“原初的”而非源自其他东西的，像康德论述的：这个行为不可能是下列这个问题——应用“标准”去发现我们是相同的“自我”，是我们一切经验中相同的观点。康德得出结论，组合这些表象的活动因此只能是完全自发性的活动，这种活动不依赖其他的东西而只依赖它自己——它是，像康德论述的，一种自发活动，一种 Selbsttätigkeit。自我意识的统一不可能由经验对象产生，因为我们各种不同的“表象”已经不得不被组合以便它们完全为了我们而成为对象。作为自发的东西，这种组合活动是“自力更生的”；行动者背后不复有行动者，幕后不复有人，行动者能够为我们做组合。每个行动者都不得不依照对所有合理的行动者都普遍合法的组合规则来亲自组合他自己的经验。
Kant in effect took himself to have shown how we were capable of combining two different and apparently exclusive views of ourselves into one overall conception of ourselves. Although we necessarily viewed ourselves as material beings in the world, we also necessarily viewed ourselves as subjective points of view on that world. The necessity for seeing ourselves as a unified, subjective point of view on the world had to do with the transcendental conditions of experience in general; for there to be any conscious experience, we had to unify all our representations into one consciousness, and that was possible only if we both unified those representations into an overall representation of an objective world populated by material substances interacting according to deterministic causal laws, and we unified those representations as being the representations of one unified consciousness, one subjective point of view. The unity of consciousness itself, however, as the transcendental “I,” never appeared in that objective world but was instead a transcendental condition of the experiential appearance of that world itself. That we necessarily think of ourselves as subjective points of view that do not appear in the objective world - as embodied beings we make our appearance in that world alongside other material objects, but as subjective points of view we do not — was, Kant contended, to be made intelligible not only by reflection on what was necessary for experience in general but also by the distinction between what he called phenomena (roughly, the world as appearing to us in experience) and noumena (the world as consisting of unknowable things-in-themselves, things that cannot be experienced).
康德实际上自以为已经证明的是，我们怎么能够做到将两种不同的、显然相互排斥的关于我们自身的看法合成一种大体上关于我们自身的概念。尽管我们必须将我们自己当作在世界中的物质存在者看待，我们也必须将我们自己看作在世界上的主观观点。必须将我们自己视为在世界上的一个统一的主观的观点，这关系到通常所说的经验的先验条件；就存在着任何自觉的经验而言，我们不得不把我们的一切表象统一成一种意识，要使这样做成为可能，唯一的条件是我们要做到下列两点：一是将那些表象统一成客观世界的总的表象，客观世界的构成物是物质实体，物质实体按照决定论因果规律相互作用；二是将那些表象联合成一种统一的意识的表象，联合成一种主观的观点。然而，作为“先验”自我的意识自身的统一，绝不会显露在客观世界里，反而构成客观世界自身的经验现象的先验条件。我们必须将我们自己看作不显露在客观世界中的主观的观点——看作我们使我们客观世界中的现象连同其他物质对象变成的具体化的存在者，但必须看作我们不使我们客观世界中的现象连同其他物质对象变成的主观的观点——上述这个看法必定，康德论辩道，被借助下列两种做法使得可被人理解：一种做法是反思通常经验必需的东西，另一种做法是区分他称之为的现象（粗略地说显露在我们经验中的世界）和本体（那由不可知的自在之物构成的世界或那些不可能被人经验到的东西）。
In a footnote to his argument, Kant drew a revolutionary conclusion that seemed to some readers to contradict other things that he said in the book. He said that the necessary unity of self-consciousness “is therefore that highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself.”^ (Hegel was much later in his Science of Logic to call these statements the “profoundest and truest insights” to be found in Kant’s first Critique.y That is, Kant seemed to be saying that all the principles of knowledge should be derivable from the con- ditions necessary for a rational agent to become self-conscious. Kant, however, had explicitly denied that, claiming instead two striking things: first, that the rules of combination had to be applied to what he called “intuitions” (such as sensory “givens”), the necessary structures of which were themselves simply given and not derivable from the conditions of self-consciousness itself; and second, that these principles, although necessary for any experience of objects at all, could not be said to give us knowledge of “things-in-themselves,” of what things were “really like” independent of all our experience of them.
在他论证的一个脚注中，康德得出了一个革命性的、在某些读者看来与他在书中论述的其他东西自相矛盾的结论。他说道，自我意识的必然统一“因此是最高点，我们必须归因于这最高点的是知性的所有的运用，甚至是整个逻辑，与此相应的是先验哲学。实际上统觉的官能就是知性自身。”（黑格尔很晚才在他《逻辑学》中称这些陈述是发现于康德的第一《批判》中的“最深刻和最真的洞见”）这也就是说，康德看来好像在说知识一切原理源头上都应该追溯到某些具有自我意识的理性行动者必需的条件。然而，康德早已明言他反而不主张两种惹人注目的东西：第一，组合的规则必须应用于他称之为的“直观的东西”（例如感觉“给予物”）或某些必需的结构（它们本身被简单地赋予我们而非可追溯到自我意识自身的状况）；第二，这些原理，尽管对于对象的经验是完全必须的，还是不可以被说成为我们提供“自在之物”的知识或事物“真正类似的”不依赖我们关于事物一切经验的东西的知识。
Invoking a realm of unknowable things-in-themselves, Kant meant something like the following. Metaphysicians had disputed for centuries about what the ultimate structure of reality was; some said it was all one thing - for example, one substance - of which thought and extension were only different “modes”; whereas others said that it was composed of eternal Forms, which were more real than their phenomenal instantiation, whereas still others claimed that reality was a set of noninteracting, self-contained monadic entities divinely arranged so that their internal movements just happened to correspond to the internal movements of the others.
借助于不可知的自在之物王国，康德要说的是某种像下面一样的东西。形而上学家们对现实的终极结构是何物的问题争论了多少世纪；一些形而上学家说现实的终极结构完全是某一东西——例如某一实体——关于思想与广延仅仅以不同“方式”成为的东西；而另一些形而上学家则说现实的终极结构由某些永恒的形式组成，这些永恒的形式比它们现象的例示更为真实，但是，仍然还有些形而上学家声称，现实是一系列非相互作用的、自给自足的、由上帝安排的、单子式的实有，因此这样一些实有的内部运动恰好与其他实有的内部运动相一致。
In Kant’s terms, these were all differing conceptions of what reality was like in-itself. In denying that we could ever have knowledge of things in-themselves, Kant was in effect claiming that we were required to take a fully agnostic position toward such metaphysical conceptions. We could with full justification claim that the world necessarily had to appear to us as a world of physical, mutually independent substances interacting with each other in space and time according to necessary causal laws (since Kant thought he had shown in the rest of his Critique that such categories were the necessary conditions of self- consciousness). But as to whether this appearing world of physical objects in causal interaction with each other was “really” in-itself a manifestation of eternal, supersensible forms or was a set of selfenclosed monadic entities was unknowable; all such claims about the metaphysical structure of reality in-itself were completely, fully, totally ungrounded and, moreover, could never be grounded, since human knowledge was necessarily limited to the way the world had to appear to us and to the “transcendental” conditions of that appearance. Human knowledge could not extend itself with any legitimacy whatsoever to what metaphysically existed in-itself. When it tried to do so, it merely ended up authorizing a series of mutually contradictory propositions, which Kant labeled “antinomies.”
用康德的术语说，上述这些是关于现实自在地所像的东西的完全不同的概念。在否定我们可能曾经有着关于自在之物的知识时，康德实质上是在主张我们需要采取彻底的不可知论的立场对待形而上学家的这些概念。我们可以有把握地声称，世界在我们看来必然是一个物质的、相互独立的实体世界，实体在时空中根据具有必然性的因果律相互作用（因为康德认为他早在他《纯粹理性批判》的其余部分就已证明这些范畴是自我意识必需的条件）。但是，至于这处在相互因果作用中显露的物质对象世界，是“真正”自在地永存的、超感觉的形式的展现，还是一系列自我闭合的单子式的实有，这一点是不可知的；所有这些关于自在现实的形而上学结构的主张都是完全地、彻底地、整个地无根基的而且绝不可能是有根基的，因为人类知识必需限于世界必须借以向我们显露的方式和必需限于现象的“先验”条件。人类知识本身不可能合法地扩展到任何形而上学地自在存在的东西。当它试图这样做的时候，它最终只是认可了一系列相互矛盾的命题，这样的命题被康德称为“二律背反”。
Many in Germany quickly understood that Kant’s denial of knowledge of things as they were in-themselves had potentially explosive consequences. First of all, it implied that there could be no theoretical knowledge of God, since God was precisely the kind of metaphysical entity about which Kant said we could in the literal sense know nothing. But in Germany, since the authority of the myriad German princes was almost always bound up with their being the heads of the churches in their respective Lander, Kant’s demonstration that we could not know about these supernatural things was taken to suggest that we also could not know whether the authority of the princes was in fact legitimate. Many of the great “rationalists” of the German Enlightenment had relied on their proofs of the existence of God to shore up claims for the authority of enlightened absolutist princes. Although Kant’s work seemed to answer the charges raised by Hume’s attack on the authority of reason as claimed by the “rationalists,” it simultaneously undermined the “rationalists’ ” own claims by demonstrating that reason could never pretend to have knowledge of things-in-themselves.
很多德国人很快就悟到了，康德否定关于作为自在的东西的知识，此举可能会产生爆炸性的结果。首先，这样的否定暗示不可能有关于上帝的理论上的知识，因为上帝恰恰是一种形而上学的实有，而这种实有是康德说的在某种意义上我们完全不可能认识的东西。但是在德国，德国无数王孙贵族的权力几乎始终是和他们各自公国（Lander）教会头头脑脑们具有密切关系，所以康德对我们不可能知道这些超自然物所作出的证明被看作使人想到我们也不可能知道王孙贵族的权力实际上是否是合理合法的。德国启蒙运动中许多伟大的“理性主义者们”早就依靠他们对上帝存在的证明来支撑开明的专制主义王公贵族的权力主张。康德著作虽然看来好像回击了由休谟对“理性主义者”主张的理性权威的抨击所引起的责难，但同时却削弱了“理性主义者”自己的主张，原因在于康德著作证明理性绝不可能声称具有自在之物的知识。
Kant’s protests that his work had shored up the new science in a way that only cleared the way for faith did nothing to assuage the fears about its undermining of princely authority. Most of the princes did not want their authority merely taken on “subjective” faith; they wanted their authority in its full, robust form as based on something demonstrably true. Kant’s austere theoretical philosophy therefore quickly became an object of intense public discussion, for it quickly came to appear to many as belonging to the same “revolutionary air” that was all-toothreateningly hovering over the princely domains of the Holy Roman Empire.
康德申明他的著作以一种仅仅为信仰廓清道路的方式为新科学撑腰打气，这个申明丝毫没有消除王公贵族对他的著作削弱了他们权力的担忧。绝大多数王公贵族不想要他们的权力只被当作“主观的”信仰；他们想要他们的权力形式上是完满的、健全的，想要他们的权力建立在某种明显地真实的东西基础上。康德朴实无华的哲学理论因此很快成了公众热烈讨论的对象，因为它很快逐渐被很多人看作属于一种等同于笼罩神圣罗马帝国王公贵族领地上空的具有极大威胁的“革命气氛”。
Reinhold, Jacobi, and the Battle over Kant’s Legacy in Jena
耶拿时期赖因霍尔德、雅科比和关于康德遗产的争论
By the late 1780s, the word was out that going to Konigsberg to study with Kant was wasted effort; Kant was busy, he was old, and he was obsessed with finishing his project before he died. That provided the opening for the small university town of Jena to establish itself as the real home of Kantianism. Indeed, the first person ever to give public lectures on the Kantian philosophy (besides Kant himself) was Christian Gottfried Schiitz, the founder and editor of the Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung, who had been lecturing on the subject at Jena since 1784, three years after the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason. Soon Kant’s works were being studied at Jena, and soon the jurist Gottlieb Hufeland was giving a Kantian twist to the study of jurisprudence at Jena, and the theologian Karl Christian Erhard Schmid was lecturing on the Critique of Pure Reason in the winter semester of 1785. Moreover, the Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung itself quickly became one of the chief organs or the propagation of the new Kantian revolution in philosophy, and Jena thus became the center of the debate over that revolution.
到18世纪80年代后期，有句话不胫而走，去柯尼斯堡师从康德白费力气；康德工作繁忙，年事已高，埋头完成有生之年的计划。这就为耶拿这个规模较小的大学城把它自己建成真正的康德主义之家提供了好机会。实际上，第一位曾经公开讲授康德哲学的人（康德本人除外）当属克里斯蒂安·戈特弗里德·许莱格尔，这位《文学总汇报》创办人兼主编，此君自《纯粹理性批判》问世3年后的1784年以来一直在耶拿以该书为题讲授康德哲学。不久，康德著作在耶拿得到相关学者的研究，接着法学家戈特利布·胡夫兰德在耶拿把康德哲学与法律学研究捏合在一起，神学家卡尔·克里斯蒂安·埃哈德·施密德也在1785年冬季学期讲授康德《纯粹理性批判》这本书。尚不止于此，《文学总汇报》本身很快变成传播康德新哲学革命的主要传媒之一，因此耶拿成了学界围绕这场革命所展开的争论的中心。
Jena’s prominence as the center of the new Kantian line of thought was reinforced by the publication in 1786 of Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy {Briefe iiber die kantische Philosophie). Born in Vienna on October 26, 1758, Reinhold had been a Jesuit novice until the order was dissolved in 1773, after which he attended a college from which he acquired the right to teach philosophy. ^ Reinhold himself came of age during the reign of Josef II of Austria, one of the paradigmatic enlightened despots of the age, who, in attempting to set the Austrian state on a firm, rational, bureaucratic footing, among other things abolished many traditional privileges for the Catholic Church, issued edicts of toleration for non-Catholics and for Jews, and expelled the Jesuits from all parts of the Holy Roman Empire, all the while setting up a political police that arrested dissenters from his policies.
耶拿作为康德哲学新思路的重镇，因 1786 年卡尔·莱昂哈德·赖因霍尔德《关于康德哲学的书信集》（Briefe über die kantische Philosophie）的发表而名声更响。1758 年 10 月 26 日出生于维也纳的赖因霍尔德，一直是耶稣会见习修士，直到这个品级在 1773 年被取消为止。在这之后，他投奔一所授权他教哲学的高校。赖因霍尔德本人在奥地利约瑟夫二世统治时期学术上羽翼丰满。约瑟夫二世当属那时讲究纲常的开明君主之列。除此之外，这位明君还在试图使奥地利国具有稳固的、合理的、官僚主义的根基过程中，废除了天主教教会诸多传统特权，颁布了一系列对非天主教徒和犹太教徒予以宽容的法令，同时把耶稣会会士赶出神圣罗马帝国的每一寸土地，并组建了一支旨在抓捕持不同政见者的政治警察。
Reinhold himself moved to Leipzig in 1783, where he converted to Protestantism, then to Weimar in 1784, where a year later he made a very judicious marriage to the daughter of Cristoph Martin Wieland, the great German writer and man of letters. His marital connections led him to become coeditor with Wieland of the Teutsche Merkur, a prominent journal. Reinhold quickly became well known as one of the “popular philosophers” writing about Enlightenment themes, and in 1785, spurred on by Schiitz’s article on Kant, he began a thorough reading of the Kantian philosophy. The result was his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy., in which he tried to show in a clear, “popular” fashion how Kant had resolved the great debate between reason and faith.
赖因霍尔德本人于 1783 年移居莱比锡，在那里他改信新教。后于 1784 年迁至魏玛，一年后他与德国大作家兼学者克里斯托夫·马丁·威兰德的女儿结为连理，实践证明他这步棋走得很妙。他的姻亲使他得以与威兰德合编《条顿墨丘利》这家著名杂志。赖因霍尔德很快大红大紫，跻身以启蒙运动为题写作的“通俗哲学家”行列，并在 1785 年，由于受到许莱格尔论康德文章的鼓舞，他着手对康德哲学作透彻的解读。结果他写出了专著《康德哲学通信》，在这部专著中，他力图以清晰明朗的、“通俗易懂”的方式证明康德早已如何解决了哲学界围绕理性与信仰展开的大讨论。
The conflict between faith and reason, brought to the forefront by Jacobi and experienced intensely by Reinhold in his own upbringing, provided the background for Reinhold’s encounter with Kant. Very roughly, Reinhold argued that Kant’s significance lay in his having demonstrated once and for all that faith and reason were not opposed to each other. Since Kant had shown that the proofs of God’s existence actually rested on practical and not theoretical reason, there was nothing to fear from modern science or speculation. Moreover, since Kant had also shown that reason cannot venture to make pronouncements about “things-in-themselves,” he had thereby demonstrated that the rationalists would also have to admit the reality of “faith.”® As Reinhold explained matters, one could be both modern and religious, provided only that one was a Kantian. Jacobi’s worries about the deleterious consequences of the extension of “reason” to all areas of life seemed to have been decisively answered.
信仰与理性之间的冲突，被雅科比弄得成为公众关注重点的且被雅科比亲手培养的赖因霍尔德强烈体验到的理性与信仰之间的冲突，提供了赖因霍尔德遭遇康德的背景。极粗略地说，赖因霍尔德坚称康德的重要性在于他早已一劳永逸地证明信仰与理性不是彼此对立的。因为康德早已阐明上帝存在的证明实际上依靠实践理性而非理论理性，所以现代科学或思辨根本就没有什么好害怕的。而且，因为康德还早已阐明理性不能冒险对“自在之物”作出看法，他由此证明了理性主义者当然也不得不承认“信仰”的真实性。像赖因霍尔德对某些问题作出解释的，一个人可能既具有现代气息又笃信宗教，唯一条件是一个人是康德哲学的信徒。雅科比担心将“理性”扩展到生活所有领域会造成有害结果，这样的担心看来好像已经被作出了决定性的回应。
Reinhold’s book catapulted the discussion of Kantian philosophy to the forefront of German life and brought with it the meteoric rise of Reinhold himself as the recognized leading exponent of the Kantian philosophy. This led to his procuring the position of “extraordinary professor” at Jena in 1787 and later to his becoming an “ordinary supernumerary professor” {ordentlicher uberzdhliger Professor) in 1792. His lectures, famous for their lucidity and rhetorical flourish, became a magnet for students. By 1788, more than 400 students (an unheard-of number for that time, particularly at a backwater such as Jena) showed up for his summer semester lectures on Wieland’s Oberon. Reinhold had overnight become the new star of German intellectual life.
赖因霍尔德的书使康德哲学探讨迅速走到德国学界前台，并且由于这个探讨，赖因霍尔德本人一跃成为公认的康德哲学顶级阐述者。这致使他于 1787 年在耶拿获得“杰出教职”职位，并于 1792 年成为“杰出教席教授”（ordentlicher Professor）。他的讲课，以清楚明晰和辞藻华丽著称，像磁石般吸引着学生们。到 1788 年，有不下 400 名学生（一个前所未闻的数目，特别是在一个死气沉沉的地方，例如耶拿）前来听他夏季学期讲授威兰德的《奥伯龙》。赖因霍尔德一夜之间成了德国知识界一颗新星。
However, during this same period, Jacobi had gone further in his criticism of Kant’s philosophy.^ Jacobi argued that the vaunted Kantian distinction between “appearances” and “things-in-themselves” only led to an even deeper and more corrosive skepticism, to the idea that we could not know what things were really like, and that the reassurances of so-called practical reason could not be enough to convince us otherwise. Coining a new term, Jacobi threw down the challenge: The consistent application of reason to human affairs could only lead to “nihilism,” to the notion that nothing really mattered.
然而，在这同一时期，雅科比在对康德哲学的批评方面走得更远。雅科比论证道，康德吹嘘的区分“现象”与“自在之物”，只能导致更深度和更有害的怀疑论，只能使人认为我们不可能知道事物真实面目，以及所谓实践理性一再作出的种种保证可能不足以使我们确信其他方面的东西。在造出“虚无主义”新术语后，雅科比发起了挑战：如果坚持将理性应用于人类事务，那么只能导致“虚无主义”，那么只能使人认为世上根本就没有什么东西真正是至关重要的。
Further, Jacobi accused Kant’s philosophy of being inconsistent and self-defeating. Kant held that things-in-themselves cause certain representations (intuitions) passively to arise in us, to which our spontaneous synthesizing activities then apply a categorial form; but Kant also held, as Jacobi pointed out, that causality was one of the categories that we arrived at in the application of this form to those intuitions, and that no “category of the understanding” could apply to things-in-themselves; Kant thus necessarily applied a category of appearances to things-inthemselves in direct contravention of his own theoretical strictures. All this showed, Jacobi argued, that no philosophical theory can do without some “given,” something that simply has to be taken as accepted, and this was as true in epistemology as in religion.
更有甚者，雅科比指责康德哲学前后矛盾，自拆台脚。康德认为自在之物使得某些表象（直观）被动地产生于我们，这些表象（直观）继而被我们自发的综合活动将一种范畴的形式应用于其上。但康德同样也认为，像雅科比指出的，因果关系是我们在把范畴的形式应用于那些直观过程中所达到的众多范畴之一，并且凡“知性范畴”都不可能应用于自在之物；康德因此必须将现象范畴应用于自在之物，这就直接违背了他自己理论上批判的东西。所有这些都表明，雅科比认为，哲学理论若无某种“给予的东西”或某种只不过必须被看作可以接受的东西，则一事无成，这种情况在认识论中和在宗教中都同样是千真万确的。
Jacobi’s arguments clearly struck at the heart of Kant’s project, and how seriously one took them depended on how one interpreted the Kantian project. What made Jacobi’s attacks all the more distressing for Enlightenment figures was that Jacobi himself was considered to be a progressive figure of the times. Jacobi was a physiocrat (that is, he held that agriculture was the basis of a country’s wealth, and he was in favor of free trade), a passionate defender of free speech, and a proponent of a form of constitutional government for the Holy Roman Empire that would be resemble that of England.* Nonetheless, he also thought that the unqualified application of standards of “reason” to all human conduct only led to a mechanized view of the world in which there was no room for human freedom, which inevitably led in turn to the excesses of Josef II in Austria and to the French Revolution.''
雅科比上述观点显然击中了康德哲学计划的要害。一个人究竟怎样严肃地看待雅科比观点，这取决于一个人怎样阐释康德的哲学计划。使雅科比的攻击变得更加令某些启蒙运动人物痛苦的，在于雅科比本人被认作是那时的进步人物。雅科比是个重农主义者（也即他认为农业是国家财富的基础，而他却赞成自由贸易），是言论自由的狂热辩护者，是那也许类似于英国宪政形式的神圣罗马帝国宪政形式的支持者。然而，他还认为，把理性标准完全应用于所有人类行为，只能致使人们形成机械的世界观，在机械世界观中，根本就不存在人类自由的地盘，这就转而不可避免地导致奥地利约瑟夫二世的暴行和法国大革命的暴行。
Jacobi’s wholesale attack on the Kantian system itself compelled Reinhold to the conclusion that what needed rehabilitating in Kant’s philosophy were not its conclusions but its very foundations, its first premises. Taking his newfound fame to heart and no longer content with merely being a mouthpiece for Kant, Reinhold began working out his own thoughts on how to complete the Kantian philosophy by providing, as he put it, the missing premises for the true foundation of Kant’s thought. The result of this project, and Reinhold’s failure at it, was epochal for the development of German idealism.
雅科比对康德哲学体系自身不分青红皂白的攻击，迫使赖因霍尔德得出下列结论：康德哲学中需要复兴的不是它的结论，而恰好是它的基础或初始前提。在认真考虑他新获得的名望后，由于不复满足于仅仅作为康德的传声筒，赖因霍尔德着手提出他自己对以下问题的想法：像赖因霍尔德论述的，如何借助为康德思想的真实基础提供缺失的前提而使康德哲学臻于完美。这项工程和赖因霍尔德在这项工程上的失败，结果为德国唯心论发展开创了新的时代。
If the Kantian philosophy were to be put on a sure footing, so Reinhold argued, then its basic principles had to be derived from some principle that was itself absolutely certain, a principle that one could not throw into doubt once one had come to understand it, and that would in its wake thus secure the claims of the Enlightenment. What was at stake, Reinhold argued, was not the “letter” of the Kantian philosophy but its “spirit,” not its “results” but its very “premises.”
如果康德哲学将被置于稳固的地位，赖因霍尔德也这么认为，那么康德哲学基础原理就必须被从某条自身绝对可靠的原理推出。这样一条原理一旦最终被理解了就不可能加以怀疑，因此它当然要捍卫启蒙运动主张。很成问题的是，赖因霍尔德辩称，不是康德哲学的“字面意义”，而是它的“精神实质”；不是它的“结果”，而恰好是它的“前提”。
To that end, Reinhold argued that since Kant’s philosophy was primarily a philosophy of consciousness, we needed a fundamental account of how this consciousness is constituted. Such a basic account would itself constitute an Elementarphilosophie (a philosophy of the “basic elements” of consciousness), and the most fundamental “element” or proposition of the Elementarphilosophie would be what Reinhold called the “principle of consciousness” {Satz des BewuJJtseins): “In consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and object and relates it to both.”'” This was taken by Reinhold to be an indubitable “fact” of consciousness, something that can serve as the foundation for all further philosophy. The Reinholdian picture of consciousness thus came to be that of a “subject” standing in relation to an “object,” with a “representation” standing between the subject and the object; for Reinhold, this subject actively relates the representation to the object (that is, takes it as a representation and not just a piece of “mental stuff’) and at the same time ascribes the representation to itself and distinguishes itself from that representation. On the basis of that conception. Reinhold went on to “deduce” the nature of the distinction between the form and content of representations and the rest of what he took to be necessary to the Kantian critical apparatus. With that deft move. Reinhold’s fame only increased; students flocked in greater numbers to Jena to hear Reinhold, the “purified Kant,” expound the Elementarphilosophie from his lectern.
说到底，赖因霍尔德论证道，康德哲学主要是意识哲学，所以我们需要对意识是怎样构成的作出基本的描述。这样一种基本描述本身应该构成 Elementarphilosophie（意识的“基本元素”哲学），而且意识的“基本元素”哲学的最基本“元素”或命题当然是赖因霍尔德所称作的“意识原理”（Satz des Bewusstseins）：“在意识中，主体区分表象和主体与客体，使得表象与主体和客体相联系。”这就是被赖因霍尔德看作的不容置疑的意识“事实”，看作的某种能够充当一切未来哲学基础的东西。赖因霍尔德的意识图画因此变成了处于与客体相关联中的“主体”的图画；变成了介于主体与客体间的“表象”的图画。对于赖因霍尔德来说，主体积极地使表象与客体相联系（也即将客体看作表象而不只是看作一块“精神材料”），同时主体将表象归于它自己并区分它自己和表象。基于上述想法，赖因霍尔德继续“推演”对下列两个方面进行区分的性质：表象的形式和内容，与那被他视为康德批判武器必需的其余东西。由于这机敏的一招，赖因霍尔德不料果真声名鹊起；同学们蜂拥至耶拿聆听赖因霍尔德这位“正宗的康德”在课堂上阐述意识的“基本元素”哲学。
Fichte’s Radicalization of the Kantian Project
费希特使康德的哲学计划激进化
Reinhold’s so-called discovery of the true basis - the premises, as it were - of the Kantian philosophy quickly ran into a devastating objection from G. E. Schulze in a widely read book at the time, Aenesidemus (published in 1792). Schulze pointed out that Reinhold’s characterization was clearly involved in an infinite regress: The subject doing the relating must be conscious of itself, and since all consciousness, on Reinhold’s definition, involves a representation, the subject doing the relating must have a representation of itself, which in turn requires another subject to relate it to itself and the first subject, ad infinitum. Given the widespread view that Reinhold’s accounts were only Kant’s views made more precise and readable, Schulze’s review might also have proved devastating to the Kantian project as a whole - except for the intervention of another young philosopher, Fichte, who in a review of Aenesidemus came to the conclusion not that the critical philosophy was to be abandoned but that it needed a better foundation than Reinhold had given it, namely, an account of self-consciousness that was not representationalist in character and therefore did not rely on the Reinholdian idea of the notion of “representation” being the fundamental concept in philosophy.*'
赖因霍尔德所谓关于康德哲学真实基础——似乎前提——的发现，旋即被 G.E. 舒尔策在当时被广为解读的（出版于 1792 年的）《埃奈西德穆》这本书中作了毁灭性的批判。舒尔策指出，赖因霍尔德对康德哲学特点的描述显然陷入尔策指出，赖因霍尔德对康德哲学特点的描述显然陷入无穷回归：主体在作出这种联系时必须意识到它自身，一切意识，照舒尔策界定，都涉及表象，所以主体在做这种联系时必须表象它自身，这转而需要另一主体使这种联系与它自身和第一个主体相联系，如此循环往复以至无穷。考虑到这个广为流传的看法（也即赖因霍尔德的描述只不过是被使得变成更准确和更可读的康德的看法），舒尔策的评论也可能已经证明摧毁了康德的整个哲学计划——除另一位青年哲学家费希特的介入外，费希特在评论《埃奈西德穆》时得出结论：康德批判哲学未必遭到抛弃，但它需要一种比赖因霍尔德早已提供的更高明的基础，也即一种对自我意识的释述，这样的释述不具有表象论的特点且因此不依赖于赖因霍尔德认为的“表象”概念构成哲学的基本概念。
