Ten Hegel’s Theory of the State(1)

第十章　黑格尔的国家理论(1)

HEGEL’S POLITICAL PROJECT

黑格尔的政治规划

In one of his few arresting metaphors Hegel wrote in the Preface to his Philosophy of Right that the owl of Minerva only flies at dusk. In a sombre tone he explained that philosophy always arrives too late on the scene, painting its ‘gray upon gray’ only when a form of life has grown old. If we apply these lines to Hegel’s own political philosophy, we might well wonder what relevance it has for us today. After all, if Hegel’s philosophy was already obsolete for his age, what value can it possibly have for our own?

    以他一个极少能够引人注意的隐喻的方式，黑格尔在他的《法哲学·序言》中写道，“密涅发的猫头鹰要到黄昏才飞起”。黑格尔以一种沉着冷静的音调解释说，哲学总是出场得太迟，只有在一种生活形式已经变老的时候，哲学才把它的“灰色绘成灰色”。如果我们把这些说法应用到黑格尔本人的政治哲学，也许我们会惊诧于它和我们今天之间的那种相关性。毕竟，如果黑格尔的哲学对于他自己的时代都已经陈旧不堪的话，它对于我们自己的时代还能有什么价值呢？

Although much in Hegel’s political philosophy is indeed dated, philosophers today still value it for raising important questions and for posing alternatives to the dominant liberalism of contemporary political thought. Usually, Hegel is seen as the great modern spokesman for communitarianism and as the pioneering critic of liberalism. Some historians regard his political philosophy as the major conceptual alternative to the liberal tradition, and they explain its historical significance in just such terms.1

    尽管黑格尔政治哲学中的许多内容都已经是明日黄花，但是今天的哲学家们仍然对它推崇不已，因为他提出了许多重要的问题，为当代政治思想中占主流的自由主义提供了替代性的选择项。黑格尔通常被看作是社群主义伟大的当代代言人，以及批判自由主义的先驱。有些历史学家把他的政治哲学看作是自由主义传统思想上最重要的替代者，他们也正是从这样的角度来解释它的历史的重要性。

But this common picture of Hegel distorts his true historical position. It is misleading to cast Hegel in such a role for the simple reason that it had already been played so well by so many of his predecessors and contemporaries. If we limit ourselves to the German tradition alone, we quickly find thinkers who criticized liberalism and defended communitarianism before, or around the same time as, Hegel. Among them were Justus Möser, A.W. Rehberg, Novalis, Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schlegel and Adam Müller. Many of Hegel’s criticisms of liberalism, and many of his communitarian ideals, were part of the common heritage of his generation. Purely for the sake of convenience, we might consider Hegel the chief representative of this wider tradition. We should not conclude, however, that these ideas are original to, or characteristic of, him.

    但是关于黑格尔的这幅司空见惯的图像歪曲了他的真实的历史位置。用这样一种角色来塑造黑格尔实在是误人不浅，理由非常简单，这种角色已经被他的许多前行者和同时代人扮演得非常之好。如果我们只把我们自己限制在德国传统之内，那么我们很快就会发现，在黑格尔之前和大约与之同时，有不少思想家批判过自由主义和捍卫过社群主义。他们当中有莫塞尔，A. W.雷伯格，诺瓦利斯，施莱尔马赫，弗里德里希·施莱格尔和亚当·缪勒。黑格尔对于自由主义的许多批评，他的许多社群主义的理想，是他那个时代的共同遗产的一部分。纯粹为了方便起见，我们可以把黑格尔看作是这个广泛的传统的主要代表。然而，我们切不可得出结论说，这些观念是他独创的，或者是他独有的。

This picture of Hegel is inaccurate for another reason: it falsifies his intentions. For it was never Hegel’s aim to reject the liberal tradition for the sake of communitarianism. Unlike some of the more conservative critics of liberalism, such as Möser and Haller, Hegel continued to uphold fundamental liberal values, such as freedom of conscience, equality of opportunity and the right of dissent. While these conservatives denied liberal values for the sake of community, Hegel insisted upon preserving them within the community. Hegel’s significance as a political thinker lies less in his defense of communitarianism or his critique of liberalism than in his attempt to synthesize communitarianism with liberalism in a single coherent conception of the modern state. It is chiefly in this regard that Hegel remains relevant to contemporary social and political thought.

    由于另一种原因，这幅黑格尔的画像是不准确的：它篡改了他的意图。因为为了社群主义的理由而拒绝自由主义，这从来都不是黑格尔的目的。不像某些对于自由主义更为保守的批评家，比如莫塞尔和哈勒，黑格尔仍旧支持自由主义的基本价值，比如良心自由、机会均等和否决权。尽管这些保守派为了共同体的利益而否定了自由主义的价值，黑格尔却坚持在共同体内部保存这些价值。黑格尔作为政治思想家的意义，与其说是在于他捍卫了社群主义，或者他批判了自由主义，不如说是，他努力要在一个一以贯之的现代国家的观念之中把社群主义和自由主义综合在一起。也主要是因为这一点，黑格尔与当代的社会与政治思想保持着关联。

Here again, though, it is important to recognize that such a project was not unique to Hegel. It was indeed the general program of the early romantic generation. There was, however, something new to how Hegel would attempt this synthesis: he would try to unite the individual to the state according to the bonds of reason rather than those of sentiment and imagination. Contrary to the romantics, Hegel insisted that the individual could identify with the state only if the state somehow satisfied the demands of critical reason. He rejected, therefore, Novalis’s famous thesis that the bonds of the state should be based upon ‘faith and love’.2

    尽管如此，在这里又一次重要的是认识到，这样一种规划并非黑格尔所独有的。实际上，这是早期浪漫派一代的总体纲领。然而，在黑格尔如何试图达到这种综合之中，出现了某些新的东西：他殚精竭虑要依照理性的纽带而非情感和想象力的纽带把个体统一到国家之中。和浪漫派相反，黑格尔坚持认为，个体可以认同国家，只要国家以某种方式满足批判理性的要求。因此，他拒绝了诺瓦利斯的著名的论点，即国家的纽带应该建立在“信与爱”的基础之上。

Hegel’s project for a synthesis of the liberal and communitarian traditions seems to propose a virtual squaring of the circle, given that these traditions seem to be so fundamentally at odds with one another. Already in the 1790s, the battle-lines between these traditions were beginning to appear.3 They were opposed in at least four respects. First, the liberals held that the chief purpose of the state is to protect liberty, the rights of citizens to pursue happiness in their own manner. The communitarians claimed, however, that the main end of the state is to ensure the common good, which is more than the sum of private interests but those basic goods essential to everyone as a human being. Second, liberals contended that the state is an aggregate that arises from the sum of individuals, each of which is a self-sufficient unit; communitarians, however, held that the state is an organic whole that determines the identity of the individuals that compose it. Third, liberals maintained that there should be a clear distinction between legality and the sphere of morality and religion: the law regulates only external actions whereas morality and religion concern the realm of inner conscience and choice. Since the communitarian held that the state is sustained only by the patriotic virtues and beliefs of its citizens, and since he stressed that it is the role of the state to educate its citizens to have these virtues and beliefs, he denied a sharp separation between these spheres. Fourth, the liberals adopted a negative concept of liberty, according to which freedom consists in the absence of coercion and constraint; the communitarians had a positive concept of liberty, according to which freedom consists in performing definite actions, such as participating in public life.

    黑格尔要把自由主义的和社群主义的传统综合起来的规划似乎提出了虚拟的化圆为方，只要这些传统看起来相互之间根本上如此扞格不通。在18世纪90年代，这些传统之间的战线已经开始成形。它们至少在四个方面相互对立。首先，自由主义者认为，国家的主要目的是保护自由，公民以自己的方式追求幸福的权利。然而，社群主义者主张，国家的主要目的是确保共同的善，共同的善不仅仅是私人利益的总合，而是那些对所有人作为人而言具有根本意义的基本善。其次，自由主义者争辩说，国家是一种从个体之总合中产生的混凝物，每一个个体都是一个自足的单元；而社群主义者认为，国家是一个规定了组成它的个体的同一性的有机整体。第三，自由主义者坚持认为，在合法性和道德与宗教的领域之间应该存在明显的区别：法律只是调整着外部行动的领域，而道德和宗教关心的是内部的良心和选择。既然社群主义者认为，国家只有通过公民的爱国的美德和信念才能维持，而既然他强调国家的角色是教育它的公民具有这些美德和信念，那么，他就否认在这些领域之间有明显的分离。第四，自由主义者采取的是一种消极的自由概念。依照这种概念，自由就在于强制和限制的缺席；社群主义者拥有的是积极的自由概念，依照这种概念，自由在于执行确定的行动，比如参与公共生活。

Already in his early Berne and Frankfurt years, Hegel had come under the influence of both the liberal and communitarian currents of thought. The communitarian influence is apparent in three respects. First, from his admiration for the Greek and Roman republics, which he praises because their citizens lived and died for the common good.4 Second, from his organic conception of society, according to which its history, religion and politics form an indissoluble unity (TE I, 42/56). Third, from his attempt to develop a civil religion, a religion for every citizen of a state that would serve as a source of social, political and cultural solidarity. The liberal influence is especially apparent from Hegel’s early defense of religious freedom. The young Hegel became especially preoccupied with ‘positivity’ – the enforcement of religious belief by the state – because he saw it as a betrayal of the spirit of Christianity, which consisted in moral autonomy. To counter this danger, Hegel defended in his Positivity Essay an essentially liberal conception of the state, according to which the essential purpose of the state is to protect my rights, among which are freedom of speech and conscience as well as security of person and property (N 173, 183).  All that the state should require from me is legality, the conformity of my actions with the law; but it does not have the right to demand morality, that my will should conform to the law (175). On these grounds Hegel insisted upon a separation between church and state.

    早在伯尔尼和法兰克福时期，黑格尔就既受到自由主义的影响，又受到社群主义的思想潮流的影响。社群主义的影响主要表现在三个方面。首先，从他对于希腊和罗马共和国的激赏来看，他之表彰它们，是因为它们的公民生和死都是为了共同善。其次，从他关于有机社会的思想来看，依照这种思想，它的历史、宗教和政治组成了一个不可消融的统一体（TE I, 42/56）。第三，从他试图发展出一种公民宗教来看，这种宗教作为社会的、政治的和文化的团结源泉服务于国家的每一个公民。自由主义的影响尤其明显地表现在黑格尔早期对于宗教自由的辩护中。青年黑格尔全神贯注于“实证性”问题——通过国家增强宗教信仰，因为他把它看作是对于基督教精神的背叛，而基督教精神则在于道德自律之中。为了抗击这种危险，黑格尔在《实证性论文》中为一种本质上是自由主义的国家观念进行辩护。依照这种观念，国家的本质目的是保护诸种权利，而在其中，最基本的是言论自由和良心，以及人身和财产的安全（N173、183）。国家要求于我的全部东西就是合法性，使我的行为合乎法律；但是它不能对道德提出要求，我的意志只应该遵守法律（175）。基于这些理由，黑格尔强调教会和国家的分离。

The tensions between these traditions surfaced in some contradictions in Hegel’s own early political thought. It became very difficult for him, for example, to square his ideal of a civil religion with his defense of religious liberty in the Positivity Essay. It was the attempt to solve difficulties such as these that eventually led to Hegel’s general project for a synthesis of liberalism and communitarianism. His Philosophy of Right was his final attempt to resolve these traditions into a single coherent philosophy of the state.

    这些传统之间的紧张关系在黑格尔自己的早期手稿中的某些矛盾之中显露无遗。例如，对他来说，在《实证性论文》中把他公民宗教的理想和他为宗教自由的辩护弄得协调一致，变得非常困难了。正是解决诸如此类的困难的尝试最终导致黑格尔要把自由主义和社群主义综合起来的总体规划。他的《法哲学》就是他要在一个一以贯之的国家哲学中融合这些传统的最后尝试。

The task of this chapter will be to explain Hegel’s attempt to synthesize liberalism with communitarianism in the Philosophy of Right. To understand his project, we must first examine what he redeemed, and what he rejected, in each tradition.

    这一章的任务将会是解释黑格尔在《法哲学》中把自由主义和社群主义综合在一起的尝试。为了理解他的规划，我们首先必须检查一下他在每一种传统中解救了什么和拒绝了什么。

THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM

对于自由主义和社群主义的批判

We can best gauge Hegel’s attitude toward communitarianism by considering his views on the ancient republics of Greece and Rome, which were for him the model of complete communal life. Hegel admired the ancient republics for several reasons. First, they gave priority to the public good over self-interest. Like Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Ferguson, Hegel praised the virtue of the ancient republics, the citizen’s devotion to the common welfare, his willingness to put the interests of the republic before his private interests. The ancient republics rightly recognized that, in cases of public danger, the citizen must sacrifice his life and property for the state. Second, the ancient republics saw that the highest good – the end of life – is to be achieved only by life in the state. Following Rousseau and Machiavelli, Hegel criticized the Christian tradition for placing the highest good beyond the earthly realm in eternal salvation in heaven. The ancient Greeks and Romans did not need personal salvation, he argued, because they found the meaning of their lives in devotion to the state. Third, the ancient republics were democratic, giving each citizen the right to participate in the affairs of the state. It is important to see that Hegel, like most thinkers in late eighteenth-century Germany, associates democracy more with communitarianism than liberalism. Liberal democracy was a much later nineteenth-century development; and some liberals of Hegel’s day, most notably Jacobi and Humboldt, were defenders of constitutional monarchy rather than republicanism. While Hegel, again like most of his contemporaries, doubted that the direct democracy of the ancient republics was practicable in the modern world, he still insisted that the modern state could not survive if the people did not have some share in government, some right, even if indirect, to govern their own affairs (§301A). It was indeed precisely through public participation in the affairs of state that the individual would identify with the state and regard itself as part of the community (§261A).

    我们最好是通过考察黑格尔对于希腊和罗马的古代共和国的观点来估算他对于社群主义的态度，因为对他而言，它们就是完全的共同生活的模型。黑格尔欣赏古代共和国出于好几个原因。首先，它们赋予公共善以私人利益之上的优先性。和马基雅维利、孟德斯鸠、卢梭和弗格森一样，黑格尔表彰古代共和国的美德，公民献身于公共福利，他愿意置共和国的利益于私人利益之前。古代共和国正确地认识到，在发生公共危险之时，公民必定会为了国家而牺牲他的生命与财产。其次，古代共和国看到了至善——生命的目的——是只能通过在国家中的生活才能达到的。因袭卢梭和马基雅维利的看法，黑格尔批判了基督教把至善放置到超越了世俗领域的天堂的永恒救赎之中。他论证说，古希腊人和罗马人并不需要个人的拯救，因为他们在献身于国家之中发现了生活的意义。第三，古代共和国是民主制的，赋予每一个公民以参与国家事务的权利。重要的是看到，黑格尔和十八世纪晚期的大多数德国思想家一样，把民主制和社群主义而不是自由主义联系在一起。自由主义的民主制要到十九世纪晚期才发展出来；黑格尔时代的某些自由主义者，最著名的有雅可比和洪堡，都是君主立宪制而非共和主义的辩护者。尽管黑格尔又一次和他的大多数同时代人一样，怀疑古代共和国的直接民主制在现代世界是否具有可行性，但是他仍然坚持认为，如果人民不能在某种程度上参与到政府中，分享某些权利，哪怕是间接地管理他们自己的事务，现代国家就不可能幸存（第301节补充）。事实上，只有通过公共参与国家事务，个体才会认同国家，把自己当作是共同体的一分子（第261节补充）。

Despite his admiration for the ancient republics, Hegel still taught that they suffered from two fundamental defects, which he explicitly identifies in the Philosophy of Right. First, they gave no place to individual rights, especially the right of the individual to dissent from the government (§§124R,138A,185R, 260R, 261R, 299A).  Second, the ancient republics did not expect the citizen to seek his own self-interest in the market place and to find his own path toward happiness (§§46R, 185R, 262A). The citizen was expected to have sufficient means and independence so that he could deliberate about the affairs of state; but, now that slavery was abolished in the modern world, this was no longer a reasonable expectation.

    尽管黑格尔对于古代共和国激赏有加，但是他仍然教导说，它们因为两个基本的缺陷而蒙受损害。他在《法哲学》中明确地说明了这两个缺陷。首先，它们没有为个体权利留下空间，尤其是个体对政府持有异议的权利（第124节附释、第138节补充、第186节附释、第260节附释、第261节附释、第299节补充）。其次，古代共和国并不期望公民寻求他们自己在市场上的私人利益，以发现他们自己通往幸福的道路（第46节附释、185节附释、262节补充）。它们期望公民们拥有足够的手段和独立性，以便他们能够审慎考虑国家事务；但是由于在现代世界中奴隶制已经废除，这就不再是一个合理的期待。

Hegel’s partiality for liberalism was no less strong than his sympathy for communitarianism. Although it is implausible to regard Hegel as a liberal,5 it is certainly the case that he upheld some fundamental liberal values. Not least among these was a free market economy where everyone had the right to pursue their selfinterest and to find happiness in their own manner (§§185, 206).  Although Hegel held that complete laissez-faire was untenable, he still warned against excessive regulation of the market place. One of the guiding goals behind the Philosophy of Right was indeed to integrate the freedoms of civil society into the modern state.  Another crucial liberal value supported by Hegel was human rights, the doctrine that all people have fundamental rights simply as human beings. He explicitly affirmed this principle in the Philosophy of Right: ‘A human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc.  This consciousness, which is the aim of thought, is of infinite importance’ (§209R). No less than Locke, Rousseau or Kant, Hegel maintains that some rights are inalienable or imprescriptable, such as the security of my person, the right to own property or to hold religious beliefs (§66R). True to his respect for such rights, Hegel strongly endorsed some classical liberal freedoms: freedom of conscience, association and press. While he still affirmed the value of a single state Church in Prussia, he held that the state should tolerate a diversity of sects, be they Quakers, Jews or Catholics (H 225). Although the state should encourage everyone to belong to some Church, it should leave it entirely to the individual to choose which one (§270R). While Hegel denied that freedom of press should give one the license to print whatever one wanted – for libel was always a problem (§319R) – he still stressed the role of a free press in forming public opinion and in gaining knowledge of the common good (§315).

    黑格尔对自由主义的偏袒和他对于社群主义的同情半斤八两。尽管把黑格尔认作一个自由主义者似乎不合情理，但是毫无疑问，他支持自由主义的某些基本的价值观。在这些价值观之中，黑格尔尤其支持自由的市场经济。在自由市场经济中，每个人都有权利追求他们自己的利益，以他们自己的方式寻找幸福（第185节、206节）。尽管黑格尔认为，完全的自由放任（Laissez-faire）是不能维持的，它仍然警告对于市场的过度管理。实际上，《法哲学》背后的一个指导目标是，把市民社会的自由融入到现代国家之中。黑格尔所支持的另一个至关重要的自由主义的价值是人权。这个学说认为，所有人都有作为人而具有的基本权利。他在《法哲学》中明确肯定了这条原则：“人之所以为人，正是因为他是一个人，而并不是因为他是一个犹太人、天主教徒、德国人、意大利人等等。最为思想之目标的意识，具有无限重要性。”（第209节附释）和洛克、卢梭或康德不相上下，黑格尔强调，某些权利是不可剥夺的或不可侵犯的，比如我的人身安全、我的财产权和坚持宗教信仰的权利等等（第66节附释）。由于忠实于对这些权利的尊重，黑格尔强烈赞成古典自由主义的某些自由：思想、结社和出版的自由。尽管他仍然肯定普鲁士唯一的国家教会的价值，但是他坚持说，国家应该宽容不同的教派，无论他们是教友派信徒、犹太教信徒，还是天主教徒（H225）。尽管国家应该鼓励所有人属于某个教会，但是它应该把选择哪一个教会的问题完全留给个体（第270节附释）。尽管黑格尔否认，出版自由应该给与每个人出版任何他想出版的东西的许可——因为诽谤总是一个问题（第319节附释）——他仍然强调出版自由在形成公共舆论和赢得关于公共善的认识方面的作用（第315节）。

For all his liberal values, Hegel took exception to liberalism in fundamental ways. First of all, for reasons we shall soon see (pp. 247–51), Hegel questioned the classical liberal economic doctrine that the free workings of market forces naturally work out for the benefit of everyone alike. He contended that the only way to ensure the liberties of civil society was for the government to control market forces (§§185A, 201A, 243). Second, he could not accept the common liberal doctrine that the purpose of the state is only to protect natural rights and the freedoms of the market place (§258R). Such a doctrine seemed to sanction the dissolution of society into a multitude of isolated and self-seeking atoms, having no sense of belonging or responsibility for the common good.  Third, Hegel disputed the social contract theory, according to which the state arises from the agreement between independent self-interested parties. Hegel questioned this doctrine on several grounds. (1) There are no such independent agents in the state of nature, since the very identity of a person rests upon society and the state. (2) If the obligation to enter the state depends on the will of the individual, then membership in the state becomes arbitrary or optional; the individual will have the right to leave the state when it is contrary to his self-interest, making all government impossible (§§258R, 281R). Fourth, Hegel did not accept the liberal’s strictly negative conception of freedom, according to which freedom consists simply in the absence of constraint and the multiplicity of options. While, as we have seen, Hegel does not dispute the importance and value of such negative freedom, he does not think that it provides an exhaustive or complete account of freedom. His own more positive conception identifies freedom with selfdetermination or autonomy, the power to act on rational laws that I would impose on myself as a rational being.

    就所有他的自由主义价值观而言，黑格尔在几个基本的方面对于自由主义持有异议。首先，出于我们很快将要看到的原因（247-251），黑格尔质疑古典自由主义的经济学说，即市场力量的自由机制自然地就会起作用，同等地惠及每一个人。他争辩说，对于政府而言，确保市民社会的自由的唯一方式是控制市场的力量（第185节补充、201补充、第243节）。其次，他不能接受常见的自由主义学说，即国家的目标仅仅是保护自然权利和市场的自由（第258节附释）。这样一种学说似乎同意把社会瓦解为大量的互不相干的和寻求自我的原子，而没有任何为了共同善的归属感或者责任感。第三，黑格尔辩驳了社会契约的理论。依照社会契约论，国家起源于各个独立的寻求自我利益的派别的协议。黑格尔基于几个理由质疑了这种学说。（1）在自然状态中，不存在那种独立的行动者，因为个人的身份是以社会和国家为基础的。（2）如果进入国家的义务依赖于个体的意志，那么国家中的成员就会变成任意的和可选择的；个体将会有权利离开国家，如果国家反对他的自我利益的话，这就使得所有国家都不可能存在（第258节附释，第281）。第四，黑格尔不接受自由主义的严格意义上的消极自由的概念。依照这个概念，自由只在于限制的自由和选择的复数性。正如我们已经看到的，尽管黑格尔并不质疑这种消极自由的重要性和价值，但是他并不认为，它提供了关于自由的详尽无遗的或者完美无缺的解释。他自己的更加积极的自由概念把自由等同于自我规定或者自律，即依照我作为一个理性存在者加诸我自己之上的理性法则行动的能力。

Hegel’s ambivalent attitude toward liberalism – the source of all its strengths and weaknesses for him – centers around a single fundamental principle, which he calls ‘the right of subjectivity’ or ‘the right of subjective freedom’ (§124R). In general, this principle states that every individual has a right to accept only those beliefs or commands, or to do only those actions, that agree with its own judgment (§132R). It means too that every individual is an end in itself, and that it should never be treated simply as a means to the purposes of others (VG 82/70). Hegel gave several more precise formulations to the principle, none of them synonymous or even coextensive. (1) It is ‘the right to recognize nothing that I do not perceive as rational’ (§132R). (2) ‘Whatever it [the subjective will] is to recognize as valid should be perceived by it as good’ (§132). (3) It is ‘. . . the right of the subject to find its satisfaction in [its] action’ (§121;VG 82/70). (4) ‘[T]he will can recognize something or be something only in so far as that thing is its own . . .’ (§107). (5) ‘. . .  [F]or a content to be accepted and held to be true, man must himself be actively involved with it, more precisely, he must find any such content to be at one and in unity with the certainty of his own self’ (EPW §7R).

    黑格尔对于自由主义的这种模棱两可的态度——对他来说，所有的力量和缺点的来源——围绕着唯一一个基本的原则，它称之为“主观性的权利”或者“主观自由的权利”（第124节附释）。总而言之，这个原则说的是，每一个个体都有权利仅仅接受他们的信念和命令，都仅仅执行符合它的判断的行动（第132节附释）。这也就意味着，每一个个体自身都是目的，它永远都不能仅仅被当作达到他人的目的的手段（VG, 82/70）。黑格尔给出了这个原则的几条更为精确的阐述，每一条都不相同，甚至都没有共同的边界。（1）它是“认识到没有什么我观察不到的事物是理性的的权利”（第132节附释）。（2）“无论它（主观意志）把什么看作是有效的，都应该被它看作为善的”（第132节）。（3）它是“……主体在（它的）行动中发现它的满足的权利”（第121节；VG 82/70）。（4）“意志能够承认什么东西或者是什么东西，仅仅因为那个东西是意志自己的……”（第107节）（5）“对于一个被接受的或者被持以为真的内容而言，人们自己必须积极地与之发生关联，更确切地说，人必须发现这样的内容和他自己的确定性处于一致并处于统一体之中。”（EPW，第7节）

Whatever its precise formulation, Hegel regards this principle as inescapable, as fundamental to and characteristic of the modern world. He traces its roots back to Christianity (§124R), and finds it quintessentially embodied in Protestantism (PR VII, 27/22). This principle is for him central to the modern state, which somehow must incorporate and satisfy its just demands. The main reason for the demise of the ancient polis is that it could not accommodate this right (§§138A, 124R, 185R, 260R, 261R, 299R).

    无论对它做如何更精确的阐述，黑格尔认为他的原则是不可回避的，对于现代世界而言，是基础性的，也是其基本特征。他追溯它的根源到基督教（第124节附释），发现它典型地体现在新教之中（PR VII, 27/22）。这条原则对他而言是现代国家的核心，它必定会以某种方式合并并且满足它的公正的要求。古代城邦灭亡的主要原因是，它不能提供这种权利（第138节补充、第124节附释、第185节附释、第260节附释、第261节附释、第299节附释）。

Nothing better reveals the liberal side of Hegel’s political philosophy than the constant use he makes of the principle of subjectivity throughout the Philosophy of Right. Hegel appeals to it to justify several classical political values. (1) The individual is bound by only those laws or policies to which he consents (§§4, 258R). (2) The individual should have the right to participate in government, or at least to have his interests represented in it (§301R). (3) The individual should have moral, intellectual and religious liberty, the right to express his opinion and to exercise his conscience (§§270R, 316, 317A, 319). (4) The individual should have the right to pursue self-interest in a market economy, or he should have the freedom of choice characteristic of civil society (§§185R, 187).  (5) The laws and constitution of a country must be clear and coherent, intelligible to the understanding of everyone alike (§211R).

    没有什么比黑格尔在整个《法哲学》中持续不断地使用主观性的原则更能揭示他的政治哲学的自由主义的一面了。黑格尔诉诸主观性原则来证成几个古典的政治价值。（1）个体只是受到他同意的法则或者政策的约束（第4节、第258节附释）。（2）个体应该有权利参与政府，或者至少在政府中有人代表他的利益（第301节附释）。（3）个体应该有权利在市场经济中追逐个人利益，或者他应该有作为市民社会基本特征的选择自由（第185节附释，187节）。（5）一个国家的法律和宪法必须是清楚的和连贯的，对于每个人的知性来说都是同样可理解的（第211节附释）。

Although Hegel strongly endorses the principle of subjectivity, and although he uses it to justify all these liberal values, he still regards it as deeply problematic. The chief problem with the principle in his view is that it is too abstract, i.e. it does not give an effective criterion or concrete guidelines about which beliefs or actions to endorse. The principle is ‘purely formal’ because it is compatible with any content; any law or belief could satisfy it (PR §§136–8, 140). It does not tell us, therefore, which laws or beliefs to accept, only that whatever laws or beliefs we accept should agree with our reason or conscience. In other words, the problem with subjectivity is that it can be false or wrong. We know that a decision or belief is right or wrong, Hegel argues, only from its content, from what it decides or what it believes (§137). For this reason, Hegel argues, it is also necessary to recognize the complementary right, which Hegel calls the ‘right of objectivity’ (§132). The right of objectivity claims that the decisions and opinions of subjectivity must be correct, i.e. they must have the right content. Just how we determine the content of the right of objectivity we will determine in the next section.

    尽管黑格尔强烈支持主观性的原则，尽管他用它来证成所有自由主义的价值，但是他仍然认为它是极度成问题的。在他眼中，这个原则的主要问题是，它太抽象了，亦即，关于支持什么信仰或者行动，它没有给出任何有效的标准或者具体的指导线索。原则是“纯粹形式的”，因为它是和任何内容相兼容的；任何法则和信仰都可以满足它（第136-138节、140节）。因此，它没有告诉我们，可以接受什么法则和信仰，而只是无论我们接受的是什么法则和信仰，它都应该和我们的理性或良心保持一致。换句话说，主观性的问题是，它可以是错误的或虚假的。黑格尔论证说，我们知道一个决定或者信念是对的或者错的，只是从它的内容而来的，从它所决定或者它所相信的东西而来的（第137节）。黑格尔论证说，因此也有必要承认与之互补的权利，黑格尔称之为“客观性的权利”（第132节）。客观性的权利主张，主观性的决断和意见必须是正确的，亦即，它们必须有正确的内容。如何确定客观性的权利的内容，我们将在下一节确定。

Such are, in very condensed outline, Hegel’s basic agreements and disagreements with both liberalism and communitarianism.  But the most important question remains: Is it possible to unite into a single coherent conception those aspects of liberalism and communitarianism that Hegel wants to preserve? There is an obvious point of friction: What if the state’s concept of the common good is not acceptable to some individuals, or even the great majority of them? If the synthesis rests upon force alone, the right of the state to compel the individual to obey, then it will be artificial and contrived.

    这就是以提要钩玄的方式描画的黑格尔对于自由主义和社群主义的基本的同意和不同意。但是最重要的问题仍旧没有回答：是否有可能把黑格尔想要保存的自由主义和社群主义的那些方面统一为唯一的始终如一的思想？这里存在着一个明显的分歧点：如果国家的共同善的概念不被某些个体，甚至是大多数个体接受，怎么办？如果综合仅仅建立在力量的基础上、国家迫使个体服从的权利的基础上，那么，它将会是人为的和不自然的。

There are two strategies to resolve this problem. One is to say that there is really no possibility of a conflict between the state’s conception of liberty and that of its citizens if the state is sufficiently democratic; then the state’s conception of the common good will represent nothing more than the will of its citizens. Another is to reduce the conception of the common good down to nothing more than the self-interest of the individuals who compose it. Since the aim of the state is to guarantee the freedoms of the market place, and since it does nothing more than ensure the opportunity for everyone to share in the goods of civil society, there is no real conflict between the state and liberty after all.

    有两个策略可以解决这个问题。其中之一是说，在国家的自由概念和它的公民的自由概念之间根本不存在任何冲突的可能，如果国家足够民主的话；那么国家的共同善的观念所代表的的不多不少正是它的公民的意志。另一个是说把共同善的观念径直还原为不多不少组成它的个体的自我利益。因为国家的目标是保证市场的自由，因为它所做的不多不少是确保每一个人都有机会共享市民社会的善，所以，在国家和自由之间压根儿就没有任何冲突。

Both strategies suffer from serious shortcomings. The chief problem with the first, as we shall soon see, is that Hegel’s state is not entirely democratic. The main difficulty with the second is that Hegel’s conception of the common good is much more substantial than the totality of the interests of the individuals who compose it.  Hence Hegel holds that for its security, the state must sometimes ask the individual to act contrary to his private interest (§324); and he maintains that the unregulated pursuit of private interest can in some cases undermine the common good, which it is the purpose of the government to define (§232). Furthermore, his objective conception of the good means that something has validity regardless of whether people assent to it or not (§§126R, 258R).

    两种策略都得忍受严重的缺点。第一种策略的主要问题是，我们将会看到，黑格尔的国家不是完全民主的。第二种策略的困难是，黑格尔的共同善的观念比起组成它的个体的利益的总体性来说，要更加实质得多。因此，黑格尔强调，为了它的安全，国家必须有时要求个体行事完全与他的个人私利背道而驰（第324节）；他坚持说，不加任何约束的追求个人私利在某些情况下会削弱共同善的基础，定义共同善是政府的目标（第232节）。此外，他的客观善的观念意味着，有些东西具有有效性，而不必顾及人民是否同意它（第126节附释、258节附释）。

Whether or not Hegel’s synthesis is successful ultimately depends on how he attempts to satisfy and balance the rights both of objectivity and of subjectivity. To understand his attempt, we must take a closer look at his theory of the institutions and powers of the modern state. Before we do this, however, we must consider one of Hegel’s central and characteristic concepts: ethical life (Sittlichkeit).

    黑格尔的综合是否成功最终依赖于他试图满足和平衡客观性的权利和主观性的权利的方式。为了理解他的尝试，我们必须更细致地观察他的现代国家的制度和权力的理论。然而，在我们进行考察之前，我们必须来考察黑格尔的核心和独具特色的概念之一：伦理生活（Sittlichkeit）。

ETHICAL LIFE

伦理生活

The concept of ethical life plays a pivotal role in the Philosophy of Right. The exposition of this concept comprises more than half of the work, overshadowing the parallel parts on abstract right and morality. The concept is so crucial because it formulates Hegel’s fundamental social and political ideal: the synthesis of the community with the individual.

    伦理生活的概念在《法哲学》中扮演了一个至关重要的角色。对于这个概念的阐明占据了这部著作超过一半以上的篇幅，使得与之平行的讨论抽象权利和道德的部分黯然失色。这个概念是如此重要，因为它阐述了黑格尔的基本的社会和政治理想（观念）：共同体和个体的综合。

But if the concept is important, it is also obscure. The problems begin with translation. The German word ‘Sittlichkeit’ has no exact English counterpart. It sometimes has the connotation of morality; but its meaning can be broader, including all aspects of human conduct. The term has a specific reference to manners, to standards of politeness and decency, as well as to what is customary and traditional (as in the adage ‘Andere Länder, andere Sitten’). The term can refer to the whole way of living and acting of a person or people. It is in this broader sense that Hegel uses it. He first conceived of Sittlichkeit as a translation for the ancient Greek ‘ethos’, which connotes the manners, morals and whole way of life of a nation or people (II, 504/159).

    但是如果说这个概念是重要的，那么它也是晦暗不明的。这些疑难始于翻译。“Sittlichkeit”这个德语词没有现成的英语对译词。它有时候具有道德的内涵；但是意义可能更加宽泛，包括人类生活的方方面面。这个术语具体的含义是指风俗、礼貌和体面的标准，以及合乎礼仪和传统的（就像在格言中“入乡随俗”【Andere Laender，Andere Sitten】中一样）。这个术语是指一个人或者一个民族的全部生活和行动方式。黑格尔正是在这种宽泛的意义上使用它。他首次是想到把Sittlichkei这个词作为希腊语ethos的翻译，它意味着一个国家或者民族的风俗、道德和全部生活方式（II, 504/159）.

Although Hegel intends his concept of ethical life to include moral actions, he makes a technical distinction between ethical life and morality (Moralität). Morality concerns the inner sphere of the individual, his moral intentions and religious conscience; it is distinguished from the sphere of abstract right or legality, which deals only with external actions, their bare conformity to law, regardless of an agent’s intentions (§§104A, 105). Both morality and abstract right deal with a person’s rights and duties as an individual. They differ from ethical life because they treat each individual on its own, apart from its place in society and the state. By contrast, ethical life considers the individual as an integral part of the social and political whole.

    尽管黑格尔想要他的伦理生活的概念包括道德行动，但是他在伦理生活和道德（Moralitaet）之间做了一个学术上的区分。道德和个体的内部领域、他的道德意图和宗教良心相关；它有别于抽象权利或者合法性的领域，后者处理的是外部的行为，它们只遵守法律，而毫不顾及行动者的意图（第104节补充、105节）。道德和抽象权利二者都处理作为个体的个人的权利和义务。它们不同于伦理生活，因为它们只是对待每一个独立的个体，而不管它们在社会和国家中的地位。与之相反，伦理生活认为个体是社会和政治整体中一个不可缺少的组成部分。

The distinction between ethical life and morality ultimately involves a more fundamental distinction between two different ways of viewing the relationship between the individual and social whole. Morality is an abstract universal: it makes the part prior to the whole, as if each individual were self-sufficient or independent.  Ethical life is a concrete universal: it makes the whole prior to the part, such that the very identity of the individual depends on its place in the whole. Hegel therefore thinks that the standpoint of morality is one-sided and abstract because it separates the individual from his place in the social whole, which gives the individual his very identity.

    在伦理生活和道德之间的这种区分，最终涉及在看待个体和社会整体之间关系的不同方式之间所作的一个更加基本的区分。道德是一个抽象的共相：它使得部分先于整体，就好像每一个个体是自足的或独立的。伦理生活是一个具体的共相：它使得整体先于部分，以至于每个个体的身份依赖于它在整体中的位置。因此，黑格尔认为，道德的立场是片面的和抽象的，因为它把个体从他在社会整体中的位置中分离了出来，而社会整体赋予个体以他的身份。

Although the concept of ethical life is essentially holistic, Hegel stresses that it also includes the interests and rights of individuals.  While the whole is prior to its parts, it also cannot function apart from them; indeed, it realizes itself only through each of them individually, only if each of them retains its own separate identity as a necessary part of the whole. In his opening account of ethical life in the Philosophy of Right (§§142–57), Hegel stresses how whole and part, community and individual, are reconciled and interdependent. If the individuals find their self-consciousness and selfidentity in the community, the ideals of the community are also actualized only through the actions and inner dispositions of specific individuals (§142). When Hegel states that the social whole is realized only through individuals he does not mean that they are only necessary means for the realization of collective ends; rather, each individual is an end in itself, and its thriving as an individual is also the end of the social organism itself (VG 82/70). A wellfunctioning social whole must take into account the rights of each of its individual members, so that their autonomy and independence are respected.

    尽管伦理生活的概念本质上是整体主义的，黑格尔强调说，它也包含着个体的利益与权利。虽然整体是先于它的各个部分的，但是离开部分，它也不能发挥功能；事实上，它只有通过以个体的形式存在的他们中的每一个才会实现它自身，只有他们中的每一个仍然保持着作为社会整体的一个必要部分的它自己的单独的身份。在《法哲学》一开始关于伦理生活的解说中（第142-157节），黑格尔强调整体和部分，共同体和个体是如何达成和解与相互依赖的。如果个体在共同体中发现了他们的自我意识和自我同一性，那么，共同体的观念也只有通过具体的个体的行动和内部性情才能现实化（第142节）。当黑格尔说，社会整体只有通过个体才能现实化之时，他的意思不是，他们只是实现集体的目的的必要手段；毋宁说，每一个个体自身就是目的，而它奋发成为一个个体就是社会有机体自身的目的（VG 82/70）。一个功能发挥良好的社会整体必须把它的每一个个体成员的权利考虑在内，以便他们的自律和独立得到尊重。

In ethical life Hegel attempted to synthesize the rights both of subjectivity and of objectivity. Hence he explains that in ethical life the laws and customs of a people are both objective and subjective.  They are objective because they seem to exist in their own right, being independent of the wills of individuals; in this regard, they are sources of authority to which the individual conforms or submits (§§144, 146). They are also subjective, however, because they have been internalized in the individual, who acts according to the customs and laws of his people as if they were his own ‘second nature’ (§§147, 151). They are his second nature not only because he has been educated and habituated to do them, Hegel stresses, but because they have also satisfied his own inner conviction and reflection. While ethical life negates morality in so far as morality attempts to separate the individual from the whole, it also attempts to preserve the fundamental principle of morality, the right of subjectivity (§154). If the individual is to become one with the community, he must do so from within, according to his own critical reflection. Hence Hegel insists that the synthesis of the community with the individual in ethical life is not based on trust or faith alone (§147).

    在伦理生活中，黑格尔试图综合主观性权利和客观性权利这二者。因此，他解释说，在伦理生活中，一个民族的法律和习俗既是主观的又是客观的。它们是客观的，是因为它们看起来凭它们自己的权利而存在，独立于个体的意志；在这方面，它们是个体所服从和遵守的权威的来源（第144节、第146节）。然而，它们也是主观的，因为它们已经内化于个体之中，个体依照他的民族的风俗与法律而行动，就好像它们是他自己的“第二天性”（第147节、第151节）。黑格尔强调说，它们是他的第二天性，不仅仅是因为他通过受教育和耳濡目染而去做这些事情，而是因为它们满足了他自己的内部确信和反思。如果说伦理生活否定了道德，是就道德试图把个体从整体中分离出来而言，那么，伦理生活也试图保存道德的基本原则，主观性的权利（第154节）。如果个体想要与共同体合而为一，他就必须根据他自己的批判性反思，从他自身内部这样做。因此，黑格尔坚持认为，共同体和个体在伦理生活中的综合不仅仅是建立在信任或者信仰的基础之上（第147节）。

As explained so far, the concept of ethical life seems to be a straightforward contradiction. On the one hand, Hegel states that ethical life establishes the right of objectivity, so that the individual recognizes the higher authority of its laws and customs and no longer questions them. On the other hand, however, he also stresses that in ethical life the individual becomes one with his community not on the naive level of trust and faith but on the higher level of critical reflection. Hence ethical life seems both to satisfy and to suspend the right of subjectivity. How does Hegel resolve this apparent contradiction?

    依据迄今为止的解释，伦理生活的概念似乎是一个简单易懂的矛盾。一方面，黑格尔说，伦理生活建立起客观性的权利，以至于个体承认了它的法律和风俗的更高权威，而不再质疑它们。然而，另一方面，他也强调，在伦理生活中，个体并不是在朴素的信任和信仰的水平上，而是在更高的批判性反思的水平上与共同体合而为一。因此，伦理生活似乎既满足了又悬搁了主观性的权利。黑格尔是如何解决这个显而易见的矛盾的呢？

Hegel could resolve this contradiction by invoking a distinction he often uses in the Philosophy of Right: that between the objective and subjective will of the individual. The subjective will involves the individual’s power of choice, his interests and needs; the objective will expresses the norms of reason, which are realized in the laws, customs and morality of social life. The contradiction then disappears if we claim that the subjective will is suspended while the objective will is reinstated.

    黑格尔是通过援引他在《法哲学》中经常使用的一个区分来解决这个矛盾的：在个体的客观意志和主观意志之间的区分。主观的意志涉及个体选择的权利，他的利益和需要；客观的意志表达了理性的规范，这规范是在社会生活的法律、风俗和道德中实现的。如果我们主张主观的意志在客观的意志复位时就被悬搁起来了，那么，这个矛盾就消失了。

But such a distinction seems to exclude the very right of subjectivity that it was Hegel’s purpose to honor. For the question remains: What if the individual, through his critical reflection, does not endorse the laws, customs and morality of the state? Hegel seems to assume that the individual’s self-reflection will eventually teach him to lay aside his own personal interests and opinions, so that he will find his higher freedom and self-awareness in the community. But what is to ensure this? Like Plato and Aristotle, Hegel assigns great importance to education in binding the individual to the community. It is only through education, he argues, that we acquire our second nature and become rational beings (§§151A, 187R). Education will perfectly tie the individual to the state, however, only if, like Plato’s system in the Republic, it becomes so detailed, rigorous and comprehensive that the individual is trained never to question the state. But Hegel himself had doubts about Plato’s system precisely because it was too totalitarian (§185R).

    但是这样一种区分似乎排除了主观性的权利，而后者是黑格尔试图授予其以荣誉的。因为问题仍旧悬而未决：如果个体，通过他的批判性反思，并不赞成国家的法律、风俗和道德，怎么办？黑格尔似乎假定，个体的自我反思最终会教导他把他自己个人的利益和观点弃置一边，结果，他会在共同体中发现他的更高的自由和自我觉察。但是什么可以保证这一点呢？和柏拉图与亚里士多德一样，黑格尔赋予教化以在把个体和共同体黏合在一起时极大的重要性。他论证说，只有通过教化，我们才能获得我们的第二天性和变成理性的存在者（第151节补充，187节附释）。教化将会完美地把个体国家绑定在一起，只要像《理想国》中的柏拉图的体系一样，它便详尽无遗、一丝不苟和无所不包，个体就会被训练成从不质疑国家的人。但是黑格尔本人对柏拉图的体系抱有怀疑，恰恰是因为它过于集权主义了（第185节附释）。

The main suspicion against Hegel’s concept of ethical life is that it achieves its synthesis of the individual with the community only by its implicit authoritarianism, only by favoring the right of objectivity over subjectivity. Hegel’s original argument in behalf of ethical life, and against the one-sidedness of morality, only seems to confirm how much it is slanted in favor of the right of objectivity. To overcome the abstractness of the principle of subjectivity, he argues, we must supplement it with the communitarian ideal. We can give content to our reason, an objective norm to our conscience, only if we place them within the ethos of the community (§§146, 148). Hegel then writes as if we should simply accept and follow what the community tells us to do:

    对于黑格尔伦理生活的概念主要的怀疑是，它仅仅通过它隐含的权威主义，仅仅通过偏爱客观性的权利胜于主观性的权利，就达到了个体和共同体的综合。黑格尔代表伦理生活一面而反对道德的片面性的独创性论证似乎仅仅是为了确定，它由于偏爱客观性的权利而有多么大的偏私。他论证说，为了克服主观性的原则，我们必须用共产主义（公有制）的理想来补充它。我们可以赋予我们的理性以内容，赋予我们的良心以客观的规范，只要我们把它们放置在共同体的伦理之中（第146节，148节）。然后，黑格尔写道，似乎我们只应该接受和遵从共同体告诉我们去做的东西：

In an ethical community it is easy to say what someone must do and what the duties are which he has to fulfill in order to be virtuous. He must simply do what is prescribed, expressly stated, and known to him in the situation.  (§150)

    一个人应该做什么，应该尽些什么义务，才能成为有德性的人，这在伦理共同体中是很容易说出的。他只需做在他的处境中已经规定了的、明确陈述出来的和他所熟知的事情就可以了。（第150节附释）

The danger here is not simply that the laws and customs of ethical life could be imposed on the individual; the problem runs deeper because the individual also has no standards or principles outside of those that are given to him by ethical life. He has no higher moral standards or principles to criticize the practices and institutions of the community. After all, apart from the content of ethical life, the right of subjectivity is purely formal, the sheer activity of reflecting. But what worth does this have on its own, especially if it is incorrect and wrong?

    这里的危险不仅仅是，伦理生活的法律和习俗可能会被强加给个体；问题要更深刻得多，因为在伦理生活给与他的那些标准或者原则之外，个体也没有任何标准或者原则。他没有更高的道德标准或者原则来批判共同体的实践和制度。毕竟，除去了伦理生活的内容，主观性的权利是纯粹形式的，是纯粹的反思行动。但是它自己究竟有什么价值呢，尤其是如果它是不正确的和错误的？

The suspicion of authoritarianism only grows when we recognize that, whenever there is a conflict between the rights of subjectivity and objectivity, Hegel unhesitantly and emphatically gives clear priority to the right of objectivity. Thus he declares that, however important the right of subjectivity, ‘the right of the rational – as the objective – over the subject remains firmly established’ (§132R). He also maintains that ‘the subjective will has worth and dignity only in so far as its insight and intention are in conformity with the good’ (§131). He further holds that ‘since the good . . . is the [i.e. the particular will’s] substance, it has an absolute right as distinct from the abstract right of property and the particular ends of welfare’ (§130). Hegel argues that we must never declare the right of subjectivity against the state. My particularity is only a right at all in so far as I am free; and therefore I cannot assert it in contradiction to ‘the substantial basis on which it rests [i.e. ethical life]’ (§126). He explains that it is ‘one of the commonest errors of abstraction to insist on private rights and private welfare as valid in and for themselves in opposition to the universality of the state’ (§126R).

    对于权威主义的怀疑只有在我们认识到以下这一点时才会出现，只要在主观性的权利和客观性的权利之间存在冲突的时候，黑格尔总是毫不犹豫而不容置疑地赋予客观性的权利以优先权。因此，他宣称，无论主观性的权利多么重要，“理性作为客观的东西对于主体而具有的法（权利），依旧岿然不动”（第132节附释）。他还强调说，“主观意志之具有价值和尊严，只是就它的洞见和意图符合于善而言”（第131节）。他还进一步坚持认为，“因为善是……（亦即，特殊意志的）实体，它有一个完全不同于抽象的财产权利和特殊的福利目的的绝对法（权利）”（第130节）。黑格尔论证说，我们从未宣称过反对国家的主观性权利。我的特殊性根本上是一种权利，只是因为我是自由的；因此，我不能断定它和“它建立于其上的实质性基础（亦即，伦理生活）”处于矛盾之中。（第126节）。他解释说，“坚持认为私人权利和私人福利是与国家的普遍性相对立的、自在自为的有效的东西，（这是）抽象思维最常见的错误之一”（第126节附释）。

The problem of authoritarianism can also be seen from this angle: that Hegel, like Kant,6 does not take actual, but only possible, consent as a sufficient criterion of a person’s acceptance of the laws.  What is decisive is not any kind of assent but rational assent (§§4A, 29R, 258R). So if a person could assent to the laws, even if he in fact happens to dissent from them, the laws are still legitimate. A person can be regarded as having given his assent to laws provided that they are rational. But then the question remains: rational according to whom? We are still left with Locke’s decisive question: Who shall be judge? Hegel’s answer seems to be perfectly clear: that it should not be the people but the government. He never had much confidence in the judgment of the common man to determine whether the laws are rational, or even to know his best interests (§§301R, 308R, 317R). He maintains that it is the universal estate alone, the government bureaucracy, which knows the best interests of the estates, even if they have not been articulated by them (§§289, 301R).

    权威主义的问题也可以从这个角度看待：黑格尔和康德一样，并不把现实的同意，而只把可能的同意看作是一个人接受法律的标准。起决定作用的不是任何种类的同意，而是理性的同意（第4节补充、第29节附释、第258节附释）。因此，如果一个人能够同意法律，即使他事实上碰巧不同意它们，法律也仍然是具有合法性的。只要一个人是理性的，就能够被看作是已经对于法律表示同意。但是问题又来了：依据谁是理性的？我们现在又被带到洛克的关键问题面前：谁应该是法官？黑格尔的回答似乎特别清晰：它应该不是人民，而是政府。在确定法律是否是理性的，甚至认识他自己的利益等方面，他从来没有特别信任过普通人的判断（第310节附释、第308节附释、第317节附释）。他坚持说，只有一个普遍的阶层，政府的官僚机构，它知道所有阶层的最大利益，即使它们从来没有把它们清晰地表达出来（第289节，第301节附释）。

Yet all these suspicions are still premature and inconclusive. For we cannot resolve the question of authoritarianism – and the whole issue of whether Hegel has a successful synthesis of communitarianism and liberalism – unless we first examine his general theory of the state. Although Hegel does give the bureaucracy great power, his account of its power is embedded in a much larger theory of the division of powers, of the checks and balances, between the branches of government. The question would then be: Does Hegel impose sufficient limits on the bureaucracy’s power to prevent it from becoming tyrannical or authoritarian? It is important to recognize that the general concept of ethical life by itself is only abstract; it postulates an identity of the individual and the social; but it still does not show us how to realize it. But Hegel does have a much more complex account of how ethical life is to be realized in the structure of the modern state. It is to this account that we must now turn.

    然而，所有这些怀疑都是不成熟的和没有说服力的。因为我们不能解决权威主义的问题——黑格尔是否成功地把社群主义和自由主义综合在一起这个完整的问题，如果我们首先不考察他关于国家的一般理论的话。尽管黑格尔的确赋予官僚制度以很大的权力，但是他对于权力的解释是植根于一个更广博的关于政府部分之间的权力划分、制约平衡的理论之中的。那么问题就将是：黑格尔是否给与管理体制的权力以足够的限制，以防止它变成暴政或者权威？重要的是认识到，伦理生活的一般概念自身就是抽象的；它假设了个体和社会的同一性；但是它仍然不会向我们指出如何实现它。但是，关于伦理生活如何在现代国家的结构中实现，黑格尔的确有一个更复杂的解释。现在是我们必须转向这个解释的时候了。