But Hegel meant much more by a “state” than merely some body possessing a monopoly on force within a territorial unity. From his days at Tubingen through Berne and Frankfurt, Hegel had been attracted to what he took to be a Greek ideal of a way of life that would unite religious, social, and political life within itself A way of life (or “spirit,” as he had come to call it in Frankfurt) had to be something that could give its participants some orientation, a point to living. In arguing for the overarching importance of a “common defense,” Hegel was not therefore arguing that the state should somehow assert itself (Hegel was not a “statist” in that essay.) He argued instead that only when a state has united its citizens in a common project with which they can freely identify can it lay claim to their full and uncoerced allegiance.*’' Germany was “no longer a state” because it no longer constituted such a common point of view for “the Germans”; it was not any kind of body in whose collective ends they could see their own ends reflected, and it was for that reason incapable of rousing them to a common defense.
但是黑格尔借助“国家”所要表达的意思还不只是某种组织垄断一国领土内的军队。从他在图宾根后到伯尔尼再到法兰克福的岁月来看，黑格尔已经受到他看作的希腊人生活方式的理想吸引，这种生活方式总是把宗教生活、社会生活和政治生活结合在自身中。生活方式（或基督教“精神”，像他在法兰克福时期就已开始称作的）必须成为一种能够提供它的采用者具体定向和生活观点的东西。在为赞成“日常防御”具有至关重要地位而辩论时，黑格尔因此不是在论证国家应该以某种方式维护它自己。（黑格尔在这篇论著中不是一个“国家主权论者”。）他反而认为国家只有在已经使公民联合在一个被公民能够自由地认同的共同计划中时，才能够要求公民充分而非强制的忠诚。“德国之所以‘将不复是一个国家’，是因为德国不复秉承‘德国人’这样一种共同的思想观点；德国不是任何一种在德国集体目的中能够被公民看出公民自己目的得到反映的实体，德国由于这个原因而不可能唤醒公民共同防御意识。
In developing that analysis of contemporary German political life, Hegel was still operating within the ambit of the issues that had motivated his unsatisfying attempts at outlining the conditions for a modern religion, asking what could provide the basis for moral, spiritual, and social reform in modern times. Originally, Hegel had asked this question of Christianity, only to find it wanting. Now Hegel asked the same question of the Holy Roman Empire - could it be the basis of moral, spiritual, and social reform or must something new replace it.^
在阐述对当时德国政治生活的分析时，黑格尔依然是在某些问题领域进行的，这些问题激起他不满足于去尝试勾画现代宗教的状况，而尝试追问何种东西能够奠定现代道德、精神和社会改革的基础。起初，黑格尔已经向基督教徒提出这个问题，仅仅发现基督教徒对这个问题的回答是不能令人满意的。现在他向神圣罗马帝国问了相同的问题——何种东西能够奠定道德、精神、社会改革的基础？或者某种新东西必须取代何种东西吗？
The background to the issue that Hegel was raising in the essay had to do with the failures of the Holy Roman Empire in the face of the challenges put to it by the French Revolution. On the one hand, the behavior of the members of the Holy Roman Empire clearly illustrated that the individual German principalities did not have any particular allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire. The smaller states were largely unenthusiastic about joining the imperial war effort, and the great powers (Austria and Prussia) showed no solidarity at all with each other, each dropping out of the war from time to time to conclude their separate short-lived peaces with France.“ The French had proved to be militarily overwhelming in part because of their ability to raise large, spirited, devoted conscript armies, whereas the princelings of the various German states neither could nor wanted to do any such thing. (Karl August of Weimar - on whose watch Goethe had built up the university at Jena - succinctly summed up the matter: “I would rather pay my last ecu to the elector of Saxony to have a couple of his good regiments march than to arm five hundred of my peasants.”)“ The distrust that the princelings of the Holy Roman Empire felt toward the common folk, such distrust that they were unwilling to arm them, was reciprocated; the common folk had no desire whatsoever to go off and fight for their princes; to most of them, one oppressor was as good as the other, and they felt no particular loyalty to any one of them.
关于黑格尔在这篇论著中提出的问题的背景，牵涉神圣罗马帝国无法面对由法国大革命向它提出的种种挑战。一方面，神圣罗马帝国成员的所作所为显然表明作为个体的德国公国没有具体表现出效忠神圣罗马帝国。这些较小的国家对加入帝国战争的努力热情大减，一些大国（奥地利和普鲁士）彼此钩心斗角，每个大国战战兢兢以和法国达成他们的间歇性短暂和平。法国人证明在军事上具有压倒性的优势，部分原因是，他们能供养一支庞大的军队，军人精神饱满，由勇于献身的应征入伍者组成，而德国各种不同公国的公侯王孙既不能够也不想去做任何这样的事情。（魏玛的卡尔·奥古斯特——在他监督下歌德创建了耶拿大学——对这件事作了简要的概括：“我宁愿把我最后的一文钱花在萨克森有选举权的人身上，以使他们的两个优良军团奔赴疆场，而不愿去武装我的500个农民。”）神圣罗马帝国公侯王孙不信任普通民众，这转而导致他们不愿意武装普通民众，这种互动循环往复；普通民众无所谓离开哪个公侯王孙和为公侯王孙中哪个人而战；在绝大多数普通民众看来，天下压迫者都是一路货色，普通民众大体上没有觉得想要具体忠诚于公侯王孙中的任何一个人。
The French, on the other hand, had rallied the people by means of the Revolution to the cause of the nation of France. The conscripts of the French army had come to believe that they were fighting for the Revolution and for France, which for them was not the abstraction that the distant duke or king was for the professional German solider. This identification with the “cause” (and the way in which the French combined this large army with superior tactics and with new ways of handling the problems of logistics) made the French unbeatable against the old-fashioned armies of the Reich^ whose discipline came from long training and from the fear of failure instilled in them by their commanding officers (usually through harsh measures). To Hegel’s way of thinking, the mass conscription and the spirited fighting of the French soldier were closer to the Greek ideal of citizenship than was the outmoded, dull professional soldiering typical of the armies of the Holy Roman Empire. Revolutionary France offered its members something that elicited their full allegiance, gave them an orienting point and something to redeem their lives. The Holy Roman Empire only offered its men modest pay for service and the threat of severe punishment if they failed at their duties.
另一方面，法国公侯王孙用法国大革命来把人民团结在法兰西民族利益下。法军中应征士兵逐渐相信他们在为法国大革命而战、在为法兰西而战，对于他们而言，远方的公爵或国王一心想打败德国的职业士兵，这样的说法绝非是空穴来风。这种对法兰西“事业”的认同（和那被法国公侯王孙用来把这支大军和优秀战略战术及处理后勤问题新方法结合起来的方式）使得法军对德意志帝国的老式军队战无不胜，法军训练有素并已经被他们的指挥官（常常通过非常残酷的措施）灌输了对失败的担忧。就黑格尔的看法而言，大批征兵和法国士兵的精神战更近乎于希腊公民的理想，而非神圣罗马帝国军队的理想。因为神圣罗马帝国军队是典型过时的、愚钝的、职业化的军队。革命中的法兰西提供它的成员们某种诱使他们完满忠诚的东西，给他们定向性的观点和某种救赎他们生活的东西。神圣罗马帝国只能提供它的臣民们羞辱的支付和严厉处罚的威胁，如果他们出现失职情况的话。
In that situation, the question that had to be raised was fully analogous to the key issue that Hegel had raised in his earlier essay “The Positivity of the Christian Religion.” In that essay, the question was not “/.s Christianity a positive religion?” but rather “Could Christianity become a people’s religion?” Likewise, the central question for the essay on the “German Constitution” was not: Is the Holy Roman Empire a state in the sense that it elicits allegiance to itself on the part of its members, that it offers them something worth living and dying for? It was instead: Could the Holy Roman Empire become such a state? To understand the possibilities open to the Holy Roman Empire, Hegel argued, one had to understand its spirit - the defining norms that articulated what ultimately mattered to the German people - in order to determine “Germany’s” possible fate.
在这种形势下，这个必须被提出的问题完全类似于那被黑格尔在早期论著《基督教的实定性》中已经提出的关键问题。在这篇论著里，所提出的问题不是“基督教是实定的宗教吗？”而宁可说是“基督教能成为人民的宗教吗？”同样，这篇关于《论德意志宪法》论著的核心问题不是：神圣罗马帝国是从下列意义上说的国家——它诱出它的成员们对它自己的效忠，它给成员们某种值得为之把生死置之度外的东西吗？这篇关于《论德意志宪法》论著的中心问题反而是：神圣罗马帝国有可能成为这样的一个国家吗？为理解适用于神圣罗马帝国的发展前途，黑格尔论证道，一个人只得理解它的精神——那些阐明最终对德国人民至关重要的东西的得以界定的规范——以便确定“德国人”可能降临的命运。
On Hegel’s account, the defining norm for the German “spirit” had to do with “freedom.” Original Germanic freedom involved the individual’s refusal “to be restricted by the whole; his limitations he imposed on himself without doubt or fear.”*^^ However, as the Germanic peoples and the Roman peoples mixed at the end of the Roman Empire, this freedom was transformed as the various states in what was eventually to become Europe became ever larger.The combination of Germanic “freedom” and the ever-increasing size of the political units of Europe resulted in the development of feudalism, in which groupings of individuals as estates came to be represented in the state. The system of original Germanic freedom thus developed into the system of representation, which in turn became “the system of all modern European states.Weaving his understanding of Gibbon into his analysis of Germanic freedom and the principle of representation, Hegel claimed that this marked an “epoch in world history. The nexus of the cultivation and formation of the world has led the human race beyond oriental despotisms, through a republic’s world-dominion, and then out of the fall of Rome into a middle term between these two extremes. And the Germans are the people from whom this third universal formation of the world-spirit was born.”^^
照黑格尔的阐述，德国式的“精神”得以界定的规范与“自由”有关。原初的德国式的自由涉及个人拒绝“受整体的限制；个人的一些限制无疑被个人毫不顾忌地强加于自己自身”。然而，当德国人和罗马人在罗马帝国末期彼此融合的时候，随着各个国家在最终成为欧洲的土地上变得越来越大，这种自由被弄得走了样。“德国式的”自由与欧洲政治实体规模的日益扩大，此二者合起来导致了封建主义的发展，在这一发展过程中，作为社会阶层的个人团体逐渐被国家所代表。原初的德国式的自由制度因此发展成代议制，代议制依次变成“一切现代欧洲国家制度”。在他把对吉本的解读变成他对德国式自由和代议制原理的分析后，黑格尔声称代议制标志着“世界历史上的新纪元。世界的孕育和形成的联系已经使人类超过东方的专制君主统治、经过共和国的世界统治和随后因罗马衰落而进入专制君主制和世界统治这两极的中项。而且德国人是从中诞生世界精神的第三种普世形态的民族”。
Unfortunately, Germany, which gave the idea of modern representative government to the rest of the world, was incapable itself of fully realizing that ideal. Because its “principle” was that of “abstract freedom,” the Germanic nation continued its cleavage to the way of life embodied in the hometowns of the Holy Roman Empire with their set of accumulated and fiercely defended arcane rights and privileges. This attachment to the individual and the hometown made it impossible for Germany to be really free, since the continued existence of these selfcontained, very traditional, supposedly “free” communities “does not rest on their own power and force; it is dependent on the politics of the great powers.Thus, the fate of German “freedom” was that it necessarily turned into a loss of freedom, into merely apparent and not actual, efficacious freedom. German freedom, as evidenced in the freedom of the individual and the hometown to adhere to their traditional ways of doing things, necessarily became entwined with a freedomundermining dependence on the goodwill of the great powers.
令人遗憾的是，德意志——为世界其他各国提供现代代议制思想的德意志——自身不可能完全实现这一理想。因为它的“原则”是“抽象的自由”，日耳曼民族使它的分裂延伸到那体现在神圣罗马帝国家乡的生活方式，家乡具有它们自己那套堆积如山和受到极力保护的神秘权利和特权。这种对个人和家乡的依附使德国不可能成为真正自由的国度，因为这些自给自足、极其传统、据称“自由”的共同体的继续存世不依靠它们自己自力更生的权力和军事力量；这样的共同体继续存世取决于大国的政治策略。这样一来，德国人的“自由”——像显示在个人与家乡的自由中固守他们传统的做事方式一样——必然变成与对自由的削弱大国善良意志的依赖缠绕在一起。
In rejecting the claims of the hometowns to be adequate embodiments of “Germanic freedom,” Hegel rejected large portions of his father’s world and his own Stuttgart youth. Indeed, he reserved his most scathing comments for his own youthful hero and the hero of his father’s generation, J. J. Moser, the great Wurttemberg lawyer who had argued that the validity of the laws of the Holy Roman Empire rested on the foundation of what tradition had established, who had done the most to write out those laws, and who was the champion of the “constitutional settlement” in Wurttemberg in 1770. (Although Moser is not explicitly mentioned, the object of Hegel’s scorn has always been clear to commentators.) Against all those lawyers and followers of Moser who were continuing to argue that the Holy Roman Empire was still a state because of the existence of imperial law and of the so-called traditions of imperial law, Hegel argued that the Holy Roman Empire was a state only in “thought” and not in “actuality.”^’ Since the Holy Roman Empire could neither enforce its laws, nor defend itself according to its laws, it could not be said to be an actual, effective state, however much it may have looked like one in Moser’s law books.
在驳斥“德国式自由”适当体现的家乡主张时，黑格尔基本上摒弃了他父亲的世界和他自己斯图加特青年时期的世界。实际上，他保留着对他年轻时的英雄以及他父亲那代人的英雄——J.J.莫泽这位符腾堡大律师——极为刻薄的评论。莫泽早就力主神圣罗马帝国法律的合法性奠基于传统业已确立的东西，莫泽不遗余力地制定了那些法律，莫泽是1770年“从法律上解决”符腾堡归属问题的领军人物（虽然莫泽未被明确提到，但黑格尔所鄙视的对象对于评论者们来说已经是一清二楚的）。在反对所有那些律师和莫泽的追随者（这两种人继续坚称神圣罗马帝国仍然是一个国家，理由是帝国法律没有消失和帝国法律所谓的传统还在）的时候，黑格尔力主神圣罗马帝国是一个仅仅存在于“思想”中而非存在于“现实”中的国家，因为，神圣罗马帝国既不可能实施它的法律，也无法依据它的法律为它自己辩护，所以，它不可能被说成是一个实际的、有效的国家，不管它也许在莫泽的法学著作中看起来多么像是一个国家。
Hegel thus firmly rejected the Moser-inspired celebration of tradition in the “good old law” of Wurttemberg. His attraction instead to the Revolution in France has to do with the way its very modernity had cast aside such appeals to tradition and substituted instead the ideal of actualizing freedom within the institutional structures of a modern political order. The vaunted “freedom” of the hometowns, so dear to so many German political thinkers at the time, had, Hegel suggested, simply rotted away because of the incoherence at the heart of German hometown life.
黑格尔因此坚决摒弃对激起莫泽希望的符腾堡“古老的美好的法律”传统的颂扬。他反倒为法国大革命所吸引，这与法国大革命的真正现代性有关：法国大革命抛弃了对传统的这些诉求，反倒代之以在现代政治秩序的公共机构体系内实现自由这一理想。家乡的炫耀式“自由”，同时也是当时德国很多政治家珍爱的“自由”，黑格尔使人联想到，简直已经烂掉了，原因在于这样的“自由”实质上与德国人家乡生活风马牛不相及。
The issue then clearly was; Given that this is the fate of Germany, is there anything to be done about it.^ Must Germany transform itself into something else? Or, analogous to the question of whether Christianity could become a modern religion, could “Germany” remain “Germanic” in the conditions of the modern world? Or does “Germany” necessarily have the same fate that Hegel at the time ascribed to ancient Greece or to the Jews - that, having played its role on the world stage, it now is fated to sink gradually into oblivion?^”
问题于是显然是：考虑到这就是德意志的命运，还可能为它做点什么吗？难道德国必须把自己变成其他东西吗？或者说，与基督教是不是能够成为现代宗教这一问题相类似，难道“德意志”可能仍然维持“日耳曼民族在现代世界的状况”吗？或者说难道“德意志”必须具有黑格尔那时归之于古希腊人或犹太人的相同命运——也即尽管德国在世界舞台上发挥过作用，但是德国现在却注定将逐渐被人遗忘？
For Germany to be a true state, it would have to unite its people in such a way that they could come to identify with it. To do that, it would first have to have as its objective “the immutable maintenance of rights.” Second, for such Germanic freedom to be possible in the modern world, a people must “be bound to a state by law.”^' Third, this legal formation of a people would clearly require representation: “people must share in the making of laws and the management of the most important affairs of state . . . without such a representative body, freedom is no longer thinkable.”’^ The problem was that all these conditions had been made virtually unrealizable because of the fact that the modern German principalities were composed of essentially contradictory sets of rights rooted in the restricted and self-undermining world of the hometowns. Where there are such contradictions, there can be no solution, for there is nothing higher to which one can appeal than the spirit of the state itself, which, if riddled with such contradictions itself, cannot resolve the contradictions of its parts.(War itself, Hegel notes, cannot decide which rights in the contradictory pairs are legitimate; it can only decide “which of the two rights is to give way.”)’'* Is such freedom possible when the form of life is so clearly shaped by the structure of the hometowns?
就德国将成为真正的国家而言，它必须以人民可能逐渐对它加以认同的这样一种方式来团结它的人民。要做到这样，它首先必将把“权利的永久维持”作为它的目标。其次，就日耳曼民族的这种自由将在现代世界成为可能而言，人民必须“法律上服从国家”。再次，国民的合法组成将显然需要代表：“人民必须参与立法和国家最重要的事务管理……没有这样一种代表团体，自由就不再是可想象的。”问题是上述这些条件本质上已被弄得无法得到满足，原因在于，近代德国公国本质上是由整套自相矛盾的、植根于受限制和自耗的家乡世界的权利组成。尽管有着这些矛盾，但不可能存在着解决矛盾的办法，因为根本不存在可以被人们诉诸的更高东西，而只存在着国家自身的精神，国家精神纵使被这些自相矛盾的东西弄得遍体鳞伤，也无法解决国家各个部分之间自相矛盾的东西。（战争本身，黑格尔注意到，不可能决定矛盾的双方哪些权利是合理合法的；它只可能决定“两种权利中哪一种权利终究要作出让步”。）难道这种自由在生活方式显然因家乡结构而形成时是可能存在的吗？
Two factors shaped Hegel’s response to this question and made his own results unsatisfactory even for himself. First, Hegel’s sympathies had always been with the more moderate Girondist wing of the Revo- lution, but the experience of the Terror had led him to have second thoughts about the Revolution’s direction, even if he still believed in its necessity and its ultimate justification. He thus clearly denounced what he called the French Jacobin “freedom frenzy,” which in the name of freedom tears down all the structures that actually make freedom possible.’^ It was therefore out of the question simply to try to copy the Revolution in Germany. Second, when he came to describe the social conditions in Germany that he thought might make the realization of modern freedom possible there, he was left with nothing except to draw on some of the basic structures of the Wiirttemberg society of his youth. In his original Tubingen and Berne writings, he had argued that any division of society into “estates” was a threat to freedom, since it necessarily fragmented what was really an organic whole; older now, he argued instead for their necessity for an adequate realization of freedom and “organic wholes.”’'^
两个因素造成黑格尔对这一问题的回应，并使他自己的结论甚至不能令他自己满意。第一，黑格尔始终同情法国大革命中较为温和的吉伦特派，但是大恐怖的经历已经致使他重新思考法国大革命的方向，尽管他仍然相信它必然发生并且它最终证明是正当的。他从而显然大加谴责他所称作的法国雅各宾派“自由的疯狂”，它是在自由名义下捣毁一切实际上使自由成为可能实现的组织。所以，不可能简单地试图将法国大革命照搬到德国。第二，当他开始描述德国社会状况在他看来可能使现代自由的实现成为可能的时候，他面对的只不过是去利用他年轻时符腾堡社会那些基本结构。早在他图宾根和伯尔尼时期原创性作品中，他就已经论证道，把社会分成“等级”是对自由的威胁，因为这种划分必然确实把有机的整体弄得支离破碎；在不久前的作品里，他反而坚称等级是为自由的恰当实现和“有机的整体”所必不可少的东西。
His conclusion was that the Rousseauian “general will” could thus only be made effective within a state having a form of representative government, in which representation is effected by various mediating structures and not within the “freedom frenzy” of Revolutionary direct democracy (which itself can only lead to factionalization and confusion).” The freedoms of the hometowns with which Hegel was familiar (and in which he grew up) had given Germans, so he thought, the correct idea of representative government and a core set of mediating institutions to actualize that idea, but those hometowns had undermined their own freedoms by making it impossible for the Holy Roman Empire to be a genuine state. They themselves were doomed, since they could only continue to exist within the protecting structure of the Holy Roman Empire, which was itself doomed. For what was still alive in hometown life to survive, it had therefore to meld with the ideals of the French Revolution, even if not with the specific development of that revolution.
他得出的结论是，卢梭的“公意”因此可能被实现的唯一条件是要在一个具有代议制形式的国家里，在这样的国家中，代议制因各种各样的传媒机构而生效，而法国大革命中直接民主的“自由的疯狂”构不成实现“公意”的条件（法国大革命中的直接民主自身只能导致国家分裂成对立的派系和致使国家混乱不堪）。黑格尔所熟悉的家乡的自由已经赋予德国人，他同样也认为，正确的代议制观念和一套核心的把代议制观念变为现实的传媒机构，但是这些家乡生活中的东西早已削弱了它们自己的自由，原因在于它们使神圣罗马帝国不可能成为真正的国家。它们自己注定是要灭亡的，因为它们只能由于保护神圣罗马帝国的结构而得以继续存在，而罗马帝国本身却注定是要灭亡的。就家乡生活中依然侥幸继续存在的东西而言，这样的东西因此必须与法国大革命的理想融为一体，尽管不是和法国大革命的具体发展相结合。
The question for Hegel was therefore: How can such representation be accomplished in Germany, given the corrupted condition in which Germany finds itself and given the way in which “Germanic freedom” had institutionalized itself in the structures of hometowns and not in a true state.^ Once again, just as he had in his earlier essays on Christianity, Hegel found himself at an impasse. He described what he took to be the conditions under which freedom could be achieved, but he had no clear idea about how any of that could be actualized. He rejected Prussian leadership for the maintenance (or restoration) of the Holy Roman Empire — Prussia was in such a state of both decay and increasing centralization that it could not in any way serve as the natural center for preserving the independence of the estates - and he toyed with the idea that Austria, where he thought that the estates had managed to hang on to their independence, was the only real hope for a rejuvenated Holy Roman Empire. Hegel was clearly trying to find a middle way between the ongoing struggles among the forces leading to centralization in Germany (which Prussia adequately symbolized) and the old, decentralized, overlapping ruling authorities, that is, the structure of Herrschaft in the Holy Roman Empire, the complex orderings by which groups and individuals exercised authority over others. But how, he wondered, was this to be accomplished?
这个问题对黑格尔因此意味着：考虑到德国发现自己处于的腐败状况，考虑到“日耳曼人的自由”借以使它自己在家乡机构而非在真正国家中制度化的方式，这种代议制将怎么可能在德国得以实现呢？再度地，正像他在他早期关于基督教论著中论述的，黑格尔发觉他自己面临一种尴尬的境地。他描述他所看作的在其下自由能够被获得的条件，但是他没有清楚地看出任何这样的条件怎么可能得到实现。他拒绝神圣罗马帝国维持（或复辟）普鲁士的领导地位——普鲁士处在既衰败又日益集权化的这样一种状态，以致它绝不可能充当保护神圣罗马帝国各成员国独立的自然首领——他同样也没有认真去思考，奥地利，在他看来神圣罗马帝国各成员国早已想方设法谋求它们的独立的奥地利，唯一真正地希望使得神圣罗马帝国返老还童。黑格尔显然在试图寻找一条位于下列两个方面之间不偏不倚的道路：继续和导致德意志（普鲁士象征的德意志）集权化势力作斗争，与过时、分散权力、重取的统治权力机构——也就是说，神圣罗马帝国的统治机构，团体和个人借以对他人行使权力的复杂管理形式——作斗争。但是，他有所不知，上述这些将怎样得以变成现实呢？
Just as he had no answer to his earlier question about how a “people’s religion” could be established, in 1801 he also had no real answer to how a proper German state could be brought about. Indeed, the only possible, thinkable solution necessarily involved the imposition of statehood by force. Since the Germans were all too corrupted by their stubborn adherence to the debased consequences of “Germanic freedom” - to the structure and assumptions of the life of the hometowns all that remained as a possibility was that some wise leader, a “Theseus” of Germany, would somehow compel the Germans to unite and “treat themselves as belonging to Germany.” (Hegel praised Machiavelli for having this kind of insight about how modern states can be formed.)*®
正像他没有回答他早期关于“人民宗教”如何可能得以建立的问题一样，在1801年他同样也没有真正回答一个体面的德国如何能够得以产生这一问题。实际上，唯一可能的、可行的解决办法必然涉及以暴力来巩固国家地位。因为德国人由于他们顽固地坚信“日耳曼人自由”带来的有损人格的结果——顽固地坚信家乡生活的结构和假定——而堕落不堪，所以一切仍然成为可能的是某个英明的领导人——德意志的“武修斯”——将以某种方式迫使德国人联合起来并且迫使他们“把他们自己当作属于德意志的国民”。（黑格尔赞颂马基雅维利对现代国家如何能够得以建立具有这种深刻的见解。）
But even Hegel himself could see that this solution was essentially no solution at all; it was at best merely a hope that things would turn out right, that the proper “Theseus” would come along and would institute a modern representative republic of sorts and not some worse tyranny. Even worse, the “fate” of Germanic freedom, of the structure of hometown life, seemed destined to vanish unless this sort of “Theseus” were miraculously to appear.
但是，甚至黑格尔本人也会看出上述解决办法本质上根本不是办法；它充其量只不过是下列的这种希望：某些事情将证明是正确的，体面的“武修斯”也将来到世间，将建立种种现代的代议制共和国而非某种糟糕的专制国家。更糟糕的是，日耳曼人自由的“命运”，家乡生活结构的“命运”，看来好像注定要走向消亡，除非这类“武修斯”奇迹般地再行人世。
1801-1802: Hegel Comes to Terms with Schelling
The Difference Essay: Kant, Schelling, and “Authentic Idealism”
1801年至1802年：黑格尔与谢林取得和解
论著《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》
康德、谢林和“本真唯心主义”
Hegel’s first published foray in the debate about post-Kantian philosophy was a short book. The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy, which appeared in September 1801, less than a year after his arrival at Jena. This small monograph defined Hegel for the next several years in the public eye: To the philosophical public, he had emerged on the scene rather suddenly as a follower of Schelling who had drawn a line between Fichte and Schelling in support of Schelling’s understanding of what was required for the post-Kantian project. Despite that general reception, however, the work was not a purely Schellingian effort. In his efforts to mold himself into a systematic philosopher, he began by defending Schelling’s own ideas and terminology in a different way than Schelling himself had done, bringing to bear on this task his own, very similar ideas that he had worked out in his conversations with Holderlin in Frankfurt. The result was a highly original, “Hegelian” text that nonetheless offered itself to the public as a piece of “Schellingian” philosophy. It also showed that Hegel was hard at work during this period on the most fundamental issues in the development of post-Kantian idealism and was always more than merely a political or religious thinker.
黑格尔首次发表的讨论后康德哲学的试水作品是《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》这本篇幅很短的书，该书问世于他到达耶拿不到一年后的1801年9月。这本篇幅很短的专著明确了黑格尔在未来几年出现在公众眼中的形象：在哲学界看来，他早已以一位谢林追随者出现在哲学舞台上，早已在费希特与谢林之间划定界限，支持谢林对后康德哲学计划需要的东西的理解。不过，尽管一般被接受，这本著作仍然不是纯谢林哲学的尝试。在他努力把自己造成一位体系哲学家的过程中，他一开始就以一种不同于谢林本人使用过的方式为谢林本人的观念和术语作辩护，把这样的辩护当作他自己义不容辞的任务，因为谢林的观念颇类似于他在法兰克福时期通过与荷尔德林的探讨而制定出的观念。结果写出了一部具有高度原创性的、“黑格尔式的”文本，然而它本身却是以一部“谢林式的”哲学作品出现在公众面前的。它同时显露黑格尔在此期间正在努力解决后康德唯心主义发展中最为基本的问题，他始终不仅仅只是一位政治思考者或宗教思考者。
Schelling was widely viewed by the philosophical public at the time as simply carrying forward Fichte’s philosophy. Hegel surprised his readers by arguing that Schelling and Fichte disagreed at the most basic level on exactly what it would take to carry forward Kant’s project without falling into what were perceived as Kant’s own dogmatisms. Reinhold had proposed that what Kantianism needed was a clear statement of its highest and first principle, which he claimed to have provided with his “principle of consciousness,” and Fichte had to a certain extent (in Hegel’s reconstruction of the line of post-Kantian thought) only taken that approach one step further. In Hegel’s construction of the progress made in post-Kantian thought. Reinhold and Fichte had not fully liberated themselves from certain Kantian “dogmatisms,” whereas Schelling had fully done so.
谢林被当时哲学界普遍看作只是在推进费希特哲学。黑格尔凭借论证谢林和费希特在下列的这一最基本层面是具有分歧的从而使读者感到十分惊奇：恰恰应该看作的是推进康德哲学计划没有陷入被认作是康德自己的独断论。赖因霍尔德早就提出康德哲学需要的是对它最高和第一原理作出明晰的陈述，这样的陈述被他声称已由他的“意识原理”提供。费希特则在某种程度上（按照黑格尔对后康德思路的重新建构）只是进一步理解这种方法。根据黑格尔对在后康德思想中作出的发展的建构，赖因霍尔德和费希特没有使他们自己彻底摆脱康德的某些“独断论”，而谢林却完全使他自己彻底摆脱康德的某些“独断论”。
In particular, both Reinhold and Fichte assumed that the Kantian distinction between “conceptual form” and “intuited content” was valid. However, in Schelling’s and Hegel’s eyes, Kant had already intimated in his later Critique of Judgment a way out of the various impasses created by his notions of unknowable things-in-themselves and contradictory conceptions of unconditioned totalities” by developing a notion of an “intuitive intellect,” a form of understanding that did not apply concepts to pre-given material from the senses but understood the sensory particulars in light of a prior grasp of the “whole” that was constructed by “reason.” Kant seemed to be suggesting, that is, that prior to the application of conceptual form to sensuous givens, there had to be an orientation to a whole that preceded and made intelligible the later, more derivative application of such conceptual form to sensuous content. Reinhold (and by implication, Fichte), in effect, had stayed mired in Kant’s original formulations and had therefore been led to their conclusions that Kantianism only required a clearer statement of its “first principle” as the ultimate condition for the possibility of there being experience of objects, which meant that they still dogmatically accepted Kant’s dualism of conceptual form / nonconceptual content that would make such a search for “first principles” appropriate at all.*'
特别要提及的是，赖因霍尔德和费希特两人都假定康德对“概念形式”与“直观内容”的区分是合理合法的。然而，在谢林和黑格尔眼里，康德在他后期《判断力批判》中已借助下列做法使人联想到有一条道路可以使人走出由他不可知的自在之物和自相矛盾的“无条件整体”概念制造的种种死胡同：发展“直觉理智”概念，发展知性的形式，知性不把概念应用于预先给定的感觉材料，而按照把握被“理性”建构的“整体”来理解可感觉的具体事物。也就是说，康德似乎在暗示的是，在把概念形式应用于感觉给予物以前，必须对整体作出定位，整体高于感觉给予物，使感觉给予物变得可以理解，使更为引申地把这种概念形式应用于感觉内容变得可以理解。实际上，赖因霍尔德（且涉及费希特）已经深陷康德的原初系统阐述的泥沼，因此迫不得已得出康德和费希特两人的结论：康德哲学只不过需要更加明确地陈述它的“第一原理”是经验对象可能存在的终极条件，这就意味着，赖因霍尔德和费希特仍然武断地接受康德关于概念形式或非概念内容的二元论，这将使得这样一种对“第一原理”的研究变成极其恰当的研究。
In Hegel’s presentation, therefore, the difference between Fichte and Schelling was a fundamental difference in what they understood the post-Kantian project to be about. Fichte, by seeking a first principle, was inevitably led to seeing the “I” as that principle, and he thus could only understand the “Not-I” as something posited by the “I”; he was thus a “subjective” idealist. Realism is simply the flip side of subjective idealism, understanding the “first principle” to lie on the side of the object, not the subject. As Hegel explained it, “dogmatic idealism posits the subjective as the real ground of the objective, dogmatic realism the objective as the real ground of the subjective.”*^ The endless oscillation within modern philosophy between realism and idealism, however, is only indicative of something deeper, of a set of shared presuppositions that neither the realists nor the idealists articulate, and for which Kant’s notion of the conflicted nature of consciousness was the clue. Within our ordinary consciousness of ourselves and the world, there are necessarily two opposing points of view. When we regard ourselves “theoretically,” objectively, we see ourselves as bodies in space and time subject to the same causal laws as other bodies; when we regard ourselves “practically,” subjectively, we see ourselves in terms of what we ought to believe, that as, as freely subject to norms. The subject of consciousness can thus take both a purely personal, subjective point of view on himself, seeing things from “within” his own experience; and he can take a detached, purely objective point of view on himself, seeing himself, as it were, from the outside. We see ourselves from the “inside” when we think of ourselves only in first-person terms as having a point of view on the world around us. We see ourselves from the “outside” when we think of ourselves as objects in a world of other objects (for example, locating ourselves on a map, seeing ourselves as others see us, or thinking of ourselves in third-person terms). That is, we see ourselves as a subjective point of view on the world and experience ourselves as spontaneous and free from that subjective point of view; we also see ourselves objectively, not as a point of view on the world but as another object in the world. As Hegel noted, “The opposition [between realism and idealism] is in consciousness, and the reality of the objective, just as much as that of the subjective is founded in consciousness.”*^
所以，在黑格尔的描述中，费希特与谢林之间的差别是在他们所理解的后康德计划将要成为的东西方面的基本差别。费希特，由于寻找第一原理，必然迫不得已将“自我”看作第一原理，他因此只会把“非我”理解成某种由“自我”设定的东西；他因此是个“主观”唯心主义者。实在论只不过反映了主观唯心主义轻率的一面，把“第一原理”理解为依赖主体这个方面而非客体这个方面。像黑格尔解释的，独断的唯心主义把主观的东西设定为客观的东西的真根据，独断的实在论则把客观的东西设定为主观的东西的真根据。不过，近代哲学中实在论与唯心论之间永无止境的摇摆，只是标志着某种更深层面的东西，只是标志着一套被实在论者和唯心论者都具有的而没有被二者阐明的预先假定的东西，对于这种预先假定的东西，康德关于意识的冲突的禀性概念为其提供了解决问题的线索。在我们关于我们自己的日常意识和世界领域，必然存在着两种对立的观点。当我们理论上客观地看待我们自己的时候，我们把我们自己看作处于时间和空间中受和其他物体相同因果关系支配的物体；当我们实践上主观地看待我们自己的时候，我们根据我们应当相信的东西看待我们自己，也就是说，我们自愿地把我们自己看作受规范支配的物体。这样一来，意识的主体既能够领会关于他自己的纯粹地个人的主观的观点，从他自己的经验“里面”来看事物；又能够领会关于他自己独立的、纯粹地客观的观点，好像从外部看他自己。我们从“内部”看我们自己，其时我们只按照第一人称项把我们自己看作具有关于我们周遭世界的观点。我们从“外部”看我们自己，其时我们把我们自己看作在其他对象的世界中的对象（举例来说，在地图上确定我们自己所处的位置，看我们自己如同别人看我们，或以第三人称项看我们自己）。这也就是说，我们把我们自己看作关于世界的主观的观点，经验也把我们自己看作自发的和摆脱主观的观点；我们还客观地看我们自己，不把我们自己看作关于世界的观点而看作在世界中的另一对象。像黑格尔注意到的，“这[实在论与唯心论之间的]对立存在于意识中，而客观实在恰恰和主观实在一样都被建立在意识基础上。”
Hegel diagnosed the futility of such a search for “first principles” that would resolve the modern debate between “realism” and “idealism” as having to do with what he called “reflection.” In the technical sense that Hegel used it, “reflection” designated an approach to philosophical thought that takes one of the basic oppositions in consciousness (the subjective or objective point of view) and then holds it fixed and uses it as a basis for constructing or criticizing the other point of view. The purpose of true philosophy is to show that the kind of “reflection” that takes itself to be necessarily driven to the antinomial oppositions of Kantian philosophy is actually implicated in something that precedes such opposition and without which such opposition would not be possible. Both Hegel and Schelling called that the “absolute,” which Hegel identified with reason itself. Moreover, just as Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason had said that “reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own,” Hegel says in the Difference book that “reason comes to know itself and deals only with itself so that its whole work and activity are grounded in itself.”*"*
黑格尔断定，这样一种对将解决近代“实在主义”与“唯心主义”之间争论的“第一原理”的研究是毫无用处的，这里的“第一原理”与他称作的“反思”有关。从严格按字面解释意义上说，黑格尔所使用的“反思”赋予那产生意识基本对立之一（主观观点或客观观点）的哲学思想以方法，接着使得方法得到固定，并把方法用作建构或批判其他观点的基础。真哲学的目的在于揭示一种把它自身看作必然被迫走向康德哲学二律背反式对立的“反思”，实际上涉及某种东西，这种东西先于这种对立，若无这种东西则对立通常是不可能存在的。黑格尔和谢林两人称这种东西为“绝对”，“绝对”被黑格尔认为是理性自身。尚不止于此，正像康德在《纯粹理性批判》中说“理性”只是使洞见成为理性，依照理性自己的计划产生的东西，黑格尔在《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》这本书中说道：“理性逐渐认识理性自己，只与理性自己打交道，所以理性的全部工作和活动基于理性自身。”
Hegel contrasts reason with “the understanding.” “The understanding” is a faculty conditioned by the world, but reason is a faculty that takes the conditioned findings of “the understanding” and weaves them into an unconditioned account of subjectivity and objectivity, of the personal and the objective points of view. “The understanding” must work on things given to it, whereas reason works only on materials it has given itself, “after a plan of its own”; reason is self-bounding and therefore “infinite,” whereas “the understanding” is bounded by things outside of itself and therefore “finite.” Reason aims at a grasp of the “unconditioned totality” that must include and resolve the oppositions of “the understanding” within itself.
黑格尔把理性和“知性”作了对照。“知性”是一种受世界制约的官能，而理性这种官能则在于领会“知性”所发现的某些受到制约的东西，进而把它们组合成对主观性和客观性的无条件的释述，对个人的观点和主观的观点的无条件的释述。“知性”必须致力于为理性提供的东西，而理性仅仅“按照它自己的计划”致力于它已给它自己的质料；理性是不受限制的，所以是“无限的”，而“知性”是受它自身之外的事物限制的，所以是“有限的”。理性旨在把握“无条件的总体”，“总体”必然包含并解决它自身中的“知性”的对立。
When “the understanding” tries to grasp something fundamental about a way of life, it inevitably ends up positing the kinds of opposi- dons that also appear in the unending debates between “realism” and “idealism.” When this happens, the form of life has become, to use a term that is increasingly crucial for Hegel, entzweit, “disjointed,” “severed,” “ruptured,” within itself. Hegel’s conception of this kind of rupturing, disjointing, Entzweiung, was already at work in his unpublished essay on the need for Wiirttemberg reform written while he was in Frankfurt - “That the Magistrates Must be Elected by the Citizens.” In that essay, he had spoken of the way in which the “yearning . . . for a more pure, more free condition had moved all hearts and severed {entzweit) them from actuality.”**^ This kind of disjointing splitting in two - creates the need for philosophy. As Hegel puts it, “When the might of union vanishes from the life of people, and the oppositions lose their living connection and reciprocity and gain independence, the need of philosophy arises.”*^*’ The failure of philosophy (and its alliance with reason) to perform this task is indicative of a form of life whose fate is gradually to deteriorate and pass away, as happened with the Greeks and Romans.®’ For Hegel the implication in all this is clear, even if he does not state it: The issue of whether modern life can succeed in Germany and in general depends on the possibility of philosophy's showing whether that way of life is indeed a possibility for us.
当“知性”尝试把握那种关于生命方式的基本东西的时候，“知性”必然最终设定种种同时出现在“实在主义”与“唯心主义”的无休止争论中的对立。当出现上述情况的时候，生命的形式，用一个对黑格尔逐渐显得至关重要的术语说，本质上变成 **Entzweiung** ，“被肢解的”“被切断的”“被断裂的”。黑格尔关于这种断裂、肢解、 **Entzweiung** 的概念已被用在他未发表的关于他在法兰克福时期撰写的符腾堡必须改革的论文（《论地方行政官必须由公民选举》）中。在这篇论文里，他已经论及在某个方面“对更纯粹的、更自由的状况的渴望……已经使人人心浮气躁并切断（ **entzweiung** ）人心与现实的联系。”这种断裂—— **Entzweiung** ，一分为二——使人需要哲学。像黑格尔论述的，“当统一的可能性从人们生活中消失，对立失去它们的活生生的联系和相关性并获得独立的时候，对哲学的需要应运而生。”哲学（及其与理性的联盟）未能完成这一任务，这一失败标志着生活形式的命运逐渐恶化和消逝，像在古希腊罗马人那里发生的一样。对于黑格尔来说，上述这些意味着的东西是一清二楚的，尽管“他没有挑明这样的东西是什么：现代生活能不能在德国获得成功，这个问题总的说来取决于哲学能否证明生活方式是不是确实对我们来说是可能存在的。”
