引言
中国经济已无法简单用“强”或“弱”来定义。当前的核心特征是伴随结构性转型的“K型复苏”——AI与高端制造等新引擎正逐步替代房地产与基建。然而，房地产下行持续施压，经济分化加剧，宏观数据与微观体感存在温差。本文深入剖析了中国经济L型走势的内在逻辑、季度波动的政策依赖，以及房地产与出口两大关键变量的未来走向。
China's economy can no longer be described simply as either strong or weak.
中国经济已不能再简单地被描述为强或弱。
Its defining characteristic is a structural transition accompanied by growing divergence, often described as K-shaped recovery.
其显著特征是伴随着日益加剧的分化的结构性转型，通常被称为K型复苏。
New growth drivers — such as artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing — are gradually replacing traditional engines, including real estate and infrastructure.
新的增长驱动力——例如人工智能和先进制造业——正在逐渐取代包括房地产和基础设施在内的传统引擎。
Against this backdrop, two trends stand out.
在此背景下，两个趋势尤为突出。
First, overall economic growth remains under pressure, as the property downturn continues to weigh on related sectors, including home appliances, furniture, ferrous metals and machinery, while also weakening local finances and local governments' capacity to support growth.
首先，整体经济增长仍然面临压力，因为房地产低迷继续拖累相关行业，包括家电、家具、黑色金属和机械，同时也削弱了地方财政和地方政府支持增长的能力。
Second, economic divergence has become increasingly pronounced, as indicated by widening gaps between supply and demand, across industries, among income groups and between regions.
其次，经济分化变得日益明显，表现为供需之间、行业之间、收入群体之间以及地区之间的差距不断扩大。
This has created a gap between official macroeconomic indicators and the actual economic experience of households and businesses.
这在官方宏观经济指标与家庭和企业的实际经济体验之间造成了差距。
Over the medium and long term, China's economy has followed an L-shaped path.
从中长期来看，中国经济遵循L型路径。
The slowdown began around 2010 when the country entered a period of growth deceleration and transition from old to new growth drivers.
放缓始于2010年左右，当时国家进入了增长减速和从旧增长动力向新增长动力转型的时期。
GDP growth fell from 10.6 percent in 2010 to 5 percent in 2025, more than halving in just 15 years.
GDP增长率从2010年的10.6%下降到2025年的5%，在短短15年内下降了一半以上。
This year, growth has moved into the 4.5-5.0 percent range, marking the beginning of what may be called an era of "around 4 percent growth".
今年，增长已进入4.5-5.0%的区间，标志着可能被称为“4%左右增长”时代的开始。
Japan stayed in the 4-5 percent range for about two decades before slowing further, but by then its per capita GDP had reached around 30,000 and its social security system was relatively mature.
日本在进一步放缓之前，在4-5%的区间停留了大约二十年，但到那时其人均GDP已达到约30,000美元，且其社会保障体系相对成熟。
China's per capita GDP remains below 14,000, making it essential to settle into a stable medium-growth range of 4-5 percent during the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period.
中国的人均GDP仍低于14,000美元，因此在“十五五”规划（2026-30年）期间稳定在4-5%的中速增长区间至关重要。
Each year, the economy has exhibited a U-shaped rhythm: a strong first quarter, pressure in the second, policy support in the third and a year-end lift in the fourth.
每年，经济都呈现出U型节奏：第一季度强劲，第二季度承压，第三季度有政策支持，第四季度有年末提振。
After the September 2024 policy package, fourth-quarter growth reached 5.4 percent, following 5.3 percent, 4.7 percent and 4.6 percent showings in the first three quarters.
在2024年9月的一揽子政策出台后，第四季度增长达到5.4%，此前前三个季度的表现分别为5.3%、4.7%和4.6%。
This pattern reflects two underlying features: the economy remains highly dependent on policy support, while self-sustaining growth momentum is still weak and the vitality of households, businesses and local governments has yet to be fully restored.
这种模式反映了两个潜在特征：经济仍然高度依赖政策支持，而内生增长动力仍然疲弱，家庭、企业和地方政府的活力尚未完全恢复。
The strong first-quarter performance is largely the result of policy-driven economic mobilization.
强劲的第一季度表现很大程度上是政策驱动的经济动员的结果。
After the Central Economic Work Conference sets annual priorities, fiscal and monetary policies are often front-loaded, and local governments accelerate projects and resource allocation, pushing construction and investment activity to a high level.
在中央经济工作会议确定年度优先事项后，财政和货币政策通常会前置发力，地方政府加速项目和资源分配，将建设和投资活动推至高位。
By the second quarter, policy momentum naturally moderates, putting pressure on growth.
到第二季度，政策势头自然减弱，给增长带来压力。
This year, combined spending under the general public budget and government-managed funds rose 6.1 percent year-on-year in January-February, but fell to minus 0.3 percent in January-May, partly reflecting a limited pipeline of shovel-ready projects.
今年，一般公共预算和政府性基金预算下的合并支出在1-2月同比增长6.1%，但在1-5月降至-0.3%，部分反映了“准备就绪”项目的储备有限。
The consumer goods trade-in program also boosted home appliance consumption with double-digit growth, but base effects and demand front-loading later became more evident.
消费品以旧换新计划也推动了家电消费实现两位数增长，但基数效应和需求前置随后变得更加明显。
Self-sustaining momentum remains weak.
内生动力仍然疲弱。
Falling property values have encouraged households to reduce debt, with the household leverage ratio edging down from 60.5 percent to 59 percent as many repaid mortgages early.
房价下跌促使家庭减少债务，随着许多人提前偿还抵押贷款，家庭杠杆率从60.5%微降至59%。
Enterprises face weak demand, pressure along the property supply chain and low capacity utilization.
企业面临需求疲软、房地产供应链压力以及产能利用率低的问题。
Local governments' land sale revenue fell from 8.5 trillion yuan ($1.25 trillion) in 2021 to 4.2 trillion yuan last year, and declined another 28.7 percent year-on-year in the first five months of 2026, weakening their capacity and willingness to promote growth.
地方政府的土地出让收入从2021年的8.5万亿元（1.25万亿美元）下降到去年的4.2万亿元，并在2026年前五个月同比又下降了28.7%，削弱了他们促进增长的能力和意愿。
Weaker local finances have also affected payments to firms and public services, further impeding household consumption.
较弱的地方财政也影响了对企业和公共服务的支付，进一步阻碍了家庭消费。
Government spending under the two budgets dropped from 30.6 percent of GDP in 2021 to 28.6 percent last year, meaning that 2-3 trillion yuan less flowed into the economy as income for enterprises and households.
两本预算下的政府支出占GDP的比重从2021年的30.6%下降到去年的28.6%，这意味着流入经济作为企业和家庭收入的资金减少了2-3万亿元。
Growth in the next stage will hinge on the performance of real estate and exports.
下一阶段的增长将取决于房地产和出口的表现。
AI-related products now account for about one fifth of China's export value and roughly half of export growth, making overall export outlook increasingly linked to AI development.
AI相关产品目前约占中国出口价值的五分之一和出口增长的一半左右，使得整体出口前景与AI发展日益紧密相连。
Real estate is likely to remain a drag, while AI-supported exports may provide upward support, with a lower base also improving headline data.
房地产可能仍然是拖累，而AI支持的出口可能提供向上支撑，较低的基数也改善了总体数据。
The property downturn persists and three issues must be addressed.
房地产低迷持续，三个问题必须解决。
First, prices remain unstable.
首先，价格仍然不稳定。
Although secondhand home prices in first-tier cities have risen for three consecutive months, national prices, sales and investment are still falling.
尽管一线城市二手房价格已连续三个月上涨，但全国范围内的价格、销售和投资仍在下跌。
In smaller cities, some inventory may become permanent as populations decline and outflows continue.
在较小的城市，随着人口减少和持续外流，部分库存可能成为永久性的。
Pressure comes from developers' cash-flow constraints, new-home discounts, higher-quality and "fourth-generation" housing products, and rising foreclosure sales.
压力来自开发商的现金流约束、新房折扣、更高质量和“第四代”住房产品以及不断增加的法拍房销售。
Second, a self-sustaining stabilization process has yet to take hold in the real estate sector.
其次，房地产行业尚未形成自我维持的稳定过程。
Local governments alone cannot break the cycle of property adjustments, falling fiscal revenue and weakened stabilization capacity.
仅靠地方政府无法打破房地产调整、财政收入下降和稳定能力减弱的循环。
Therefore, central government support is needed to fill fiscal gaps.
因此，需要中央政府的支持来填补财政缺口。
Third, fiscal pressure in some cities continues to worsen supply-demand conditions, as land supply increases despite high inventory.
第三，一些城市的财政压力继续恶化供需状况，因为在高库存的情况下土地供应仍在增加。
Stabilization therefore requires both supply control and demand support, backed by stronger transfer payments.
因此，稳定需要供应控制和需求支持，并由更强的转移支付作为后盾。
The writer is chief economist and president of the Research Institute at Yuekai Securities.
作者是粤开证券研究院院长兼首席经济学家。
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
这些观点不一定反映《中国日报》的立场。