Chapter 4 The odyssey of mind
心灵还是精神？
Mind or spirit?
现在我要坦白，我一直在欺骗。It is time to confess: I have been cheating. 到目前为止，我对黑格尔哲学的论述小心翼翼地略去了黑格尔本人反复谈到并认为至关重要的东西：Geist（精神）的概念。My account of Hegel’s philosophy so far has carefully omitted all mention of something that Hegel himself refers to repeatedly and regards as crucial: the idea of Geist. 它是如此关键，以至于黑格尔说：《历史哲学》的整个目标就是要认识“精神”在历史中的指导作用。So crucial is this idea that Hegel actually says that the whole object of the Philosophy of History is to become acquainted with Geist in its guiding role in history. 因此，如果不了解这个概念，我们就只能部分地把握黑格尔的历史观。Without some knowledge of this idea, therefore, one can have only a partial grasp of Hegel’s view of history. 在《法哲学原理》中，“精神”的概念也如影随形。In the Philosophy of Right, too, the concept of Geist is never far away. 比如黑格尔把国家称为“客体化的精神”。Hegel refers to the state, for instance, as ‘objectified Geist’. 因此，前面的章节之所以有意误导读者，So the preceding chapters were deliberately misleading; 我唯一的理由就是这样做有一个好处，可以方便读者逐渐进入黑格尔那奇诡而又往往模糊不清的思想世界。my only excuse is that I misled in a good cause, the cause of easing the reader gently into the strange and often obscure world of Hegel’s ideas.
对英语读者而言，黑格尔的Geist概念首先有翻译上的困难。For the English-speaking reader, the difficulties of Hegel’s concept of Geist begin with its translation. 在德文中，这是一个非常普通的词，但它有两种迥然不同但却相关的含义。In German the word is common enough, but it has two distinct, though related meanings. 这是用来意指“心灵”（mind）的标准语词，即区别于我们身体的心灵。It is the standard word used to mean ‘mind’, in the sense in which our mind is distinct from our body. 例如精神病是Geisteskrankheit，其字面意思是“心灵疾病”。For example, ‘mental illness’ is Geisteskrankheit – literally, ‘mind-sickness’. 然而，Geist还能意指“精神”（spirit）这个英语词所表达的各种含义。Geist can, however, also mean ‘spirit’ in the varied senses of that English word. 于是，“时代精神”是der Zeitgeist，而基督教三位一体——圣父、圣子、圣灵中的第三个要素圣灵是der Heilige Geist。在Thus ‘the spirit of the times’ is der Zeitgeist, while the third element of the Christian Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (or Holy Spirit) is der Heilige Geist. 某些段落，黑格尔对这个词的用法很像我们对“心灵”一词的使用，The translator’s task is made doubly difficult by the fact that in some passages Hegel seems to use the word much as we would use ‘mind’, 另一些语境则像“精神”，还有一些场合，他的用法同时包含这两种含义，这使翻译者的任务变得更加艰巨。in other contexts he uses it as we would use ‘spirit’, and in others still his usage has elements of both meanings.
在这种绝境下，翻译者有三种选择：In this impossible situation, the translator has three options: 要么完全使用mind，要么完全使用spirit，要么视语境选用最恰当的词。to use ‘mind’ throughout; to use ‘spirit’ throughout; or to use whichever seems most appropriate in the context. 我反对第三种做法，因为对黑格尔来说，他所谓的Geist是同一种东西，这显然是至关重要的，尽管出现在其各种作品中的是Geist的不同方面。I have rejected the third option, because it is obviously important to Hegel that what he calls Geist is one and the same thing, notwithstanding the different aspects of it that emerge in his various writings. 我在开始写这本书时曾打算使用spirit一词，因为近来几乎所有翻译黑格尔的人都选择了这个词。When I began work on this book, my presumption was that I would use ‘spirit’, for this has been the choice of virtually all recent translators of Hegel. 然而随着我更深入地尝试以一种可以让初学者理解的方式来阐述黑格尔，Yet as I began to get more deeply into the attempt to present Hegel in a form that would be understandable to readers who are not already Hegel scholars, 我越来越相信，对英语读者来说，使用spirit一词乃是对“Geist在黑格尔那里的真正含义”这个问题未经详察而预作判断。I became convinced that to use ‘spirit’ is to prejudge, for the English-speaking reader, the whole question of what Geist really means for Hegel. 在英语中，除了“时代精神”和“协作精神”等一些特殊用法，spirit还不可避免地有着宗教或神秘意味。In English, apart from special usages like ‘spirit of the age’ and ‘team spirit’, the word ‘spirit’ has an inescapably religious or mystical flavour. 一个spirit在显灵板上敲打出讯息，或者萦绕着荒芜的哥特式宅邸。A spirit taps out the message on the Ouija board, or haunts the deserted Gothic mansion. spirit是一种脱离身体的、幽灵般的存在，是那种除非你有点迷信才会相信的东西。A spirit is a ghostly, disembodied being, the sort of thing you believe in if you are a bit superstitious, 如果持有一种冷静清晰的科学世界观，你就不会相信它。but not if you take a cool, clear scientific view of the world.
也许在考察黑格尔时，在某些方面我们将不得不说，他的哲学是建立在这种有些迷信的世界观基础之上的。Now it may be that at some point in our examination of Hegel we shall have to say that his philosophy is based on this somewhat superstitious view of the world,黑格尔本来正是想用Geist概念来指这样一种脱离身体的、幽灵般的存在。 and his concept of Geist is intended to refer to just such a ghostly, disembodied being. 但我们绝不能从一开始就假设这一点。We must not, however, assume this from the start. 黑格尔是一位在西方哲学传统中进行研究的哲学家，Hegel is a philosopher working in the Western philosophical tradition. 该传统中的哲学家总是非常关注心灵或意识的本性及其与物理世界的关系。Philosophers in this tradition have always been much concerned with the nature of mind, or consciousness, and its relation to the physical world. 笛卡尔通过追问自己能够完全确知什么而开辟了近代哲学时代。Descartes began the modern philosophical era by asking what he could know with complete certainty; 他的回答是，尽管他可能正在做梦，或者被一个恶魔所欺骗，从而自己的几乎一切信念都是错误的，但有一件事情他可以确定地知道，那就是“我思故我在”。and he answered by saying that while he might be dreaming, or deceived by an evil demon and hence mistaken in almost all his beliefs, the one thing he could know with certainty is: ‘I think, therefore I exist.’ 在这一点上我不可能被欺骗，因为要想被欺骗，我仍然必须存在。I cannot be deceived about that, for to be deceived, I must still exist. 然而，这个“我”是什么呢？它不是我的物理身体——在这方面我可能被欺骗。What, though, is this ‘I’? It is not my physical body – about that I could be deceived. 我所确知的这个“我”仅仅是一个思想着的东西，换句话说就是心灵。The ‘I’ that I know with certainty is simply a thing that thinks: in other words, a mind. 由此论点产生了后来西方哲学关注的一些核心问题：From this argument arose the central preoccupations of subsequent Western philosophy. 我的思想和感受是如何与我的身体相联系的？How are my thoughts and feelings connected to my body? 是否既存在着思想那样的心灵对象，又存在着身体那样的物质对象？Are there both mental objects, such as thoughts, and material objects, such as bodies? 如果是这样，这两种如此不同的东西又是以何种方式相互作用的？If so, in what way can two such different kinds of thing interact? 我的大脑是物质的东西，物质如何可能有意识？My brain is a material thing; how can matter be conscious? 哲学家把这一系列问题称为“心—身问题”。This nest of issues is known among philosophers as ‘the mind–body problem’. 还有一些问题也可以追溯到笛卡尔，它们集中于认识问题：Another set of issues, also traceable to Descartes, focuses on problems of knowledge: 我们如何可能知道世界是什么样子？How can we know what the world is like? 我们能否确信自己的思想无论如何都是某个“外在实际”世界的反映，就像我们往往认为的那样？Can we be sure that our thoughts are in any way a reflection of some ‘real’ world that is ‘out there’, as we tend to assume? 倘若我的全部意识经验，包括为了获得简单信念——比如我面前这张纸的存在——而需要的对颜色、形状和质地的感觉，都始终在我的心灵中，If all my conscious experiences, including the sensations of colour and shape and texture that I rely upon for simple beliefs like that in the existence of the sheet of paper in front of me now, are always in my mind, 那么我如何可能认识处于我意识之外的世界的任何东西呢？how can I ever know anything at all of the world outside my own consciousness?
离题去讨论西方哲学传统的问题是为了说明，像黑格尔这样的哲学家撰写关于心灵的著作是完全可以预料的。The point of this digression into the problems of the Western philosophical tradition is simply this: it is entirely to be expected that a philosopher like Hegel should write about mind. 他这样做并不意味着他相信有脱离了肉体的灵魂存在，或者有持科学世界观的冷静清晰的人不会相信的某种东西存在。That he does so should not suggest that he believes in the existence of disembodied spirits or of anything else in which you and I, cool, clear-thinking adherents of the scientific world-view that we may be, do not also believe. 因此，至少在开始讨论黑格尔的意思时，我们不要把他所说的Geist理解成在谈论某种特殊的神秘存在，Therefore we should at least start our discussion of what Hegel is saying by taking his references to Geist not as talk about some peculiar mystical being, 而要看成对长久以来关于心灵本质的哲学争论的贡献。but as a contribution to the long-standing philosophical debate about the nature of mind. 于是在本书中，我回到上一代黑格尔翻译者的做法，把Geist译为mind。Accordingly in this book I return to the practice of an earlier generation of translators of Hegel and render Geist as ‘mind’. 随着研究的深入，我们将会弄明白到底应该在什么意义上来理解黑格尔的这个概念。We shall see as we go along in just what sense of that word Hegel’s concept is to be understood.
《精神现象学》的任务
The task of the Phenomenology
迄今为止，我对黑格尔观点的介绍是极不完整的，这可以从前面讨论黑格尔历史哲学时被搁置的一个问题看出来，That my presentation of Hegel’s views up to this point has been seriously incomplete can be seen by returning to a question I brushed aside early in the discussion of Hegel’s philosophy of history. 即为什么世界历史不过是自由意识的进步呢？Why is the history of the world nothing but the progress of the consciousness of freedom? 这个问题需要有一个回答。黑格尔明确否认，历史的方向是某种幸运的偶然（ 无论如何，这与他的整体思路完全不一致）。The question cries out for an answer. Hegel explicitly denies – and it would in any case be quite out of keeping with his whole line of thought – that the direction of history is some kind of fortunate accident.黑格尔断言，历史上的事情是必然发生的。Hegel asserts that what happens in history happens necessarily. 这是什么意思呢？这如何可能是真的？What does this mean? How can it be true? 黑格尔的回答是，历史之所以就是自由意识的进步，是因为历史就是精神的发展。Hegel’s answer is that history is nothing but the progress of the consciousness of freedom because history is the development of mind. 在《历史哲学》中，黑格尔并没有打算解释这一思想，因为他已经出版了一部极为冗长晦涩的著作，以表明精神如此发展的必然性，In the Philosophy of History Hegel did not set out to explain this notion because he had already published a very long and very dense volume intended to demonstrate the necessity of mind developing as it does. 这就是《精神现象学》。That volume is The Phenomenology of Mind. 卡尔·马克思把它称为“黑格尔哲学的真正诞生地和秘密”。Karl Marx called it ‘the true birthplace and secret of Hegel’s philosophy’. 另一些人则被它750页晦涩难懂的文字所吓倒，甘愿不去理睬它所包含的无论什么秘密。Others, defeated by its 750 pages of bewildering and tortuous prose, have been content to let whatever secrets it might contain rest undisturbed. 然而，任何关于黑格尔的论述都不能堂而皇之地无视它的存在。No account of Hegel, however, can decently overlook it.
关于这本书，显然应从它的标题谈起。The obvious place to start is with the title. 《牛津英语词典》告诉我们，“现象学”意指“关于现象的科学，区别于关于存在的科学”。The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that ‘phenomenology’ means ‘the science of phenomena, as distinct from that of being’. 如果我们熟悉“现象”与“存在”的区分，这些就不难理解。That is all very well if we are familiar with the distinction between ‘phenomena’ and ‘being’. 而对于不熟悉的人，这本词典也颇有助益地告诉我们：“现象”在其哲学用法中是指“感官或心灵直接注意到的东西，一种直接的知觉对象（区别于实物或自在之物）”。For those who are not, the same dictionary obligingly tells us that ‘phenomenon’ means, in its philosophical use, ‘that of which the senses or the mind directly takes note; an immediate object of perception (as distinguished from substance, or a thing in itself)’. 为了说明这里所作的区分，我们可以考虑呈现于我视觉中的月亮和实际的月亮之间的不同。The distinction being made here can be illustrated by considering the difference between the moon as it appears in my vision, and the moon as it really is. 它昨夜在我的视觉中显现的是网球大小的一弯银色新月，而它实际上当然是一个直径几千公里的岩石球体。In my vision it appeared last night as a silvery crescent no bigger than a tennis ball; it really is, of course, a sphere of rock with a diameter of several thousand kilometres. 银色的新月就是现象。因此，现象学研究的是事物显现给我们的方式。The silvery crescent is the phenomenon. Phenomenology, then, is the study of the way in which things appear to us.
如果现象学研究的是事物显现给我们的方式，我们也许会猜想，《精神现象学》研究的将是精神显现给我们的方式。If phenomenology is the study of the way in which things appear to us, a ‘phenomenology of mind’, we might guess, will be a study of the way in which mind appears to us. 这样一种猜测是正确的，但还需要补充一个典型的黑格尔式的转折。Such a guess would be correct, but there is a characteristically Hegelian twist to add. 研究精神如何显现给我们时，我们只可能研究它如何显现给我们的精神。When we study how our mind appears to us, we can only be studying how it appears to our minds. 这样一来，精神现象学实际上研究的是精神如何显现给它自己。Thus a phenomenology of mind is really a study of how mind appears to itself. 因此，黑格尔的《精神现象学》追踪了意识的不同形式，就好像从内部考察每一种形式，Accordingly, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind traces different forms of consciousness, viewing each one from inside, as it were, 并且表明较为有限的意识形式是如何必然发展成更完善的形式的。and showing how more limited forms of consciousness necessarily developed into more adequate ones. 黑格尔本人则把他的任务称为“对作为一种现象的知识的阐述”，因为他把意识的发展看成朝向那些更充分地把握实在、最终达到“绝对知识”的意识形式的发展。Hegel himself describes his project as ‘the exposition of knowledge as a phenomenon’ because he sees the development of consciousness as a development toward forms of consciousness that more fully grasp reality, culminating in ‘absolute knowledge’.
在《精神现象学》导言中，黑格尔解释了他为什么认为这种研究是必要的。In his introduction to the Phenomenology, Hegel explains why he believes it necessary to carry out this kind of study. 他从认识问题开始讲起。He begins with the problem of knowledge. 他说，哲学的目标是“对真正存在之物的实际认识”，或如他带着几分神秘色彩所谓的“绝对”。The aim of philosophy, he says, is the ‘actual knowledge of what truly is’ or, as he somewhat mysteriously characterizes it, ‘the absolute’. 不过在对“真正存在之物”进行表态之前，我们不妨先停下来反思一下认识本身，Before we start to pronounce upon ‘what truly is’, however, hadn’t we better pause to reflect upon knowledge itself, 即我们如何能够认识实在。that is, on how we come to know reality? 在试图获得知识的过程中，我们是在努力把握实在。In our attempts to gain knowledge we are attempting to grasp reality. 因此黑格尔说，认识往往被比作我们借以把握真理的工具。Hence knowledge, Hegel says, is often likened to an instrument by which we grasp truth; 如果工具出了毛病，到头来我们可能除谬误以外什么也得不到。if our instrument is faulty we may end up holding nothing but error.
因此我们要从对认识的探究开始。很快我们就被怀疑的忧虑所困扰。So we begin with an enquiry into knowing. Immediately we are beset by sceptical worries. 假如认识实在就像用某种工具去把握实在，If trying to know reality is like using some kind of instrument for grasping reality, 那么很可能会有一种危险，即把工具用于实在将会改变实在，isn’t there a danger that applying our instrument to reality will alter it, 因此我们把握到的东西将非常不同于未受干扰的实在。so that we grasp something very different from undisturbed reality? （正如现代物理学家发现，不可能确定亚原子粒子的速度和位置，因为无论用什么仪器来观测都会干扰它们。）(Compare the way modern physicists find it impossible to pin down the speed and location of subatomic particles, because whatever instrument they use to observe them will also interfere with them.) 黑格尔说，即使我们抛弃“工具”这一比喻，而把认识当作我们借以观察实在的更为被动的媒介，Even if we abandon the ‘instrument’ metaphor, Hegel says, and regard knowledge as a more passive medium through which we observe reality, 我们也仍然是在观察“经由媒介的实在”（reality-through-the-medium），而不是观察实在本身。we are still observing reality-through-the-medium, not reality itself.
如果我们借以观察的工具或媒介会产生歪曲的效果，那么要想认识到真实的事态，一种方法就是去发现这种歪曲的性质，并把它所造成的差异减掉。If an instrument or a medium through which we are looking has a distorting effect, one way of coming to know the true state of affairs is to discover the nature of the distortion and subtract the difference it makes. 例如观察一根一半放入水中、一半露在外面的木棍，水中的部分看起来是弯曲的。For example, if I look at a stick half in the water and half out, the part in the water appears bent. 木棍真是弯曲的吗？如果我了解折射定律，从而了解透过水去观察所造成的差异，我就能计算它。Is the stick really bent? I can calculate this if I know the law of refraction and thus the difference that looking at it through water makes. 减掉这种差异，我就能发现木棍实际是什么样了。Subtracting this difference, I will discover what the stick is really like. 我们能否以同样的办法处理认识工具或认识媒介所造成的歪曲效果，从而达到对实在本身的认识呢？Can we perhaps do the same with the distorting effect of the instrument or medium of knowledge, and thus come to know reality as it is?
黑格尔说，不行。这种解脱途径对我们来说是不适用的。No, Hegel says, this escape from our puzzle is not open to us. 认识不同于观察。因为就认识而言，哪些东西可以减掉呢？Knowing is not like seeing. For in the case of knowing, what is one to subtract? 这就好比减掉的不是水使光线发生的弯曲，而是光线本身。It would be like subtracting not the difference the water makes to the ray of light, but the ray of light itself. 没有认识，我们连木棍都不会知晓。Without knowledge we would not know the stick at all; 因此，如果减掉我们的认识行为，我们将会一无所知。to subtract our act of knowing, therefore, would be to leave us knowing nothing.
因此，我们的工具不可能保证我们得到一幅未受干扰的实在图像，我们也不可能通过考虑工具所造成的干扰而更接近实在。So our instrument cannot guarantee us an image of undisturbed reality, nor can we come closer to reality by making allowances for the disturbance caused by our instrument. 那么，我们是否应该接受怀疑论立场，认为不可能真正认识任何事物呢？Should we therefore embrace the sceptical position that there is nothing we can truly know? 在黑格尔看来，这种怀疑论自相矛盾。But such scepticism, Hegel says, is self-refuting. 倘若怀疑一切，那为什么不怀疑“我们不可能认识任何东西”呢？If we are to doubt everything, why not doubt the claim that we can know nothing? 不仅如此，我们一直在讨论的这种怀疑论观点有其自身的预设，而这些预设它声称是知道的。Moreover, the sceptical argument we have been considering has its own presuppositions, which it claims to know. 其出发点是：有“实在”这样一种东西，认识是我们把握实在的某种工具或媒介。It starts with the idea that there is such a thing as reality, and that knowledge is some kind of instrument or medium by which we grasp reality. 在此过程中，它预设了我们自身与实在或者说绝对之间的一种区分。In so doing, it presupposes a distinction between ourselves and reality, or the absolute. 更为糟糕的是，它理所当然地认为，我们的认识与实在之间是彼此割断的，Worse still, it takes for granted that our knowledge and reality are cut off from one another, 但同时又把我们的认识当作某种真实的东西来处理，也就是说，当作实在的一部分来处理。but at the same time still treats our knowledge as something real, that is, as a part of reality. 因此，怀疑论也是不成立的。Thus scepticism will not do either.
黑格尔简洁地提出了关于认识的某种看法，然后表明它导致了一种无法摆脱也无法忍受的困境。Hegel has neatly set up a certain view of knowing, and then shown that it leads into a hole from which we cannot escape, and in which we cannot remain. 他现在指出，我们必须抛弃所有这些关于认识作为工具或媒介的“无用观念和表述”，因为它们都把认识与实在本身割裂开来。We must, he now says, abandon all these ‘useless ideas and expressions’ about knowledge as an instrument or medium, all of which divide knowledge from reality as it is.
在整个论述过程中，黑格尔没有提到任何一位哲学家持有他认为必须拒斥的认识论观点。In all of this argument there is no mention of any philosopher who has held the view of knowledge that Hegel now says we must reject. 在某种程度上，黑格尔是在批判所有经验论哲学家——洛克、贝克莱、休谟以及其他许多人——所共有的假设。To some extent he is criticizing assumptions common to the whole school of empiricist philosophers – Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and many others. 不过所有读者都可以清楚地看出，他的主要靶子是康德。It would, however, have been obvious to all his readers that his main target is Kant. 康德认为我们永远无法认识实在本身，因为我们只能在空间、时间和因果性的框架之内理解我们的经验。Kant argued that we can never see reality as it is; for we can only comprehend our experiences within the frameworks of space, time, and causation. 而空间、时间和因果性并非实在的组成部分，而是我们把握实在所必需的形式，Space, time, and causation are not part of reality, but the necessary forms in which we grasp it; 因此我们永远无法认识不依赖于我们认识的事物。therefore we can never know things as they are independently of our knowledge.
在另一部著作《小逻辑》中，黑格尔的确给出了其对手的名字，并对他作了类似的批判In another work, the Lesser Logic, Hegel does name his opponent and mounts a similar attack against him （虽然像是要显示其思想的丰富性，他是以略为不同的论证令人信服地阐明观点的）。(though as if to display his intellectual fertility, he presses home his point with a slightly different argument). 这段话很值得引用，因为其结尾的一则类比指出了前进的道路：The passage is worth quoting, because it concludes with an analogy that suggests the way forward:
康德指出，我们在进行工作以前，必须对用来工作的工具先行认识；We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is to be employed; 假如工具不完善，则一切工作将归徒劳。for if the instrument be insufficient, all our trouble will be spent in vain……但对认识的考察只能通过认识活动来完成。 … But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. 考察所谓认识的工具，与对认识加以认识，乃是一回事。To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. 但试图在我们认识之前进行认识，其荒谬可笑实无异于某学究的聪明办法：But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, 在没有学会游泳以前，切勿冒险下水。not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim.
此学究的愚蠢之举所带来的教益很清楚。The lesson taught by the folly of Scholasticus is clear. 要想学会游泳，我们必须勇敢地跳入激流；To learn to swim we must plunge boldly into the stream; 要想认识实在，我们必须勇敢地跳入作为我们一切认识出发点的意识之流。and to obtain knowledge of reality, we must plunge boldly into the stream of consciousness that is the starting point of all we know. 唯一可能的认识进路就是从意识向它自身显现的内部去考察意识，换言之就是一种精神的现象学。The only possible approach to knowledge is an examination of consciousness from the inside as it appears to itself – in other words, a phenomenology of mind. 我们不从那些复杂的怀疑，而是从一种自视为真正知识的简单意识形式出发。We shall not start with sophisticated doubts, but with a simple form of consciousness that takes itself to be genuine knowledge. 然而，这种简单意识形式将会证明自己还达不到真正的知识，于是就发展成另一种意识形式。This simple form of consciousness will, however, prove itself to be something less than genuine knowledge, and so will develop into another form of consciousness; 而后者也将表明自己是不完善的，于是发展成其他某种东西，这一过程将持续下去，直到我们达到真正的知识为止。and this in turn will also prove inadequate and develop into something else, and so the process will continue until we reach true knowledge.
《精神现象学》详细追溯了这一过程。The Phenomenology of Mind is the tracing of this process in detail: 正如黑格尔所说，它是“培养和教育意识自身达到科学水平之过程的详细历史”。as Hegel puts it, ‘the detailed history of the process of training and educating consciousness itself up to the level of science’. 事实上，在整个历史中出现的那些观念的发展就是这种培养和教育的一部分。Part of this training and educating is in fact the development of ideas that has occurred throughout history; 于是，黑格尔的《精神现象学》在部分程度上预示了《历史哲学》包含的内容。thus Hegel’s Phenomenology is in part an anticipation of the material covered in the Philosophy of History. 然而这一次，同样的事件是用另一种方式处理的，因为黑格尔旨在揭示意识的发展过程乃是必然的。This time, however, the same events are treated in a different manner, for Hegel’s aim is to exhibit the process of the development of consciousness as a necessary one. 每一种意识形式在显示自己达不到真正知识的过程中，都把我们引向了黑格尔所谓的“决定性的否定”（determinate negation）。Each form of consciousness, in revealing itself to be less than genuine knowledge, leads us to what Hegel calls ‘a determinate negation’. 这并非批评我们的普通认识方法的那些哲学家所捍卫的空洞的怀疑论。This is not the empty scepticism defended by philosophers who find fault with our ordinary methods of knowing; 从那种空洞的怀疑论出发是无法前进的。from that empty scepticism there would be no way forward. 而决定性的否定本身就是某种东西。[想想数学中的负号（negationsign）：它产生的不是零，而是一个明确的负数。]A determinate negation, on the other hand, is itself something. (Think of the negation sign in mathematics: it produces not zero, but a definite negative number.) 这种因为发现一种意识形式不完善而产生的“某种东西”本身就是一种新的意识形式，即意识觉察到之前形式的不完善而不得不采取一种不同的方式来克服它们。The ‘something’ that is the result of the discovery that a form of consciousness is inadequate is itself a new form of consciousness, namely consciousness aware of the inadequacies of the previous form and forced to adopt a different approach in order to surmount them. 于是我们将被迫从一种意识形式走向下一种意识形式，不停地去寻求真正的知识。Thus we shall be compelled to move from one form of consciousness to the next in a restless searching for true knowledge.
因此，《精神现象学》将可以回答前面提出的问题：为什么世界历史不过是自由观念意识的发展史，以及为什么历史上发生的事情都是必然发生的。The Phenomenology will therefore provide an answer to the question raised earlier, as to why the history of the world is nothing but the development of the consciousness of the idea of freedom, and why what happens in history happens necessarily. 不过令人难以置信的是，对这个重大问题的回答仅仅是这部著作主要目标的一个副产品，Yet, incredibly, the answer given to this monumental question is merely a by-product of the principal aim of the work, 其主要目标是表明真正知识的可能性，从而为哲学的目的——用黑格尔的话来说就是提供“对真正存在之物的实际认识”——充当基础。which is to demonstrate the possibility of genuine knowledge, and thus to serve as a foundation for philosophy’s aim of providing, as Hegel put it, ‘actual knowledge of what truly is’.
