The need for philosophy thus arises out of a need for social life to overcome or heal its internal ruptures. It most certainly is not the need for some new, alternative authority that would replace the older authorities that have lost their hold on people. Philosophy, that is, does not replace the older system of religion with its “system.” In an 1802 reproach to the notorious defender of modern skepticism, G. E. Schulze - who had argued that philosophy had historically failed to produce a proper “system” to guide people - Hegel responded by ridiculing Schulze as having “presented the relation between philosophy and the public as that between a [state] administration and a people; the philosopher would hold the office of Pastoral Duty for the People’s Reason and would have taken the duty upon itself to construct for the people a constitutional philosophy and to administer the People’s Reason.”®® The implication was obvious: philosophy can and should aspire to no such thing.
因而，对哲学的需求源自需要社会生活克服或弥合它内在的断裂。对哲学的需求绝不是需要某种新的可供选择的权威，这样的权威也许取代某些较早的权威，因为后者业已失去了人民的支持。这也就是说，哲学没有用它自身的“体系”取代更老的宗教体系。在1802年对现代怀疑论著名辩护者G.E.舒尔策——此君早就辩称从历史上看哲学未能产生适当的“体系”以引领人民——作出指摘时，黑格尔作出的回应是嘲笑舒尔策“已经把哲学与公众之间的关系描述成是[国家]行政与国民之间的关系；哲学家应该把牧师的责任看作国民的理性。”这话弦外之音是不言而喻的：哲学不能够且不应该妄想去做的事情。
The kinds of “disjointing” that philosophy treats thus depend on the way of life itself and what “counts” for it. As examples of dualisms that were important in the past, Hegel lists “spirit and matter, soul and body, faith and intellect, freedom and necessity,” which, as he notes, “used to be important” but which have been supplanted in our time by the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity.®’
种种被哲学论述的“断裂”因此取决于生活方式本身和被“算作”生活方式的东西。例如历史上重要的二元论例子，黑格尔列举了“精神与物质，灵魂与肉体，信仰与理智，自由与必然”，它们，像他注意到的，“过去常常是很重要的”，但它们在我们时代已被主观性与客观性之间的对立所取代。
In trying to heal those ruptures, philosophy does not propose new and alternative explanations of the phenomena so much as it tries to shift the nature of the questions being asked about what ultimately counts, what is normative for us - as Hegel put it in the journal he kept during his years in Jena, “The questions which philosophy does not answer are answered in that they should not be so posed.”” In the case of the rupture between the “subjective” and the “objective” points of view, philosophy therefore had to ask if there was necessarily a viewpoint that included both of them and in terms of which they both are derivative.
在试图弥合那些断裂过程中，哲学没有提出对某些现象的新的可供选择的解释，甚至哲学不想改变那些常被追问的最终指望的东西或作为我们规范的东西问题的性质——像黑格尔在耶拿岁月所始终在日记中论述的，“那些无法被哲学回答的问题之所以将得不到回答是因为这些问题不应该被提出来。”因此，在“主观”观点与“客观”观点之间存在着断裂情况下，哲学只得追问是不是必需存在着一种观点，这种观点包含“主观”观点与“客观”观点，按照这种观点，“主观”观点与“客观”观点是不是被推出的。
Both the subjective and the objective points of view are, however, our points of view, and the opposition between them is an opposition within “us.” Consciousness, as a subjective awareness of an objective world, can in fact only be possible if the same agent can assume both points of view within himself. The point of view of consciousness presupposes therefore that the conscious agent have a grasp on something that is itself neither subjective nor objective, a unity of thought and the world, or conceptual form and sensuous content, that is prior to any such division between them. The “absolute” is thus the unity of subject and object, the unity of thought and being that underlies all our disrupted consciousness of ourselves and our world.
然而，主观观点和客观观点都是我们的观点，它们之间的对立也是“我们”的对立。意识，作为客观世界的主观意识，其实只能是可能的东西，如果同一行动者能够假定他自己的两种观点的话。意识的观点因此假定，自觉的行动者把握的事物自身既不是主观的也不是客观的，是思想与世界的统一，或是概念形式与感觉内容的统一，也就是说，是先于对主观与客观、思想与世界、概念形式与感觉内容的任何这样的划分的。这样一来，“绝对”是主体与客体的统一，是思想与存在的统一，这种统一构成我们关于我们自己和我们的世界的一切断裂意识的基础。
The dispute between realism and idealism thus had to be over the deeper ground and unity of what Hegel in the Difference essay called the “subjective subject-object” and the “objective subject-object.” The unity of those points of view - what Hegel calls a “subject-object” must include within itself a conception of how our subjective experience relates to a world of objects. However, there are two ways of misconstruing this “absolute,” paralleling the oppositions of “realism” and “idealism.” A “subjective subject-object,” as he calls it, would be a conception of objects as constructed out of subjectivity; an “objective subject-object” would have to be a conception of how the character of our experience is determined by the way in which objects interact with our minds. Any conception of the world as being somehow a construct or a “posit” out of our experiences thus has to be a “subjective subjectobject”; any conception of what is normative for our experience as deriving merely from the causal product of our interactions with nature or a grasp of some extra-mental item that determines in turn how we are to judge it would have to be an “objective subject-object.”
实在主义与唯心主义之争因而必然高于黑格尔在《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》这部论著中称作的“主观的主体—客体”与“客观的主体—客体”的更具有深度的根据和统一。那些观点的统一——黑格尔称作的“主体—客体”——必须在它自身中包含我们的主观经验怎样与对象世界相联系这一概念。然而，存在着两种误解“绝对”的方式，存在着两种把“实在主义”与“唯心主义”的对立相提并论的方式。“主观的主体—客体”，像他称作的，应该是出之主观性而建构的对象概念；“客观的主体—客体”必将是我们经验的特点如何被对象借以与我们心灵相互作用的方式确定的概念。任何关于世界作为以某种方式的建构物或出之于我们经验的“设定物”的概念因而必然是“主观的主体—客体”；任何关于下列的东西都必然是“客观的主体—客体”：凡是我们经验的规范都仅仅源自我们与自然相互作用的因果产物或都仅仅源自对某种额外精神产物的把握，这样的把握反过来决定我们应该如何对某种额外精神产物作出判断。
Since we find ourselves in our own conscious lives always embodying both the objective and the subjective points of view, the temptation is always to try to eliminate the incompatibility by constructing one point of view in terms of the other. Fichtean idealism, for example, attempts to construct the world out of the subjective positings of the “I,” and thus embodies the strategy of constructing everything out of a “subjective subject-object.” All materialists do exactly the opposite. (In the Dijference essay, Hegel actually defends materialism against Reinhold’s objections, arguing that Reinhold has failed to take seriously the intellectual motivations that would make someone into a materialist.) Schelling, on the other hand, has seen that both points of view are necessary to account for conscious life, “so that the absolute presents itself in each of the two subject-objects, and finds itself perfected only in both together as the highest synthesis in the nullification of both insofar as they are opposed.”*'' In Schelling’s terminology, the “absolute” must be therefore the “indifference point” of the subjective and objective points of view.
因为我们发觉我们自己处在我们自己自觉的生活中总是既体现客观的观点又体现主观的观点，所以这就诱使我们始终注定试图借助根据他者建构一种观点来消除不一致性。举例来说，费希特的唯心主义尝试去构建出之于“自我”的主观设定物的世界，因此体现出之于“主观的主体—客体”构建一切事物的策略。全体唯物主义者恰好反其道而行之。（在《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》这本论著中，黑格尔实际上为唯物主义遭到赖因霍尔德的非议鸣不平，坚称赖因霍尔德未能用心看待那些也许使某人成为唯物主义者的理智动机。）恰恰相反，谢林已经看出主观观点和客观观点是说明自觉的生活所必需的，“所以，绝对仅仅用主观的主体—客体和客观的主体—客体中的每一个来描述绝对自己，发觉绝对本身仅仅在下列的时刻才是完美无瑕的：就它们俩是相互对立的而言，主观的主体—客体和客观的主体—客体在取消它们两自己时共同成为最高的合题。”用谢林的术语说，“绝对”因而注定要成为主观的观点和客观的观点的“无差异点”。
Hegel thus supplied a kind of argument for the absolute that was only adumbrated in Schelling’s formulations but which, so Hegel thought, was nonetheless implicit in such formulations. He also supplied what he no doubt took to be the missing argument for the necessity of “intellectual intuition.” That we can entertain the opposition of the subjective and objective points of view in one consciousness could not be explained by either the subjective or objective point of view itself; therefore, the explanation had to be in terms of something that included each as factors within itself, and this could only be the intuitive awareness of the activity of which both points of view are themselves constituted. It is an intuition in that it has an “object” (our experience of the unity of the two points of view) of which it is aware, namely, the activity that constitutes the two different points of view; and it is intellectual in that it is not sensuous while still being an awareness within conscious life of the constitution of these two points of view. Schelling’s division of philosophy into transcendental philosophy (which explores things from the subjective point of view) and Naturphilosophie^ which explores things from the objective point of view, is explained as being rooted in the unity of the intuition of the absolute, of the self-limiting activity that makes up the two points of view.
黑格尔因此向绝对提供一种论证，绝对只不过是约略显示在谢林的系统阐述中，但是绝对，黑格尔这样认为，仍然暗含于这些系统的阐述中。他同样也提供无疑被他看作的“理智直观”必然性所缺少的论证。我们在同一个意识中持有主观的观点和客观的观点的对立，这种情况不可能要么被借助主观的观点自身加以解释，要么被借助客观的观点自身加以解释；所以说，这种解释必须根据某种东西（而且这种东西在它自身中包含主观的观点和客观的观点这两个因素中每一个因素）才能被我们做出，这种解释只能是对主观的观点和客观的观点二者自身由其构成的活动的直观意识。这种活动是直觉，因此它具有它所意识到的“对象”（我们关于主观的观点和客观的观点统一的经验），也即那构成两种不同观点的活动；这种活动是理智的活动，因为它不是感性的活动，而仍然意识到自觉的生活领域中主观的观点和客观的观点构成。谢林把哲学划分成先验哲学（它从主观的观点考察事物）和自然哲学（它从客观的观点考察事物），这样的划分被解释成是植根于绝对直观的统一，植根于限制自己的活动，限制自己的活动组成主观的观点和客观的观点。
In putting it in this way, Hegel was subtly trying to pull Schelling back toward Kant via the ideas he had worked out with Holderlin in Frankfurt. At the outset of the Difference essay, Hegel claimed that Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction of the Categories” is indeed the authentic (echter) idealism in its spirit, not its letter.’^ That spirit had to do with what the post-Kantians had taken to calling “pure speculation,” whereas the letter had to do with the oppositions set by “the understanding” from within the Kantian system itself Even there, however, Hegel characterized “speculation” in very Kantian terms, as the “activity of the one universal reason [directed] on itself’ which thereby “grasps its own grounding within itself’ - thereby echoing Kant’s own claim that “reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism . . . [and] reason depends on this freedom for its very existence.”®^
在以这种方式论述上述思想过程中，黑格尔借助他在法兰克福时期与荷尔德林共同提出的思想巧妙地试着把谢林拉回到康德的思想轨道。在《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》这本论著开始部分，黑格尔声称康德的“先验范畴推演”其实从它的精神实质上而非它的字面意义上说堪称本真的（echter）唯心主义，“这里的精神实质涉及后康德主义者早已看作的所谓‘纯粹的思辨’，而这里的字面意义牵涉被从康德哲学体系自身里面的‘知性’设定的对立。然而，即使是在那里，黑格尔也完全用康德术语，把‘思辨’描述成是‘唯一普世的[直接指向]其自身的理性活动’，理性由此‘把握它自已自在的根据——因此他重复康德自己的这样的主张，即‘理性想必因它承担的一切东西而隶属于批判……[并且]理性仰赖于它真实存在的自由’。”
“Faith and Knowledge”: Kant's Way out of Kant
《信仰与知识》：康德的离开康德之路
It was one thing to analyze the fundamental oppositions in philosophy as stemming from a misunderstanding by the “reflective understanding” about the unity of the absolute. Hegel, however, had larger targets in mind. One year following the publication of his Difference essay, Hegel again took up the related themes of how fundamental oppositions surface within a way of life and their relation to philosophical thought in an extended essay in the Critical foiirnal of Philosophy published in 1802 called “Faith and Knowledge or the Reflective Philosophy of Subjectivity in the Complete Range of Its Forms as Kantian, Jacobian, and Fichtean Philosophy. In that piece, he argued that there was more at stake than just a set of merely theoretical philosophical errors, that in fact the culture (Kultur) of his own time had come to be based on reflection, and that Kant’s, Jacobi’s, and Fichte’s “philosophies have to be recognized as nothing more but the culture of reflection raised to a system. This is the culture of the ordinary human understanding.”’^ The errors of philosophy were only expressions of a deeper malaise in the culture itself’^
对哲学中某些基本对立加以分析，这件事源于“反思的知性”对绝对统一的误解。不过，黑格尔心怀更大的目标。在他的《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》这本论著发表一年后，黑格尔重拾跟下列的内容相关的论题：这些基本对立怎样显露于生活方式中，怎样表现出它们与一篇经过扩充的论著中哲学思想的关联，这篇论著1802年刊发于《哲学评论杂志》，论著题为《信仰与知识或主观性的反思哲学》，它形式上完全基于康德、雅科比、费希特哲学领域。在这篇作品里，他力主的是，现在的问题是不只存在着一套纯理论的哲学错误，实际上他自己时代的文化（Kultur）已经逐渐奠基于反思，康德、雅科比和费希特的“哲学必须被认作只不过是被提升至体系的反思文化。以上所述是人类日常理解力的文化。”“哲学犯下的错误只不过是这种文化自身中更深程度的抑郁的体现。”
In putting matters this way, Hegel was also throwing into question something he had long held dear, the value of Bildung- If to become “cultivated” and “formed” were features of the “culture” of the time. and the culture of the time was itself fraught with ruptures within itself, then acquiring Btldung - doing the kind of thing his parents had done and which he had been raised to do — would by itself not be enough. Btldung required something beyond what it had traditionally included, namely, the kind of systematic philosophy Hegel was now advocating.
在以上述方式提出问题过程中，黑格尔还对他长期以来一直珍爱的教养的价值提出质疑。如果做“有教养的人”和做“成熟的人”是那时“文化”的特点而且那时的文化本身充满断裂，那么获得教养——做一种被他父母做的且他自幼就被教育去做的事情——大概自然而然还缺点什么东西。教养需要某种超出它传统上包含的东西以外的东西，需要一种被黑格尔现时倡导的体系哲学。
The modern “culture of reflection” is in fact the “culture” whose basic characteristics have been expressed by the philosophies of Locke and Hume, according to which the task of philosophy can be only to have “the world assessed and from now on explained from the standpoint of the subject.”’^ At its best, “reflection” can produce only a more or less coherent ordering of the assertions emerging from taking one of those points of views as fixed, not a resolution of the fundamental division between them.*’^ The result is a proliferation of “systems” of philosophy, each with its own degree of plausibility, and no apparent way of settling the disputes among them.
现代“反思文化”其实是这样的“文化”，它的基本特点已经得到洛克哲学和休谟哲学的陈述，根据他俩的陈述，哲学的任务只能是使“世界得到评估和从现在开始使世界从主体的观点得到解释”。在它全盛时期，“反思”也只能产生或多或少有序的断言而已，这样的断言来自把那些观点中之一种看作固定不变的，而非看作对那些观点间的基本划分的解决办法。结果是哲学“体系”如雨后春笋般地涌现，每一哲学“体系”从它自身程度上看都是貌似有理的，显然没有什么方法能够解决哲学体系间的争论。
In positing one of the sides of the subject-object dualism as more basic than the other, as explaining somehow how the other acquires its determinateness, both such Lockean and Kantian “reflective” philosophies invariably degenerate into some form of psychologism. That is, they inevitably lead to some kind of theory about how the “operations of the mind” are structured by certain laws such that the mind performs these operations on some discrete bit of experiential data so as to produce the experienced world. If, after all, one operates with the picture of the world (of the set of things-in-themselves) as interacting with a subject (either by causing intuitions, as Kant says, or by causing some even more generally conceived Ansto/J, some “check” or “impingement,” as Fichte says), and one goes along with the picture of “mind” (or the “I”) “processing” the “data” according to its own set of laws to produce the world of appearance (which can never be said to be the same as the world-in-itself), then of course it makes sense to ask for the laws governing this kind of operation. Philosophies of reflection are thus led to some picture of one set of principles being applied to some given data to produce a product that is somehow the unity of both; the paradigm becomes that of application of a scheme to some given content rather than developtnent of both from something else.
在假定主体—客体二元论的某一方面作为比其他方面更为基础的方面时，在以某种方式解释其他方面怎么需要确定主体—客体二元论的某一方面时，洛克和康德两人的这种“反思”哲学一律地蜕变成心理主义的某种形式。这也就是说，他们两人的“反思”哲学不可避免地变成关于下列内容的一种理论：“心灵的运作”受到某些法则的支配，所以心灵整理这些互不相关的经验材料，以便产生被经验到的世界。如果人们毕竟（要么借助产生直观，像康德说的，要么借助产生某种被加以更为一般地设想的 **Anstoβ**，一种“检查”或“影响”，像费希特说的）从而把（自在之物的那套）世界图画用作与主体相互作用，如果人们和“心灵”（或“自我”）这幅图画一道遵照经验“材料”自身那套法则来“加工”经验“材料”以产生现象世界（现象世界不能说成等同于自在世界），那么当然要求经验“材料”自身法则支配心灵这种运作就是讲得通的。这样一来，反思哲学被使得产生某套原理的某种图式，这套原理被应用于某种给定的材料，产生的产物是以某种方式作为某套原理的某种图式与某种给定的材料的统一体；这个范式变成把图式应用于某种给定的内容，而非根据其他东西发展一套原理的某种图式和某种给定的材料。
Hegel argued that Jacobi’s thought formed an especially interesting case because Jacobi wished to deny the Kantian and Fichtean picture of the mind’s “processing data” or “applying” forms to some given con- tent while holding onto the basic picture of subject and object that drove Kant and Fichte to their own conclusions. Rejecting both Kant and Fichte as transcendental skeptics, Jacobi is simply left with a great divide between subject and object which he bridges by the deus ex machina of positing that we just immediately know that there is a world external to our experiences and a God that answers to our need for Him. (In both cases, Jacobi calls this immediate knowledge “faith.”) Jacobi, however, could only come to this conclusion if in the first place he took “the [transcendental] imagination and self-originating reason as something arbitrary and subjective, and . . . sensuous experience as eternal truth.That is, Jacobi is led into his doctrine that we just know that there is a world out there because he psychologizes Kant’s and Fichte’s points.
黑格尔力主雅科比的思想之所以变得特别有意思，是因为雅科比想要否定康德和费希特关于心灵“加工材料”或心灵把形式“应用于”某种给定的内容这一描述，同时想要坚持认为对主体和客体的基本描绘迫使康德和费希特得出他们自己的结论。在拒绝作为先验怀疑论者的康德和费希特观点后，雅科比只不过面对主体和客体之间巨大的分界线，这样的分界线被他借助解围之神的下列做法加以弥合：假定我们只是立刻知道在我们的经验之外存在着一个世界和一个对我们有求必应的上帝。（在上述两种情况下，雅科比称直接知识为“信仰”。）不过，雅科比只能得出这样的结论，如果首先他把[先验的]想象力和具有自我创造力的理性当作某种独断和主观的东西看待的话，如果首先他把……感觉经验当作永恒真理看待的话。“这就是说，雅科比被迫得出这样的论断：我们只知道之所以存在着一个外部世界是因为他从心理角度阐释康德和费希特的观点。
Hegel’s point was that one could not simply write off Jacobi’s strategy as only a psychologistic misunderstanding of Kant and Fichte, since their philosophies inevitably require such a reading. Since we cannot say what things-in-themselves are, we are inevitably led back to the idea that it is “we” (or the “transcendental I”) that put the relations of causality onto “givens,” and once we begin to reflectively focus on what we mean by saying that we put these constructions on things, “transcendental idealism has passed over into this formal or more properly, psychological idealism.That is, the idea that we transcendentally apply the categories to the givens of experience quickly passes over into the idea that the categories are simply something that we humans just “project” onto experience.Thus, “Kantian, and more particularly Fichtean philosophy are forever sliding into this psychological idealism.This is the consequence of “explaining the world from the standpoint of the subject.” Kantian and Fichtean idealisms are thus essentially “dualisms” and are “nothing more than an extension of Lockeanism.””’-’
黑格尔的观点在于，人们不可能把雅科比的策略简单地一笔勾销，不可能把雅科比的策略只当作对康德和费希特心理主义的误读误解，因为康德和费希特哲学不免需要这样一种心理主义的解读。因为我们不能说出自在之物是什么，所以我们不可避免地不得不回到这样的想法：正是“我们”（或“先验的自我”）使得因果关系成为“给定的东西”，一旦我们着手集中思考我们所意图着的在于说我们把这些建构加到了事物身上，“先验唯心主义就变成了形式的或更恰当的心理唯心主义”。“就是说，我们先验地把某些范畴应用于经验的给定物，这样的想法很快成了下列的想法：这些范畴不过是某种被我们人类恰好‘投’向经验的东西。”这样一来，“康德哲学，和更特殊的费希特哲学永远滑入心理唯心主义”。“这就是‘根据主体观点阐释世界’带来的后果。”因此说，康德和费希特唯心主义本质上是“二元论”，本质上“只不过是洛克主义的延伸”而已。
In saying all that, though, Hegel proposed what he saw as Kant’s own way out of Kant’s troubles. Despite his dualism of “concept” and “intuition,” Kant had come to the conclusion that there could be no “unsynthesized intuitions” of which we could be conscious, that is, that there is nothing in experience that is simply “immediately given,” of which we can be aware without having to be in possession of any conceptual faculties or that we can know without having to know anything else: As Hegel puts it, indirectly quoting Kant himself, “The Kantian philosophy has the merit of being idealism because it does show that neither the concept in isolation nor intuition in isolation is anything at all; that intuition by itself is blind and the concept by itself is empty.”'”'* Both concepts and intuitions are “moments” within the whole that is consciousness. They are not independent elements that must be somehow brought together and combined in order for consciousness to come to be. Furthermore, Kant himself seemed to acknowledge as much when he argued that the synthetic unity of consciousness was original, that is, underived, and formed the basis of everything found within consciousness. Hegel makes the point thus: “The original synthetic unity must be conceived, not as produced out of opposites, but as a truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites.”'”^ The “opposites” here are concepts and intuitions, which are “identical” because they are only constituents of a whole, which Hegel identifies with “the absolute and original identity of selfconsciousness.”""’
尽管如此，在作出上述这些论述过程中，黑格尔还是提出他所看到的作为康德自己摆脱康德的苦恼的路径。尽管他的“概念”和“直观”是二元论的，康德仍然最终得出下列的结论：根本不可能存在着被我们意识到的“未经综合的直观”，就是说，经验中根本不存在着简单地“直接给予的”东西，根本不存在着能够被我们意识到的且不必为任何概念官能拥有的东西，或者说，根本不存在能够被我们知道的且不必知道任何其他东西的东西；像黑格尔表述的，间接地引用康德本人的话，“康德哲学之所以具有唯心主义的优点是因为它确实表明孤立的概念和孤立的直观什么也不是；无概念的直观是盲目的和无直观的概念是空洞的。”概念和直观二者构成作为意识的整体中的“环节”。它们不是独立的元素而必须被以某种方式集在一起且融为一体以便意识逐渐生成它们。进一步说来，康德本人看来好像同样也承认上述这一点，其时他坚称意识的综合统一是原初的，就是说，是非引申的，和构成一切见于意识领域事物的基础。黑格尔因此强调指出：“原初的综合统一必须被设想成不是出自对立的产物，而必须被设想成是一种真正地必然的、绝对的、原初的对立物统一。”这些“对立物”是概念和直观，它们之所以是“同一的”，是因为它们只是整体的成分，整体被黑格尔认作“自我意识的绝对和原初的同一”。
On Hegel’s view, Kant argued otherwise only because he was in the grip of a “reflective,” dualistic picture of the mind as consisting of separate elements that had to be psychologically combined instead of a picture of the mind as having various “moments” within its overall organic unity. Thus, Kant was led to argue that transcendental philosophy must supply the rule of application for its concepts, that is, its categories, and it must do this a priori.In making that move, Kant thus shifted the focus of transcendental philosophy away from the unity of experience as oriented to a “whole” and toward the application of categories to the “given.” The application of the categories to the givens of sensuous intuition, however, requires some kind of interplay between the two faculties, that is, some kind of mediation between the pure categorial concepts (the “scheme”) and the empirical intuitions (the “content”) to which they are “applied.” Kant, of course, concluded that time had to be that intermediary, since it is both pure (a priori) and empirical (it is a form of intuition, that is, a form in which objects can be “given” to us); and since all representations appear in what Kant calls “inner sense,” everything appears in time. Kant calls this intermediary the schematism^ with the schema being a system of rules that applies the category to an object of sense and which thereby gives the otherwise empty category its determinateness, or its “meaning” {Bedeutung). The schema is set up by the faculty Kant calls the productive imagination, and Kant himself notes that how it does this - apply the rules - is a mystery.”’**
照黑格尔看，康德之所以坚持不同的看法是因为他把“反思的”、二元论的心灵图画理解成由一些分开的、必须被从心理学上加以组合的元素组成，而不是把“反思的”、二元论的心灵图画理解为具有处在它总的有机统一中各种不同的“环节”。所以说，康德不得不坚称，先验哲学必须把规则应用于先验哲学概念，也就是，必须把规则应用于先验哲学范畴，并且先验哲学必须先天地这样去做。在采取这一措施过程中，康德从而把先验哲学着眼点由摆脱定向经验的统一转到“整体”和转向把这些范畴应用于特定的“给予物”。但是，要想把那些范畴应用于感性直观的给定物，这就需要两种官能间的某种相互作用，就是说，需要纯粹的范畴概念（“图式”）与范畴所“被应用于的”经验直观（“内容”）之间的某种中介。康德无疑断定时间必须成为媒介物，因为时间既是纯粹的（先验的）也是经验的（时间是直观形式，也即对象能够借以被“给予”我们的形式）；因为一切表象都显露在被康德称作的“内在的感觉”中，所以一切事物都显现在时间中。康德称媒介物为图式性表述，图式作为规则体系把范畴应用于感觉对象，图式因此使另外的空洞范畴具有它的确定性或它的“意义”（ **Bedeutung** ）。图式由康德称作的多产的想象力这个官能设立，康德本人指出这个官能怎样做到这一点——应用某些规则——是神秘莫测的。
Hegel scoffed at the very idea that Kant needed to have any such doctrine of schematism, arguing that the only reason for introducing it had to do with his “reflective” conception of the mind as “processing” discrete data in the first place. Indeed, if one pursued Kant’s line of thought vis-a-vis the notion of an original, underived unity of selfconsciousness instead of his idea of consciousness as divided into distinct faculties of concept and intuition, then the productive imagination itself would be seen not as an intermediary but as the original unity Itself. “This power of imagination is the original two-sided identity. The identity becomes subject in general on one side and object on the other; but originally it is both. And the imagination is nothing but reason itself . . . as it appears in the sphere of empirical consciousness.”'”^
黑格尔恰恰嘲笑下列的看法：康德需要具有任何这样的图式性表述理论，并坚称唯独采用图式性表述理论的理性才首先与他关于作为“加工”分散材料的心灵“反思”概念有关。实际上，如果一个人追求把康德的思路和原初的、非引申的自我意识概念相比，而非和康德关于意识被划分成概念和直观的不同官能想法相比，那么多产的想象力本身就不应该被看成是媒介物，而应该被看作原初统一本身：“想象力的力量是原初两方面的同一。这种同一通常一方成了主体另一方成了客体；但最初这种统一既是主体也是客体。而且想象力只不过是理性自身而已……此时它出现在经验意识领域。”
What in Kantian idealism had therefore looked like a division into two distinct faculties of spontaneity and receptivity (of “the understanding” and “intuition”) really involved an original unity in which spontaneity was already at work in what only seemed to be the sheer givenness of experience. It is not so much that we receive contents in our experience of the world as we take up our experience in a kind of spontaneous activity. Thus, the model of “reflection” - that we apply a formal “scheme” to a sensible “content” - does not actually fit what Kant says about productive imagination. In taking up a content, we are not applying anything to a “given” so much as we are actively orienting ourselves in experience by attending to various manifestations of the world to us or by actively taking up certain incentives to action by determining our will in accordance with them. Hegel identifies this “taking up” as the appropriating of the manifold of sense as spontaneity.”” However, this spontaneity is not simply free, unattached activity, as if one had an inert world on one side and a free-spinning spontaneity on the other side. Rather, it must be conceived as an active taking up of something, of a way in which the world manifests itself to us by virtue of our taking up its manifestations to us.
如此而来，在康德唯心主义那里，看来类似成为（“知性”与“直观”的）自发性和感受性这两种不同官能的切分确实涉及原初的统一体，在原初统一体中自发性已经作用于仅仅看来好像是经验纯粹给予性的东西。我们不接受我们经验到的世界的内容，这就如同我们不借助一种自发活动来接受我们的经验一样。因此，“反思”的模式——我们将其作为形式“图式”应用于可感觉“内容”的模式——实际上不适合康德就多产的想象力所说的东西。在接纳内容过程中，我们没有把任何东西应用于“给予物”，就像我们借助下列的做法来积极地定位经验中的我们自己一样，专心于世界向我们作出的各种不同的显露或积极接纳行为的某些刺激以确定我们意志与它们的一致。黑格尔认为这种“接纳”就是对具有自发性的感觉多重性的盗用。然而，这种自发性不只是自由的、无拘无束的活动，好像人们一方面具有惰性世界另一方面又具有自由旋转的自发性。说得确切一点，这种自发性必须被想象成是对某物的积极接纳，必须被想象成是对一种方式的积极接纳，因此世界借助我们接纳它向我们显露的东西来向我们显露世界自身。
In the Difference essay, this was called “intellectual intuition,” but, significantly, Hegel does not put that term to such use in “Faith and Knowledge,” although a similar idea is at work there. In “Faith and Knowledge,” Hegel is more concerned to show how Kant in particular is driven by the logic of his own thoughts to something like a doctrine of “intellectual intuition,” and to show how the logic of Kant’s philosophy also indicates a way out of dependence on “intellectual intuition.”
在《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》这本论著中，以上论述的被称作“理智直观”，但具有重要意义的是，黑格尔在《信仰与知识》中没有把这一术语作这样的使用，尽管类似的观念在那里得到了运用。在《信仰与知识》中，黑格尔更为关心的是去证明康德特别怎样由他自己的思想逻辑而被迫转向某种像“理智直观”理论的东西，更加关心的是去证明康德的哲学逻辑同时怎样标示一条摆脱对“直觉理智”的依赖的路径。
In this light, Hegel focuses particularly on Kant’s 1790 Critique of Judgment, especially §§76-77 of that work."' Kant argues there that we necessarily require a conception of a purposive whole for two kinds of judgments even if we can never infer that any such purposive whole actually exists."^ Those judgments are those concerning, for example, organisms whose parts can only be understood in terms of their serving some function in the whole that is the organism; and those judgments about the beauty of certain natural objects and human artifacts.
考虑到上述这些，黑格尔特别着眼于康德1790年发表的《判断力批判》这部著作，特别是该著中的第76节至77节。康德在那里论证道，我们必然需要两种判断用于合目的的整体这一概念，即使我们绝不能够推断任何这样的合目的的整体实际上都是存在的。举例来说，那些判断涉及那些有机体，有机体中的部分只能被根据它们在作为有机体的整体中发挥的某种作用加以理解；那些关于某些自然对象和人造物的美的判断同样也涉及那些有机体。
What especially caught Hegel’s eye was Kant’s claim that since, first of all, we cannot do without the concept of purposiveness, and, second of all, we cannot say the world is actually purposive, we are led to the regulative idea of an intuitive intellect, in his terms, to “a complete spontaneity of intuition ... a cognitive power different from and wholly independent of sensibility,”"^ which requires us to “conceive of an understanding that, unlike ours, is not discursive but intuitive, and hence proceeds from the synthetically universal (the intuition of a whole as a whole) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts.”"■* That is, we are led to the regulative idea of an intellect that actively takes up a teleological whole and elicits out of that whole what the parts must be, even if we cannot say that such an intuitive intellect actually exists. Kant added to this the extraordinary claim that we could regard thereby the “substrate” of the material world as a thing-in-itself and “regard this thing-in-itself as based on a corresponding intellectual intuition (even though not our own). In that way there would be for nature, which includes us as well, a supersensible basis of its reality, although this basis would necessarily remain beyond our cognitive grasp.In the second introduction to the Critique of Judgment, Kant added that “judgment . . . provides nature’s supersensible substrate (within as well as outside us) with determinahility by the intellectual power . . . This judgment makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.”'"’
尤其吸引黑格尔注目的是康德主张，因为，第一，我们不可能做任何事情，如果没有目的性概念的话，第二，我们不可能说世界实际上是有目的的，所以，我们被迫走向理智直观这一规定的观念，用康德术语说，我们被迫走向“直观的绝对自发性……一种不同于且完全不依赖于鉴赏力的认识能力”。这就要求我们把知性想象成为和我们理性不同的不是作为推论而作为直观的东西，所以知性经历了从综合的共相（纯粹的整体直观）到具体，也即经历了从整体到部分。“这就是说，我们被迫走向规定的理智观念，理智积极地接纳目的论意义上的整体，推出部分必须从属于的整体，即使我们不可能说这样一种理智直观实际上是存在着的。康德对此进一步作出非同凡响的主张：我们因此可能把物质世界的“基质”当作自在之物看待，可能“把自在之物看作奠基于相应的理智直观（尽管自在之物不属于我们自己的理智直观）。在这方面，就自然（这里的自然也包括我们）来说，应该具有自然现实的超感觉基础，尽管这样的基础通常必然依旧是我们无法认识和把握的东西。”在《判断力批判》下卷导言里，康德进一步论证道：“判断……借助理智力量向自然的超感觉基质（它也是我们无法把握的东西）提供可决定性……这个判断使我们可能从自然概念领域过渡到自由概念领域。”
Hegel seized on Kant’s idea that he had provided a link between nature and freedom in the reflective judgment, saying that Kant had found the “middle term” between the two, indeed, their “identity.”"^ However, he charged Kant with failing to show that this idea of an intuitive intellect could only be regulative, a conception that although necessary for us to have, could not be said to actually exist. This was, Hegel argued, most clear in Kant’s own explanation of judgments about the beautiful. The experience of the beautiful, on Kant’s analysis of it, is intrinsically normative’. As Kant puts it, “When we make a judgment declaring something to be beautiful ... we cannot base it on experience; for it seeks to justify us in making judgments that contain an ought: It does not say that everyone will agree with my judgment, but that he ought to.””® (Kant makes the same kinds of claims about teleological judgments.)”'’
黑格尔利用了康德关于反思判断力早已提供自然与自由之间的联系这一想法，并说康德找到了自然与自由之间的“中项”，更确切地说，自然与自由的“同一”。然而，他指责康德未能证明理智直观概念仅仅可能是规定的概念，只可能是一种虽然必须被我们具有但不可能被说成实际上存在着的概念。这，黑格尔坚称，极其清楚地体现在康德自己关于审美判断的阐释中。审美经验，按照康德对它作出的分析，本质上是具有规范的；像康德论述的，“当我们作出一个判断宣称某物是美的……的时候，我们不可能使这个判断建立在经验基础上；因为经验试图向我们证明作出含有‘应当’的判断是正确的：经验不是假定每人都会赞同我的判断，而假定他应当同意我的判断。”（康德对目的论判断力作出了相同种类的主张。）
The difference between teleological and aesthetic judgments, Kant says, is that the former are objective while the latter are subjective. By this Kant means that in making teleological judgments, I judge that an object is as it ought to be in fulfilling its purpose. (Kant’s cited the eye as an example of such an object.)”” If I judge it merely in terms of mechanical laws, I make no such normative judgment: A defective eye violates no rules of physics; its defectiveness lies in its failure to achieve the purpose of seeing. On the other hand, when I make an aesthetic judgment that something is beautiful, I make a judgment that others should judge it as I do, that is, that the object ought to be judged as / judge it.
目的论判断力与审美判断力之间的差异，康德说道，在于目的论判断力是客观的东西而审美判断力则是主观的东西。借此说法，康德意指，在作出目的论判断时，我断定对象是像它应当实现它的目的一样的东西。（康德举出眼睛作为这样一种对象的例子。）“如果我仅仅按照机械法则来断定它，我就没有作出这种规范性的判断：一只有缺陷的眼睛没有违反物理学的法则；它的缺陷在于它未能达到看的目的。另一方面，当我作出某物是美的这一审美判断时，我作出他人应该像我那样断定对象这一判断，也就是，我作出对象应当被像我对它作出断定那样被加以断定这一判断。”
In teleological judgments, therefore, I judge that the object ought to be a certain way; in aesthetic judgment, I judge that the object ought to be judged in a certain way.”' Furthermore, I do not claim that the object that is being judged is defective if somebody fails to judge it as it ought to be judged; I am judging that my judging the object to be beautiful is as It ought to be, and that my judging (or the other’s judging) is defective if it is not as it ought to be. I cannot state a rule for this, except to say that others ought to judge as / judge (a normativity that Kant calls “exemplary” necessity).'” Kant (infamously) called this “purposiveness without a purpose,” by which he apparently meant that although my judgment is normative (purposive), it has no specific rule to guide it (it is without a purpose).'”
所以说，用目的论判断，我断定对象应当具有某个方面；用审美判断，我断定对象应当被按照某个方面加以断定。尚不止于此，我主张正在被断定的对象是没有缺陷的，如果某人不能像它应当被断定一样对它作出断定的话；我在断定我断定对象是美的是像它应当被作出的断定一样的断定，我在断定我的判断（或他人的判断）是有缺陷的，如果它不是像它应当被断定一样被加以断定的话。我不可能陈述上述判断的规则，除了能够说他人应当像我一样作出断定外（一种被康德叫作“典型的”必然性的规范性）。康德（生硬地）称这为“无目的的合目的性”，借此称呼，他表面上表达的是，虽然我们的判断是符合规范的（符合目的的），但它却不具有特殊规则引导它（它是无目的的）。
