This latter course, in effect, was the Prussian way, but Hegel had come to the conclusion in “The German Constitution” that Prussia was unsuitable for the restoration of the Holy Roman Empire because of its own decline and because its centralizing policies threatened the existence of the estates.*'’* In his 1802-03 writings, Hegel was trying to thread the needle, to support something like the Prussian idea of locating the authority of the estates in a larger social whole while at the same time avoiding the risks of eliminating the estates altogether, as he feared was actually happening in Prussia.
这后一过程实质上是普鲁士式的道路，但黑格尔早已在《论德意志宪法》中得出的结论是，普鲁士之所以不适合恢复到罗马帝国是因为普鲁士自己的衰落，是因为普鲁士集权化政策威胁到社会等级的存在。在他1802至1803年的著作中，黑格尔正试图去完成一件困难的事情，正试图支撑像普鲁士人观念一样的东西，这就是把社会等级的权力置于更大的社会整体中，同时避免冒险彻底消除社会等级，像他担心的实际在普鲁士发生的情况一样。
Hegel thus found himself in the dilemma that was to occupy him for a good part of his life when he turned to thinking about political matters. On the one hand, he rejected J. J. Moser’s methods; to Hegel, Moser seemed to have contented himself with the useless task of simply compiling the various traditional claims of rights and privilege without making any attempt to impose any kind of rational unity on them. On the other hand, Hegel did not want to take the Prussian route of potentially eliminating the estates altogether. In 1802 and 1803, Schellingian theory combined with a concept of “recognition” seemed to give him the way out he needed, since it seemed to be able to offer an account of the estates as “potencies” of the whole society, as corporate bodies that on their own created a dynamic that led to the creation of a “state” that was their unity but still presupposed their existence; and it did this by virtue of a non-naturalistic but not reductionistic theory of “spirit” and agency.
黑格尔因此发觉他在转而思考政治问题时陷入他一生绝大部分时间里无法摆脱的困境。一方面，他拒绝J.J.莫泽的方法；在黑格尔看来，莫泽好像提及他本人做了一些无用功，这就是只是编纂有着不同传统的权利和特权的主张，而没有尝试把任何种类合理的统一强加于这样的权利和主张。另一方面，黑格尔不想采用普鲁士完全潜在地消除社会等级这一道路。在1802年和1803年，谢林的兼有“认识”概念的理论看来好像给黑格尔指出了黑格尔所需要的路径，因为谢林的理论看来好像能够说明社会等级是整个社会的“潜能”，正像法人团体独立地创造一种导致创造“国家”的动力，“国家”是法人团体的统一体但仍然以法人团体的存在为先决条件；谢林的上述理论凭借“精神”与中介的非自然主义理论而非还原论的理论给黑格尔指出了黑格尔所需要的路径。
In reinterpreting the estates as embodying fundamental ethical stances toward social life, Hegel also thereby radically reinterpreted who could be included in membership in them. What he called at the time the “absolute estate” included the nobility as members; since the members of this estate live “general lives wholly belonging to the public,” only that estate was fit for life in politics. Hegel thus included in that estate not only the nobility but also philosophers - a conclusion that made sense only in light of Fichte’s redefinition of the university and of philosophy’s place in it.' (Hegel also drew on Plato’s authority for combining the tasks of the political nobility and the philosophers.)*^' From a biographical point of view, it is striking that Hegel thereby included himself but would have excluded his father from membership in the “absolute estate.”*
在重新把社会等级解释成是体现对社会生活的基本伦理态度时，黑格尔同样也因此重新从根本上解释了究竟谁可能被包含在社会等级成员中。他在当时所称作的“绝对等级”包含贵族作为成员；因为这个等级中的成员过着“完全属于公众的一般生活”，所以只有这个等级适合政治生活。黑格尔因此不但把贵族而且把哲学家算入这个等级——一个仅仅根据费希特对大学和对哲学在大学中地位的重新界定而说得通的结论。（黑格尔还利用了柏拉图的权威把政治贵族的任务与哲学家的任务结合起来。）从传记的观点看，引人注目的是黑格尔因此把他本人列入“绝对等级”的成员，而大概会把他父亲排除在“绝对等级”的成员之外。
A major point of Hegel’s argument was obviously to demonstrate that old-fashioned cameralist jurisprudence should be replaced by speculative Hegelian/Schellingian philosophy. A speculative theory of what would count as an adequate realization of freedom would, Hegel concluded, make “a good part and perhaps all of the sciences called positive jurisprudence . . . fall within a completely developed and elaborated philosophy,” and, by implication, not within the domains of the cameralistic faculties.* “Philosophy,” Hegel said, “stands in the Idea of the whole above the parts; thereby it keeps each part in its limits and also, by the majesty of the Idea itself, prevents the part from burgeoning by subdivision into endless minutiae.”*
黑格尔论证的一个重要观点显然在于证明老派官房学的法学应该被思辨的黑格尔哲学或谢林哲学所取代。思辨理论应该被算作自由的适当实现，这样的思辨理论应该，黑格尔推断，构成被称作实定法学的主要部分，或许构成整个实定法学……应该属于一种得到全面发展和详尽阐述的哲学，而不应该属于官房学专业领域，尽管黑格尔对这样的见解含而不露。“哲学”，黑格尔说道，“位于部分之上的整体观念中；因此它使每一部分在其界限内，同样也通过观念自身的权威来使部分不致被迅速再分成无穷的细小部分。”
Philosophy speaks from the standpoint of the “absolute” - but from what point of view was the philosopher speaking when he said that? At this point, Hegel did not find even his own answers to that question very convincing; and he had to worry that his own doctrine of the “mores” of a “people” only threatened to be replace cameralism’s dogmatics with some more communitarian and equally dogmatic conception of law. The System of Ethical Life remained unpublished and unfinished.
哲学根据“绝对”的观点言说——但哲学家在讲哲学时根据何种观点言说呢？在这个问题上，黑格尔甚至还没有找到一个非常令他自己信服的答案；他不得不担心他自己关于“人民”的“更多东西”理论仅仅威胁要用某种更带有共产主义社会味道的、等同于教条的法律概念取代官房学的教条。《伦理体系》此时仍然没有出版，也没有写完。
1804-1805: Logic and Metaphysics
Hegel's First "Logic”
1804年至1805年：逻辑学与形而上学
黑格尔最早的“逻辑学”
Hegel’s only reputation at this time was that of being Schelling’s disciple, and since their journal had closed he had been publicly silent, publishing nothing. Moreover, the small inheritance on which he had been living was dwindling fast, and the small supplements from the nominal students’ fees and honoraria for his work in journals were nowhere near enough to compensate.
黑格尔在这时仅有的名气是作为谢林的信徒，因为他们合办的杂志已经停刊，所以他在公共场合沉默不语，连一个字也没有发表。不仅如此，一小笔他长期赖以为生的遗产也快要花光了，一小笔来自微不足道的学生服务费的补贴和他为杂志社工作的酬金几乎难以满足他的生活开销。
Clearly, Hegel needed a salaried position, and, just as clearly, he needed a book to get one; but none seemed to be forthcoming. In 1802 he announced that “his” system would be forthcoming; this was repeated in 1803 when he told his students that his own “compendium” for the lectures would soon be forthcoming; when he wrote to Goethe on September 29, 1804, requesting an appointment as a professor in philosophy, he added that “the purpose of a work I hope to complete this winter for my lectures - a purely scientific elaboration of philosophy will permit me to present it to Your Excellency, should I be kindly permitted to do so.”'’'’ In 1805, he wrote a letter to Johann Heinrich Voss, seeking to enlist his help in attaining a position at Heidelberg, saying, “By fall, I will give an exposition of my work as a system of philosophy.””* In 1804-05, Hegel wrote out a clean copy of a long manuscript on “Logic, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Nature,” which was almost certainly intended to be the basis for the book he had been promising since 1802. Yet again, despite his earnest promises of a book to all concerned and despite his desperate need for one, Hegel became completely dissatisfied with his efforts and as he had before, simply and abruptly stopped work on it and began work on another manuscript.
很显然，黑格尔需要一个带薪的职位；同样十分清楚的是，他需要撰写一本书以获得带薪的职位；但写书的事看来似乎没有任何眉目。在1802年，他宣称“他的”体系即将问世；这样的宣称在1803年被他重复了一遍，当时他告诉学生他自己的讲课“纲要”将会很快编写出来；当他于1804年9月29日致信歌德，请求担任哲学教授职位的时候，他补充说道：“我希望在这个冬季学期为我讲课——对哲学作纯粹科学的详尽阐述——写出一本著作，这本著作的目的在于将使我能够把它献给阁下，承蒙惠允。”在1805年，他致信约翰·海因里希·福斯，试图谋取在他提携下获得海德堡大学教职，信中说道：“到秋季，我将把我的著作扩充成哲学体系。”在1804年至1805年，黑格尔誊清了一部很长的“逻辑学、形而上学和自然哲学”手稿，这部手稿几乎肯定意在奠定他自1802年以来一直在允诺的这本书的基础。然而，尽管他对有关这本书的一切作了严肃认真的承诺，尽管他极需一本书来证明自己的水平，黑格尔仍然对他自己的努力极为不满，像他以前做的一样，他只不过突然中止了这本书的写作并着手另一部手稿的写作。
The 1804-05 manuscript - The Jenaer Systementwiirfe II: Logik, Metaphysik, Natiirphilosophie {Jena System Draft II: Logic, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Nature) - presents a curious development in Hegel’s thought.'” It is almost certainly written during the period 1804-05, but it contains none of the social and political reflections of the earlier attempts at a system. It surely was a reworking of some older lecture notes (or an older manuscript for a book) that Hegel had developed for his courses on logic and metaphysics in 1802; most likely, his abandoning this manuscript had to do with how he came to see its incompatibility with the state of his thought as it was developing during the period 1805-06. Indeed, it seems that he quite suddenly stopped working on it altogether. The manuscript thus marked yet another stage in the growing crisis in Hegel’s career. The very obscurity of the surviving manuscript is evidence of just how distraught Hegel was becoming at this point in his life.
1804至1805年手稿——《耶拿体系草案：逻辑学、形而上学和自然哲学》——展现了黑格尔思想奇特的发展。这部手稿几乎肯定写于1804至1805年这个阶段，但它不包含对体系早期尝试的社会反思和政治反思。它想必是对被黑格尔在1802年为他逻辑学和形而上学课程撰写的那些旧讲稿（或一部较早书稿）的修订；很可能，他放弃了这部手稿，这涉及他怎样逐渐看出这部手稿与他将在1805至1806年这个时期阐述的思想状况不相一致。实际上，情况似乎是他完全极其突然地终止了这部著作的写作。这部手稿因此仍然标志着黑格尔学术生涯中另一危机日益增加的阶段。现存手稿的极其晦涩恰好证明黑格尔在他平生那个阶段变得多么心烦意乱。
Early on in his career at Jena, Hegel had come to the idea that his “system” would be divided among what he had taken to calling logic and metaphysics, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit, but it was not clear to him just how the three (or maybe four) parts of his system were to be related to each other. Uniting all these different sections would be a truly speculative philosophy conceived, as Hegel now put it, as the articulation of the absolute, that is, the articulation of the basic structure, the unity, underlying both the objective and the subjective points of view.
早在他耶拿学术生涯时期，黑格尔就已经开始认识到，他的“体系”应被划分成被他早就喜爱称作的逻辑学与形而上学、自然哲学和精神哲学，但他恰恰尚不清楚他体系的三个（或许四个）部分是如何相互关联的。把所有的这些不同部分结合起来的应该是一种真正的思辨哲学，像黑格尔当时论述的，思辨哲学应该被设想成是对绝对的系统阐述，也就是说，应该被设想成是对基本结构或同一的系统阐述，基本结构和统一既构成客观观点的基础，也构成主观观点的基础。
Hegel’s unpublished manuscript of 1804-05 was an attempt to accomplish this via a “logic” of relations. Hegel’s decision to call this a “logic” followed the trend of the times. If nothing else, other people at Jena (including Fichte) had been doing much the same thing, and Hegel’s own course in philosophy as a student at Tubingen in the winter semester of 1788-1789 had been called “Logic and Metaphysics” (taught by J. F. Flatt).
黑格尔生前未发表的1804年至1805年手稿是一次借助“关系逻辑学”来完成对绝对的系统阐述的尝试。黑格尔顺应当时学界潮流决定称对绝对的系统阐述为“逻辑学”。甚至英雄所见略同，在耶拿的其他人（包括费希特）同样也一直在用心阐述他们各自的“逻辑学”，黑格尔自己在1788至1789年冬季学期在图宾根学习的哲学课程也被称作“逻辑学”和“形而上学”（由J.F.弗拉特讲授）。
The key idea of Hegel’s 1804 “Logic” seems to have been that the system begins with something like Hblderlin’s conception of the unity of thought and being, some notion of a fundamental identity, and one then shows that the articulation of this identity itself presupposes an articulation of “difference,” following which one shows how the articulation of this relation of identity and difference must develop itself into a yet richer, more determinate relational system. Although the crucial introductory sections of the manuscript are missing, it seems most likely that Hegel began the manuscript with the concept of what he called “simple relation” - Holderlin’s notion of the deep unity of thought and being - from which the surviving portions show that he then proceeded to develop the relations of “reality” and “negation,” out of which the conceptions of qualitative difference and quantitative difference were then themselves developed. The articulation of the conception of “quantitative difference” was used to argue the point that traditional syllogistic logic was incapable of handling conceptions of the “infinite,” which had been otherwise quite capably handled in the mathematics of the differential and integral calculus.'^** The way in which the infinite is expressed as a “ratio” in the calculus shows that there is indeed a purely conceptual basis for articulating the infinite, and that mathematics has thereby shown that a new type of “logic” is required in order that the “infinite” not be conceived as some kind of “thing” - as an infinitesi- mally large or small quantity — but as having an “ideal” existence in its expressions in the formulas of the calculus.
黑格尔1804年“逻辑学”中的关键思想看来似乎在于他的体系开篇论述的类似荷尔德林思想与存在统一的概念或某种基本同一的观念，这一关键思想于是表明对同一本身的系统阐述预先假定了对“差异”的系统阐述，紧接着这一关键思想表明对同一与差异关系的系统阐述怎么必然把它自身发展成了一个甚至更为丰富的、更加确定的关系体系。虽然这部手稿中至关重要的导论部分现已阙失，但看来似乎很可能黑格尔在手稿开头部分论述了被他称作的“简单关系”这一概念——荷尔德林关于思想与存在的深度统一的见解——根据这样的假定，手稿的现存部分表明他接着继续阐述“现实”与“否定”的关系，依据这一关系，质的差异与量的差异概念本身继而得到阐述。系统阐述“量的差异”概念，习惯上的做法是去论证下列这样的要点：传统的三段论逻辑学不能够处理“无限”概念，而数学中的微积分处理起“无限”概念已是得心应手。“一种借以把无限表述为微积分比率的方法，揭示确实存在着一种系统阐述无限的纯粹概念的基础，揭示数学因此已经证实人们需要一种新型‘逻辑学’，以便‘无限’不应该被设想成是某种‘东西’——不应该被设想成是无穷大或无穷小的量——而应该被设想成是‘无限’‘理想地’存在于‘无限’用微积分公式表述中。”
Indeed, the mathematical example shows, Hegel argued in the manuscript, that thinking in terms of simple “relations” (Beziehungen) requires us to articulate them in terms of a more basic conception of “ratios,” or “relationships” {Verhultnisse), “totalities” grasped in thought that are the conditions of our conceptual grasp of the “relations” between things (such as the individual elements in an infinite series). In the manuscript, two such “relationships” are singled out: the relationship of being and the relationship of thought. Under the heading “relationship of being,” Hegel includes what he calls the relationships of substantiality, of causality, and of reciprocal interaction, which together commit us to understanding the various individual substances of the world as only moments in the process of the world’s coming to be and passing away as a whole, “moments” at which that “infinite” process coalesces into individual “points.”
更确切地说，手稿中所使用的数学例子表明，黑格尔在手稿中辩称，这种用简单“关系”（Beziehungen）进行的思维要求我们以思想把握的“比率”或“关系”（Verhältnisse）或“总体”这些更基本的概念从而对简单“关系”作出系统的阐述，这些较为基本的概念构成了我们概念式地把握事物（例如无限级数中个体元素）间“关系”的条件。在手稿中，这样的两种“关系”被挑出：存在的关系与思想的关系。在“存在的关系”这个标题下，黑格尔列出被他称作的实体关系、因果性关系和相互作用关系，它们共同使我们承诺把世界各种不同的个别实体仅仅大体上理解成是世界生成与消逝过程中的一些环节，一个个“无限”过程因之合并为个别“点”的“环节”。
If the “relationship of being” is the conceptual articulation of the way in which the particular items of the world are both absorbed into and produced by the universal process of nature itself, then the “relationship of thought” is the pure “logic” of the unity of and relations between the “universal” and the “particular” aspects of that process, the logic according to which the primordial divisions in the “judgment,” and later in the “syllogism,” are produced.'®’
如果“存在的关系”是对一种方式作概念式的系统阐述，而且以这种方式世界中具体事物既被并入自然本身的普遍过程，也生于自然本身的普遍过程的话，那么“思想的关系”就是上述过程的纯粹统一的“逻辑”，就是上述过程的“普遍”方面与“具体”方面之间关系的纯粹统一的“逻辑”，这样的“逻辑”依据的是“判断”和而后“推论式”中原始划分的产生。
In the manuscripts, Hegel argues for the conclusion that any rigorous, “logical” typology of judgments must itself be derived from what is necessary to articulate the larger totality within which such judgments are made, in particular, to articulate the implicit relations between universals and particulars. The guiding thread in that discussion has to do with the notion that if there are only so many ways that universals and particulars can be related to each other, then there can be only that many types of correctly formed judgments. However, all attempts to establish this in any kind of rigorous fashion only demonstrate, so Hegel concluded, that a putatively purely formal classification of judgments itself already depends on a more substantial, material treatment of what it is correct to assert, and that the doctrine of judgment thus naturally gives way to a doctrine of what it is correct to assert, which itself comprises the classical theory of the syllogism, the theory of inference.
在这部手稿中，黑格尔为赞成下列的结论而展开论证：任何严格“逻辑”判断的类型学自身都必须被追溯到系统阐述这些判断被借以作出的更大总体所必需的东西，特别是，都必须被追溯到系统阐述普遍与特殊之间的暗含的关系所必需的东西。这种探讨中的引导性思路关系到的见解是，如果只存在着这么多的方式以致普遍与特殊能够彼此关联的话，那么就只能够存在着这么多的正确形成的判断类型。然而，一切以任何种严格方式确立上述见解的尝试都只不过证明，黑格尔也断言，一种假定地纯粹地形式的判断分类自身已经取决于对这种分类所正确地断言的东西作出一种更加实体的、更加物质的论述，判断的理论因此自然地让位于关于判断所正确地断言东西的理论，这后一理论自身包含古典的推论理论或推理理论。
In the 1804 “Logic,” Hegel argued that the classical theory of the syllogism, however, required as a condition of its own possibility another nonsyllogistic totality. This was not, however, an entirely new conclusion; already in his 1802 essay on the “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy” for the Critical Journal of Philosophy^ he had shown that he was quite familiar with the criticisms of formal syllogistic structure made by the third-century skeptic, Sextus Empiricus. On Sextus’ account, a familiar syllogism such as “Every man is an animal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal” is inadequate; it itself rests on syllogisms that are either incomplete - how do we know that every man is an animal until we have investigated all men? - or are complete and therefore make the syllogism circular - since if we have investigated every man, then we have also investigated Socrates, so we already know Socrates is an animal, and we have already presupposed the conclusion, “Socrates is an animal,” in even stating the syllogism. Other similar criticisms had been voiced in Hegel’s own day about the sufficiency of syllogistic structure. To put it in the contemporary terms coined by Gilbert Ryle: What was at stake were the inference licenses at work in the syllogism; the argument was that we cannot understand the validity of syllogisms until we have shown the validity of the inference licenses themselves (since they cannot be included in the premises of the system). Hegel concluded not only that it was simply dogmatic to presuppose that all such inference licenses must be formal, but also that an investigation of both the way in which judgments must be classified and the proof the validity of syllogisms themselves shows that the whole of syllogistic logic cannot be explained in terms of a purely formal enterprise.
然而，在1804年的“逻辑学”里，黑格尔认为古典的推论理论要求把另一非推论式的总体作为它自己可能性的条件。然而，这并不是一个全新的结论；早在他1802年发表在《哲学评论杂志》上的“怀疑论与哲学的关系”这篇论文里，他就已经表明他深知由公元三世纪怀疑论者塞克斯都·恩披里柯作出的对形式推论结构的批判。按照塞克斯都的阐述，一个为大家所熟悉的推论，例如“每人都是动物，苏格拉底是人，所以苏格拉底是动物”，是个不适当的推论；这个推论自身所依靠的那些推论要么是不完整的——难道我们怎么知道每人都是动物直到我们对所有人都作了调查研究为止吗？——要么是完整的且因此使这个推论成为循环论证——因为如果我们对每个人都作了调查研究，那么我们也就对苏格拉底作了调查研究，所以我们已经知道苏格拉底是动物，我们就已经预先假定了“苏格拉底是动物”这个结论，甚至我们在着手陈述这个推论时就已经预先假定了“苏格拉底是动物”这个结论。诸如此类的批判早在黑格尔自己的时代就已经被说成是关于推论结构的充足性问题。用吉尔伯特·赖尔所创造的当代术语来描述推论结构的充足性，成问题的是三段论中使用的推论许可；这个论证意味着我们不可能理解三段论的合法性直到我们证明推论许可自身的合法性为止（因为推论许可不可能被包含在推论方式的前提中）。黑格尔不但断言预先假定所有这些推论许可必须是形式的简直是独断论的做法，而且断言对判断必须借以被分类的方式和推论自身合法性的证据的研究，表明整个三段论逻辑不可能根据一种纯粹形式的研究来加以解释。
Hegel’s treatment of syllogisms themselves in his 1804-05 “Logic” is very abbreviated. His general argument, though, is something like the following. The traditional explanation of the validity of syllogisms had to do with the way in which the subjects or predicates were said to be “distributed” as the middle terms of the inference. The syllogism, “All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal,” involves a major term (“mortal”), a minor term (“Socrates”), and a middle term (“man”) that “binds” the major and minor terms together in the conclusion. The invalidity of syllogisms such as “Socrates is white, white is a color, therefore Socrates is a color” was to be explained by the notion that the subject and predicate terms were not “distrib- uted” correctly in the premises (or were not “distributed” at all). The idea of “distribution” was traditionally explained in terms of what “fell under” the term and what did not.
黑格尔在他1804年至1805年的“逻辑学”中简明扼要地论述了推论自身。尽管如此，他的推论代表着像下列一样的东西。对推论合法性的传统解释涉及一种方式，借助这种方式，主词或谓词作为推理中项被说成是“周延的”。三段论“凡人皆有死，苏格拉底是人，故苏格拉底有死”，含有大项（“有死”）、小项（“苏格拉底”）和中项“人”，中项使大项和小项在结论中得以结合。诸如“苏格拉底是白的，白的是颜色，所以苏格拉底是颜色”这样的三段论的非法性应该被用主项和谓项在前提中不是正确地“周延的”（或“完全不周延的”这一说法）加以解释。“周延”这一说法传统上通常被根据“列入”项的东西和不“列入”项的东西加以解释。
Since, however, the understandings of the terms and their “distribution” were not themselves formal in nature, the determination of what counts as a valid syllogism cannot depend solely on resources internal to the formal structure of syllogisms themselves but must also depend on the material content of certain concepts; what counts as purely logical vocabulary (for example, connectives such as “and” and “or”) and what counts as “distributing” the terms depends on what counts as a substantive understanding of conceptual content in the first place. The very understanding of the validity of syllogisms themselves, he concluded, had to do with our implicit grasp of the larger “whole” of thought and being that gave sense to such judgments and their syllogistic connections in the first place.
然而，对推论中项及其“周延”的理解自身其实是形式上的理解，所以若要确定被算作的合法推论则不可能只取决于源自推论自身形式结构固有的东西，而且必须取决于某些概念的物质内容；所以若要确定被算作的纯逻辑词汇（举例来说，诸如“与”和“或”这样的连接词）和被算作的“周延”项，则取决于首先被算作的对概念内容实体式的理解。正是对推论自身合法性的这一理解，他断言，涉及我们含蓄地把握思维与存在的更大“整体”，这样的“整体”首先赋予这些判断及其推论的联系以意义。
Metaphysics as the Completion of Logic
形而上学作为逻辑学的完成
Since the validity of the syllogism depends on the “distribution” of terms, any rigorous definition of the basic terms already presupposes some kind of “definition by essence,” the paradigm of which is that of geometrical procedure. The formal validity of syllogisms therefore depended, so Hegel reasoned in the 1804-1805 manuscript, on a more complex unity that would mediate between the “relationships of being” and the “relationships of thought.” This would be “metaphysics,” and the “totality” of such metaphysical definition and division would be a form of cognition {Erkennen)}^^
因为推论的合法性仰赖于项的“周延”，所以任何对基本项的严格界定都已经预先假定某种“本质界定”，都已经预先假定一种作为几何学程序范式的范式。推论形式的合法性因此取决于，黑格尔在1804年至1805年的手稿里也推断说，一个更加复杂的统一体，这个统一体应该在“存在的关系”与“思想的关系”之间起着中介作用。这些应该属于“形而上学”范畴，这样的形而上学界定和划分的“总体”当然属于认识（ **Erkenntnis** ）形式范畴。
“Metaphysics” conceived in this fashion would be articulation of the unity of “thought” and “being,” the “absolute,” the “logic,” that is, of what Holderlin had called “Being.” Metaphysics thus is the doctrine of the way in which what appear to be basic oppositions are conceptually articulated in terms of their deeper unity and connection with each other.The basic principles of such unities are those of identity and contradiction, the “principle of the exclusion of a third” (bivalence), and the “principle of sufficient reason.” These principles cannot be proved within syllogistic logic itself, since syllogistic logic presupposes them.
被以这种方式构想的“形而上学”应该是对“思想”与“存在”的统一、“绝对”、“逻辑学”的系统阐述，也即应该是对荷尔德林称作的“存在”的系统阐述。形而上学因此是关于一种方式的学说，由于这种方式，看来好像是那些基本对立物被概念上按照它们更深程度的统一和彼此的联系作了系统阐述。这种统一的基本原则是同一与矛盾原则、“第三中项原则”（二值）和“充足理由原则”。这些原则不可能在三段论逻辑自身中得到证明，因为三段论逻辑预先假定了这些原则。
Staying true to the inspiration of Holderlin, Hegel divides “meta- physics” into three main subdivisions: cognition as a system of principles, the “metaphysics of objectivity,” and the “metaphysics of subjectivity,” each of which have a deeper unity in the “absolute” that is prior to their division from each other. In the metaphysics of objectivity, we think of “cognition” (which Hegel identifies in the manuscript with the “absolute I”) as making objective claims about ourselves and the world. This necessarily leads to something like the classical pre-Kantian metaphysical conceptions of the soul, the world, and the “highest essence” (God), which themselves generate the paradoxes that motivated classical metaphysics and which eventually necessitated the Kantian revolution in philosophy, which is then itself grasped in an intuition of the “absolute” as the unity of this kind of “subjectivity” and “objectivity.”
在确实受到荷尔德林启发后，黑格尔把“形而上学”划分成三个主要部分：作为原理体系的认识、“客观性形而上学”和“主观性形而上学”，这三个部分中每个部分都具有“绝对”的更深程度的统一，“绝对”先于这三个部分的彼此划分。在客观性形而上学那里，我们把（被黑格尔在这部手稿中认为等同于“绝对自我”）的“认识”看作提出关于我们自己和世界的客观主张。这样一来就必定导致某种像前康德古典形而上学关于灵魂、世界和“最高本质”（上帝）的概念一样的东西，这三个概念本身所产生的悖论激发了古典形而上学的动机并最终必然引起康德的哲学革命，康德哲学革命本身又被用这种“主观性”与“客观性”统一的“绝对”直观加以把握。
The Articulation of the “Absolute” and the Early Philosophy of Nature
对“绝对”的系统阐述与早期的自然哲学
In 1802 and 1803, Hegel began to assemble clippings concerning natural science from various journals and newspapers, and he returned intensively to one of his earlier interests as a schoolboy in Stuttgart, the study of physics and mathematics, in an effort to gather material for a philosophy of nature that would mesh with his reflections on the possibility of human freedom. The philosophies of nature that he produced during these years display a detailed knowledge on his part of a good bit of what was going on in the natural science of the time. (Certainly Jena, with its collection of budding natural scientists, was a good place to learn about these things.) They vary quite a bit in detail - the two earlier drafts begin with the system of the sun, the movement of the planets, the earth, and then move to mechanics, whereas the final draft in 1805—06 begins with pure mechanics and derives things from that — but they all retain (as Rolf-Peter Horstmann has shown) the idea that the two basic factors in nature are what Hegel calls the “aether” and matter. m nature as The “aether” is the way the absolute appears most basically unity, and it develops into “difference” in various ways (or as the “universal” that is differentiated into “particulars”); the aether develops itself into “matter,” and this “matter” then develops itself into the various appearances of nature.
在1802年和1803年，黑格尔着手收集各种不同报刊杂志上有关自然科学的活页，他竭力回到他早年在斯图加特中小学时代的一种兴趣，研究物理学和数学，努力为构建一种自然哲学而收集材料，这种自然哲学将和他对人类自由的可能性的反思融为一体。这被他在这些年间所提出的自然哲学，展示了他本人对当时自然科学中研究的很多东西深入细致的了解。（当然，耶拿由于云集一批初露头角的科学家，成了获悉自然科学中研究东西的好地方。）这些他在这些年间所提出的自然哲学内容十分庞杂——两部早期草稿从太阳系、行星运行、地球开始，然后转到力学，而1805年至1806年最后那部草稿从纯力学开始并把某些东西的起源追溯到纯力学——但这些他在这些年间所提出的自然哲学全都保留了（像罗尔夫-彼得·霍斯特曼已证明的）这样的见解，这就是大自然中两种基本因素是被黑格尔称作的“以太”和“物质”。“以太”从根本上说是绝对借以本质上显露自身作为“统一体”的方式，它也以各种不同的方式发展成为“差异”（或它作为“普适”发展成为具有差别的“特殊”）；以太自身发展成为“物质”，“物质”继而发展成为自然的各种不同的现象。
The details of Hegel’s philosophy of nature in this period are notimportant here. Hegel himself abandoned and modified many of theideas he sketched out, and he certainly never saw fit to publish thosenotes, copious as they were. Their importance lies in the way in whichthey show the manner by which Hegel tried to flesh out his convictionthat he needed a nonreductionist and still non-naturalist account of thegenesis of spirit out of nature.
黑格尔这个阶段自然哲学的细节在这里并不重要。黑格尔本人就放弃了且修改了他所勾勒出的很多想法，他当然从未把那批笔记当作适合发表的东西看待，尽管它们内容翔实丰富多彩。它们的重要性在于这样的方面，这就是它们表明借助特定方式黑格尔试图使他自己更加确信，他需要对出之于自然的精神的形成作出一种非还原论和仍然非自然主义的阐述。
