Part Four Social and Political Philosophy
Nine Freedom and the Foundation of Right(1)
第四部分 社会和政治哲学
第九章 自由与权利的基础(1)
METAPHYSICS AND POLITICS
形而上学与政治
Although most contemporary scholars have declared Hegel’s metaphysics dead, they stress that his social and political philosophy is alive and well. With some justice, they hail Hegel’s Philosophy of Right as a classic in political thought, a work on a par with Plato’s Republic, Hobbes’s Leviathan and Rousseau’s Social Contract.1 But, with some embarrassment, they tiptoe around Hegel’s metaphysics. Since any connection of Hegel’s social and political philosophy with his metaphysics would seem to render it obsolete, most scholars have adopted a non-metaphysical approach.2
尽管绝大多数当代学者宣称黑格尔的形而上学已死，但是他们强调说，他的社会与政治哲学仍然活着并且健康良好（well）。他们把黑格尔的《法哲学》推崇为政治思想中的经典，一本可以与柏拉图的《理想国》、霍布斯的《利维坦》和卢梭的《社会契约论》相媲美的著作这多少有些公正合理。1但是令人有些困窘的是，他们蹑手蹑脚地绕开黑格尔的形而上学。因为黑格尔的社会与政治哲学和他的形而上学的任何关联都会使它显得陈腐不堪，于是大多数学者选取了非形而上学的道路。2
However tempting, such an approach is flatly contrary to Hegel’s own intentions. For, from the very beginning, it was his ambition to provide a metaphysical foundation for social and political philosophy. In his first publication on the topic, his 1802–3 On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, he argued that the main shortcoming of previous systems of natural law is that they had separated natural law from metaphysics. They had failed to recognize that metaphysics is the foundation of the other sciences, and that a discipline has a scientific component only to the degree that it rests on such a foundation. Here Hegel self-consciously set himself in opposition to the positivistic spirit of much modern jurisprudence that attempts to free law from metaphysics. The problem with positivism, Hegel argues, is that metaphysics is inescapable, and that in pretending to be free from it we only beg the most basic questions against it.
无论多么有诱惑力，这样一条道路简直就是和黑格尔自己的意图南辕北辙。因为从最开始，他就野心勃勃地要为社会与政治哲学提供一个形而上学的基础。在他关于这个话题的最早出版物中，他1802~1803年的《讨论自然法的科学方式》一文就论证说，此前的自然法体系的主要缺点是，它们把自然法同形而上学分离开来了。它们没有能够认识到，形而上学是其他科学的基础，一个学科只有到了它建基于那样一个基础之上的程度，才有了科学的组成部分。黑格尔论证说，实证主义的问题是，形而上学是不可逃避的，而在自称可以摆脱形而上学时，我们只是以未经证明的结论来证明这个最基本的问题来反对它。
Still, there is something to be said for the non-metaphysical approach. If only on a superficial level, it is possible to understand much in Hegel’s social and political philosophy without his metaphysics. Much in Hegel’s theory is straightforwardly intelligible, as much the result of observation and prudence as speculative logic. Although the architechtonic structure of the Philosophy of Right – its routine divisions into the dialectical moments of universality, particularity and individuality – reflects Hegel’s speculative logic, this structure is somewhat artificial and arbitrary, more imposed upon than derived from its subject matter. Hegel is indeed often at his best when he lays aside his metaphysics and simply explores his subject matter.
对于这种非形而上学的道路，还有些话要说。如果仅仅在一个表面的层次上说，理解黑格尔的社会与政治哲学中许多东西而不需要他的形而上学，这是可能的。黑格尔理论当中有许多是可以直截了当地理解的，既可以理解为观察与深谋远虑的结果，也同样可以看作是思辨逻辑的结果。尽管《法哲学》的建筑术结构——它按部就班地划分为普遍性、特殊性和个体性的辩证法环节——反映了黑格尔的思辨逻辑，但是这种结构总有些说不清道不明的矫揉造作与专横武断，这与其说源自于它的题材，不如说是强加于其上的。的确，在黑格尔把他的形而上学放置于一旁而仅仅探讨它的题材时，他总是处于最佳状态。
It is also necessary to note a profound ambivalence on Hegel’s part regarding the foundation of his social and political philosophy. While he sometimes insists that its foundation lies in his speculative logic, he also stresses that its specific doctrines derive entirely from the immanent logic of its subject matter. If Hegel’s method is metaphysical, it is also phenomenological, demanding that we examine each subject for its own sake, apart from all prior principles and preconceived ideas (pp. 159–62). Although each specific science derives its foundation from the system as a whole, it should also be self-sufficient, an organic whole in its own right. So if we stress this phenomenological aspect of Hegel’s methodology, it would seem that much in his social and political philosophy should be comprehensible in its own terms.
注意到从黑格尔的角度来看待他的社会与政治哲学的基础时的深刻的含糊性，这也是有必要的。尽管他有时坚持认为，它的基础在他的思辨逻辑之中，但他同时会强调它的具体学说完全源于这个题材的内在逻辑。如果黑格尔的方法是形而上学的，那么它也是现象学的；要求我们除了所有在先的原则和预先构想的观念之外，为了它自己的目的而考查每一个主题（第159~162页）。尽管每一个具体科学都从作为整体的体系中获得它的基础，但它也应该是自足的，它以其自身就是一个有机整体。因此，如果强调黑格尔的方法论中这个现象学的方面，似乎他的社会与政治哲学中的大部分东西应当根据它自己的术语才可以理解。
Yet the question remains: How comprehensible? And here the short answer must be: not enough. Whatever the spirit of the phenomenological method, the fact remains that some of the central concepts of Hegel’s political philosophy presuppose, and are only fully intelligible in the context of, his metaphysics. We shall soon see that Hegel’s concept of right rests upon his Aristotelian metaphysics (pp. 210–14), that his concept of freedom is based upon his notion of spirit (p. 201), and that his theory of reason in history is based on his absolute idealism (pp. 263–4).
但是问题依然是：它是如何理解的？在这里，最简短的回答必定是：不充分。无论现象学方法的精神是什么，事实仍就是，黑格尔政治哲学的某些核心概念预设了他的形而上学，而且只有在他的形而上学的语境中才是完全可理解的。我们很快就会看到，黑格尔的权利概念建立在他的亚里士多德式的形而上学的基础之上（第210~214页），他的自由概念建基于他的精神概念之上（第201页），他的历史中的理性的理论建基于他的绝对观念论之上（第263~264页）。
THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
自由的概念
All scholars agree there is no more important concept in Hegel’s political theory than freedom. There are good reasons for such rare unanimity: Hegel regards freedom as the foundation of right, as the essence of spirit, and as the end of history. Unfortunately, however, there is no concept of Hegel’s political theory that is more opaque and contentious. Since the concept is so pivotal, obscure and controversial, it is necessary to examine it in a little detail.
所有的学者都同意，在黑格尔的政治理论当中没有比自由更重要的概念了。有许多非常好的理由来说明这种罕见的全体一致：黑格尔把自由看作权利的基础，看作精神的本质，看作历史的目的。然而，不幸的是，在黑格尔的政治理论中没有一个概念比自由更含混不清与聚说纷纭了。因为这个概念是如此重要、晦暗不明而又争论不休，我们有必要稍稍详细一点来考查它。
Hegel has several distinct but related concepts of freedom, which appear in scattered places in his writings. First and foremost, he understands freedom as autonomy, i.e. the power of self-government, the capacity to make and follow one’s own laws. Hence he writes in The Philosophy of World History: ‘. . . only that will which obeys the law is free; for it obeys itself and is self-sufficient [bei sich selbst] and therefore free’ (VG 115/97). Hegel’s idea of autonomy presupposes that the will’s self-imposed laws are rational; I am not free simply by creating and following any law, but the law must be worthy of the assent of any intelligent being. Hence freedom consists in acting according to the laws of reason.
黑格尔有好几个各不相同而又相互关联的自由概念，它们散见于他的著述的不同地方。首先并且最重要的是，他把自由理解为自律，亦即自我统治的力量，为自己立法并遵从自己的法则的能力。因此，他在《世界历史哲学》中写道：“……只有那种遵从法则的意志是自由的；因为它服从它自身，而且是自足的（bei sich sebst）并因此是自由的。”（VG 115/97）。黑格尔的自律的概念预设了，意志加诸自我的法则是理性的；我是自由的，不仅仅是因为创造和遵从了任何法律，而且是因为法律必须值得任何有理智的存在者的同意。因此，自由就存在于依照理性的法则而行动之中。
Hegel also conceives freedom as independence or self-sufficiency, i.e. not depending on anyone other than oneself. He defines freedom in these terms when he writes in The Philosophy of World History: ‘. . . spirit is self-sufficient being [Beisichselbstsein], and just this is freedom. For if I am dependent, I relate to something that is not I and I cannot be without this external thing’ (VG 55/48). A similar account of freedom appears in the Philosophy of Right when Hegel explains that the will is free if ‘it relates to nothing but itself, so that every relationship of dependence on something other than itself falls away’ (§23). This sense of freedom is closely connected with autonomy, for an autonomous being is independent in not depending on anyone else to govern itself.
黑格尔也把自由构想为独立或自足，也就是不依赖除了自身之外的任何他人。他在撰述《世界历史哲学》时用这些术语来定义自由：“……精神是自足的存在（Beisichselbstsein），而且只有这一点才是自由。因为如果我是有所依赖的，那么我就和不是我的东西关联在一起，且如果没有这个外在的东西，我就不能存在。”（VG 55/48）。关于自由的类似解释也出现在《法哲学》中，黑格尔解释说，意志是自由的，如果“它除了与它自身而不与任何东西相关联，那么，每一种依赖某物而非它自身的关系就崩塌了”（第23节）。自由的这种含义与自律紧紧相联，因为一个自律的存在者是独立地而非依赖任何其他人统治自己。
Finally, in the Philosophy of Right Hegel sometimes formulates positive freedom in terms of self-determination (§§7, 12R, 21). Selfdetermination essentially means two things: (1) that the self, and not forces outside itself, determines its actions; and (2) that in determining itself, it makes itself determinate, turning what is merely potential, intended and inchoate into something actual, realized and organized. When Hegel thinks of freedom as selfdetermination he implies that (1) I have a specific essence or nature, which consists in my rationality, and that (2) the process of self-realization, of developing this essence or nature, is natural and necessary (pp. 74–5). Clearly, self-determination is closely connected with autonomy: self-determination means that the self is autonomous because it determines itself into action according to principles it gives itself. For similar reasons, self-determination is also intimately linked with independence: if the self determines itself into action it is independent of causes external to itself.
最后，在《法哲学》中，黑格尔有时依据自我规定来阐述积极自由（第7节，12节R, 21节）。自我规定本质上意味着两样东西：（1）自我，而不是它自身之外的力，决定了它的行动；（2）在规定它自身之时，它使他自身变成有规定的，把仅仅是潜在的、意图中的和处于萌蘖之中的东西变成某种现实的、实现的和有组织的东西。在黑格尔把自由看作是自我规定之时，他暗示的是，（1）我有一个具体的本质或本性，它存在于我的理性之中；（2）自我实现的过程是发展这个本质或者本性的过程，是自然的和必然的（第74-75页）。显而易见的是，自我规定和自律紧紧联系在一起：自我规定意味着，自我是自律的，因为它依照它赋予它自身的原则而把它自身规定为行动。处于类似的原因，自我规定也和独立有着紧密的关系：如果自我把它自身规定为行动，那么它就是独立于外在于它的各种原因的。
Hegel’s technical formulation for freedom is the will willing itself, i.e. the will having itself for its own object and end (PR §§22, 27). Such language appears paradoxical, but the main point is simple, resting on two straightforward premises. First, Hegel thinks that the very essence of the self consists in freedom. Like Rousseau and Kant, he maintains that the distinctive feature of a rational being is its freedom, more specifically, its autonomy, its power to act on universalizable principles. Second, Hegel maintains that we become free only if we are self-conscious that we are free, having the power to make freedom the goal of our actions; a slave who does not know that it is free will never achieve its freedom. Both points together mean that the self will become free only if it makes freedom itself the object and goal of its activity; in other words, the will must will itself. It is in such self-reflexive willing, Hegel further argues, that true independence and self-determination reside. For if the will wills itself, it relates to itself alone, and so it does not depend on anything outside itself.
黑格尔关于自由的专业阐述是遵从着它自身的意志，亦即，把它自身当作是它自己的对象和目的的意志（PR第22，27节）。这种语言看起来像个悖论，但是它的要点是简单明了的，建立在两个直截了当的前提上。第一，黑格尔认为，自我的本质就在于它的自由之中。和卢梭与康德一样，他强调，一个理性存在者的独特特征是它的自由，更具体地说，它的自律——它依照可普遍化的原则而行动的力量。其次，黑格尔强调，只有当我们自我意识到我们是自由的，有力量把自由变成我们行动的目标的时候，我们才变成自由的；一个不知道它是自由的奴隶从来不会获得自由。这两点合起来意味着，自我只有当它把自由自身变成它的行动的目的和目标之时，才会变成自由的；换句话说，意志必须意愿着它自身。黑格尔进一步论证说，正是在这样一种自我反思的意愿中，自由才会安居下来。因为如果意志意愿着它自身，它就只和它自身相关联。因此，它就不依赖于在它之外的任何事物。
In §§5–7 of the Philosophy of Right Hegel provides a more detailed account of freedom, specifying three fundamental moments necessary for freedom. These three moments – universality, particularity and individuality – correspond to the structure of the concept in his Logic. In this context they specify three conditions under which a person can be completely free in the world. According to the moment of universality, a free person must have the power of selfawareness, the capacity to abstract from all specific situations and to be aware of itself apart from them; it must have the ability to stand back from all courses of actions, to reflect on different options and their consequences. If a person had no such power, they would not be free because they would have no sense of its own agency, and they would have no power to rationally assess what they should do. According to the moment of particularity, to be free, a person must choose a particular option and act in a particular situation. Without choosing and without acting a person cannot be free; and to choose and to act they must choose something specific and do something specific. According to the moment of individuality, the synthesis of the other two moments, a person must, after detaching themselves from and reflecting on all options, eventually commit themselves to, and ultimately identify themselves with, one option; in other words, they must accept one situation as worthy of their effort and commitment. Hegel describes this moment of individuality as one of self-limitation: one limits oneself because, rather than fleeing all commitments, one accepts one situation in life; and yet one self-limits oneself because one chooses the situation as a result of reflection and deliberation.
在《法哲学》第5~7节，黑格尔提供了一个关于自由的更加详细的解说，具体规定了对于自由而言必不可少的三个基本环节。这三个基本环节——普遍性、特殊性和个体性——相应于他《逻辑学》中的概念结构。在这个语境中，它们具体规定了世界上的人能够达到完全自由的三个条件。依照普遍性的环节，一个自由的人必须具有自我觉察的能力，从所有具体的处境当中抽离出去并且离开处境觉察到它自身的能力；它必须有能力从任何行动的过程中后退出来，以反思不同的选择及其后果。如果人们没有这种力量，那么他们就不会是自由的，因为他们对于他们自己的动力没有任何感觉，他们也没有力量对于他们应该做出的行为进行理性的评估。依照特殊性的环节，为了成为自由的，一个人必须在一个特定的处境中做出一个特定的选择，并且行动。如果没有选择和没有行动，一个人就不可能是自由的；为了选择和行动，他们必须选择特定的东西，做某件特定的事情。依照特殊性——另外两个环节的综合——的环节，一个人必须在让自己和所有选择保持距离，并且对之进行反思后，最终让自己投身到某个选择之中，并且最终把他们自己等同于这个选择；换句话说，他们必须接受一个处境作为值得他们付出努力并全身投入的。黑格尔把这一个体性的环节描述成自我限制的环节：一个人限制他自身，因为一个人接受生命中的某一处境，而非在所有承诺之间漂浮不定；一个人自我限制他自身，还因为一个人选择处境作为反思和深思熟虑的结果。
Whatever its basis in his logic, Hegel’s analysis of freedom in the Philosophy of Right reflects his fundamental moral teaching that freedom has to be realized in the world, and cannot be attained by flight from it. This is a theme that Hegel had first developed in his Christianity and its Fate when he argued that Jesus doomed himself by fleeing from the world and seeking redemption in heaven alone. In the Phenomenology Hegel later saw the same problems in stoicism, which preached inner retreat from the vicissitudes of fortune, and in French radicalism, which wreaked destruction because it could not accept any specific constitution. In Hegel’s view, Christianity, stoicism and French radicalism were all failed strategies for achieving freedom. Since they attempted to escape the world, they did not struggle against it, and so ultimately succumbed to it. Hegel’s theme contains a tragic note: the need to reconcile ourselves with the world, to limit ourselves and to commit ourselves to some specific situation in life. Yet this tragic teaching always went hand-in-hand with a moral about the need to struggle against the world. Hegel saw that the main problem for realizing one’s freedom in the world is that one has both to struggle and to yield, both to limit oneself and to detach oneself, both to commit oneself yet to remain critical; true freedom lay in finding the delicate balance between these extremes.
无论在他的逻辑学中的基础是什么，黑格尔在《法哲学》中关于自由的分析反映了他根本的道德教导，即自由必须在世界上变成现实，而不可能通过从世界上逃离而获得。这就是黑格尔在《基督教及其命运》一文中首次发展出来的主题，当时他论证说，耶稣本人注定要逃离这个世界，而只寻求在天堂中的救赎。后来在《精神现象学》中，黑格尔在斯多葛派和法国激进主义中看到了同样的问题——斯多葛派劝诫从命运的变化中撤退到内心；而法国激进主义则造成毁灭性的后果，因为它不能接受任何特定的宪政。在黑格尔眼中，基督教、斯多葛派和法国激进主义都是为达到自由而彻底失败的策略。因为他们试图逃避这个世界，所以他们没有发动反抗世界的斗争，因此最终向这个世界屈服。黑格尔的主题包含着一种悲剧性的音符：必须在我们和世界之间达成和解，限制我们自己，让我们自己投身到生活的某些特定处境之中。但是这种悲剧性的教导总是和一种必须反抗世界的道德牵手并进。黑格尔看到，实现这种自由的主要困难是，一个人必须既要斗争，又要屈服，既要限制他自己，又要挣脱他自己，既要全身心投入，又要保持批判；真正的自由就在于在这些极端之间发现微妙的平衡。
A decisive influence in the development of Hegel’s concept of freedom was Kant. We can trace each of Hegel’s formulations back to Kant, who had already written about freedom in terms of autonomy, independence and self-determination.3 It was indeed Kant who first suggested, in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, that the free will wills itself because it must act according to the idea of freedom (GMS IV, 448). The influence of Kant’s concept of freedom upon Hegel is not a matter of conjecture but easily detectable. In the early Berne writings Hegel made Kant’s principle of autonomy his chief moral ideal, his main weapon in his battle against the positivity of Christianity. And in the Philosophy of Right Hegel explicitly endorsed Kant’s conception of freedom as acting on moral duty: ‘In doing my duty, I am with myself [bei mir selbst] and free. It is the merit and exalted standpoint of Kant’s philosophy in the practical sphere that it has stressed this significance of duty’ (PR §133A).
在黑格尔的自由概念发展的历程中产生决定性影响的是康德。我们能够把黑格尔的每一个阐释回溯到康德那里，在康德的著述中已经根据自律、独立和自我规定等讨论自由了。3事实上，康德在他的《道德形而上学基础》中第一次指出，自由意志意愿着自身，因为它必须根据自由的理念而行动（GMS IV，第448页）。康德的自由概念对于黑格尔的影响不是出自凭空臆想，而是有案可稽，并俯首可拾。在他的早期伯尔尼手稿中，黑格尔把康德的自律原则变成他的主要的道德理想，他与基督教的实证性相抗争时的主要武器。而在《法哲学》中，黑格尔明白确凿地推崇依照道德义务而行动这种康德的自由思想：“我在尽义务时，我是心安理得（bei mir selbst）而且自由的。着重指出义务的这种意义，乃是康德实践领域的哲学的功绩与卓尔不群的观点。”（PR第133节补充）
Still, despite these facts, it would be a serious mistake to conclude that Kant’s and Hegel’s concepts of freedom are substantially the same.4 Though they are alike in very general respects, Kant and Hegel give them very different, even conflicting, interpretations. The most important differences are fourfold:
尽管有如此多的事实，但是由此推断说，康德的自由概念和黑格尔的实质相同，别无二致，却有可能是一个严重的错误。4尽管它们在最一般的方面非常相似，但是康德和黑格尔赋予它们以截然不同的、甚至相互冲突的阐释。它们之间最为重要的区别有如下四点：
¶ Though Kant and Hegel both see freedom in terms of moral action, and though both think that morality must be founded on reason, they have very different conceptions of reason. Kant’s conception of reason is formal or abstract: the power to determine and act on universalizable principles; Hegel’s conception of reason is material or concrete: the ethos and way of life of a specific community.
一、尽管康德和黑格尔两人都根据道德行动来看待自由，尽管他们俩都认为道德必须建立在理性的基础之上，但是他们对于理性的思考却有天壤之别。康德的理性观是形式的或者说抽象的：规定可普遍化的原则并依其行动的力量；黑格尔的理性观是质料的和具体的：某一特定共同体的伦理（ethos）和生活方式。
¶ Though they both conceive freedom as self-determination, they have very different conceptions of the self. Since Kant’s rational self stands above the spheres of society and history, it has its identity apart from other rational selves like itself; it is self-conscious in opposition to other such selves. Hegel, however, understands the self in and through the other; his self realizes itself only through internalizing the other and making it part of its very identity. Hence, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes self-determination as the entire process by which the self externalizes itself in others and then internalizes them in a wider concept of itself (§7). The proper subject of freedom is therefore spirit, the intersubjective self, the I that is a We and the We that is an I.
二、尽管他们俩都认为自由是自我规定，但是他们对于自我的理解也是判然有别。因为康德的理性自我是高高站在社会和历史的领域之上的，它除了和它一样的其他理性自我之外，有它的同一性；它在和其他那样的自我的对立中有它的自我意识。然而，黑格尔是在他者中并且通过他者理解自我，他的自我只有通过把他者内部化和使它成为它的同一性的一部分才意识到它自身。因此，在《法哲学》中，黑格尔把自我规定描述为自我在他者中把它自身外在化，然后在一个更广阔的它自身的概念中把他者内在化的整个过程（第7节）。因此，自由的本己的主体是精神，是主体间的自我，是那个是我们的我和是我的我们。
¶ Kant conceives of self-determination as the power of reason over sensibility; Hegel, however, understands self-determination as acting according to my whole nature, where there is no conflict between reason and sensibility. Following Schiller,5 Hegel insists that my desires and feelings have to be integrated into the powers of rational self-determination, so that the self does its duty from inclination and not apart from it, still less contrary to it. Hegel rejected Kant’s more rationalistic and dualistic account of self-determination, because if freedom were acting according to my rationality alone it would be still compatible with a form of constraint: namely, the repression of my desires and feelings. He argued that the sovereignty Kant gave to reason had simply moved the sources of domination inside the self.
三、康德把自我规定设想为在感性之上的理性的力量；然而，黑格尔把自我规定理解为依照我们全体的本性而行动，在我的本性中，感性和理性之间不存在什么冲突。黑格尔追随席勒，5坚持认为，我的欲望和情感必须要整合到理性的自我规定的力量之中，因此，自我尽义务时，是从禀好（inclination）出发，而非把它排除在外，和它之间的对立并不那么尖锐。黑格尔拒斥了康德对于自我规定的更加理性主义的和二元论的解释，因为如果道德是仅仅依照我的理性而行动的话，它就仍旧和某种局限是相容的：也就是说，压制我的欲望和情感。他论证说，康德赋予理性的那种主权仅仅把统治的资源移入到自我内部。
¶ Kant conceives of freedom as independence from the causality of nature, so that the self is the sole cause of its own actions and has the power to do otherwise. Hegel thinks that such independence is illusory: freedom is realized only within the realm of nature and it requires acting according to the necessity of one’s own nature and the universe as a whole. In his understanding of freedom as a form of necessity, as self-awareness of one’s place in the universe as a whole, Hegel’s main debt is to Spinoza.
四、康德把自由设想为独立于自然的因果性的，因此自我是它自己的行动的唯一原因，有力量做任何其他事情。黑格尔认为，这种独立性是一种幻象：只有在自然的领域才是可实现的，它必需依照它自己的本性和作为整体的宇宙的必然性而行动。在他把自由理解为某种形式的必然性，在对于它在作为整体的宇宙中的位置的自我觉察之时，黑格尔从斯宾诺莎那里受益良多。
Prima facie it might seem that Hegel abandons the concept of freedom as independence when he stresses that the self must live through others and in the world. This seems to amount to the admission that the self has a de facto dependence on others. Hegel indeed thinks that we are dependent on others and the world, and that it is only through such dependence that we become who we are. It is important to see, however, that in recognizing such de facto dependence he does not think he is abandoning the ideal of independence but embracing it; for he argues that true independence comes not from abstracting or fleeing from the other and the world but in making them part of myself; for if I truly internalize the other and the world, making them part of myself, then my dependence on the other becomes a form of self-dependence. It is ultimately Kant who must abandon his ideal of independence, Hegel argues, because he conceives it completely in abstraction from others and the world, so that it cannot recognize its de facto dependence upon them.
乍一眼看来（prima facie），在黑格尔强调自我必须通过他者而在世界之中生活之时，似乎他摒弃了作为独立的自由概念。这也似乎意味着，承认自我实际上（de facto）是依赖于他者的。黑格尔的确认为，我们是依赖他者和这个世界的，只有通过这种依赖，我们才能变成我们之所是。然而，重要的是要看到，在承认这种事实上的依赖之时，他并不认为他抛弃了独立的理想，而是包含了它；因为他论证说，真正的独立并不是来自于从他者和世界之中退缩或者逃离，而是使它们成为我自己的一部分；因为如果我真正把他者和世界内在化了，把它们变成了我的一部分，那么，我对他者的依赖就变成了某种形式的自我依赖。黑格尔论证说，最终必须摒弃他的独立理想的是康德，因为他完全是在从他者和世界的撤退中设想它的，因此他不能承认它实际上对于它们的依赖。
A BETRAYER OF LIBERTY?
自由的背叛者？
For better or worse, Hegel has gone down in history as one of the chief champions of a ‘positive concept’ of freedom. Since the distinction between positive and negative liberty is relatively recent, it is anachronistic to apply it to Hegel. Still, it has become such an endemic way of discussing Hegel – by both defenders and detractors alike – that it cannot be ignored. According to Isaiah Berlin’s classical distinction,6 a negative concept of liberty identifies freedom with lack of constraint or absence of coercion, i.e. with noninterference with any of my actions; hence the less constraint, the more free I am. Negative liberty therefore essentially consists in freedom of choice, having a multiplicity of options. On the other hand, a positive concept of liberty identifies freedom with a specific course of action, such as acting on moral principle, obeying divine commands, or realizing my true self. Such liberty is then compatible with limiting my options, and even with compelling me to do the specific action. Positive liberty seems to sanction, therefore, Rousseau’s notorious dictum: ‘forcing a person to be free’. So, not surprisingly, it has been denounced as a threat to negative liberty, as a rationale for totalitarianism or authoritarianism. Interpreted as a one-sided champion of positive freedom, Hegel has been flayed and flailed by his liberal critics as a potent ‘betrayer of liberty’.
不论是好是歹，黑格尔已经作为一个积极“自由概念”的主要拥护者而进入了历史。因为在积极自由和消极自由之间做出区分已经是比较晚近的事情了，把它运用到黑格尔头上实在是弄错了时代。它仍然一直被当作一种难以摆脱的讨论黑格尔的方式——无论是他的捍卫者还是他的贬低者在这点上殊途同归——以至于它难以被忽视。依照以赛亚·柏林的经典区分，6消极的自由概念把自由当作是缺乏限制或者说强制的缺席，也就是说，不干涉我的任何行动；因此，限制越少，我越是自由。因此，消极自由本质上就在于选择的自由，具有复数性的选择可能性。另一方面，积极的自由概念把自由等同于具体的自由进行，比如依照道德原则行动，遵从神圣的命令，或者实现真正的自我。那么，这种自由和限制我的选择，和强迫我做出某个特定的行动，甚至是可兼容的。因此，积极自由似乎支持卢梭那著名的格言：“强迫某人自由。”因此，毫不奇怪，它被谴责为对于消极自由的威胁，集权主义或者权威主义的基本原理。黑格尔被阐释为积极自由的片面的拥护者，他的自由主义的批评者把他痛斥为强有力的“自由的背叛者”而大肆挞伐。
The most obvious problem with this interpretation is that it cannot account for one stubborn and incontestable fact: that Hegel himself was an unwavering and unequivocal champion of negative as well as positive liberty. Hegel had a distinction between kinds of freedom that is analogous, though not equivalent, to Berlin’s; and he is explicit and emphatic in upholding both forms of freedom. Hegel’s own distinction is between what he usually calls ‘formal’ or ‘subjective freedom’ on the one hand, and ‘absolute’ or ‘objective freedom’ on the other hand; uncannily, he sometimes even distinguishes between ‘negative’ liberty and ‘affirmative’ or ‘positive liberty’ (PR §§5, 149A; VG 57/50).7 Formal, subjective or negative freedom involves the power and right of the individual to reflect upon and choose different courses of action, and to choose that option which best suits its taste, judgment or conscience (PR §§ 121, 185R, 228R, 258R, 273R, 274, 301, 316). On the other hand, absolute, objective or positive freedom involves thinking and acting on rational principle, on laws that are recognized in public life (§§149, 258R). In the Philosophy of Right Hegel shows himself to be a staunch advocate of formal and subjective freedom on many occasions, and he fully recognizes and stresses that such freedom requires non-interference by the government (§§185R, 206R, 260). He repeatedly argues that the chief weakness of the classical polis is that it did not recognize subjective freedom (§§124R, 138A, 185R, 260R, 261R, 262A, 299R), whereas the main strength of the modern state is that it secures individual rights (§§41, 185R, 206R, 260, 262A, 299R).
这种阐释最明显的疑难在于，它不能解释一个无法改变与无可争议的事实，即黑格尔本人是一个毫不动摇与确凿无疑的否定性消极自由以及肯定性积极自由的支持者。黑格尔在多种自由类型之间做了一个与柏林相类似的尽管并非完全相同的划分。他毫不含糊地强调对于两种形式的自由都加以支持。黑格尔自己的划分是在以下两者之间做出的：一方面是他所谓的“形式的”或“主观的自由”，另一方面是“绝对的”或者“客观的自由”。令人惊诧的是，他有时甚至划分了“消极的自由”和“肯定的自由”或“积极的自由”（PR第5节以下、第149节补充；VG57/50）7。形式的、主观的或者消极的自由涉及个体在对于不同的行动过程的反思与选择不同过程的权利，以及选择最合适它的趣味、判断与良知的选项的权力与权利（PR第121节、185节附释、228节附释、273节附释、274节、301节、316节）。另一方面，绝对的、客观的或者肯定的自由涉及依照理性的原则，依照公共生活中得到承认的法则而思维与行动（第149节、258节附释）。在《法哲学》中，在许多场合中，黑格尔显示自己为形式的和主观的自由的忠诚的支持者。他完全承认并强调，这种自由的前提是政府不干预（第185节附释、206节附释、260节）。他反反复复论证说，古代城邦的主要缺点在于，它不承认主观自由（第124节附释、138节补充、185节附释、260节附释、262节补充、299节附释），而现代国家的主要力量在于，它保护个体权利（第41节、185节附释、206节附释、269节、262页补充、199节附释）。
It is important to recognize that Hegel’s defense of negative liberty was not a late development for him but a constant of his intellectual career, one of the enduring hallmarks of all his political writings. In the Positivity Essay of the Berne and Frankfurt periods he argued passionately that the state has the duty to protect the rights of individuals, such as freedom of speech and conscience. And in the Verfassungsschrift of the late Frankfurt and early Jena periods he protested strongly against the totalitarian state that attempts to control everything from above, leaving no room for individual liberties and local initiatives. Hence the interpretation of Hegel as a onesided protagonist of positive liberty ignores not only a central feature of his mature doctrine but also a pivotal theme of his early writings.
重要的是要承认，黑格尔对消极自由的辩护并非他晚期思想的发展，而是他思想生涯中一以贯之的事，是所有他的政治著述的始终如一的标志。在伯尔尼和法兰克福时期的《实证性论文》中，他充满激情地论证说，国家有义务保护个体的权利，例如言论自由与良知。在法兰克福晚期和耶拿早期的《宪法论文》中，他强烈反对试图自上而下地控制一切，不给个体自由与地方首创性留下任何空间的极权政府。因此，把黑格尔阐释为积极自由的一边倒的主角，这不仅忽视了他成熟学说的核心特征，而且忽视了他早期著述中一个极为重要的主题。
There seems to be some justification, however, for reading at least the mature Hegel along these lines. In the Philosophy of Right (§§15–17), Hegel mounts an argument to the effect that negative freedom is not really freedom in the proper sense. He contends that freedom understood as ‘arbitrariness’ (Willkür), i.e. the power to abstract from all options and to choose between them, contradicts itself because the will is both independent of and dependent on its object. Whatever the merits of this argument, it seems as if Hegel were entirely rejecting freedom in the negative sense for the sake of positive freedom alone.
然而，至少是就依照这些线索解读成熟的黑格尔而言，似乎存在着某种合理的证明。在《法哲学》（第15~17节）中，黑格尔使某个论证带有这种意思，在他本来的意义上说，消极自由并非真正的自由。他争辩说，自由被理解为“任性”，也就是说，从所有选择项中退缩回来并且在它们之间进行选择的权力，就和它自身发生矛盾了，因为意志既独立于又依赖于它的对象。无论这个论证具有什么价值，似乎黑格尔仅仅为了积极自由的缘故而完全拒绝消极意义上的自由。
When, however, we read these passages more in context, this interpretation proves untenable. It suffers from several difficulties. First, the target of Hegel’s argument is not really negative liberty (in Berlin’s precise sense) but the formal liberty that attempts to realize freedom in complete abstraction from all commitment. Second, Hegel is not criticizing the value of choice as such but, more specifically, arbitrariness, where an agent cannot or will not give reasons for taking one option over another. Third, though Hegel does not think that freedom in the sense of arbitrariness is freedom in the full and complete sense, he still does not reject it entirely but retains it as one essential aspect or moment of liberty. Hegel fully realizes that there are some choices that we make that lack objective reasons and that might be based on nothing more than the personal or individual choices, such as my choice of a specific career or mode of dress. But even these choices should be protected by the state, Hegel thinks, because they are part of ‘the infinite right’ of subjectivity (see pp. 231–3).
然而，如果我们在语境之中再次阅读这些段落，这种阐释证明是站不住脚的。它遭遇到好几重困难。首先，黑格尔的论证的靶子实际上不是（确切地伯林意义上的）消极自由，而是实现从所有事务中完全撤退出来的自由的尝试。其次，黑格尔并不是在批判选择自身的价值，而是，更加具体地说，在批判任性的价值，在任性中，一个行动者不能也不愿意给出他做某种选择而非另一种的理由。再次，尽管黑格尔并不认为，任性意义上的自由并非全面而完全意义上的自由，但是他仍然没有完全拒绝它，而是把它保留为自由的一个本质的方面或环节。黑格尔完全地意识到，我们所做的某些选择缺乏客观的理由，它们建基于其上的东西无非是个人的或个体的选择，例如，我选择某个特定的职业或者服装样式。但是黑格尔认为，即使这些选择也应该变成国家的保护，因为它们是全观性的“无限权利”的一部分（另见第231-233节）。
Granted that Hegel values negative as well as positive freedom, the question remains whether his use of positive freedom sanctions authoritarianism. The issue here is more complicated than many scholars recognize. At stake is not simply the historical or factual issue whether Hegel acknowledges the value of negative liberty, but two logical or systematic issues: whether Hegel’s concept of positive freedom has authoritarian implications, and whether Hegel can unite both forms of freedom into a single coherent philosophy of the state. It is not sufficient to point out that Hegel intends or wants negative liberty to be upheld; for that leaves the question whether it is compatible with his ultimate principles. The issue is not disposed of simply by claiming that, because autonomy involves the capacity of choice, subjective freedom is the precondition of objective freedom.8 For this begs the question: what if my subjective choice is at odds with the standard of rationality involved in autonomy? The question whether Hegel betrays negative liberty ultimately rests upon whether political institutions, as Hegel envisages them, involve sufficient safeguards for negative liberty. We will consider these troublesome issues in more detail below (pp. 237–43).
只要黑格尔既重视消极自由也重视积极自由，他对积极自由的使用是否批准权威主义的问题就是悬而未决的。这里的问题比许多学者认识到的要复杂得多。仍旧成为一个问题的，就不是黑格尔是否认识到消极自由的价值这样一个纯粹历史的或事实的问题，而是两个逻辑的或者体系的问题：黑格尔的积极自由的概念是否具有权威主义蕴含的问题，以及黑格尔是否能够把两个形式的自由统一成一个单一的条理一贯的国家哲学的问题。仅仅指出下面这一点还不够，即，黑格尔意欲或者想要支持消极自由，因为那产生了它是否与他的终极原理相容的问题。这个问题不能仅仅通过宣称以下这一点来处理，即，因为自律涉及选择的能力，主观自由是客观自由的前提条件8。因为这又把将要证明的东西设为前提了：如果我的主观选择与和自律相关的理性的标准不一致，将会怎么样？黑格尔是否背叛了消极自由的问题最终建立在政治制度——正如黑格尔认为它们的那样——是否牵强足够保卫消极自由的问题。我们将在下面更加详实地来讨论这些令人棘手的问题（第237—243节）。
