11 Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Freedom, History, and the Modern European State
第11章 黑格尔的《法哲学原理》：自由、历史和现代欧洲国家(1)
From Nuremberg to Berlin: The Recovery of “Ethical Life”
Hegel’s 1820 Elements of the Philosophy of Right was written against the background of the ongoing, intensely fierce debates over the shape Germany was to assume in the aftermath of Napoleon’s spectacular fall and the conflicts between reformers and reactionaries. In fact, the basic ideas and themes of the book had already been substantially worked out at least by the time that Hegel had landed in Heidelberg, and the very general themes of the book appear even earlier in his lectures in Jena and in his dictations to his Gymnasium class in Nuremberg. In the 1820 book, Hegel thus put into writing the results of his sustained reflections over a long period of time on the shape of modern European life, and sharpened his thoughts on those issues in light of the controversies surrounding what constitutions, if any, German states should have and whether (and how, on what basis) German law' should be codified. Both debates had surrounded him at Heidelberg, and the changes from the Heidelberg manuscripts to the finished product of 1820 reflect Hegel’s ongoing attempts to demonstrate how his own idealist approach to philosophy might provide the needed orientation for those debates.
从纽伦堡到柏林时期：“道德生活”的复苏
1820年黑格尔撰写《法哲学原理》之际，德意志正处于一场激烈的争论之中，这场争论围绕着拿破仑突然垮台后，在改革者与反改革者冲突的背景下，德意志究竟应采用何种政体。实际上，这本书的基本思想与主题，至少在黑格尔抵达海德堡时就已大致成形，而其主旨早在他耶拿授课期间以及在纽伦堡中学任教撰写的讲义里就已初现端倪。在1820年的《法哲学原理》中，黑格尔将自己长期以来对现代欧洲生活状况的思考诉诸笔端，并针对当时争论的问题表明了立场。当时的争论焦点在于，如果德国要有宪法，那应是何种宪法，以及德意志的法律是否应该制定（若要制定，又该如何制定以及基于何种依据）。黑格尔在海德堡周边所面临的争论，以及从《海德堡手稿》到1820年完稿的《法哲学原理》期间发生的变化，都反映出他一直在尝试论证，自己的唯心主义哲学路径如何为这些争论指明必要方向。
In particular, the themes of “universalism” and “particularism” that had animated so much of his thought since his Wiirttemberg days shaped and structured the Philosophy of Right. Hegel had long been convinced that the purely “universalizing” demands of his Enlightenment education in hometown Wiirttemberg were somehow too onesided, too arrogantly dismissive of the necessity for the more particular, individual elements of human life and thought; but like so many of the people of his generation, he had also broken with any simple identifica- tion with the hometowns. Hegel thought of himself as a German und a European, and he thus deeply mistrusted the purely parochial and narrow structure of hometown life, rightfully seeing in it the major obstacle to the kind of spiritual, moral, and political reform with which he had come to identify as a young man; yet he was never willing to completely write it off and remained attracted by what he saw as its virtues.
尤其是，自符腾堡时期起，“普救论”和“特殊恩宠论”这两个话题就一直给予黑格尔极大的精神激励，此时它们又促使黑格尔创作了《法哲学原理》。黑格尔一直坚信，在家乡符腾堡所接受的启蒙教育，使他形成了纯粹“普世化”的要求，这种要求必然会消除人类生活和思想中较为具体的个体性元素，显得过于片面和狂妄。然而，与大多数同龄人一样，黑格尔早已与家乡符腾堡人朴素的乡土观念决裂。他一直将自己视为德意志人，同时也是欧洲人，因此对家乡生活那种纯粹地方性且狭隘的结构深感怀疑，准确地察觉到家乡生活自他年轻时起就成为精神、道德和政治改革的巨大阻碍。不过，他绝不愿对家乡生活全盘否定，反而一直被他所认为的家乡生活的优点所吸引。
Hegel had already developed a fairly clear notion of what kind of political philosophy would fit into his systematic ideas by 1806 in Jena. Nonetheless, as he had done with his Logic, when he began his courses on “Doctrines of Right, Duties, and Religion” in Nuremberg in 1810, he operated almost exclusively with Kantian terminology, even telling his students, for example, that the “legal, ethical, and religious concepts” they were to study were of “objects” in the “intelligible world,” that is, of the “unconditioned totalities,” the “Ideas” of which Kant had spoken. His course itself was even structured along the lines of Kant’s Metaphysics of Ethics} The theory of Sittlichkeit, which figures so prominently in the 1820 Philosophy of Right, played little or no role in the Nuremberg dictations.
到1806年在耶拿时，黑格尔已对何种政治哲学会契合他的系统思想有了较为清晰的认知。然而，由于他已经完成了《逻辑学》，所以在1810年于纽伦堡开设“权力、义务和宗教学说”课程时，他几乎清一色地使用康德的术语。例如，他甚至告诉学生，他们必须研习的“法律、伦理、宗教概念”，是“可理解的世界”的“对象”，即“无条件的总体”，也就是康德所提及的“理念”。他的课程本身甚至是按照康德《道德形而上学基础》的思路设计的。在1820年《法哲学原理》中占据显著地位的德行理论，在纽伦堡时期的讲课中地位却微乎其微，甚至几乎没有提及。
Much of the impetus for Hegel’s development of his political philosophy surely came from the events around him. By the time Hegel arrived in Heidelberg, Napoleon had fallen, the Congress of Vienna had for all practical purposes given the Napoleonic reorganization of Germany the stamp of approval, and the struggle was beginning over constitutional and legal reform. Most likely, one of the prime movers in the sharpening of his thoughts on politics and ethics was the codification debate of 1814, although he did not directly discuss that debate in any of his dictations from the Nuremberg period. In some ways, his mature work on political philosophy (already substantially worked out in Heidelberg, although not, apparently, in any finished manuscript format) was a rethinking of those debates on constitutionalism and legal codification in light of doctrines already found in his Phenomenology. Hegel simply needed those years to work out his own thought so as to be true to his own insights.
黑格尔身边发生的事件无疑成为他阐述政治哲学的主要动力。到黑格尔抵达海德堡时，拿破仑已经下台，维也纳议会为了切实可行的目的支持改组拿破仑时代的德意志，围绕修宪和制定法律的斗争就此展开。很有可能，促使黑格尔阐述其政治和伦理思想的主要动力之一，便是1814年关于修宪的争论，尽管他在纽伦堡时期的讲课中并未直接探讨这次争论。在某些方面，他关于政治哲学的成熟著作（实质上在海德堡时期就已规划好，尽管显然在当时写成的手稿中尚未提出），是依据《精神现象学》中的学说，对关于宪政主义和修改法律的争论进行的重新思考。黑格尔只是需要一些时间来阐述自己的思想，使其符合他独特的见解。
In particular, Hegel had to have been struck by Savigny’s entry into the debate and especially by the way in which Savigny brilliantly made out the case against the need for the codification of German law by appealing to his view that law was an expression of a people’s identity. of its Gmt; in Savigny’s view, it seemed that one could not criticize the identity of a people, one could only draw out the implications and commitments of such an identity. Hegel had himself held a similar (though by no means identical) view at one point in Jena (around 1802— 03)5 but he had substantially modified his views in light of his more historically oriented Phenomenology by 1806. Hegel thus had to be struck by the “positivity” of Savigny’s views: Expressions of a people’s identity simply have to be accepted; there was no going behind them for something deeper or more critical. By 1807, nothing could have been further from Hegel’s own stance.
特别值得一提的是，黑格尔必定深受萨维尼参与这场争论的影响。黑格尔尤其受到触动的是，在某个层面上，萨维尼通过诉诸法律是一个民族身份及其精神表达的观点，巧妙地提出无需修订德意志法律。在萨维尼看来，似乎人们无法批评一个民族的身份，而只能阐释这样一种民族身份的含义并予以认可。黑格尔本人早在耶拿时期（大约1802 - 1803年间）在这个问题上就持有类似（尽管绝非相同）的观点，但到1806年，他已依据更具历史倾向的《精神现象学》从本质上修正了自己的看法。因此，黑格尔必然受到萨维尼“积极性”观点的影响，即必须完全接受一个民族身份的表达，却没有进一步探究这种表达背后更深层次且更具决定性的因素。到1807年，黑格尔自己的立场或许尚未得到进一步发展。
For Hegel, this “dogmatic” insistence on a people’s identity simply failed to grasp the essential “negativity” of European history and Getst, the way in which European life fundamentally embodied a reflective sense of self-doubt about its basic norms and commitments and how that form of self-doubt was both destructive of ways of life and also productive of new forms of Geist. Moreover, since what counts as authoritative for a form of Geist has to do with what has come to be required for it by virtue of the internal failures of the preceding normative orders, we can understand a form of Geist only in terms of its collective ends and projects, of what it is collectively trying to accomplish and the “negativity” involved in those collective ends. The Phenomenology concluded that the collective end of European life had come to be that of achieving the conditions under which a people can be said to be free. To stop short at a “people’s” self-identity (the Volksgeist, in Savigny’s terms) would be to settle for a “dogmatic” position, to refuse to examine whether that self-identity is itself rational and sustainable.
对黑格尔而言，“独断地”坚持一个民族的身份，完全未能把握欧洲历史和精神本质的“消极性”，未能理解欧洲生活以何种方式从根本上体现了一种对其基本规范和承诺的自我怀疑式反思观念，也未能认识到自我怀疑的形式既破坏了生活方式，又催生了精神的新形式。不仅如此，鉴于处于优先地位的标准化秩序的内在失败，被视为精神形式权威的东西涉及人们最终对精神的需求。所以，我们只能依据精神的整体目的和规划，依据精神总体上试图达成的目标以及蕴含在这些整体目的中的“消极性”，来理解精神的形式。《精神现象学》断言，欧洲生活的整体目的最终是获得使一个民族被称为处于自由状态的条件。若突然停止思考“民族的”自我认同（用萨维尼的术语即民族精神），就必然会确立“独断的”立场，进而拒绝审视自我认同本身是否合理且持久。
In Jena, Hegel had tried to integrate the kind of unity he thought was to be found in Greek culture in its “ethical life” - its SittHchkeit with the reflective, self-distancing aspects of modern “morality.” But in the Phenomenology^ he had shown how Greek SittHchkeit was lost forever and how the modern “moral worldview” had thus necessarily supplanted it, and he had gone further to argue that the modern moral standpoint itself required a certain modern, Christian religious practice for “we moderns” to be able to reconcile ourselves to the point in history to which “we” had collectively brought ourselves. His reflection on the modern debates about legal codification and constitutionalism, however, led him to rethink his views on SittHchkeit and to conclude not only that a modern SittHchkeit was possible, but also that it was actually necessary if the force of modern conceptions of legality and of morality themselves were to be sustainable.
早在耶拿时期，黑格尔就已尝试将他认为见于希腊“伦理生活”的希腊文化中的一种统一体，连同现代“道德”反思、自我疏远的方面，并入希腊文化的“伦理生活”——它的Sittlichkeit 。但是在《精神现象学》中，他已表明希腊人的美德是如何永久丧失的，以及现代“道德世界观”又是怎样因此必然取代了这种美德。并且他还进一步论证道，现代道德观点本身需要一种特定的现代基督教实践，以使“我们现代人”能够接受在历史中“我们”集体所达到的某个阶段。不过，他对法律编纂与立宪主义的现代争论的反思，促使他重新思考自己关于美德的看法，并进一步断言，如果要维持法律和道德的现代观念自身的力量，那么一种现代美德不仅是可行的，而且实际上是必不可少的。
This led Hegel to reformulate and sharpen one of his most striking claims. The only reasons that can count for an agent as “unconditional” reasons are those that are necessary components of an admirable, a “worthy” form of life. This had been true of Greek life, and at one point Hegel obviously despaired of seeing how those kinds of unconditional reasons could be found in modern circumstances. The Greek form of life had been so admirable because it was so beautiful^ but modern life, fragmented as it necessarily was and therefore necessarily lacking that kind of beauty, did not seem as if it even could sustain that kind of unconditional allegiance unless it were held together by a very modern religion which itself would have to be underwritten by something like Hegel’s own philosophy.
这就致使黑格尔在此系统阐述并深化他最为引人瞩目的主张之一。那些可被视为“无条件”理由的机制的唯一原因，是那些作为值得赞美的生活形式或“有价值”生活形式的必要组成部分的原因。这适用于希腊人的生活，而在这一点上，黑格尔显然对如何在现代环境中找到这类无条件的原因深感失望。希腊人的生活形式之所以值得赞美，是因为它极为优美，然而现代人的生活（尽管必然是碎片化的，因而必然缺乏一种美感），除非由一种独特的现代宗教维系，否则似乎甚至无法维持一种无条件的忠诚，且这种宗教本身必须像黑格尔自己的哲学一样得到认可。
However, by the time Hegel came to formulating his mature political thought, he had put more of an edge to his views on this point. Although lacking the beauty of Greek life, modern life was more admirable in terms of its rationality. The complex, not easily discerned rationality of post-revolutionary institutions and practices could be both shown and demonstrated in speculative philosophy, and that meant that modern life could manage to recapture what supposedly had been lost with the Greeks, namely, a sense of Sittlichkeit^ possessing its own type of partially fragmented and decisively nonclassical beauty. By the time he set to writing his first edition of the Encyclopedia (published in Heidelberg in 1817), the idea of a modern Sittlichkeit had been made explicit; and that also implicitly meant for him that he had to demonstrate that Protestant Christianity, in its reinterpretation in light of his philosophy, was indeed the defensible modern religion and compatible with the claims to rationality embodied in modern Sittlichkeit.
不过，当黑格尔着手系统阐述其成熟的政治思想时，他对上述问题的看法进一步深化。虽然现代生活缺乏希腊人生活的优美，但从合理性角度而言，它更值得赞美。这种复杂性，即后革命时期社会制度和实践合理性的复杂性，难以轻易忽视，它可能在思辨哲学中得到体现和证明。这意味着现代生活或许能够设法重新获得据称希腊人已失去的东西——一种伦理观念，并拥有现代生活自身那种部分碎片化且具有决定性的非古典之美。到他着手撰写《哲学科学全书》（1817年第1版在海德堡出版）时，一种现代伦理（Sittlichkeit）的观念已然得到阐述。对黑格尔来说，这无疑意味着他必须证明：在依据自己的哲学对其重新解释的过程中，新教基督教实际上是一种值得捍卫的现代宗教，并且与体现在现代伦理中的合理性主张是兼容的。
The problem with modern life was that its rationality was not immediately apparent to its participants; for that, one required a set of reflective practices that could display and demonstrate the rationality of modern life, namely, those involved in modern art, modern religion, and, most importantly, modern philosophy. Thus, Hegel saw himself as critically entering the debates on legality and constitutionalism with his explicitly modern philosophy that would show how the anti-reform elements of German life (and even the odd conservative mixture of reform and anti-reform represented by Savigny and his followers) were wrong in their assessment of what European and German Getst actually meant and what it required.
现代生活的问题在于，其合理性并非为参与者所直接明晰。因此，人们需要一系列反思性实践，这些实践能够展示和证明现代生活的合理性，包括现代艺术、现代宗教中所蕴含的内容，而最重要的是现代哲学中所包含的内容。所以，黑格尔认为自己通过明确的现代哲学思想，从本质上参与了关于合法性与立宪主义的争论，并且他的哲学将揭示德国人生活中的反改革人士（甚至包括萨维尼及其追随者所代表的改革与反改革保守主义者这一奇特群体），是如何错误地评判了欧洲和德国精神实际所指及其所需的东西。
In his letter to Schelling from Frankfurt, Hegel had asked “what return to intervention in the life of men can be found”; now he had a good example of how he might do that right in front of him.^
在他写给当时在法兰克福的谢林的信中，黑格尔追问：“回归干预人类生活的东西是可以找得到的”。此刻，他面前有一个很好的可加以正确阐释的例子。
The Philosophy of Right
Although Hegel’s 1820 Philosophy of Right was unfairly criticized both during and after Hegel’s lifetime as being only an “apology” for Prussian absolutism, it was in fact an attempt on Hegel’s part to articulate the rational form of the kind of reformed, modern European state and society that people like Baron von Stein, and later Prince von Hardenberg, had tried to establish in Prussia; and most of his friends and students understood that.
《法哲学原理》
尽管黑格尔1820年的《法哲学原理》在他生前和身后都遭受了不公正的批判，被仅仅视为对普鲁士专制主义的“辩解”，但对黑格尔而言，它实则是一种尝试，旨在系统论述经过改革的现代欧洲国家和社会的合理形式，类似于巴龙·冯·施泰因以及后来的冯·哈登贝格国王等人试图在普鲁士建立的国家和社会的合理形式。黑格尔的绝大多数朋友和学生都理解他的这番良苦用心。
The core idea of the book is that what counts as “right” in general is what is necessary for the realization of freedom. In that respect, Hegel both adhered to his Kantian inspiration while at the same time, in a crucial and decisive way, moving away from Kant. One crucial difference from Kant was Hegel’s rejection of Kant’s claim that if we were to be free, we had to be capable of exercising a kind of non-natural causality on ourselves, a “transcendental causality” that stood outside the natural, causal order of things and that could initiate chains of events without itself being the effect of any earlier causal chain. Hegel, by contrast, conceived of freedom not as the exercise of any form of causality at all but as instead having to do with the nature of the way in which we are capable of assuming a “negative” stance toward our inclinations, desires, and impulses.
这部书的核心思想是，一般被视为“法”的东西，是实现自由所必需的条件。在这方面，黑格尔既秉持康德式的抱负，同时又以一种关键且决定性的方式与康德分道扬镳。他与康德的一个关键区别在于，黑格尔拒绝康德的这一主张：如果我们注定是自由的，我们就必须能够运用一种关于自身的非自然因果关系或“先验因果关系”，这种因果关系不受事物自然和偶然秩序的支配，且能引发事件的连锁反应，而自身不受任何更早因果链条的影响。恰恰相反，黑格尔根本不认为自由是任何形式因果关系的运用，而是将自由设想为与一种方式相关，通过这种方式，我们能够对自己的倾向、欲望和冲动采取一种“否定”的立场。
Hegel shared with Kant the notion that the will is essentially a form of “practical reason,” of our acting according to norms, but he disagreed with the idea that for such a will to be free, it required a special form of causality on its part. Our freedom consists instead in the stance we take towards our actions and, on Hegel’s view, I am fully free when the reasons for which I act are those that I can count as my reasons, that is, the ones for which / am the subject, with which I identify myself. The agent’s preferences, desires, and impulses have a normative status for the agent only to the extent that they fit into his overall project for his life, fit into some sense of his own identity, who he is as the acting subject - insofar as they express a certain self-relation. (On Hegel’s view, there would indeed be some empirical story to be told about how it is that we ultimately move ourselves by virtue of our decisions, but however that empirical story turns out, it would not be necessary for the account of an action’s being “my own” and “expressing” my acknowledgment of my reasons for acting. Only if reasons were taken to be “things” alongside other “things” would there be a need for a special doctrine of transcendental causality.)
黑格尔与康德都认同，意志实质上是“实践理性”的形式，是我们依据规范行事的形式，但黑格尔不同意这样的观点：就这种自由意志而言，它自身需要一种特殊的因果关系。我们的自由反而在于我们对自身行动所持的立场。按照黑格尔的观点，当我行事的理由是我能够将其视为自己的理由时，也就是说，当我行事的理由是我作为主体所依据的理由，且我将这些理由等同于我自己的理由时，我就是充分自由的。行动者的偏好、欲望和冲动具有一种规范地位，因为行动者只有在与他生活的整个计划相适应的程度上，才能契合关于自身身份的某种观念，即他作为行事主体的身份——在这些偏好、欲望和冲动表达了一种确定的自我关系的范围内。（按照黑格尔的看法，实际上总是存在某种经验性描述，来告知我们最终如何通过决定来促使自己行动，但无论经验性描述证明了什么，都无需借助它来阐释作为“我自己的”行动以及“表达”我对行事理由的认可。只有当理由被当作与其他“事物”并行的“事物”看待时，才可能需要一种特殊的超验因果关系理论。）
Thus, in humans, the capacity to have a will is the capacity, first of all, to have one’s actions express one’s practical commitments - to follow from and fit into one’s project for one’s life - to have those actions done because of those and not some other practical commitments; second, to have the capacity to reflect on those practical commitments in terms of their relations of significance to other ends and other principles the agent entertains; and third, to be able to understand those commitments as one’s own and not having been imposed on oneself from something outside the structure of one’s willing. To have a “will,” that is, is to be able to act in a minded way, to be able to act according to norms. The “will,” as Hegel put it, is “a form of thought.”^ The opposite of such freedom would be to act in terms of something one cannot rationally endorse for oneself, that is, ultimately to be pushed around by considerations that are not really one’s own but come from or belong to something else (for example, brute desires; or mere social conventions).
因此，对人类而言，具备意志的能力体现在以下几个方面：首先，人们的行为能够表达其实践承诺，即基于这些承诺做出推断，并与个人人生计划相契合，且是因这些承诺而非其他实践承诺而做出相应行为；其次，人们有能力依据这些实践承诺与其他目标及行动者所遵循的其他原则之间的重要意义关系，对这些实践承诺进行反思；第三，能够理解这些承诺是自己的承诺，而非来自个人意愿结构之外的强加。也就是说，拥有“意志”意味着能够用心做事，能够依据标准行事。正如黑格尔所说，“意志”是“思想的形式”，这种自由的对立面大概是依据自己无法理性认同的事物行事，也就是说，最终大概是被某些并非自己的思考所左右，而是源于或属于对其他事物的思考（例如，无理性的欲望；或纯粹的社会习俗）。
To be free, however, is not to be simply “expressing” oneself in isolation, it is rather, as the Phenomenology had shown, to stand in a complex, mediated relation to other self-conscious entities. In Hegel’s almost paradoxical way of putting it, one can be an agent only by being recognized as an agent, and thus the conditions of free agency exist fully in the relations of mutual recognition among agents, on the norms to which we can mutually hold each other; what counts thereby as a sustainable “reason” for action is fully social in character and depends on some sense of what it is that these agents are collectively trying to achieve, not just on what individuals are trying privately to achieve for themselves. That is, freedom must consist in a fully reciprocal, mutual imposition of norms, not in the one-sided imposition of norms by one person or group on another.
然而，实现自由并非简单孤立地“表达”自我，而是必然与其他自觉存在处于一种复杂的中介关系中，这正如《精神现象学》中所阐述的。用黑格尔近乎悖论的方式来阐述这个问题，一个人只有被认可为行动者，才能真正成为行动者。因此，自由行动者存在的条件完全涉及行动者之间的相互认可，依据这个标准，我们能够相互认知。所以，被视为行动的持久“理由”理应完全具有社会性，并且取决于行动者集体试图达成的目标的某种意义，而不仅仅取决于个人私下为自己努力完成的事情。也就是说，自由必须在于规范的完全相互施加，而不是一方或群体对另一方或群体的单向规范施加。
That rather bold thesis about “sociality” in itself, however, seemed to lead to another, equally paradoxical conclusion. Although each agent’s “calling” is to be free, to act in terms of principles that are “his own,” it is clearly the case that none of us begins life as such a free being, nor do we come to that status fully naturally. Rather, we learn to subject ourselves to principles only by at first being subjected by others to those principles. A certain kind of “obedience” to the authority of others is necessary in order to learn to be self-determining, and the goal of such obedience must be to free the agent from such obedience, since it is also clear that such obedience is incompatible with freedom in Hegel’s sense.'* That principle to which I am subjected by others comes to be my principle only when I internalize the ends of that action, when I make those alien ends into my ends — that is, when I come to identify with them - and I can ultimately come to identify with those ends only if I can understand them, however implicitly, as following from what is inevitably bound up in my own rational agency itself To the extent that we cannot understand those norms as rational, we see them not as our own but as something that is “ours” and “not ours”; we become alienated from them.
不过，这个关于“自在的社会性”的大胆论题，似乎引出了另一个同样看似悖论的结论。尽管每个行动者都“声称”自己是自由的，是按照“自己的”准则行事，但显然，我们每个人并非生来就是自由人，也无法自然而然地达到自由状态。更确切地说，我们最初是通过被他人引导去遵循某些原则，才学会让自己遵循这些原则。为了学会自我决定，对他人权威的某种特定“顺从”是必不可少的，但这种顺从的目的必须是让行动者摆脱这种顺从，因为这种顺从显然与黑格尔所定义的自由不相容。只有当我内化了行动的目的，将这些异己的目的转化为自己的目的，即最终与它们达成一致，并且只有当我能够将它们理解为源自我作为理性行动者自身不可避免的限制（无论这种理解多么模糊）时，我所遵循的他人引导的原则才能最终成为我的准则。在我们无法将这些规范理解为合理的程度上，我们不会将它们视为自己的，而是将它们看作“我们的”和“不是我们的”某种东西，我们会与它们格格不入。
Hegel’s theory of practical reasoning, painfully worked out over the duration of his stays in Frankfurt, Jena, and Heidelberg, finally enabled him to articulate these lines of thought in a form he found satisfactory. For any individual agent to be free, he must be able to reason practically about what he is to do, and such practical reasoning itself would be possible only if there were some conception within it about what it is that an individual is trying to accomplish by his actions, that is, what good he is trying to achieve. An explicitly formulated piece of practical reasoning would thus always begin with some statement about what is ultimately good and best, to be accompanied by other premises, themselves established by reflective deliberation, about what is necessary for this individual to achieve that kind of good. There are, however, no “goods” that are immediately obvious to “we moderns.” Even what look like purely natural goods must, given our own “negativity,” be incorporated into our maxims, be given a rational form; the only good, therefore, that can serve as an “ultimate good” to function as the first premise of any practical reasoning must be the good of freedom itself, that whatever else is the case I be free in directing my actions and that only through this freedom can I be “at home” with myself in my actions.
黑格尔在法兰克福、耶拿和海德堡客居期间努力构建的实践推理理论，最终使他能够得意地阐述自己的思想脉络。为了让个体行动者获得自由，他必须能够对计划要做的事情进行实践推理，而这种实践推理只有在特定情况下才能实现：在实践推理中，应该存在关于个人试图通过行动达成目标的某种概念，也就是说，存在关于他努力实现目标所涉及利益的概念。因此，实践推理明确阐述的内容，一开始总是涉及关于以下方面的某种陈述：什么最终是好的和最好的，以及为了实现那种善，对这个人而言什么是必要的，其他前提总是满足某种陈述，而这些陈述本身是通过深思熟虑确立的。然而，在“我们现代人”看来，并不存在极其明显的“利益”。考虑到我们自身的“消极性”，即使看似纯粹自然的利益，也必须融入我们的准则，并赋予其合理的形式。所以，唯一能够作为实践推理首要前提、充当“终极利益”的，必须是自由本身的利益，这意味着在任何情况下，我都应该自由地指导自己的行动，同时也意味着只有通过自由，我才能在行动中感受到自己“自由自在”。
Expressed so abstractly, though, such an invocation of “freedom for freedom’s sake” offers little or no guidance for deliberation. The purpose of the Philosophy of Right was thus to demonstrate what our commitment to “freedom” itself further committed us to, such that reflection on those commitments would thereby give us a grasp of some more concrete actualizations of freedom that could serve as efficacious, more substantial first principles of practical reason. In thinking about it in this way, Hegel brought into play his reflections on Holderlin’s original insight about judgment preceding from a prereflective sense of how things stand; practical reasoning, Hegel concluded, must itself therefore come out of some type of prereflective orientation that establishes certain goods as first premises, which in turn feature in the agent’s project for his life and with which the agent can later, through reflection, come to see as rational. That prereflective orientation has to do with our socialization, with the ways in which we are formed by our education and form an implicit, even at first unclear, sense of what we are about, what our identity calls on us to do. Since ultimately our “projects” for ourselves must be consistent wfith the “negativity” of self-consciousness - the self-distancing stance we can always assume towards ourselves, our past, and the world around us - we can never simply immediately accept the self-identity with which we have been socialized; our own “negativity” entails that we must also be able to satisfy ourselves reflectively as to whether those “projects” into which we have been socialized can themselves be rationally sustained, can maintain our allegiance to themselves.
不过，尽管上述表述如此抽象，这种“为了自由而追求自由”的诉求，对人们思考自由的实际指导作用微乎其微。《法哲学原理》这部著作的目的，就是要证明我们对“自由”的承诺，本身会进一步促使我们做出其他承诺，对这些承诺的反思，会让我们把握自由更具体的现实体现，而这种现实体现可用作实践推理中有效且更本质的第一原理。在以这种方式思考问题时，黑格尔开始反思荷尔德林关于事物定位前反思观念判断的最初洞见。黑格尔断言，实践推理本身必须源自某种前反思的定向，这种定向将某些利益确立为初始前提，而这些初始前提反过来在行动者的生活计划中发挥重要作用，因为有了这些初始前提，行动者通过反思，随后才能被视为理性的个体。前反思的倾向与我们的社会化相关，也与我们接受教育的方式相关，正是这些方式塑造了我们，并使我们形成一种模糊甚至起初并不清晰的观念，即关于我们将成为什么样的人以及我们的身份要求我们做什么的观念。由于我们自身的“计划”最终必须与自我意识的“消极性”相一致——我们总是对自己、过去及周围世界持一种自我疏离的态度——所以我们绝不能简单地立刻接受已被社会化的自我认同。我们自身的“消极性”要求我们思考，对于这些使我们社会化的“计划”本身，是否能够得到合理的维持，以及我们是否能够在反思中让自己忠诚于这些“计划”。
Following this idea out, Hegel argued that in the modern world, the realization of freedom must be articulated into three more determinate spheres, which he characterized as “abstract right,” “morality,” and “ethical life” {''Sittlichkeif'). Each of these embodies a way in which institutions and practices underwrite and sustain the ways in which our freedom is actualized in that each of them provides individuals with more concrete, specific first premises about “the good” (freedom) on the basis of which they may then rationally deliberate what they are required to do.
顺着这个思路，黑格尔坚称，在现代世界，自由的实现必须在三个较为明确的范畴内进行系统阐述，他将这三个范畴描述为“抽象法”“道德”和“伦理生活”（“Sittlichkeit”）。每个范畴都体现了制度和实践所认可的方式，并维持着一种我们实现自由的途径。因此，基于个人日后可能对被要求之事进行理性审慎思考的基础，每个范畴都为个人提供了关于“利益”（自由）更具体、特殊的初始前提。
“Abstract right” is that sphere in which individuals are committed to the mutual recognition of certain basic rights having to do with property, exchange of property, and contracts. In a finite world of limited means, embodied agents require disposition over certain material ele- ments for them to be able to carry out any of their commitments at all. To the extent that each of them is ultimately committed to realizing his own freedom (and not, for example, something else, such as the greater glory of God), he is required to extend such commitments to others (granted certain other very “modern” premises about reasoning and agency). It is the equal claims of others - an equality won by centuries of hard struggle — that leads to the commitment to mutual and abstract rights to property; it is “abstract” in that the first premise of reasoning for these very modern agents is taken to concern itself with their getting what they contingently happen to want, within the context of a set of mutually recognized rights.
“抽象法”是这样的一个领域，在该领域，个人承诺相互认可与财产、财产交换、契约有关的某些基本权利。在一个财富有限的有限世界中，得到体现的行动者要求支配某些物质元素，以使他们能够从根本上兑现他们的承诺。在他们中每个人最终都会认识到他自己的自由（举例来说，不是其他某种东西，诸如上帝更伟大的荣耀）的程度上，他也被要求拓展这样的承诺给其他人（承认关于推理和行动者的某些其他非常“现代的”前提）。正是其他人的相等主张——一种经过多少世纪艰苦卓绝的斗争所赢得的平等——致使人们作出对财产的相互和抽象的权利承诺；由于推理的原初前提，对这些特有的现代行动者来说的“抽象的”通常被理解成是，在一系列得到相互认知的权利语境下，关注他们得到自己偶然想要得到的东西。
Moreover, given the finitude and fallibility of human life, there will always be wrongs committed in the context of any such social “whole” based on such rights. Some agents will refuse to see themselves as “one among many” and therefore ignore others’ rights in the pursuit of getting what they want, and to the extent that they are able to do that with impunity, the entire structure of “right” would be thereby threatened. To that end, some system of “punishment” is required, some infliction on the offending party of an equivalent harm to that which he has visited on others; the function of such punishment is to express the normative force of his actions were they to be applied to himself That itself, though, requires that at least some people be capable of speaking with the voice of “right” itself, and that the offending party not be used to satisfy somebody else’s desire (even for revenge) but be punished only for the sake of “restoring” right.
不止于此，考虑到人类生活的有限性和出错性，在基于这样的权利基础上的任何这样的社会“整体”的语境下，总是会发生错误的。一些行动者会拒绝把他们自己当作“很多人中的一个人”看待，所以他们在追求想得到自己想要的东西时忽视了其他人的权利，在他们能够这样做而没有受惩罚的程度上，“权利”的整个结构从而就会受到威胁。为了特定目的，“惩罚”的某种体系就应运而生了，就需要对牵连别人的相当危害的犯罪一方实施惩罚；这种惩罚的作用就是表达他的行为的规范力量，假如他的行为得以被应用于他自己的话。不过，这本身要求至少一些人应该能够站出来代表“权利”本身说话，但是犯罪一方不应该被用来满足其他某人的愿望（甚至是为了复仇），而应该仅仅为了“恢复”权利的缘故而受到惩罚。
The ability to put one’s own interests and inclinations aside and speak and act from the standpoint of “right” itself is not, however, itself an “abstract right” but a “moral disposition,” a feature of character. “Morality,” the second sphere of the realization of right-as-freedom, thus concerns itself with the general and unconditional obligations that people have by virtue of their overall commitment to freedom. Those are, very roughly, Kantian in form: People have an obligation to do the right thing (that is, to perform actions that are in accord with reasons that could be shared by all) and to do it out of the right motives (to do the right thing because it is right, not because it satisfies some other impulse, desire, or social convention). Hegel famously argued, though, that on its own, this moral demand is relatively empty; it functions as the first premise of a piece of practical reasoning, but it leaves us in the dark as to what exactly is required by “reasons that could be shared by all.” Moreover, the sheer contingency of what can actually count as an “unconditional moral obligation” is made manifest in those conditions of extreme distress, as when a desperate, starving person steals a loaf of bread to survive or to feed his family; in admitting that this “right of distress” trumps property rights, we also thereby admit that what counts as an “unconditional moral obligation” can itself be overridden by more mundane concerns having to do with individual welfare.
然而，我们能够撇开一个人的兴趣和倾向，依据“权利”本身的观点言说和做事，这样做本身不是一种“抽象权利”而是一种“道德支配”和一个人物的品格。“道德”，作为自由权利实现的第二个领域，因此关心的是人们借自己对自由的全部承诺所具有的一般的和无条件的义务。这些大体上是形式上的康德哲学：人们有义务去做正确的事情（也就是，作出的举动同能被所有人共享的理由相一致）并且出于正确的动机做事（所以做正确的事情是因为它是正确的而非因为它满足一些其他的冲动、欲望或社会习俗）。不过，黑格尔对此做了如下的著名的论证，就它自己本身而言，这道德上的要求是相对比较空洞的；它所起的作用是作为实践推理活动的首要前提，但是它使我们对于可“被所有人所共享的理性”所确切地要求的东西茫然不知。不止于此，关于实际上能被当作一种“无条件的道德义务”的东西的纯粹偶然性在这些极端的不幸条件下才能被使得展现，例如当一个绝望的、快饿死的人偷了一条面包来维持生存或养活他的家人时；在承认这种“不幸的权利”胜过财产权利时，我们从而也就承认被算作“无条件的道德义务”东西本身可能会遭到与个人幸福有关的更加世俗的关心的践踏。
Kant himself had admitted that it was absurd for us to expect individuals entirely to forsake their own happiness. Therefore, for us to make sense of the contingency of right and welfare, Hegel argued, we must, as Kant himself had seen, additionally commit ourselves to a notion of a “highest good,” to bringing about in this world a union of virtue and happiness, such that these contingencies of right and welfare do not throw our whole scheme of moral obligation into question.^ Kant’s own invocation of the “highest good,” Hegel seems to imply, shows that Kant implicitly acknowledges the right of the individual to his own satisfaction. This principle, in fact, of the “right of subjective freedom,” first expressed in Christianity, is, Hegel says, the “pivotal and focal point in the difference between antiquity and the modern age ... it has become the universal and actual principle of a new form of the world. Its more specific shapes include love, the romantic, the eternal salvation of the individual as an end.”'’ Hegel thus crucially reinterpreted the specifically Kantian conception of the “highest good” - conceived as the union of virtue and happiness - towards what he simply calls “the” good - conceived as the union of virtue and satisfaction. Satisfaction, for Hegel, involves the achieving of ends that are crucial for an agent’s sense of the project of his life, what he is about, what “counts” for himself; as Hegel makes the distinction, an agent may be satisfied yet still be unhappy.' In reinterpreting Kant in that way, Hegel was stressing what he saw as the logic at work in Kant’s view: What was at stake was the union of the “universal” (the moral rule as expressed in virtuous action) and the “particular” (expressed as happiness for Kant and as satisfaction for Hegel). Thus, Hegel’s longstanding interest in combining Enlightenment universalism with a sort of particularism reinterpreted in very modern terms came into play.
康德本人早就承认，期待个人完全能够放弃他们自己的幸福，这对我们来说是荒谬绝伦的。所以，黑格尔论证道，就我们为了使得权利和幸福的偶然具有意义而言，我们就必须像康德本人所看出的一样，额外地认同一个“最高利益”的观点，就必须承诺把美德和幸福的统一带入世界，这样一来的话，权利和康乐的偶然性就不会使我们的整个道德义务计划遭到质疑。黑格尔似乎暗示着，康德本人关于“最高利益”的祈祷表明康德含蓄地认可个人对于他自己的满足的权利。照黑格尔说，这条起初由基督教表达的“主观自由的权利”的原则实际上是“古代与现代之间的差异的关键焦点……它变成了新世界形式普世的和实际的原则。它的更为特殊的形态包括爱、浪漫的东西和作为目的的个人永恒救赎。”因此至关重要的是，黑格尔把“最高利益”这个康德哲学特有的概念——被设想为美德和幸福的统一的概念——阐释成他简单地叫作的“这”善——被设想为美德和满足的统一。在黑格尔看来，满足牵涉达到某些目的，它们对于行动者关于生活计划的观念、行动者将要成为什么样的人、什么被当作行动者自己的东西来说是至关重要的；像黑格尔作出区别的，一个得到满足的行动者可能仍然是感到苦恼的。在以此方式重新阐释康德时，黑格尔在强调他看作的在康德看法中起作用的逻辑：成问题的是“共相”（在各种不同的行动中表现出的道德准则）和（作为康德的幸福和作为黑格尔的满足被表达的）“殊相”的统一。因此，这就提起了黑格尔一直以来对于以特有的现代术语来重新阐释把启蒙运动普救论与一种排他主义结合起来的兴趣。
