The Fed that failed

失败的美联储

How inflation humbled America’s central bank

通胀是如何击垮美国央行的

CENTRAL BANKS are supposed to inspire confidence in the economy by keeping inflation low and stable. America’s Federal Reserve has suffered a hair-raising loss of control. In March consumer prices were 8.5% higher than a year earlier, the fastest annual rise since 1981. In Washington inflation-watching is usually the preserve of wonks in shabby offices. Now nearly a fifth of Americans say inflation is the country’s most important problem; President Joe Biden has released oil from strategic reserves to try to curb petrol prices; and Democrats are searching for villains to blame, from greedy bosses to Vladimir Putin.

中央银行应当通过保持低通胀和稳定来激发人们对经济的信心。美联储遭遇了令人毛骨悚然的失控。3月份消费者价格指数较上年同期上涨8.5%，为1981年以来最为迅速的年度涨幅。在华盛顿，研究通货膨胀通常是那些坐在破旧办公室里的书呆子们的专利。现在，近五分之一的美国人认为通货膨胀是美国最重要的问题；美国总统拜登已从战略储备中释放石油，试图遏制汽油价格；民主党人也在寻找替罪羊，从贪婪的老板到普京。

It is the Fed, however, that had the tools to stop inflation and failed to use them in time. The result is the worst overheating in a big and rich economy in the 30-year era of inflation-targeting central banks. The good news is that inflation may have peaked at last. But the Fed’s 2% target will remain a long way off—forcing agonising choices on the central bank. Apologists for America’s policymakers point to annual price rises of 7.5% in the euro area and 7% in Britain as evidence of a global problem, driven by the soaring price of commodities, especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nearly three-quarters of the euro zone’s inflation is attributable to rocketing energy and food prices.

然而，美联储拥有阻止通胀的工具，却未能及时使用。其结果是，在一个以控制通货膨胀为目标的央行所统治的30年里，一个庞大而富裕的经济体出现了最严重的过热。好消息是，通货膨胀可能终于要见顶了。但距离美联储2%的目标还有很长的路要走——迫使央行做出痛苦的选择。那些为美国政策制定者辩护的人指出，欧元区每年7.5%的物价上涨和英国7%的物价上涨证明了这是一个全球性的问题。而这一问题的原因是由于大宗商品价格飙升所造成的，特别是在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后。欧元区近四分之三的通货膨胀是由于能源和食品价格飙升所致。

America, though, benefits from abundant shale gas, and its higher incomes mean that staples have a smaller effect on average prices. Strip out energy and food and the euro zone’s inflation is 3%—but America’s is 6.5%. Also, America’s labour market, unlike Europe’s, is clearly overheating, with wages growing at an average pace of nearly 6%. Recent falls in the prices of oil, used cars and shipping probably mean that inflation will fall in the coming months. But it will stay far too high, given the underlying upward pressure on prices.

然而，美国受益于丰富的页岩气，其较高的收入也意味着主食对平均价格的影响较小。除去能源和食品，欧元区的通货膨胀率是3%，但美国却是6.5%。除此之外，与欧洲不同的地方，是美国的劳动力市场明显过热，工资以平均近6%的速度增长。最近，油价、二手车价格和船运价格的下跌可能意味着未来几个月通胀将会下降。但考虑到潜在的价格上涨压力，这一比例仍将过高。

Uncle Sam has been on a unique path because of Mr Biden’s excessive $1.9trn fiscal stimulus, which passed in March 2021. It added extra oomph to an economy that was already recovering fast after multiple rounds of spending, and brought the total pandemic stimulus to 25% of GDP—the highest in the rich world. As the White House hit the accelerator, the Fed should have applied the brakes. It did not. Its hesitancy stemmed partly from the difficulty of forecasting the path of the economy during the pandemic, and also from the tendency of policymakers to fight the last war. For most of the decade after the global financial crisis of 2007-09 the economy was hung over and monetary policy was too tight. Predicting inflation’s return was for those who wore tinfoil hats.

由于在2021年的3月，拜登通过了逾1.9万亿美元的财政刺激计划，山姆大叔走上了一条独特的道路。在多轮的财政支出刺激下，经济已经快速复苏，而拜登政府又为它添了把火，使得总的疫情刺激计划占到了GDP的25%——这是发达国家中最高的。当白宫踩下油门时，美联储本应踩下刹车。但事实并非如此。其犹豫不决的部分原因是，在疫情期间难以预测经济的走势，同时也归根于决策者倾向于打最后一场战争。2007年至2009年期间发生了全球金融危机，在之后十年的大部分时间里，经济停滞不前，货币政策过于紧缩。只有胡说八道的人（戴着锡纸帽的人：偏执的阴谋论疯子）才能预见到通胀的回归。

Yet the Fed’s failure also reflects an insidious change among central bankers globally. As our special report in this issue explains, around the world many are dissatisfied with the staid work of managing the business cycle and wish to take on more glamorous tasks, from fighting climate change to minting digital currencies. At the Fed the shift was apparent in promises that it would pursue a “broad-based and inclusive” recovery. The rhetorical shift ignored the fact, taught to every undergraduate economist, that the rate of unemployment at which inflation takes off is not something central banks can control.

然而，美联储的失败也反映出了一种全球央行行长的潜在变化。正如我们在本期特别报道中所解释的那样，在世界各地有许多人对管理商业周期的刻板工作感到不满，他们希望承担更有吸引力的任务，从应对气候变化到铸造数字货币。在美联储，这种转变明显体现在承诺将追求“广泛和包容”的复苏。这种措辞上的转变忽视了这样一个事实：导致通胀上升的失业率不是央行所能够控制的。

In September 2020 the Fed codified its new views by promising not to raise interest rates at all until employment had already reached its maximum sustainable level. Its pledge guaranteed that it would fall far behind the curve. It was cheered on by left-wing activists who wanted to imbue one of Washington’s few functional institutions with an egalitarian ethos.

2020年9月，美联储将其新观点写入法律，承诺在就业率达到可持续的最高水平之前不会加息。它的承诺确保了其将远远落后于潮流。左翼活动人士对此表示欢迎，美联储是华盛顿为数不多的几个职能机构之一，他们希望为它注入平等主义精神。

The result was a mess which the Fed is only now trying to clear up. In December it projected a measly 0.75 percentage points of interest-rate rises this year. Today an increase of 2.5 points is expected. Both policymakers and financial markets think this will be enough to bring inflation to heel. They are probably being too optimistic again. The usual way to rein in inflation is to raise rates above their neutral level—thought to be about 2-3% —by more than the rise in underlying inflation. That points to a federal-funds rate of 5-6%, unseen since 2007.

其结果是造成了一场美联储直到现在才试图清理的混乱。去年12月，美联储预计今年的加息幅度只有区区0.75个百分点。而如今则预计会加息2.5个百分点。政策制定者和金融市场都认为这足以控制通货膨胀。他们可能又过于乐观了。控制通货膨胀的通常方法，是将利率提高到高于其中性水平——大约2-3%——高于基本通货膨胀的上升幅度。这意味着联邦基金利率要达到自2007年以来前所未见的5-6%。

Rates that high would tame rising prices—but by engineering a recession. In the past 60 years the Fed has on only three occasions managed significantly to slow America’s economy without causing a downturn. It has never done so having let inflation rise as high as it is today.

如此高的利率可以抑制物价上涨，但这是通过制造经济衰退来实现的。在过去的60年里，美联储只有三次成功地在不引发经济衰退的情况下显著放缓了美国经济。更何况它从未放任通胀上升到如今的高度。

An American contraction therefore hangs over the global economy as part of a trio of risks, along with Europe’s energy security and China’s struggle to suppress covid-19. Poor and middle-income countries in particular have a lot to lose from sharply higher rates at the Fed, which will tempt away capital and weaken their exchange rates, especially if a global downturn saps demand for their exports at the same time.

因此，美国经济萎缩与欧洲能源安全和中国抗疫斗争一样，是拖累全球经济的三大风险之一。贫困国家与中等收入国家尤其会因为美联储大幅加息而蒙受巨大损失，这将诱使资本流出并导致它们的货币贬值，特别是当全球经济衰退的同时也会削弱它们的出口需求。

Does the Fed have the stomach to inflict such economic pain? Many economists advocate higher inflation, because in the long run interest rates would go up in tandem, lifting them further away from zero, below which they are hard to cut in a crisis. Inflation is already helping the federal government by shrinking the real value of its debts. Around 2025, when the Fed reviews its policymaking framework, it will have the chance to raise the target. There is nothing special about 2%, except the fact that the Fed has promised it in the past.

美联储有胆量造成这样的经济痛苦吗？许多经济学家主张提高通货膨胀率，因为从长期来看，利率会同步上升，进一步远离零，而低于零则很难在危机中降息。通过使其债务的实际价值缩水，通货膨胀已经在帮助联邦政府了。到了2025年前后，当美联储重新审视其决策框架时，它将有机会提高这一目标（2%的通胀率）。除了曾经被美联储承诺过，2%没有什么特别之处。

My word is my bond

Inflation that is stable and modestly above 2% might be tolerable for the real economy, but there is no guarantee the Fed’s stance today can deliver even that. And breaking promises has consequences. It hurts long-term bondholders, including foreign central banks and governments which own $4trn-worth of Treasury bonds. (A decade of 4% inflation instead of 2% would cut the purchasing power of money repaid at the end of that period by 18%.) It might add an inflation risk premium to America’s cost of borrowing. And if even America broke its inflation promises in tough times, investors might worry that other central banks—many of which are looking over their shoulders at indebted governments—would do the same. In the 1980s the recessions brought about by Paul Volcker’s Fed laid the foundations for inflation-targeting regimes worldwide. Every month inflation runs too hot, part of that hard-won credibility ebbs away. ■

我说话算话（我的承诺会影响我的债券）

对于实体经济来说，稳定且略高于2%的通胀也许是可以容忍的，但即便是美联储如今的立场也无法保证能够达到这一水平。违背诺言是有后果的。它会伤害长期债券持有者，包括持有4万亿美元美国国债的外国央行和政府。（如果10年间的通胀率为4%而不是2%，那么在这段时期结束时，所偿还货币的购买力将下降18%。）这可能会给美国的借贷成本增加通胀风险溢价。如果美国在困难时期违背了它的通货膨胀承诺，投资者也许会担心其他中央银行——其中许多央行正盯着其负债累累的政府——也会这么做。上世纪80年代，在保罗·沃尔克领导下的美联储引发的衰退为全球范围内的通货膨胀目标制奠定了基础。每个月的通货膨胀率都过高，是导致这种来之不易的信誉消逝的一大因素。■