5 Hegel Finds His Voice: The Phenomenology of Spirit
The Project of the Phenomenology
第5章 黑格尔开口说话：《精神现象学》
《精神现象学》计划
However desperate Hegel’s situation may have been while composing the Phenomenology of Spirit, in completing it he finally came to terms with the influences of Holderlin and Schelling in his own original way. As one of his students from his later Berlin years, Karl Ludwig Michelet, observed, Hegel “was in the habit of calling this piece, which appeared in 1807, his voyage of discovery, since here the speculative method, which for him uniquely befitted the history of philosophy, in fact encompassed and traversed the whole sphere of human knowledge.”' Indeed, Hegel’s use of the cliche “voyage of discovery” seems particularly apt for the Phenomenology, since in it he managed to bring together many of his youthful concerns into a comprehensive philosophical conception that was to stay with him for the rest of his life.
不管黑格尔创作《精神现象学》时的处境多么绝望，当他写完这部作品时，他凭借其独创的方式在学界产生的影响已足以与荷尔德林、谢林相媲美。身为黑格尔晚年在柏林的一名弟子，卡尔·路德维希·米希勒观察到，黑格尔“习惯上将1807年问世的《精神现象学》这部作品称作他的‘发现的航行’，因为在该作品中，那对他来说唯一适合于哲学史的思辨方法实际上贯穿于人类知识的全部领域”。更确切地说，黑格尔对“发现的航行”这一老套说法的使用似乎特别适合《精神现象学》，因为在其中，他设法将许多不成熟的思考整合成一个可能与他余生形影不离且涵盖面广的哲学概念。
The experimental character of the book was evidenced in his ambivalence about what to title it; he in fact ended up giving it several different titles, thereby confusing the printer and the binders so much that many of the earliest copies ended up with several of the different titles bound together. (The original title finally came out as “System of Science: First Part: The Phenomenology of Spirit,” with another title stuck between the “Preface” and the “Introduction,” which in some editions came out as “Science of the Experience of Consciousness” and in other editions as “Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit.”)"
《精神现象学》一书具有试验性的特点，这体现在黑格尔在该书书名的选择上犹豫不决；他甚至最终赋予它若干不同的书名，以至于把印刷工和装订工都搞糊涂了，许多初版《精神现象学》最终同时印有多个不同的书名。（首版书名最后印为“科学体系：第一部分：精神现象学”，在“序言”与“导论”之间还插入一个标题，这个标题在一些版本中印成“意识的经验科学”，在另一些版本中印成“精神现象的科学”。）
Quite likely, the change in title had to do with Hegel’s assumption of a Kantian idea for use in a new context. In The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant - in the context of arguing against Newton’s way of distinguishing “true motion” from merely “apparent motion” - had said that his own transcendental investigation into the a priori presuppositions of physics was to be called a “phenomenology”; the aim of such a “phenomenology,” Kant went on to say, was “not of the transformation of mere appearance (Schein) into truth, but of appearance (Erscheinung) into experience (Erfahrung).”'^ As Hegel began to grasp that his original idea for a “science of the experience of consciousness” was itself necessarily turning out to be a history of the shapes and formations of consciousness itself, he saw his construal of the historical “movement” of spirit to be analogous to Kant’s “phenomenology” of the “true” movement in nature, and he thus titled his book somewhat metaphorically the “phenomenology” of spirit, a study of spirit’s “true” movement in history, to be distinguished from its only “apparent” movement.^
很可能，书名的变化与黑格尔将康德的理念用于新语境的假设有关。在《自然科学的形而上学基础》中，康德——在据理反对牛顿关于将“真实运动”与纯“貌似运动”加以区分的方式这一点上——就已说过，他个人对物理学的先天假设所作的先验研究可称作“现象学”；康德继续说，这种“现象学”的目的“不是将纯假象（Schein）变成真理，而是把现象（Erscheinung）变成经验（Erfahrung）”。黑格尔在着手去把握他关于“意识的经验科学”这一原初理念时，必须证明它自己是意识本身的形态与形成的历史。他将他对精神的历史“运动”的解释看作类似于康德自然“真实”运动的“现象学”，因此把“精神现象学”——即对精神的历史“真实的”运动的研究——用作书名，以与精神的唯一“貌似”的运动相区分，这多少有点隐喻的味道。
In his Phenomenology^ Hegel attempted to lay out the basis for his whole system of philosophy and to convince his audience — “we moderns” - that they in fact needed something like his system.*’ He and Holderlin together in Frankfurt had concluded that the modern world was something qualitatively new and demanded therefore a “new sensibility” appropriate to it. That meant that the older appeals to tradition, nature, and other forms of authority were necessarily going to be unsatisfactory in modern times, and the issue before “we moderns” thus seemed rather stark: Either we found some way in which to establish a new philosophy appropriate for modernity; or we had to face Jacobi’s indictment that the Enlightenment appeal to reason itself was mistaken, an act of human hubris, whose outcome could only be, to use the term Jacobi coined, “nihilism.”
在《精神现象学》中，黑格尔试图为他的整个哲学体系奠定基础，并试图使他的读者——“我们现代人”——确信他们其实需要像他的体系一样的东西。他和荷尔德林在法兰克福时就已共同断定，现代世界在质上是一种新的东西，因此需要一种与之相称的“新的感受性”。这意味着，对传统、自然和其他权威形式的诉求在现代必将是不能令人满意的和落伍的。因此，摆在“我们现代人”面前的问题似乎是颇为严峻的：要么去寻找某种方法并借此建立与现代性相称的新哲学；要么只好面对雅科比的控诉：诉诸于理性本身的启蒙运动是错误的，是人类的傲慢行为，启蒙运动的结果只能是“虚无主义”，用雅科比杜撰的术语来说。
The Phenomenology was in some respects a direct confrontation with Jacobi’s indictment of modernity. Kant’s proposal for an investigation by reason of its own powers had foundered on the defects in Kant’s own development of his system; the post-Kantian project thus was required, if it was to answer Jacobi’s charge, to develop a thoroughgoing skepticism even about reason itself and its own pretensions; simple blind faith in reason could not supplant a trusting faith in anything else. A procedure modeled on such a thoroughgoing skepticism, though, could only appear “as the path of doubt, or, more authentically, as the path of despair,” as an effort to destroy any and all attempts at establishing any kind of truth.^ Such despair, of course, could only be assuaged by reason s demonstration of its own self-sufficiency. The Phenomenology was therefore to be a form of “self-consummating skepticism,” a way in which a thoroughgoing skepticism undid itself, and reason’s commitments were thereby established and secured.**
《精神现象学》在某些方面是直接与雅科比对现代性的控诉相抵触的。康德提出对理性自身能力进行研究的建议早已铸就康德本人体系发展过程中的缺陷；后康德计划因此是必不可少的，如果它旨在回敬雅科比的指责，甚至旨在提出一种关于理性本身和理性自身权利的彻底的怀疑主义；对理性的简单而盲目的信仰不可能取代对任何其他事物的轻易的信仰。尽管如此，仿效这种彻底的怀疑主义的做法只表现为“是怀疑的道路，或者说得更确切些，是绝望的道路”，可视为是为力图摧毁任何种类的真理而作出的努力，以及为确立任何种类的真理而作出的全部尝试。诚然，这种绝望只能借助理性显露其自身的自足而得以消除。因此，《精神现象学》必然成了一种“自我实现的怀疑主义”，必然成了一种路径，通过这路径，彻底的怀疑主义得以消除，而理性所作出的承诺由此得到确保。
In keeping with that idea, Hegel crafted a book with a highly unorthodox structure, evident in even a quick overview of the work’s range of concerns. Beginning with “consciousness,” Hegel tried to show that there are no “given” objects of direct awareness that determine the judgments we make about them; that “consciousness” already involves “self-consciousness,” and that self-consciousness itself is highly mediated and dependent on structures of mutual recognition among selfconscious agents; that attempts to establish “successful” patterns of mutual recognition have foundered because of their inability to sustain allegiance to themselves when set under the microscope of reflective self-criticism; that what we therefore must take as authoritative for ourselves has to do with what has come to be required of us by virtue of the failures of past attempts at sustaining a set of normative structures of mutual recognition and that to understand what is required of us at the present, we must understand how the past came to demand that of us; and that the attempt to understand such reflective, social activity in modern life requires us to rethink a Christian view of the nature of religion as the collective reflection of the modern community on what ultimately counts for it; and that only such a historically, socially construed philosophical account of that whole process can adequately introduce us to such a fully “modern” standpoint and provide us with an elucidation of both itself and its own genesis.
为了与以上理念保持一致，黑格尔精心创作了一本具有高度非正统结构的著作，尽管他显然对该著述中一系列有关问题未能展开论述。黑格尔从“意识”开始，试图证明的是：不存在直接意识到的、决定我们对之作出判断的“给定的”对象；“意识”已经牵涉到“自我意识”，自我意识本身被高度中介化，并依赖于自我意识行动者之间的相互认知结构；为确立相互认知的“成功的”模式而作出的尝试已告失败，因为这些尝试在被置于反思式的自我批评的显微镜下时无法保持对它们自己的忠诚；因此，我们必须将我们自己视为权威性的东西，这关乎我们由于过去在维持一套相互认知的规范性结构方面所做的尝试失败了而开始需要的东西。为了理解现时我们所需要的东西，我们就必须理解过去如何开始要求我们做到的东西；试图理解现代生活中这种反思和社会的活动，这就要求我们重新把基督教关于宗教本质的观点看作对最终被认作宗教之物的现代共同体的集体反思；只有对全过程作出这种历史和社会地解释性的哲学描述，才能适当地引领我们熟悉这种完全“现代的”观点，并向我们提供关于这一观点自身及其特有的起源的阐释。
Consciousness and Self-consciousness
意识和自我意识
Hegel confronted Jacobi’s indictment at the very beginning of his book. Jacobi had argued that not only must we accept religious faith as a groundless act of belief, a ‘'‘‘salto mortalef we must accept the existence of a world external to our own consciousness as a matter of such “faith,” which Jacobi called “sense-certainty.” However, Hegel argued, even the simplest act of awareness in such “sense-certainty” already involves us in much more than an awareness that individual things just “are”; in making judgments about “sense-certainty,” we articulate those experiences as complexes of individual things-possessing-general-properties, which in turn requires us to articulate a background set of laws and forces that are not “given” in direct awareness but construed by our faculty of “understanding.” However, even that act of understanding the world as a totality of individual things possessing general properties interacting according to laws itself produces a set of contradictory, antinomial results. The result is that Jacobi’s original claim - that “consciousness” is a simple awareness of things as they immediately are (either through sense-certainty or, more complexly, through perception or, even more complexly, in their supersensible background supplied by the “understanding”) — turns out to involve much more than simple consciousness itself. We are in fact always aware of things as such and such, taking things to be this way or that, and are supplying a meaning to our experience that it does not automatically have. Jacobi’s “faith” thus turned out to involve more complexity than he had thought it would.
黑格尔在《精神现象学》一书开篇极为坦然地面对雅科比的控诉。雅科比早就辩称，我们不但必须承认宗教信仰是无根基的信仰行为，而且必须承认我们自己的意识之外的世界的存在是关于被雅科比称作“感性确定性”的这种“信仰”的问题。然而，黑格尔主张，意识到这种“感性确定性”这一最简单的行为甚至已经使我们大大地超出了意识到个别事物恰恰“存在”的范围；在对“感性确定性”作出判断的过程中，我们系统地阐述那些经验是拥有一般特质的个别事物的综合体，这反过来要求我们阐明一系列处于一定背景中的法则和力量——这些法则和力量未被直接意识所“给予”，但被我们的“理解”力所解释。不过，即使把世界理解成由根据法则相互作用且拥有一般特质的个别事物构成的总体，此举自身也会产生一系列自相矛盾和二律背反式的结果。其结果是，雅科比的原先主张——“意识”纯粹是意识到事物是直接存在的（事物不是借助感性确定性而存在，就是较为复杂地凭借知觉而存在，甚或更为复杂地，通过由于被“理解”所提供的事物的超感性背景而存在）——证明涉及的远不止简单的意识本身。我们实际上总是意识到事物是某某事物，并始终用各种方式来理解事物的存在，我们正在向我们的经验提供一种它并非自动具有的意义。雅科比的“信仰”因此证明所涉及的复杂性胜于他先前认为他的“信仰”将涉及的复杂性。
The only way to deal with the antinomial consequences of the norms that govern our “consciousness” of the world is to understand them in terms of our “self-consciousness” about what we are doing, what goals we are trying to achieve in making such judgments. Those goals would at first seem to be given by the demands of “life” itself, by what is necessary to sustain ourselves and reproduce ourselves, and what counts as “the norm” for such self-consciousness would depend therefore on what is necessary for “life.”
要论述那支配我们关于世界“意识”的规范的二律背反式结果，其唯一的方法就是根据关于我们正在论述之物的“自我意识”，根据关于我们在作出这些判断过程中所正在试图达到的目标的“自我意识”来理解上述二律背反式的结果。那些目标起初看来好像将由“生命”本身的要求所给予，将由为支撑我们自身且再生产我们自己所必需的东西所给予，所以被认作这种自我意识的“规范”的东西总是取决于“生命”所必需的东西。
However, a self-conscious agent never simply “is” what he is in terms of life itself He always has what Hegel calls a “negative” relation to his own natural states of desire and sensation, since (as the opening of the Phenomenology had shown) those natural states never fully determine the norms by which they are judged. This only becomes fully clear, however, when one self-conscious agent encounters another. In seeking reassurance that his norms are correct, are what all agents would affirm, each agent demands that the other agent recognize his normative grasp of himself and the world as the truth, as the norms that all agents would rationally follow. In making those demands, though, each finds that it is not “life” itself that is setting the terms of judgment but his own selfconceived project for his life that determines which of his desires have a normative ranking above the others and which of his desires have a rightful demand to fulfillment. Each becomes aware, that is, of his own “negativity,” of the way in which his project is never fully determined by the strength or the intensity of any particular desire.
然而，自我意识的行动者决不只“是”按照“生命”本身存在的。他始终具有一种被黑格尔称作与他个人欲望和感觉的自然状态的“否定的”关系，因为（像《精神现象学》的开篇已表明的）那些自然状态决不完全决定它们借以被判断的规范。可是，这一点只不过当一个自我意识的行动者遭遇另一自我意识的行动者时才变得完全明朗。在设法再三保证他的规范是正确的且是所有行动者应该维护的过程中，每一个行动者都要求其他行动者要认识到，他规范地把握他自己和作为真理的世界，作为一切行动者都应理性地遵从的规范的世界。虽然如此，在提出那些要求时，每个行动者都发觉，设置判断项的不是“生命”本身，而正是他个人对他的生命自我设想出的计划决定他哪些欲望在规范上高于他者的欲望，并决定他哪些欲望要求得到合法的满足。也就是说，每个行动者都意识到他自己的“否定性”，都意识到他的计划决不完全借以被任何具体欲望的力量或烈度所决定的方式。
To the extent that one of the parties decides that his own selfconception is indeed more important than life itself, the demand for recognition becomes a struggle to the death. When out of fear for his life, one agent thereby submits to the authority of the other, both enter into a relationship of mastery and servitude. The “master” imposes the norms, the principles of correct judgment, on the vassal, who, in order to fulfill his natural desires, lets those principles be imposed on him. The master’s project for his own life determines which of the vassal’s desires are worthy of satisfaction; the vassal’s own project for his life, his conception of what ultimately ought to matter to him, is subordinate to and even determined by the master’s project.
在群体中，当一员认定他自己的自我概念确实比生命自身更为重要时，认知的要求就成了与特定的死亡的斗争。当一个行动者出于对他的生命的担忧而屈服于他者的权威时，该行动者和他者双方形成权力与奴役的关系。“主人”把特定的规范、正确的判断的原则强加于奴隶，奴隶为满足他的自然欲望而甘愿接受那些原则。主人为他自己的生命制定的计划决定奴隶的哪些欲望是值得满足的；奴隶为他的生命制定的自己的计划，或他关于最终应该对他有关的东西的概念，从属甚至决定于主人的计划。
However, through the discipline of his work for the master, the “vassal” comes to distinguish more clearly between his own subjective point of view and a more impersonal, normative point of view represented by the master. Although the master’s point of view comes to represent the “totality” in terms of which the vassal must orient himself, it nonetheless remains only a particular point of view whose claim to authority really is only that it has been compelled by the master; and once it becomes explicit just how one-sided the relationship is, that what has counted as the true norms is only the result of some contingency of power, neither the master nor the vassal can any longer sustain a normative allegiance to that set of norms. Just as the vassal reflects on his status and comes to understand the sheer contingency of the master’s hold on him, likewise the master comes to understand that the recognition he requires from the vassal, because it is only compelled, cannot serve as the free recognition he himself requires, cannot serve to vouchsafe his original claim that these were the norms that any agent would adopt.
然而，“奴隶”由于为主人工作而受到磨炼，开始对他自己的主观观点与主人所表述的更加非个人的规范性观点作出更为清晰的区分。主人的观点虽开始用奴隶必须在“总体”中熟悉环境的字眼描述“总体”，却仍然只是一种特殊的观点，这种观点关于权威的主张确实只不过在于：权威由主人强加给奴隶。一旦那已被认作真实规范的东西只是权力的一种可能导致的结果，这一点清晰地表明主人与奴隶之间的关系恰恰是多么片面的，主人和奴隶就都无法再坚持规范性地忠于那套规范。正如奴隶深思他的地位且开始理解主人限制他纯属偶然一样，主人也开始从奴隶的角度理解他所需要的认知，因为这种认知只不过是被强加的，不能用作他自己所需要的自由的认知，无法用来确保他这样的原初的主张是正确的：这些规范是任何行动者都应采纳的。
Reason and History
理性和历史
Having reached that point in the Phenomenology^ Hegel then shifted his narrative - in a fashion without much precedence in his earlier manuscripts - to overtly historical considerations, taking the normative failure of relations of mastery and servitude to explain the depth of the cultural crisis that followed the demise of the slave-owning societies of antiquity. Various other attempts to sustain a kind of self-mastery and independence in light of that failure (Stoicism and Skepticism) themselves failed to make good on their own promises, and the ancient world’s despair at attaining anything like an adequate normative framework was finally answered by Christianity, with its claim that “we” must willingly put ourselves in servitude to this higher truth, which itself can only be “revealed” to us. The discipline of Christian worship throughout the medieval period (a period of universal servitude), however, prepared the way for an assertion of self-activity through the application of norms of impersonal reason to the world.
在到达《精神现象学》中这一点后，黑格尔接着——以在他早期手稿中不多见的方式——把笔锋转到对历史作通盘的思考，并利用权力与奴役的关系在规范上的失败来解释随着古代奴隶制社会的灭亡而产生的深度文化危机。由于这一失败（斯多葛主义和怀疑主义），为支撑一种自制和独立所做的其他各种不同的尝试本身未能履行它们自己的诺言，而古代世界对达到像任何适当的规范性框架一样的东西的绝望最终由基督教用它的这样的主张作出回答：“我们”必须为了这本身只能向我们“启示”的更高的真理而甘受奴役。无论如何，整个中世纪时期（一个普遍奴役的时期），基督教徒所崇拜的苦行修炼借助把非个人的理性的规范应用于尘世来为坚持自主铺平了道路。
Following up on that idea, Hegel wrote an even longer, historically shaped chapter entitled simply “Reason” to show how the development of the idea of applying impersonal reason to nature and then to human affairs had culminated in a modern recognition that the unconditionality of the claims of reason have to do with their being necessary constituents of an admirable or worthy way of life, and that this modern realization itself had provoked a crisis in reason and therefore in modern culture itself In that chapter, Hegel argued that European “spirit,” by applying the standards of impersonal reason to both nature and human affairs, had only further developed and articulated the kind of “negativity,” the self-undermining skepticism that was in fact essential to the European conception of what ultimately mattered to it. Such “negativity” had first become explicit in ancient Greek society, and it had shaped European “spirit” into a way of life that embodied within itself a kind of intrinsic demand for reflective self-doubt that in turn continuously undermined the various alternative claims to authority that appeared within that way of life. Having developed itself in this fashion, European “spirit” thus embarked on the “path of despair” that Hegel characterized the Phenomenology as portraying.
紧接着这一理念之后，黑格尔写下了仅以“理性”为标题、内容更长、历史地形成的一章，以表明把非个人的理性理念应用于自然、继而应用于人类事务的这一发展怎样在现代认知中早已达到这样的顶点：无条件的理性所作出的那些主张必然和它们的令人钦佩的或有价值的生活方式的构成有关。这种现代认知本身早就激起了理性的危机，因此激起了现代文化自身的危机。在“理性”这一章中，黑格尔论证道，欧洲人的“精神”，凭借将非个人的理性的标准应用于自然和人类事务中，只是早已进一步发展、阐明了那种“否定性”，和一种自我逐渐削弱的怀疑主义，这种怀疑主义其实对最终和它有关的欧洲人的概念是至关重要的。这种“否定性”最早显然已存在于古希腊社会中，它却早就使欧洲人的“精神”形成一种生活方式，这种生活方式本质上体现为一种反思式的自我怀疑的内在要求，这种要求反过来又连续不断地削弱关于权威和显露在这种生活方式中的不同的可供选择的主张。欧洲人的“精神”在以此方式发展出它自身后，因而踏上了被黑格尔描述成《精神现象学》的特点的“绝望的道路”。
In the chapter on “Reason,” Hegel attempted to illustrate, in a dazzling although obscure series of portraits of the development of early modern European life, just how the various attempts of European life to shore up its normative commitments in the early modern period by a reliance either on reason itself or on something else beyond reason that would somehow “ground” and reassure reason about itself had, each on its own terms, undermined themselves and come to generate out of the specific ways in which they failed new attempts at such reassurance. In Hegel’s sweeping account, neither Faustian faith in knowledge as the power to compel the world and other agents to give us what we want, European sentimentalist faith in a unity of hearts, neo-Stoic appeals to “virtue” as disinterested altruism, nor even more modern ideals of communities of “expressive freedom” were able to survive the magnifying glass of such skeptical, corrosive rational reflection on themselves. In Hegel’s broad picture of the development of European life’s failure to rationally underwrite the authoritativeness about what mattered to it, Kant emerged as the great hero of modernity; Kant heroically rescued modern reason’s claims to authority by showing that reason could indeed establish a “substantial” form of Geist in the shape of the “kingdom of ends” mutually legislating for itself, taking no authority for itself except that which it could generate out of its own “spontaneous” activities. However, while that turned out to be fully necessary as a modern self-conception, it also turned out, Hegel argued, to be empty as an actual guide to action. Thus, the stage was set for the spiritual crisis over whether the modern authority of reason was itself sustainable or was itself simply too empty and arid to produce anything worthy of full allegiance.
在“理性”这一章里，黑格尔试图阐明的是，在对现代初期欧洲人的生活发展的一系列晦涩费解却令人眼花缭乱的描写中，在这一发展的自身的关系的每个方面，欧洲人生活中各种不同的尝试恰好怎样早已受到了削弱，并恰好怎样开始产生欧洲人未能借以对这种再确证作新的尝试的特殊方式。欧洲人生活中各种不同的尝试意在不是借助依靠理性自身而是借助依靠理性之外的其他东西来支撑现代初期欧洲人生活的规范性的承诺，这些承诺总是以这种方式“基于”且再次确证关于它自身的理性。在黑格尔的总括性的描述中，关于知识作为强加于世界和其他行动者的权力提供我们所需的东西这种浮士德式的信仰，欧洲人关于心灵的统一的感伤主义信仰，新斯多葛主义对作为无私的利他主义“美德”的诉诸，以及“表现自由”的共同体的更为现代的理想，这一切都在对它们自身作这种怀疑主义的、渐衰的理性反思这面放大镜前原形毕露。在黑格尔关于欧洲人生活无法合理地保证和欧洲人生活有关之物的权威性的发展这幅雄浑有力的画卷里，康德表现为现代性的大英雄；康德借对这样的东西作出证明而英勇地挽救了现代理性关于权威的主张：理性确能建立以“目的王国”形式出现的一种“实体的”精神，目的就理性自身而言是彼此合法的，而理性并不以权威自居，除了理性能够由于它自己的“自发的”活动而产生的东西外。然而，以上虽然证明作为现代的自我概念是完全必要的，但同时证明作为对行为的实际指导是空洞无物的，黑格尔力主这一点。因此，“理性”这个阶段因精神危机而设置，不是精神危机被理性的现代权威自身所加剧，就是因理性的现代权威本身只是过于空洞无物和毫无结果，以致无法产生任何值得充分依赖的东西而导致了精神危机。
Geist and History
精神和历史
Having written such a long — and almost certainly originally unanticipated - chapter on “Reason” that culminated in the notion that the unconditional force of reason’s basic claims had to do with the worthiness of the way of life of which it was an essential constituent, Hegel found himself committed to writing an even longer chapter entitled “Spirit” (“Gmr”) in order to make good on that assertion. In the ‘‘‘’Geist" chapter, Hegel attempted to show how past ways of life various “shapes” of Geist - had undermined their own claims to worthiness and to allegiance wholly within their own terms just as the early modern attempts at shoring up reason’s claims themselves had foundered; and that by virtue of their own specific modes of failure, the historical succession of such failed forms of Geist had come to require modernity’s appeal to reason as basic and essential to itself.
在已经写下这样长的一——几乎无疑是独创而出乎人们预料的——关于“理性”的一章并且“理性”以理性的基本主张的无条件力量和理性本质上构成生活方式的价值有关这一观念而告终后，黑格尔感到要专写题为“精神”（Geist）的更长的一章以使上述主张得到更好的论述。在“精神”这一章里，黑格尔力图表明的是：生命过去的那些表现方式——精神的各种不同的“形态”——已经怎样在它们特有的关系领域完全削弱了它们自己关于价值和忠诚的主张，正像现代初期在支撑理性的主张方面所作出的那些尝试本身早已失败了一样；借助那些尝试自己的特殊的失败的模式，精神的这类失败了的形式所具有的历史连续性早就开始要求现代性诉诸于对它自身是基本和至关重要的理性。
Just as the historical section in the beginning of the book had begun with a reflection on the failures of the ancient ways of life to sustain a kind of Stoic or Skeptical form of independence and self-sufficiency for self-conscious agents, the section on “Geist" opens with a consideration of the Greek introduction of “negativity,” of the corrosive, undermining power of reflective thought into Western history. Ancient Greek life presented the picture of an “ethical harmony” unified within an ideal of beauty. Within ancient Greek life, individuals acting only on the particular demands of their own social roles were thus confident that the combined results of their actions would be ethically harmonious, and that the “whole” that was produced out of these various actions was itself beautiful and self-sustaining. However, ancient Greek life had no place within its conception of itself for the notion of an individual stepping outside of his role to appeal to some kind of ethical standard that was not itself completely embodied in a particular social role. Although this contained a set of contradictions that were always implicit within Greek life, those contradictions were only fully articulated in the heyday of its flowering, achieving one their most eloquent articulations in the Sophoclean tragedy Antigone.
正如《精神现象学》一书开头论述历史的那部分上来就去反思古代生活方式未能为一些有自我意识的行动者维持一种斯多葛派或怀疑主义的独立和自足的形式一样，关于“精神”这部分一开始就去思考希腊的“否定性”的导入，就去思考西方历史中反思的思想的腐蚀性和逐渐削弱的力量。古希腊人生活提供了一幅美的理想领域统一的“伦理和谐”的图画。在古希腊人生活领域，个体只根据他们自己扮演的社会角色的特殊要求行事，这类个体因此坚信的是：他们的行为所产生的总体结果应该在伦理上是和谐的；由这些不同的行为产生的“整体”本身是美的和自给的。然而，古希腊人的生活在它关于它自身概念的领域不存在这样的观念：个体扮演本不属于自己的角色并诉诸于一种本身不完全体现在特殊的社会角色中的伦理标准。虽然这一观念含有在希腊人生活领域始终固有的一系列自相矛盾的东西，但那些自相矛盾之物却只是在希腊人生活的鼎盛时期才得以阐明，并在索福克勒斯的悲剧作品《安提戈涅》中得到了一次栩栩如生的系统描述。
The narrative of the tragedy Antigone tracks the downfall of Oedipus’ family. Oedipus’ son Eteocles sits on the throne of Thebes, but the other son, Polyneices, who believes the throne should be his, attacks the city, and both he and Eteocles are killed in the attack. Their maternal uncle, Creon, assumes the royal power and orders that although Eteocles’ body is to be given the proper burial rites, these are to be prohibited for Polyneices because of what Creon claims are his traitorous acts. In defiance of this edict, Antigone (the daughter of Oedipus and therefore the sister of both Polyneices and Eteocles) performs the burial rites for her dead brother, Polyneices. She is caught at doing this, and Creon sentences Antigone to be entombed alive. As a result, Antigone commits suicide, Creon’s son (who had been betrothed to Antigone) also commits suicide, Creon’s wife dies, and Creon is thus faced with his own ruin as a result of his actions.
关于悲剧《安提戈涅》的叙事可追溯到俄狄浦斯家族的衰落。俄狄浦斯之子厄特俄克勒斯坐上了底比斯的王位，但俄狄浦斯的另一子波吕尼克斯认为王位应是他的，因此攻打底比斯城邦，他和厄特俄克勒斯在这次攻打中双双被杀。他们的舅父克瑞翁篡夺皇权并下诏曰：虽然厄特俄克勒斯的尸体将被以适当的仪式下葬，但这些仪式波吕尼克斯禁用，原因是克瑞翁声称波吕尼克斯有谋叛行为。安提戈涅（俄狄浦斯之女，因此也是波吕尼克斯和厄特俄克勒斯两兄弟之妹）无视这一法令，为她死去的哥哥波吕尼克斯举行了安葬仪式。她这样做时被人发现了，克瑞翁判处抗命外甥女安提戈涅活埋。其结果是，安提戈涅自杀身亡，克瑞翁之子（此前已同安提戈涅订婚）也自杀身亡，克瑞翁之妻死去，因此克瑞翁面临由于他的行为而导致的他自己的毁灭。
In explicating Antigone., Hegel developed his own original theory of tragic drama. Tragic drama consists in the portrayal of individual agents being required to do something that is right that is also at the same time unequivocally wrong and that leads to the agent’s destruction. In Greek tragedy, it is the clash within the way of life itself that requires its participants to perform wrong actions that are also necessarily right in terms of what is required of them by the way of life itself. Greek tragedy thus typically presents a conflict between characters who each embody some particular “ethical principle” of Greek life, and since both sides to the conflict are in the right and yet commit wrong, there can be no happy or “moral” answer to the dilemma posed by the play.
在解释《安提戈涅》时，黑格尔提出了自己关于悲剧的独创的理论。悲剧在于描述个体的行动者必须做些事情，这些事情是正确的同时也显然是错误的且导致了行动者的毁灭。在希腊悲剧作品里，正是在生活方式自身领域的碰撞，要求剧中人作出错误的举动，这些错误的举动根据生活方式本身所要求它们的东西又必然是正确的。因此希腊悲剧作品一般都描述人物间的冲突，这些人物中每个人都体现着希腊人生活的某种特殊的“伦理原则”；因为冲突的双方都是正确的，然而又都做错了，所以对于悲剧《安提戈涅》所提出的难题不可能做出令人满意的或“合乎道德的”解决。
As Hegel construed it, Antigone does what she has to do as defender of the divine law of the household and Creon does what he has to do as defender of the civic state. The result is mutual destruction, and the result of such tragic reflection for the Greeks was the gradual undoing of their faith in their ethical harmony and “beauty” and their becoming more reflective and “philosophical,” which resulted in turn in the gradual and necessary undermining of the beliefs necessary to sustain their way of life.
如黑格尔所解释的，安提戈涅作为王室神圣法律的保护人做了她必做之事，克瑞翁身为城邦的保护人做了他必做之事。其结果是彼此的毁灭，希腊人的这种悲剧式反思的结果在于逐渐使希腊人不再相信他们的伦理和谐及“美的东西”，并且使希腊人变得越来越沉思的和“达观的”，这反过来又导致逐渐必然削弱为支撑他们的生活方式所必需的信念。
The attempts by the successors to the doomed Greek ethical harmony to fashion a worthy way of life for themselves could only result in a long period of European self-alienation in the absence of such harmony. As he had in the “Reason” chapter, Hegel sketched out a brilliant, obscure, and provocative account of the logic of the line of development from Roman to contemporary times. The alienated, “formal” unity of the Roman Empire, bound by no common substantial ends, was maintained only by the force of its legions, the formal character of its laws, and the power and authority of the emperor, who was represented as an “absolute person,” a “titanic self-consciousness that thinks of itself as an actual living god,” who is only “really conscious of what he is ... in the destructive power he exercises against the self of his subjects.”® The “legal person” in Roman life, deprived of any “social substance,” thus had to find his “substance” within himself, in the stoical contemplation of his life and the alienated give-and-take of the legal relations of the empire. The result was the creation of a new type of “interiority” among its citizens, a new type of concern with inwardness and subjectivity.
这些后继者们为使注定要灭亡的希腊人的伦理和谐形成一种对他们自己有价值的生活方式而作出的种种尝试，只能导致欧洲人因缺乏这种和谐而长期自我异化。像黑格尔在“理性”那章中论述的，黑格尔对逻辑学从罗马到当代的发展线索做了卓越的、晦涩的和发人深思的概述。罗马帝国的异化和“形式上的”统一，并非是与普通的物质上的目的相关联的统一，仅凭罗马帝国的军团的力量得以维持，借助罗马帝国的法律的合乎传统习俗的特点得以维持，和借助罗马帝国皇帝的权力和权威得以维持。罗马帝国皇帝被描绘为“专制者”，被描绘成“一个自视为现实上帝的巨大的自我意识”，罗马帝国皇帝只不过“对于他自己是怎样的一种势力具有了确实的意识……在他用以对付跟他对立的有自我性的臣民的毁灭性暴力中，他是普遍的现实势力”。罗马人生活中的“法人”，被剥夺了任何“社会实体”的法人，因此必须在对他的生活和对罗马帝国异化的给予和索取的合法关系作禅欲式沉思过程中发现他自身领域的“实体”。其结果是使罗马帝国公民产生一种新型的“内隐性”，一种与本质和主观性的新型的关系。
The dissolution of the Roman Empire and its crystallization into “Christendom” and then even later into “Europe” provided only a further fragmented and alienated set of ideals. The warriors dominating the scene in early medieval Europe came to understand themselves to be the spiritual descendants of the Roman patricians, to be aristocrats, and since the Roman way of life had bequeathed a conception of the self as fundamentally lacking any substance on its own, all that could count for these “aristocrats” was obtaining honor and glory in the eyes of appropriate others. The logic of such aristocratic recognition eventually required there to be a single point of authority that bestowed such recognition, and this achieved its historical apogee in the figure of the absolute monarch, Louis XIV, the Sun King, who effectively turned what might have been a sullen and rebellious aristocracy into a fawning set of courtiers eager for favors and valuable opportunities for investment. With that, the ideals of the aristocracy effectively merged with those of the merchants, the bourgeoisie; and since the aristocrats had defined themselves in terms of being devoted to king and country and not to the “common” and vulgar pursuit of money and comfort, the linchpins of belief in the right of the aristocracy to govern collapsed when that form of negative self-definition dissolved.
罗马帝国的解体和罗马帝国形成“信奉基督教的国家”，后来甚至“信奉基督教的国家”形成“欧洲”，这些只不过提供了一系列更为碎片化和异化的理想。那些支配中世纪初欧洲舞台的武士们开始把他们自己理解为古罗马贵族的精神上的后裔，理解为贵族；因为罗马人的生活方式早已演变成基本上缺乏独立的任何实体的自我概念，所以一切能够认作这些“贵族”拥有的东西在适当的他者们的眼中都获得了荣誉和荣耀。这种贵族式的认知逻辑最终要求具有赋予这种认知的唯一权威的观点，这在专制君主路易十四这位“太阳国王”身上达到了它的历史的顶点。路易十四有效地使本可变得抑郁而反叛的贵族成为一系列阿谀奉承、渴望得宠、珍惜加官晋爵机会的侍臣。由于这样，贵族们的理想实际上和商人、资产阶级的理想融为一体；因为贵族已用献身于国王和国家而非沉溺于对金钱与安逸的“通常”和庸俗的追求的字眼来界定他们自己，所以那类决定贵族权利的信念的关键性之物在否定的自我界定的形式消解时坍塌了。
The collapse of the aristocratic ideal left only a fragmented world that presented its participants with conflicting and contradictory demands for belief and action. (Hegel appealed to and cited Denis Diderot’s short dialogue “Rameau’s Nephew” - translated only in 1805 by Goethe - to illustrate the emptiness and lack of orientation experienced by such agents trying to make their way in such a fragmented world.) Something like a “pure consciousness” that was “above” the fragmented forms of social life seemed to be required, and by the eighteenth century that demand itself had become the scene of another form of modern fragmentation. The oddly sectarian skirmishes between the coexisting movements of skeptical modern Enlightenment and emotionalist modern religion - Pietism in Germany, Jansenism and Quietism in France, Wesleyanism in Great Britain — embodied this fragmented outlook. One side, the Enlightenment, believed that the exercise of “pure insight” by individuals, abstracted away from all tradition and social relations, could generate a set of ideals that would command allegiance; the other side, “Faith,” believed that an emotional encounter with God and a corresponding orientation in life would follow if one personally opened one’s heart in the right way, and that one required no treatises from learned theologians to accomplish this.
贵族理想的破灭只留下一个碎片化的世界，碎片化的世界向它的分享者提出的信念和行为的要求是互相冲突的和自相矛盾的。（黑格尔诉诸于且引用狄德罗的短篇对话《拉摩的侄儿》——只是在1805年才由歌德译成德文——来阐明被试图在这种碎片化世界中飞黄腾达的这类行动者所体验到的彷徨。）那些“高于”社会生活碎片化形式的“纯意识”一样的东西看起来好像是必需的，到18世纪这一要求本身已变成现代碎片化的另一种舞台。现代怀疑主义的启蒙运动与现代唯情论的宗教——德国的虔诚派，法国的詹森主义与寂静主义，大不列颠的卫斯理宗教义——的共存运动之间那些奇特的宗派性争论体现着这种碎片化的观点。作为启蒙运动一方相信，运用从各种传统和社会关系中抽象出来的个体的“纯洞见”，有可能产生一系列将发出效忠命令的理想；作为“宗教正统”的另一方相信的是：假如一个人亲自以正确的方式敞开心扉的话，与上帝情感上的遭遇和一种相应的生活定位就总会接踵而至；一个人无需借助博学的神学家们的专著来做到这一点。
