Three Absolute Idealism
第三章 绝对观念论(3)
Understood as the thesis that everything is an appearance of the idea, absolute idealism is compatible with realism, i.e. the doctrine that objects exist apart from and prior to consciousness. The appearances of the idea might be material objects as well as self-conscious subjects, and indeed the whole realm of nature prior to the development of humanity. Hegel assumes throughout his Naturphilosophie that nature exists apart from and prior to human consciousness, and that the development of humanity presupposes and only arises from the prior development of the organic powers of nature.
在被理解为“每一事物都是理念的显现”这一论题时，绝对观念论就与实在论（realism）相容了。而按照实在论，对象在意识之外并且先在于意识。理念的表象，可能是质料性客体，也可能是自我意识着的主体，并且实际上整个自然领域先于人类的发展。黑格尔在《自然哲学》中始终假定，自然外在于并先于人类意识而存在，人类的发展预设了有机的自然力量的先在发展，并且只能源出于这种发展。
Hegel’s absolute idealism is also compatible with naturalism. If naturalism is the general thesis that everything in nature happens according to laws, then absolute idealism sanctions naturalism, because it holds that everything that happens in nature happens of necessity. It is also compatible with the more specific thesis that everything in nature conforms to mechanical laws, i.e. laws where the cause of any event is some prior event in time. Hegel does not deny the mechanism of nature because he regards its workings as the necessary means for the realization of ends. Absolute idealism is incompatible only with a naturalism that claims everything is explicable only according to mechanical laws. The proper antithesis of absolute idealism is therefore neither realism nor naturalism but a radical or narrow mechanism that claims to be the only paradigm of explanation.
黑格尔的绝对观念论也兼容自然主义（naturalism）。如果说自然主义是这样一种普泛的论点，即自然中所有事物的发生都合乎规律，那么绝对观念论赞同自然主义，因为它认为自然中所有事物的发生都出自必然性。它也与一种更特殊的论点相兼容，即自然界的每一事物都符合机械法则，亦即任何事件的原因乃是某一时间在先的事件。黑格尔并不否认自然的机械论，因为他认为自然的机械论运作乃是实现目的的必要手段。绝对观念论仅仅与下面这种自然主义不相容，这种自然主义主张任何事物唯有依据机械法则才是可解释的。因此，与绝对观念论正相反对的论点，既不是实在论也不是自然主义，而是一种激进的或狭隘的机械论，它要求成为唯一的解释范式。
According to Hegel’s absolute idealism, then, the whole dispute between materialism and idealism is misconceived. The absolute idea is neither subjective nor objective because it is the form or structure that inheres equally in both. We cannot reduce the subject down to the object, as if it were only material, and neither can we reduce the object down to the subject, as if it were only ideal. Both the subjective and objective are equally real, and the opposition between them is apparent from our everyday experience; it is indeed a necessary condition for the self-realization of the absolute that it divides itself into the subjective and objective (as we shall see, pp. 93–5). Nevertheless, this opposition does not diminish the identity or unity of the absolute, because as the formal and final cause, as the intelligible principle of all things, it can be either subjective or objective.
那么，根据黑格尔的绝对观念论，唯物论和观念论之间的整个争论都遭到了误解。绝对理念既非主观的也非客观的，因为它是这两者同等固有的形式或结构。我们不能把主体还原为客体，仿佛它仅仅是质料的，同样我们也不能把客体还原为主体，仿佛它仅仅是观念的。主观和客观是同样实在的，二者之间的对立明显来自我们的日常经验；这种对立实际上是“绝对”自我实现的必要条件，即它将自身分裂为主观和客观（我们在第93–95页看到这一点）。然而，这一对立并没有削弱“绝对”的同一性或统一性，因为作为形式因和目的因，作为所有事物的可理解原则，它可以要么是主观的，要么是客观的。
Although Hegel insists that the absolute idea realizes itself in the realm both of subjectivity and of objectivity, there is still a sense in which his absolute idealism gives pride of place to subjectivity over objectivity. It is one of Hegel’s fundamental criticisms of Spinoza that he did not sufficiently honor subjectivity and recognize its status over nature; he made subjectivity one attribute of substance, an attribute having the same status as matter, and indeed only one of an infinite number of attributes. For Hegel, however, subjectivity is the highest manifestation, organization and development of the absolute. The absolute fully realizes itself only in the realm of history, and most of all in the domain of culture, i.e. in art, religion and philosophy. Hegel restores to Spinoza’s monism the idea of a great chain of being, a hierarchy of natural forms, which begins with matter, develops progressively through minerals, vegetables and animals, and finally culminates in humanity itself. The absolute is therefore better realized in the realm of subjectivity than objectivity. Although the absolute could indeed exist apart from and prior to subjectivity, it still could not fully realize or develop its nature without subjectivity. Nature without subjectivity could indeed exist, but it would be like the sapling that never grew into a mighty oak.
尽管黑格尔强调绝对理念同时在主观性和客观性中实现自身，但是在某种意义上，他的绝对观念论仍然赋予主观性之于客观性更高的地位。黑格尔对斯宾诺莎的一个根本批评是，斯宾诺莎没有给予主观性以充分的荣耀，承认它高于自然的地位；斯宾诺莎将主观性当作实体的一个属性，一种与物质具有同等地位的属性，因而实际上仅仅是无限多样的属性之一种。然而，对黑格尔来说，主观性是“绝对”最高的展示、组织和发展。只是在历史领域，并且主要是在文化领域，亦即在艺术、宗教和哲学中，“绝对”才充分实现自身。黑格尔把存在巨链的理念——一种有关自然形式的等级制，恢复到了斯宾诺莎的一元论的水平，这种理念从物质开端，渐进地发展到矿物、植物和动物，最后在人类自身中达到顶峰。因此，相比于客观性领域，“绝对”在主观性领域更好地实现了自身。尽管“绝对”事实上能够外在于和先于主观性而存在，但是没有主观性，它就不能充分实现或发展它的本性。没有主观性的自然确实能够存在，但它就像是一棵从未成长为参天橡树的小树苗。
The important role of subjectivity in Hegel’s idealism, combined with his statement that the absolute must be conceived as subject as well as substance, has been one of the main sources of a very popular, but ultimately mistaken, reading of his absolute idealism. According to this reading, Hegel’s absolute idealism is a form of cosmic subjectivism or supersubjectivism. It is essentially the doctrine that the absolute is spirit, the divine universal subject, and that this subject creates the entire world. This interpretation makes Hegel’s idealism a form of subjective idealism, though of a higherorder and more metaphysical kind. The subject is no longer finite (i.e. empirical and individual) but infinite (i.e. rational and universal). This infinite self would not be simply the Kantian transcendental subject, which is purely formal; rather, it would be the Kantian transcendental subject with all restrictions removed, i.e. one that is not individuated and that has the power to create the content as well as the form of experience. Although the material world exists independent of the finite subject, it does not exist independent of the infinite subject, who has posited the whole realm of nature through its infinite activity.
主观性在黑格尔观念论中的重要地位，同他关于“绝对”必须既被设想为主体也被设想为实体的陈述结合在一起，成为关于黑格尔绝对观念论的一种十分流行但根本上错误的解读的一个主要根源。根据这种解读，黑格尔的绝对观念论是某种形式的宇宙的主观主义或超级主观主义。它本质性是这种学说，即“绝对”是精神，是神圣普遍的主体，这一主体创造了整个世界。这种解读使得黑格尔的观念论变成某种形式的主观观念论，尽管是更高级的和更形而上学的类型。主体不再是有限的（亦即经验的和个体的），而是无限的（亦即理性的和普遍的）。这一无限的自我，将不仅仅是康德式的、纯形式的先验主体；相反，它将是去掉了所有限制的康德式的先验主体，亦即一种不再是个别化的、并且有能力既创造经验形式也创造经验内容的主体。尽管物质世界独立于有限主体而存在，但它不能独立于这一无限主体而存在，这一无限主体通过它的无限活动而设定了整个自然领域。
There are several problems with this reading. First, Hegel thinks that even if we eliminate the restrictions on the transcendental subject – even if we remove the thing-in-itself and the given content of experience – we still have subjective idealism because the forms of thinking are true only for the subject and not of the world itself (EPW §42A3, 45A). Second, Hegel maintains that the opposition between the subjective and objective has no meaning within the absolute idea, so that it cannot be regarded as exclusively subjective or objective (EPW §24A1). Third, Hegel maintains that the subjectivity of the absolute is only its final stage of organization and development; it is only the result, not the beginning. In the beginning, considered in itself, the absolute is not subject but substance.
这种解读存在几个问题。首先，黑格尔认为，即使我们可以消除对先验主体的各种限制——即使我们移除物自身和被给与的经验内容——我们拥有的仍然是主观的观念论，因为思想的形式仅只对于主体而非世界自身而言是真实的（EPW§ 42A3，45A）。其次，黑格尔主张，在绝对理念内部，主观与客观之间的对立没有意义，因此不能用一种相互排斥的眼光来看待主观或客观（EPW§ 24A1）。第三，黑格尔主张，“绝对”的主观性仅仅是其组织和发展的最后阶段；这只是结果，而非开端。在开端处，在它自身中考察的话，绝对不是主体而是实体。
THE SYNTHESIS OF IDEALISM AND REALISM, FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
观念论与实在论、自由与必然的综合
It should be clear by now that one purpose of Hegel’s absolute idealism is to transcend the stalemate between idealism and naturalism. Absolute idealism would somehow preserve the merits, and negate the flaws, of these limited standpoints. Both were conceived as one-sided abstractions, false of the whole but true of one of its parts. But what, more precisely, were these standpoints? And how, more concretely, were they to be synthesized?
现在应该很清楚了，黑格尔绝对观念论的一个目的，是扬弃观念论（idealism）与自然主义（naturalism）之间的僵硬对立。绝对观念论以某种方式保存这些有限立场的优点，否定其缺陷。二者都被设想为片面的抽象，就整体而言为假，但是就片面而言为真。但是，更为确切地说，这些立场究竟是什么？并且，更为具体地说，如何实现它们的综合？
For Hegel, and the entire romantic generation of the 1790s, the standpoint of realism or ‘dogmatism’ represented the philosophy of Spinoza; and the standpoint of idealism or ‘criticism’ represented the philosophy of Fichte. Fichte had declared that these are the only two possible positions, and he demanded that one choose between them. But his ultimatum was rejected by Hegel and the romantic generation, who saw merits in both standpoints. The great strength of Fichte’s idealism was its concept of radical freedom, the right and power of the self to create itself and its entire world. Fichte’s concept of the self-positing ego – that the self is only what it makes of itself – was irresistibly attractive to the generation of the 1790s, who wanted to break down all the limits of the traditional order and to create a new heaven and earth. The great virtue of Spinoza’s naturalism is that it saw the divine in nature and not as a supernatural heaven existing beyond it. Spinoza’s naturalism seemed to reconcile the demands of science and faith by naturalizing the divine and divinizing nature. Given the strengths of both positions, it was the ideal of the entire romantic generation to synthesize Fichte’s freedom and Spinoza’s naturalism.
对黑格尔和18世纪90年代整个浪漫主义的一代来说，实在论或“独断论”的立场以斯宾诺莎哲学为代表；观念论或“批判论”的立场以费希特哲学为代表。费希特曾经公开宣布，只有两种可能的立场，并且要求人们二者选一。但黑格尔和浪漫派的一代拒绝了费希特的最后结论，他们看到了两种立场中的长处。费希特观念论的伟大力量是它激进的自由概念，是“自我”创造自己以及整个世界的权利和能力。费希特“设定自我的自我”概念——自我仅仅是它从自身之中创造出来的东西——对18世纪90年代的那一代人来说，有着无法抵制的诱惑。他们想要打破传统秩序的所有限制，开创一个新天地。斯宾诺莎自然主义的优点是，它看到了自然中的神圣，而这种神圣并非存在于自然彼岸的一种超自然的天堂。通过神圣者的自然化和自然的神圣化，斯宾诺莎的自然主义似乎实现了科学与信仰这两种需求的和解。考虑到两种立场的力量，整个浪漫的一代的理想，就是综合费希特的自由与斯宾诺莎的自然。
But this ideal seems to be a mere dream, requiring a squaring of the circle. The problem is that Fichte’s concept of freedom and Spinoza’s naturalism seem utterly irreconcilable, just as Fichte had insisted. According to Fichte’s concept, freedom consists in the power of the self to make itself whatever it chooses to be; the self has no nature prior to its own choices. The self has the power of choice, the capacity to do one action or the other, completely independent of prior causes. Fichte realized that we do not now have such radical freedom, and that most of our character is determined by external causes in nature; he still insisted, however, that such freedom should be an ideal or goal for action. The self should strive to gain more control over nature, so that its entire character depends on nothing but its own free activity. Such a radical concept of freedom is undermined, in two respects, by Spinoza’s naturalism. First, Spinoza’s naturalism is deterministic. According to Spinoza, God acts from the necessity of his own nature alone, and cannot do otherwise any more than a triangle can have its three angles be less than 180 degrees; since all human thoughts and actions are simply modes of the divine nature, they too must be necessary. What I think or do will be simply what God thinks and does through me; someone cannot act otherwise any more than the eternal divine nature can change. Second, Spinoza’s naturalism is also quietistic, undermining any motivation to change the world. For Spinoza, the essence of God is perfect and eternal: and since everything expresses or manifests the essence of God, everything should be perfect and eternal. Why, then, bother to change things? Despite Spinoza’s own radical politics, his metaphysics seemed to undercut motivation for social and political change, or at least to offer consolation to those who could not change it. For Fichte, though, philosophy should end in a call for action: the world is not rational yet we should strive to make it so. What the dogmatist hypostasized – a self in harmony with its world – Fichte wanted to make into the goal of action.
但这个理想看起来仅仅是个梦，近乎要求一种方的圆。问题在于，正如费希特所主张的那样，他的自由概念和斯宾诺莎的自然概念完全是不可调和的。按照费希特的概念，自由在于“自我以任意选择是其所是”的方式创造自己的权力；自我没有先于其选择的本性。自我具有选择的力量，具有完全独立于先在的原因而这样做或那样做的能力。费希特意识到，我们现在并没有这种激进的自由，我们大多数品格都是由外部的自然原因决定的；然而，他仍然主张这种自由应当是一个理想或行动的目标。自我应当努力获取对自然的更多控制，以便它的整个品格仅仅取决于它自己的自由活动而非其他。这种激进的自由概念，在两个方面，被斯宾诺莎的自然主义侵蚀了基础。首先，斯宾诺莎的自然主义是决定论的。按照斯宾诺莎，上帝仅根据他自己本性的必然性而行动，并且不会越雷池一步，就像三角形的内角和不会超过180°一样；由于人类的所有思想和行为都仅仅是神圣自然的样式，因此也都是必然的。我的所思所为只不过是上帝通过我的思和为；一个人不能以别的方式行动，只能在外部神圣自然能够变化的范围内行动。其次，斯宾诺莎的自然主义也是寂静主义的，它侵蚀了任何试图改变世界的动机的基础。对斯宾诺莎来说，上帝的本质是完美的和永恒的：而由于每一事物都是上帝本质的表达或显示，因此每一事物都应当是完美的和永恒的。那么，为何要自寻烦恼改变事物呢？撇开斯宾诺莎自己的激进政治学不谈，他的形而上学看起来从根本上削弱了社会和政治变革的动机，或者至少是给那些无力变革的人提供了某种安慰。然而，对费希特来说，哲学应当终结于对行动的召唤：世界还不是理性的，我们应当为使之理性化而努力奋斗。独断论者只是假设自我与其世界的和谐一致，费希特则想把它变成行动的目标。
The hopelessness of trying to wed Fichte’s idealism with Spinoza’s naturalism becomes all the more apparent when we consider Hegel’s critique of Fichte. Like all the romantics, Hegel had been sharply critical of Fichte’s dualism, his distinction between the noumenal or intelligible realm of freedom and the phenomenal or sensible realm of necessity. This dualism seemed to eternalize the alienation between the self and nature, making it impossible for them ever to become one. But there was good reason behind the Fichtean dualism. Like Kant, Fichte had been forced to postulate such a dualism to ensure the possibility of freedom. His reasoning seemed inescapable: since freedom involves choice, the power to do otherwise, and since everything in nature is determined, such that it is necessary and cannot be otherwise, freedom is possible only if it is taken outside the sphere of nature entirely and placed in an intellectual or noumenal realm. For Hegel and the romantics, dualism was not the solution but the problem. However, this made the problem of freedom all the more urgent. How is freedom possible in Spinoza’s monistic and naturalistic world?
如果我们考虑到黑格尔对费希特的批判，那么，实现费希特的观念论和斯宾诺莎的自然主义联姻的无望，就变得越发明显了。像所有浪漫主义者一样，黑格尔已经对费希特的二元论、他关于本体或可知的自由王国与现象或可感的必然王国的区分，提出了尖锐的批评。这种二元论似乎将自我与自然之间的异化永恒化了，使得二者最终合一成为不可能的事。但是，在费希特的二元论背后，有一些好的理由。和康德一样，费希特被迫假设这种二元论以确保自由的可能性。他的推理似乎是无可避免的：由于自由包含着选择亦即以别样方式做某事的能力，并且由于自然中的每一事物都是被决定的，以至于它是必然的和不可能采取别样方式的。因此，唯有当被带到整个自然领域之外和放置于理智或本体的领域中，自由才是可能的。对黑格尔和浪漫主义者来说，二元论并不是解决问题的方案而正是问题本身。然而，这使得自由问题变得更加急迫。在斯宾诺莎一元论的和自然主义的世界中，自由如何可能呢？
Hegel’s answer to this question lay, in part, with his idealist reinterpretation of Spinoza. Since his absolute idealism restored subjectivity as the purpose and pinnacle of nature, Hegel reinstated one aspect of Fichte’s idealism. In one sense Fichte was right after all: the self should be the first principle. Fichte was indeed correct in placing self-consciousness at the center of all things, as the basis to explain nature, for self-consciousness is the purpose of nature, the highest degree of organization and development of all its living powers. Where Fichte went astray, however, was in interpreting the final cause as the first cause. He had wrongly assumed that the ego is the fundamental ontological principle of nature when it is really only its purpose or end. The first cause is nothing less than Spinoza’s substance, which does indeed act from the necessity of its own nature alone.
黑格尔对这一问题的回答，部分在于他对斯宾诺莎的观念论的重新阐释。由于他的绝对观念论将主体性重置为自然的目的与顶峰，黑格尔恢复了费希特观念论的一个方面。毕竟在某种意义上费希特是对的：自我应当是第一原则。确实，费希特正确地把自我意识放在了所有事物的中心地位，当作解释自然的基础，因为自我意识是自然的目的，是自然全部活力的最高程度的组织和发展。然而，费希特走偏的地方在于，他把目的因解释成了第一因。他错误地假定，自我是自然的基础性的本体论原则，而它实际上仅仅是自然的目的或终点。第一因恰恰是斯宾诺莎的实体，而它确实只根据自然自身的必然性而行动。
Hegel’s absolute idealism also gave human agency a much greater role in the cosmos than anything imagined by Spinoza. Spinoza had made man into a mode of the single divine substance. Since substance has an independent essence and existence, and since a mode has a dependent essence and existence, man depends on God but not God on man. God has an eternal, complete and selfsufficient existence, which remains the same despite the activity of man. For Hegel, however, God depends on human beings as much as they depend on God. For it is only through human activity and self-awareness that the divine finally realizes itself. If there were no human self-awareness and activity, the divine nature would still exist, to be sure, yet it would remain imperfect, potential, inchoate and indeterminate. It is only through our activity, then, that we perfect, complete and realize the divine, so that human activity is divine itself. By giving such a greater role to human agency, Hegel believed he could do some justice to Fichte’s activism. Since it is only through our activity that the divine realizes itself, we have good reason to act, and indeed a divine mission. In acting we help to realize the essence of God himself.
黑格尔的绝对观念论也赋予了人类行为（human agency）以一种比斯宾诺莎想象的任何事物更重要的宇宙中的位置。斯宾诺莎曾经把人变成唯一神圣实体的样式。由于实体具有独立的本质与实存，并且由于样式具有依存的本质与实存，人依存于上帝而不是上帝依存于人。上帝具有永恒、完全和自足的实存，尽管有人的活动，它仍旧保持同一。然而，对黑格尔而言，正像人类依存于上帝一样，上帝也依存于人类。因为只有通过人类活动及其自我觉知，神圣者才能最终实现它自己。如果没有人的自我觉知和行为，神圣自然诚然还在，但它将保持为一种完美的、潜在的、未充分发展的和不确定的存在。那么，只有通过我们的活动，我们才能使神圣者完美、完全和实现，因此，人类活动自身就是神圣的。通过赋予人类行为以更重要的作用，黑格尔相信，他可以公正地对待费希特的行动主义。由于神圣者唯有通过我们的行动才能实现自身，我们因此有了好的行动理由，事实上是有了神圣的使命。在行动中，我们帮助上帝自身实现其本质。
These aspects of absolute idealism soften the sting of Spinoza’s determinism; but they do not remove it. Even if the self is the height of creation, and even if its acts realize the divine nature, it is still the case that the divine acts from the necessity of its own nature alone, so that all acts of the self will be necessary too. It is precisely in this regard that Hegel makes his most important move in reconciling Fichte and Spinoza: re-interpreting the concept of freedom itself. In his lectures on world history Hegel often uses Fichte’s language in describing freedom. He states that the self is selfpositing, and that it is what it makes of itself (VG 55. 58/48, 50). Yet, despite the apparent similarity of language, Hegel’s underlying concept is very different from Fichte’s.27 Contrary to Fichte, Hegel thinks that freedom involves necessity, and he accepts Spinoza’s definition of freedom in the Ethica: ‘That thing is called free that exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined into action by itself alone’ (Part I, def. 7).28 Both Fichte and Hegel see freedom in terms of self-determination; but their concepts are similar in name only. Self-determination in Hegel means that (1) I have a specific essence or nature, and that (2) it is natural and necessary for it to be realized. Fichte denies both these points, because (1) his self is only what it posits itself to be, having no preexisting essence or nature, and (2) it can choose between different courses of action.
绝对观念论的这些方面，虽然软化了斯宾诺莎决定论之刺，但并没有移除它。即使自我是创造的顶端，即使它的行动使神圣自然成为现实，事情的真相仍然是，神圣者依据其自身本性的必然性而行动，因此自我的所有行为也将是必然的。正是在这一点上，黑格尔在调和费希特与斯宾诺莎方面迈出了最重要的一步：重新阐释自由概念本身。在世界历史讲演录中，黑格尔经常使用费希特的语言来描述自由。他说自我是自我设定，并且它就是它的自我创造（VG 55.58/48，50）。然而，尽管存在语言上的表面相似，黑格尔的基础性概念是不同于费希特的。27与费希特相反，黑格尔认为自由与必然性相关，并且他接受了斯宾诺莎在《伦理学》中给“自由”下的定义：“凡是仅仅由自身本性的必然性而存在、其行为仅仅由它自身决定的东西叫作自由”（Part I，def.7）28。费希特和黑格尔都根据自我规定来理解自由，但他们的概念不过是形名相似而已。在黑格尔这里，自我规定意味着：（1）我具有某种特殊的本质或本性；（2）它的实现是自然而必然的。费希特则完全否认这两点，因为，（1）他的“自我”仅仅是它的自我设定，没有任何预先存在的本质或本性；（2）它能够在不同的行动方案之间做选择。
The question arises, however, how any finite agent or human being can be free in Spinoza’s sense. Spinoza’s concept of freedom seems to apply only to God, because he alone acts from the necessity of his own nature. All finite modes of the single infinite substance are determined into action by other finite modes, and so on ad infinitum. Ultimately, Hegel adopts the same solution to this problem as Spinoza: I am free in so far as I am really identical with the whole universe; I realize this freedom only in so far as I become aware of this identity through philosophy, what Spinoza calls the intellectual love of God. The same concept resurfaces in Hegel through his concept of reconciliation, which teaches the self to accept the necessity of the world in so far as he finds his identity in it.
然而，问题来了，任何有限的行动者或人能够在斯宾诺莎的意义上是自由的吗？斯宾诺莎的自由概念似乎仅仅适用于上帝，因为他只按照他自己本性的必然性而行动。唯一无限实体的所有有限样式，其行动都被其他有限样式所决定，如此循环往复以至无穷。最后，黑格尔对这个问题采取了与斯宾诺莎同样的解决方案：只要我和宇宙整体是真正同一的，我就是自由的；只有我通过哲学意识到这种同一性，我才是实现了自由，斯宾诺莎称之为对上帝的理智之爱。通过“和解”这一概念，“自由”在黑格尔这里获得一个新的面貌：它教导自我通过发现它在世界中的身份而接受世界的必然性。
It should be clear that Hegel’s concept of freedom implies a form of compatibilism, the doctrine that the claims of freedom and determinism can be made compatible. Hegel upholds the fundamental dictum of all compatibilism: to say that the self is free does not mean that its acts are undetermined; my willing to do something does not exclude, but indeed implies, that I have been determined to will it. In adopting such compatibilism Hegel believed that he could avoid the need to postulate any form of dualism to save freedom. Even if all my actions were part of the natural order and could not be otherwise, I was still free in doing them as long as I wanted to do so. We will later investigate some of the problems of this compatibilism (pp. 263–6).
显然，黑格尔的自由概念中暗含某种形式的相容论，亦即自由的要求和决定论的要求是能够相容的。黑格尔赞成所有相容论的一条基础性格言：说自我是自由的，并不意味着他的行动是不被其他事物决定；我想做某事并不排除，相反倒是暗含着，我是被决定地想要去做。通过采取这种意义上的相容论，黑格尔认为，他可以不必为了拯救自由而假定任何形式的二元论。即便我的所有行动都是自然秩序的一部分而别无选择，在做这些事情的时候，我仍然是自由的，只要这些事情是我想做的。后文（第263–266页）我们还将对这一相容论的某些问题进行考察。
THE MYTH OF PANLOGICISM?
泛逻辑主义的神话？
One of the fundamental issues of Hegel’s absolute idealism concerns the status of contingency. Some scholars maintain that Hegel’s position commits him to ‘panlogicism’, i.e. the doctrine that everything happens of necessity according to reason. Others hold, however, that Hegel fully recognizes the reality of contingency, and that he is indeed one of the first modern philosophers to argue for the necessity of contingency.29 For these scholars, the panlogicist interpretation is best consigned to the dustbin of intellectual history as one of the Hegel myths and legends.30
黑格尔绝对观念论的一个基础性的问题，是对偶然性地位的关注。有些学者认为，黑格尔的立场犯了“泛逻辑主义”的错误，亦即每一事物都依照理性的必然性而发生。然而，另一些学者认为，黑格尔充分承认偶然性的实在性，实际上他是论证过偶然性的必然性的首批现代哲学家之一。29在这些学者看来，这种泛逻辑主义的解释最好作为一个关于黑格尔的神话和传奇扔到思想史的垃圾箱里去。30
Both interpretations have a point. The panlogicists have a strong case, insufficiently appreciated by their critics. Their interpretation follows from two premises, both of them indisputable. First, Hegel holds that the absolute is causi sui, existing from the necessity of its own nature alone. Second, Hegel also maintains that the absolute is all reality, having nothing outside itself to limit it. Both premises entail that everything exists by the necessity of the divine nature. If, per contra, we introduce something contingent into Hegel’s system, it would have to be outside the absolute, which would limit it and make it finite. Hegel therefore seems to be as committed to panlogicism as Spinoza, who holds that everything exists of necessity in the single infinite substance.
两种阐释都有道理。泛逻辑主义者有一个很强的理由，是他们的批评者没有充分领会的。他们的阐释是从两个无可置疑的前提推断出来的：其一，黑格尔认为绝对是自因（causi sui），只依据其本性的必然性而存在；其二，黑格尔还主张，绝对即是全部实在，没有任何在它之外限制它的事物存在。这两个前提蕴含着，所有事物都依据神圣自然的必然性而存在。与之相反（per contra），如果我们将一些偶然的事物引进黑格尔体系，那么，它就会在绝对之外存在着，从而限制绝对，使之变得有限。因此，黑格尔看似犯了与斯宾诺莎泛逻辑主义同样的错误，后者认为所有事物出于唯一的无限实体的必然性而存在。
The advocates of contingency also have a point. Hegel insists that philosophy must explain the finite world; and he holds that one of the central characteristics of finitude is contingency, the fact that something could be or not be. If, therefore, philosophy is to explain the finite world, it must establish the necessity of contingency. Indeed, Hegel regards Spinoza’s failure to explain finitude as the main flaw of his system. Hegel would be guilty of just such failure, though, if he could not explain the reality of contingency itself.
偶然性的支持者也有他们的道理。黑格尔主张哲学必须解释有限世界；他认为有限存在的核心特征之一就是偶然性，亦即这样一种事实：有些事物可能存在也可能不存在。因此，如果哲学要去解释有限世界，它就必须确立偶然性的必然性。确实，黑格尔认为，不能解释有限是斯宾诺莎体系的主要缺陷。然而，如果黑格尔不能解释偶然性自身的实在性，他也将对这种无能感到羞愧。
It is important to see that it would not satisfy Hegel to limit contingency to appearances in the subjective sense, i.e. what appears to, and exists only for, the finite understanding. When Hegel insists that philosophy explain finitude he means appearance in the stronger objective sense, where it signifies the manifestation, expression or embodiment of the idea, whether it is perceived by the finite intellect or not. It was one of Hegel’s main criticisms of Schelling that he had limited finitude to appearances in the subjective sense; because he could not explain it on the basis of the absolute, he ended, like Spinoza, condemning finitude as an illusion.
重要的是要看到，将偶然性限制于主观意义上的现象——亦即对有限知性显现且仅只就有限知性而言存在的东西——之上，是不能令黑格尔感到满意的。当黑格尔主张哲学要解释有限性时，他是指在更强的客观意义的现象。它指的是理念的展示、显现或体现，无论它是否为有限知性所知觉到。黑格尔对谢林的一个主要批评是，谢林将有限性限制于主观意义上的现象上；因为他不能在绝对的基础上对其加以解释，因此最终像斯宾诺莎一样将有限性谴责为幻象。
The question remains, however, whether Hegel can explain the reality of contingency in the stronger objective sense. It is precisely here that absolute idealism faces its most intractable problem. We shall soon see how Hegel faced this difficulty in the case of the particularity and difference of the finite world (pp. 94–5). He will show that particularity and difference arise of necessity from the self-differentiation of absolute life. But contingency eludes easy explanation in these terms. Although the metaphor of life makes it possible to understand how the universal becomes particular, and how the one becomes the many, it cannot explain how the necessary becomes contingent. There is a straightforward contradiction here: what happens of necessity cannot be otherwise; but the contingent can be otherwise. It was on these grounds that the late Schelling attacked Hegel’s system, which, he argued, conflated the realms of essence and existence. While the realm of essence is necessary, that of existence is irreducibly contingent, a surd for all thought.31
然而，问题还在于，黑格尔能否在一种更强的客观意义上解释偶然性的实在性。确切地说，绝对观念论在这里遇到了它最难以驾驭的问题。我们很快就会看到，黑格尔在有限世界的特殊性与差异的情况中是如何面临这一困难的（第94–95页）。他将指出，特殊性与差异必然起源于绝对生命的自我差异化。但是，偶然性并不能从这些术语中得到简单的说明。尽管生命的隐喻使得普遍如何变为特殊和一如何变为多能够得以理解，但它不能解释必然如何变为偶然。这里存在一种简单明了的矛盾：出于必然而发生的事物不可能是偶然的，但偶然发生的事物则可以是必然的。晚年谢林正是基于这些理由攻击黑格尔的体系，他认为黑格尔将本质的领域与存在的领域混为一谈。本质的领域是必然的，而存在的领域是一种无可化约的偶然性，是一切思想的无理数。31
The problem deepens, however, as soon as we explore what an explanation of contingency would mean. Such an explanation would have to show the necessity of contingency. But this could mean either of two things. First, that the specific content of the contingent is really necessary, so that only the appearance of contingency is necessary. Second, that it is necessary that there is contingency, so that the specific content of the contingent is not really necessary. The first possibility gives contingency only a subjective status, and so does not really explain its objective appearance. The second possibility gives the contingent objective status; but it also limits the absolute, because there is something that exists outside it. In general, if we argue that the absolute needs something not itself to become itself, then we must again admit that the absolute is finite after all.
然而，一旦我们探究偶然性的解释意味着什么时，问题就深化了。这样一种解释不得不显示出偶然性的必然性，而这可能意味着两种不同的东西。首先，偶然物的特定内容实际上是必然的，因此，只是偶然物的显现是必然的。其次，存在着偶然性这一点是必然的，因此偶然性的特定内容实际上不是必然的。第一种可能性赋予偶然性的只是主观的身份，因此不能真正解释它的客观显现。第二种可能性赋予了偶然物以客观的身份；但它也限制了绝对，因为有某物在它之外存在着。一般来说，如果我们主张绝对需要某种非它自身之物变为它自身的话，我们就必须再次承认绝对毕竟是有限的。
It must be said that Hegel’s defenders do not admit the depth of this problem. Some content themselves with pointing out that Hegel recognizes the necessity of contingency. But this is only to state a desideratum. It leaves both the problem of how contingency comes from necessity, and of how the realm of contingency, once it is admitted, does not limit the absolute. Others point out that Hegel holds that only the general features of reality are necessary, admitting that its particular features are contingent.32 But this interpretation introduces a dualism between form and content into Hegel’s system; and it too accepts a reality outside the absolute. Still others point out that contingency is an essential moment of the dialectic, because one constantly discovers that the necessity of each lower stage depends on a higher stage, which is contingent itself.33 Although this is an accurate account of the dialectic, it still does not give an objective contingency, because the contingency holds only for the consciousness or level of reflection going through the dialectic. The philosopher, who sees things from the perspective of the whole, should know that everything happens of necessity.
必须说，黑格尔的捍卫者并不承认这个问题的深度。有些人满足于指出黑格尔认识到了偶然性的必然性。但这只是表达了一个愿望。它既留下了偶然性如何来自必然性的问题，也留下了如果一旦承认偶然性领域，它如何不限制绝对的问题。另一些人指出，黑格尔认为，唯有实在的普遍特征才是必然的，同时承认其特殊的特征是偶然的。32但这种解释在黑格尔的体系中引入了形式与内容之间的二元论，并且它也接纳了绝对之外的实在。还有人指出，偶然性是辩证法的一个本质环节，因为人们经常发现，每一低级阶段的必然性都依赖于一个更高的阶段，而后者自身是偶然的。33虽然这是对辩证法的准确描述，但仍然没有给出一种客观的偶然性，因为偶然性只是对于意识或者经历辩证法的反思阶段有效。而从整体的视角来看待事物的哲学家应该认识到，一切都是出于必然而发生的。
Critics of the ‘myth’ of panlogicism often argue that it was never Hegel’s intention to deduce the realm of the contingent. There is indeed strong evidence for this. Famously, Hegel had refused to derive Herr Krug’s pen;34 and in his Philosophy of Nature he stressed that philosophy cannot explain the multiplicity and variety of nature (§250). But this evidence is beside the point. It is perfectly possible for Hegel to be a panlogicist and to admit the limits of philosophical deduction. For these limits concern only the capacity of the philosopher to comprehend or reconstruct absolute necessity, which still exists whether he can reconstruct it or not. We must distinguish between what the philosopher could do in principle, were he infinitely wise, and what he can do in practice, given the limits of the finite human intellect.
泛逻辑主义“神话”的批评者经常认为，黑格尔从来没有试图演绎出偶然的领域。确实存在支持这一点的强有力的证据。众所周知，黑格尔曾经拒绝推论出克鲁格先生的笔34；在《自然哲学》中，他强调哲学无法解释自然的多样性和丰富性（第250节）。但这个证据并没有切中要害。黑格尔完全可能既是一个泛逻辑主义者，又承认哲学推论的限度。因为这些限制仅只与哲学家理解或重构绝对必然性的能力有关；这一绝对必然性一直存在，无论哲学家能否重构它。我们必须区分哲学家在原则上能做什么和在实践上能做些什么，前者假定他有无限智慧，后者则考虑到人类理智的诸种限制。
The difficulties of contingency are especially apparent in Hegel’s notorious difficulties in deriving nature from his logic. In the final section of the Encyclopedia Logic Hegel argues that the idea ‘decides’ (sich entschliesst) to ‘dismiss’ nature out of itself (aus sich zu entlassen) (§244). There are two problems here. First, the idea should reveal nature from the necessity of its own nature, so that it cannot ‘decide’ or ‘resolve’ to do so. Second, the content of the logic is formal and abstract, and so it cannot derive the concrete content of nature. To be sure, the category of the idea, which ends the Logic, is a much richer category than that of being, with which it begins; but the idea is still only a logical category, having only other logical categories within itself. The identity of the idea with nature is therefore only an identity in thought, still leaving the contingent realm of nature outside itself. If the idea has any other content in itself, it is only because it has illegitimately presupposed it.
偶然性的各种困难，尤为明显地出现在黑格尔从自己的逻辑中派生出自然这一臭名昭著的困境中。在《哲学百科全书·逻辑学》的最后一部分，黑格尔论证说，理念“决定”（sich entschliesst）从自身中“释放”出（aus sich zu entlassen）自然（第244节）。这里有两个问题。首先，理念应该从其本性的必然性中揭示自然，不能“决定”或“决心”这样做。其次，逻辑的内容是形式的和抽象的，所以它不能派生出自然的具体内容。可以肯定的是，理念这一范畴，在《逻辑学》结束的地方要比在它的开端处，内容更加丰富；但理念还只是一个逻辑范畴，在自身之中只有其他逻辑范畴。因此，理念与自然的同一性，仅仅是思想中的同一性，仍然将自然这一偶然的领域留在了自身之外。如果理念在自身中有其它内容的话，这仅仅是因为它曾经非法地预设了它。
In the end, the problem of contingency presents Hegel with a dilemma. The realm of contingency must be inside or outside the system. If it is inside the system, then contingency has only a subjective status, so that there is no explanation of real contingency. If, however, it is outside the system, it has an objective status; but it then limits the absolute and introduces a dualism between form and content.
最后，偶然性问题使黑格尔陷入一种两难困境。偶然性领域必须在体系之内或者之外。如果是在体系之内，那么偶然性就只具有一种主观的地位，因此不可能有关于真正的偶然性的解释。然而，如果说偶然性是在体系之外，它就具有客观的地位；但是它因此限制了绝对，并引入了一种形式与内容的二元论。
