英文早读第107篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。
I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year-to-year results (remember when I talk of "results," I am talking of performance relative to the Dow) in order to achieve better overall long-term performance. Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite heavily in what I believe to be the best investment opportunities recognizing very well that this may cause occasional very sour year - one somewhat more sour, probably, than if I had diversified more. While this means our results will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long-term margin of superiority should be greater.
我乐意放弃相当一部分年度环比的结果水平（记住当我讨论结果时，我就是再说相对于道琼斯的表现）为了实现更好的整体长期表现。简单说，这意味着我愿意相当重度集中在我认为会成为最佳投资的机会上并意识到这可能会引起偶然的非常阴郁的年份——某人可能会更阴郁，或许，相比与我更加分散。然而这意味着我们的结果将会反弹更多，我认为这也意味着我们的长期表现将会更加优秀。
You have already seen some examples of this. Our margin versus the Dow has ranged from 2.4 percentage points in 1958 to 33.0 points in 1965. If you check this against the deviations of the funds listed on page three, you will find our variations have a much wider amplitude. I could have operated in such a manner as to reduce our amplitude, but I would also have reduced our overall performance somewhat although it still would have substantially exceeded that of the investment companies. Looking back, and continuing to think this problem through, I feel that if anything, I should have concentrated slightly more than I have in the past. Hence, the new Ground Rule and this long-winded explanation.
你已经看到了这方面的一些例子。我们的领先相对于道琼斯从1958年的2.4个百分点到1965年的33.0个百分点。如果你检查在第三页列举的基金的偏离度，你将会发现我们的偏离有更大的幅度。我可以以这样的方式运作去减少我们的幅度，但是我将同样减少我们的整体表现尽管他仍将大幅领先那些投资公司。回顾来看，继续思考这个问题，我觉得是否任何事，我应该比过去做的降低我们集中的。因此，新的基准规则和这个长篇累牍的解释。
Again let me state that this is somewhat unconventional reasoning (this doesn't make it right or wrong - it does mean you have to do your own thinking on it), and you may well have a different opinion - if you do, the Partnership is not the place for you. We are obviously only going to go to 40% in very rare situations - this rarity, of course, is what makes it necessary that we concentrate so heavily, when we see such an opportunity. We probably have had only five or six situations in the nine-year history of the Partnership where we have exceeded 25%. Any such situations are going to have to promise very significantly superior performance relative to the Dow compared to other opportunities available at the time. They are also going to have to possess such superior qualitative and/or quantitative factors that the chance of serious permanent loss is minimal (anything can happen on a short-term quatational basis which partially explains the greater risk of widened year-to-year variation in results). In selecting the limit to which I will go in anyone investment, I attempt to reduce to a tiny figure the probability that the single investment (or group, if there is intercorrelation) can produce a result for our total portfolio that would be more than ten percentage points poorer than the Dow.
再一次让我说这是有点不合适的推理（这不是说对还是错——为了意图让你必须自己思考他），你或许有一个不同的观点——如果你是这样，合伙基金不是适合你的地方。我们很明显必须在很稀缺的情况实现40%——这个稀缺度，当然，使我们重度集中很必要，当我们看到这样的机会。我们或许仅仅有五六个情况在合伙基金9年的历史中我们超过了25%。任何一个这样的情况都保证了相比于道琼斯非常重要的领先表现相对于同一时间可获得的其他机会。他们也必须包含这些优秀的数量少喝质量上的因素严肃的永久性损失可能性最小（任何事都可以在短期基础上发生这也解释了在结果上年度环比差异加大的更大风险）。在选择我将进入到任何投资的限制时，我尝试减少单一投资（或者组合，如果他们有内部关联性）可以产生我们整体组合的结果比道琼斯更差10个百分点的可能性。
We presently have two situations in the over 25% category - one a controlled company, and the other a large company where we will never take an active part. It is worth pointing out that our performance in 1965 was overwhelmingly the product of five investment situations. The 1965 gains (in some cases there were also gains applicable to the same holding in prior years) from these situations ranged from about 800,000 to about 3 1/2 million. If you should take the overall performance of our five smallest general investments in 1965, the results are lackluster (I chose a very charitable adjective).
我们现在有两个情况在超过25%的范畴里——一个是控制类企业，另一个是一个大型企业我们将不会获得活跃的席位。很值得指出我们在1965年的表现是这5个投资的绝对结果。1965年的获利（在一些情况他们也是同样领先年份可获得的盈利）从这些案子从80万美金到大约350万美金。如果你摘取我们1965年5个最小的一般投资表现，结果将是无光泽的（我选择了一个仁慈的形容词）。
90.be willing to：乐意进行
91.in terms of：在……方面；从……角度看
92.rarity：罕见；稀有
93.quotational：引用的
94.lackluster：无趣味的；单调的；无光泽的
95.charitable：慈善的；关爱的；仁慈的
96.deductive：演绎的；推理的；推论的
97.counsel：劝告；忠告；建议
98.adequate：足够的；充足的；合格的
99.summation：总和；总结；概括
100.eminent：杰出的；卓越的；著名的；显赫的
101.harem：闺阁；闺房
102.academician：院士；学者
