Twelve Aesthetics(2)
第十二章 美学(2)
ART AS COGNITION
艺术作为认知
Although Hegel subordinated art to religion and philosophy, and although he even declared the obsolescence of art, the fact remains that he still gave it fundamental importance. Art was the first medium of knowledge of the absolute. As such, Hegel rated its cognitive powers above the empirical sciences and history (XIII, 20–2/7–9). While they remained confined to the finite world, art could grasp the infinite, glimpsing the eternal within the passing events of nature and history. Indeed, Hegel gave art a higher cognitive status than the understanding. While the understanding is stuck in mere abstractions and opposed to sensibility, art could grasp the concrete universal and reconcile understanding with sensibility (XIII, 21/8, 82/55). Furthermore, the understanding had no power to grasp the true infinite, which art could fathom, even if through the dark glass of sensible images.
尽管黑格尔使艺术从属于宗教和哲学，尽管他甚至宣称艺术过时了，事实上他仍然赋予艺术以基本的重要性。艺术是绝对知识的第一个中介。因此，黑格尔将其认知能力置于经验科学和历史之上（XIII, 20–2/7–9）。如果说上述两者仍然局限于有限的世界，艺术则可以把握无限，在自然和历史的过眼云烟中瞥见永恒。事实上，黑格尔给予艺术一种高于知性的认知地位。知性只停留于抽象之中而与感性相对立，而艺术则可以把握具体的普遍并调和知性与感性（XIII, 21/8，82/55）。此外，艺术可以彻底把握（fathom）知性无力把握的真无限，尽管是通过感性图像这副墨镜。
In bestowing such cognitive status upon art, Hegel reaffirmed the romantic legacy, despite his many disagreements with it. He agreed with Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher and Hölderlin that art was a higher form of knowledge than the understanding. He too held that the insights of art are irreducible to what we can know or explain purely discursively, according to abstract concepts, judgments and syllogisms. However, where the romantics went astray, in Hegel’s view, is in placing art above philosophy. They could do this, he argued, only because they had limited philosophy to the abstract concepts of the understanding. They did not have a proper appreciation, therefore, of the dialectical form of reason. For two reasons, Hegel held that the dialectic is a more adequate form of concrete universality than art. First, it grasps explicitly and self-consciously what art sees only implicitly and subconsciously. Second, although the intuitions of art see the unity of the whole, the dialectic also grasps unity-in-difference, i.e. it sees each part of the whole and how they depend upon it.
通过将这样的认知地位授予艺术，黑格尔重新肯定了浪漫派的遗产，尽管他与之存在着诸多分歧。他同意谢林、弗里德里希·施莱格尔、施莱尔马赫和荷尔德林的观点，即艺术是比知性更高的一种知识形式。他也认为艺术的洞见不能被还原为我们能够根据抽象的概念、判断和三段论，纯粹通过推论而知道或解释的东西。但是，在黑格尔看来，浪漫派误入歧途之处在于把艺术置于哲学之上。他认为，他们之所以这样做，只是因为他们将哲学局限于知性的抽象概念之上。因而，他们没有对理性的辩证形式做出恰如其分的评价。出于两个理由，黑格尔认为辩证法是一种比艺术更为恰当的、具体普遍性的形式。首先，它可以明确和有意识地把握艺术只能含蓄和下意识地把握到的东西。其次，纵然艺术的直观可以看到整体的统一性，但是辩证法还能把握有差异的同一，即它能看到整体的各个部分以及各部分是如何依赖于整体的。
Whatever Hegel’s reasons for departing from the romantics, the basic question remains why he remained loyal to them at all. In other words: why did Hegel continue to uphold the cognitive status of art, its power to grasp the absolute? In the early 1800s the position was still a controversial one. After all, the general trend of eighteenth-century aesthetics had been toward subjectivism, according to which art simply expressed the feelings of the artist or pleased the senses of the observer. The most important representative of this trend was Kant, who had argued in the Critique of Judgment that aesthetic judgments have only a subjective validity about what objects are pleasing to the perceiver; though these judgments have a universal validity, they still concern only feelings of pleasure that refer to no qualities in the object itself. Of course, the challenge to the cognitive status of art is even more venerable, going back at least to Plato, who had banished artists from his republic on the grounds that their works could only trade in illusion. When we consider such potent challenges to Hegel’s position, we have to ask how he responded to them.
不管黑格尔出于什么原因与浪漫派分道扬镳，基本的问题仍然是为什么他仍然完全忠实于他们。换句话说，黑格尔为什么继续支持艺术的认知地位，它把握绝对的力量？在19世纪早期，这个立场仍然是充满争议的。毕竟，18世纪美学的总体趋势是走向主观主义。根据主观主义，艺术只是表达艺术家的情感（feelings）或取悦观看者的感官（senses）。这个趋势最重要的代表是康德，他在《判断力批判》里提出，对于何种对象能够取悦感受者，审美判断只具有一种主观的有效性；尽管这些判断具有一种普遍的有效性，它们仍然只关涉与对象本身的质无关的愉悦的情感。当然，对艺术之认知地位的挑战是更为令人肃然起敬的，至少可以追溯到柏拉图，他将艺术家从他的理想国（republic）中驱逐出去，因为他们的作品只能经营幻相。如果我们考虑到对黑格尔的立场所构成的如此有力的挑战，我们必须问他是如何回应他们的。
In the introduction to his Aesthetics Hegel does have an interesting response to these issues, a defense of the cognitive status of art against its critics. His account is not developed in great detail, however, partly because its epistemological and metaphysical premises are laid down in his other works. Because Hegel’s treatment is not sustained or systematic, it has been regarded as derivative, as really resting upon the foundation that Schelling gave it in his System of transcendental Idealism and in his Philosophy of Art.20 But this is a mistake. While Hegel indeed had debts to Schelling, the premises behind his position rest on his own epistemology and metaphysics, which involve substantial differences with Schelling. Our task now will be to reconstruct Hegel’s position on the cognitive status of art by placing it in the wider context of his epistemology and metaphysics.
在《美学》的导论部分，黑格尔的确对这些问题做一个颇为有趣的回应，在他的批评者面前捍卫艺术的认知地位。然而，他的解释并没有足够详细地展开，部分是因为其认识论和形而上学的前提是在他的其他著作中奠定的。由于黑格尔的处理方式没有一以贯之或不成系统，它已经被视为派生的，实际上是基于谢林在他的《先验观念论体系》（System of transcendental Idealism）和《艺术哲学》（Philosophy of Art）中所给出的基础。但这是一个错误。尽管黑格尔确实从谢林那里受益良多，但其立场背后的前提是基于他自己的认识论与形而上学，后者与谢林有着实质性的差别。我们目前的任务是，通过将艺术置于黑格尔的认识论和形而上学这个更广阔的语境之中，来重建他关于艺术之认知地位的立场。
Hegel’s thesis of the cognitive status of art has its most general and explicit formulation in his definition of beauty: ‘the sensible appearing [Scheinen] of the idea’ (XIII, 151/111). The most significant claim behind this formula is its reevaluation of the concept of appearance. Appearance could be the realm of illusion, in which the truth is disguised or concealed; but it could also be the realm of revelation, where the truth is manifested or disclosed. Notoriously, Plato understood appearances in the former sense, and it was for just this reason that he had banished art from his republic. He distinguished sharply between the intellectual realm of the forms and the sphere of the senses; and since the artist could only imitate objects of the senses, his work amounted to an appearance of an appearance, so that it is two steps removed from the truth. In the introduction to his Aesthetics Hegel counters Plato’s argument by flatly declaring his opposing concept of appearance. ‘Appearance is essential to essence; the truth would not be, if it did not shine and appear . . .’ (XIII, 21/8). Hegel agrees with Plato that we cannot take the objects of the senses on their own as reality; and he admits that art would be indeed removed from reality if all it could do is imitate these objects. However, art is significant, Hegel argues, precisely because its sensible forms indicate a more substantial reality lying behind them.
黑格尔关于艺术之认知地位的命题，在他对美的定义中，有着最为普遍和明确的表述：“理念的感性显现（Scheinen）”（XIII, 151/111）。这个表述背后最重要的主张是它重新评价了现象的概念。现象可能是幻相的领域。在这个领域中，真理被伪装或隐藏；但它也可能是揭示的领域，在其中，真理被展现或揭露。众所周知，柏拉图在前一种意义上理解现象。出于这个原因，他把艺术逐出他的理想国。他明确区分了理念的可知王国和感官的领域；由于艺术家只能模仿感官的对象，他的作品充其量是现象的现象，所以距真理有两步之遥。在《美学》的导言中，黑格尔通过明确宣布他的相反的现象概念——“现象对于本质来说是本质性的；真理不会存在，如果它不表露或显现……”（XIII, 21/8）——反驳了柏拉图的论证。黑格尔同意柏拉图的观点：我们不能将感官的对象本身当成实在；他承认，如果艺术所能做的只是摹仿这些对象，那么，它确实会远离现实。然而，艺术是有重大意义的，黑格尔论证说，正是由于它的感性形式表明了一种位于其背后的更实质性的现实。
What justification did Hegel have for his revaluation of the realm of appearance? Its basis lay with his organicist metaphysics, and more specifically his Aristotelian conception of universals, which we have already examined above (pp. 56–7). According to that conception, the universal is not merely an abstract term, a collective name for a number of distinct but similar particulars, as it is in the nominalist tradition; still less is it an archetype or eternal form, which is completely beyond the passing world of sense particulars, as in the Platonic tradition.21 Rather, the universal is concrete, the immanent form of an object, its formal and final cause. This means that sense particulars embody or manifest the universal; they are part of the very process by which the universal comes into being, the specific form in which it realizes itself in the world. Hence the appearances of the sensible world are not illusory but revelatory, because they embody and realize the substantial form of an object. So, in so far as art deals with sensible appearances, it has the power to reveal the immanent form of an object.
黑格尔对现象领域的价值重估有什么正当的理由？它的基础在于他的有机主义的形而上学（organicist metaphysics），更确切地说，是他的亚里士多德式的关于普遍的思想（conception），后者我们已经在上文考察过了（第56~57页）。根据这个构想，普遍不是一个纯粹的抽象术语，一系列既有差别又相类似的特殊构成的一个集合名词，一如它在唯名论传统中所是；它更不可能是一个原型（archetype）或永恒形式（eternal form），完全超越于感官特殊的变动不居的世界之外，犹如在柏拉图传统中那样。毋宁说，普遍是具体的，是对象的内在形式，它的形式因和目的因。这就意味着，感官特殊把普遍具体化或显示了普遍；它们正是普遍得以产生的那个过程的一部分，是普遍在世界中实现自身的具体形式。因此，可感世界的现象并非幻相，而是揭示，因为它们具化和实现了对象的实质性的形式。所以，就艺术处理可感的现象而言，它具有揭示对象的内在形式的力量。
Hegel’s most concerted effort to explain the cognitive status of art appears in his account of the standpoint of aesthetic contemplation (XIII, 58–9, 152–4/36–7, 113). Here again his Aristotelian metaphysics plays a pivotal role. Like Kant, Hegel distinguishes aesthetic contemplation from the practical and theoretical standpoints. In the practical standpoint we make an object conform to our ends; and in the theoretical standpoint we see the object as an instance of some universal or general laws. Both standpoints see the universal as external to the object: the universal of the practical standpoint is some end that we impose on the object; the universal of the theoretical standpoint lies solely in the understanding or reflection of the observer. In aesthetic contemplation, however, we see the universal as inherent in the object, as deriving from its inner nature (XIII, 154/113). What is characteristic of aesthetic contemplation, Hegel maintains, is that we regard the object as autonomous, as realizing its own intrinsic ends and as acting according to the necessity of its own nature alone.
黑格尔对艺术的认知地位进行解释的最协调一致的努力，出现于他对审美沉思观点的叙述中（XIII, 58–9，152–4/36–7，113）。在这里，他的亚里士多德式的形而上学再一次发挥了关键作用。像康德一样，黑格尔将审美沉思与实践的和理论的观点区分开来。在实践的观点中，我们使一个对象符合我们的目的；而在理论的观点中，我们将对象看作一些普遍或一般法则的例证。这两种观点都把普遍看作外在于对象的：实践观点的普遍是我们强加在对象上的某种目的；理论观点的普遍仅存在于观察者的知性或反思中。然而，在审美沉思中，我们将普遍看作内在于对象的，看作从其内在本质中派出来的（XIII, 154/113）。黑格尔认为，审美沉思的基本特征是，将对象看作自主的，它实现自身的内在目的，只按照自身本性的必然性而行动。
Here we see the basis for Hegel’s departure from Kant. Since aesthetic contemplation gives us insight into the inherent form of the object, it gives us knowledge of that object, of what that object is in itself. In the Critique of Judgment Kant had distinguished aesthetic from teleological judgment, and he had insisted that both forms of judgment are strictly regulative, i.e. we must treat them only as if they were true of the object itself. In granting aesthetic experience the power to grasp the inherent form of an object, Hegel went against the grain of both these Kantian points. Aesthetic experience is a species of teleology, and it gives us knowledge of the object, because it grasps its intrinsic purpose, its formal–final cause. Hence the ultimate basis for Hegel’s departure from Kant – for his going beyond the Kantian limits and ascribing cognitive status to art – resides in his defense of the constitutive status of teleology (see pp. 100–7).
在这里，我们看到了黑格尔与康德分道扬镳的基础。由于审美沉思使我们对对象的固有形式有了深刻认识，所以它给了我们关于那个对象的知识，关于那个对象自在（in itself）地是什么的知识。在《判断力批判》中，康德将审美判断与目的论判断区分开，并且坚持认为，两种判断形式都严格地是调节性的，即我们必须只是似乎把它们当作对象本身的真实性来对待。在赋予审美经验以把握对象内在形式的力量时，黑格尔与康德的上述两个观点背道而驰。审美经验是目的论的一个种，它给与我们关于对象的知识，因为它把握了对象的内在目的，它的形式—目的因。因此，黑格尔背离康德——因为他超越了康德哲学的界限并赋予艺术以认知地位——的最终基础存在于他对目的论的建构地位的辩护之中（参见页100-7）。
Hegel’s theory of the cognitive status of art has to be placed in the context of his complex attitude toward the doctrine of imitation, which for centuries had been the main theory about the objective status of art. Given his attempt to defend the objectivity of art, one would expect Hegel to be sympathetic toward the theory of imitation. But the very opposite is the case. He sometimes writes about it as if it were completely obsolete, surpassed by modern doctrines that stress the creative activity of the subject. He decisively rejects one version of the doctrine, according to which imitation consists in ‘the aptitude to copy natural forms as they are present to us’, as if the artist should simply duplicate what is given to the senses. Hegel fires off a whole battery of objections against this version of the doctrine (XIII, 65–9/41–4). He first points out that it makes art superfluous: Why simply duplicate what is already given to us? He then adds that it also makes art absurdly ambitious; for we cannot ever recreate through artistic means all the richness and particularity of nature, given that art recreates with one sensual medium what is given to all our different senses in nature. After pointing out these problems, Hegel complains that imitation reduces art to something purely formal; since what matters is how something is imitated, not what is imitated, even the ugly and trival could be the subject matter for art. Finally, Hegel notes that imitation does not apply to all the arts; architecture and poetry, for example, are hardly imitative.
黑格尔关于艺术的认知地位的理论，必须被置于他对摹仿说的复杂态度这一语境之中。几百年来，模仿说已经成为关于艺术的客观地位的主要理论。鉴于他尝试着捍卫艺术之客观性，人们会期望黑格尔对摹仿理论持同情态度。但事与愿违。他有时候提到摹仿说时，好像它已经完全过时了，已经被强调主体的创造性活动的现代学说超越了。他断然拒绝这种学说的一个版本，根据这个版本，摹仿存在于“复写自然的形式——一如它们呈现给我们的那样——的才能”中，好像艺术家应该只是把被给与感官的东西加以复制（duplicate）一样。黑格尔对这个版本的模仿说提出了一系列反对意见（XIII, 65–9/41–4）。他首先指出这种学说使艺术变得多余：为什么要简单地复制已经被给与我们的东西？然后，他补充说，它也使艺术的雄心变得荒谬绝伦；假定艺术凭借一种感性的中介再创造那在自然中已经被给予我们所有不同感官的事物，那么，我们再也不能通过艺术的手段重现自然的丰富性和特殊性。在指出这些难题之后，黑格尔抱怨摹仿将艺术还原为某种纯形式的东西；因为问题的关键是事物如何被摹仿，而非什么被摹仿，甚至丑陋和琐碎的事物都可以成为艺术的题材。最后，黑格尔指出摹仿并不适用于所有的艺术门类，例如，建筑和诗歌就很难说是摹仿性的。
Yet Hegel’s attitude toward imitation was much more complex than some of his polemics suggest. The complexities emerge when he discusses the question, very topical in his day, whether art should idealize nature or imitate it (XIII, 212/160). Here Hegel seems to take the side of those who hold the modern theory that the artist should idealize nature, and he has indeed been read as a one-sided partisan of that approach.22 But a closer reading of the text shows that he wants to do full justice to both sides of this dispute, and that he endorses one version of imitation after all.
然而，黑格尔对摹仿的态度，比他的一些辩论中所提及的要复杂得多。当他讨论在他的时代非常热门的问题，即艺术应该理想化自然还是摹仿自然的时候，复杂性就出现了（XIII, 212/160）。在这里，黑格尔似乎站在那些持艺术家应该理想化自然的现代理论的人一边，而且他确实被解读成一个这种进路的单边支持者。但是对文本的进一步阅读表明，他希望对争论的双方都保持完全的公正。别忘了，他还为一种版本的摹仿说背书。
Hegel seems to side with those who insist that art should idealize nature when he stresses the creative activity of the artist, and when he insists that aesthetic objects please us because their form is made rather than given (XIII, 216/164). He argues that it is the task of the artist to grasp his subject matter in its universality, which he cannot achieve simply by copying all the extrinsic and accidental features given to the senses. It soon becomes apparent, however, that Hegel regards such idealization not as a kind of fiction but as a deeper and more adequate representation of reality itself. What the artist represents is not the object in its particularity, externality and contingency but its inherent substantial form. Since this form is not given to the senses, it has to be recreated by the intellect itself (XIII, 221, 227/167, 172). In his account of art in his lectures on the philosophy of religion Hegel explains two different senses in which art can be true of its object. Truth can consist in correctness (Richtigkeit) where the work is an accurate to the features of the object given in sense; and it can consist in the correspondence of the work with the inherent concept of the object (VPR III, 144/I, 235). It is only in this latter sense that Hegel thinks art can have a claim to truth; but it is also in this sense that he could be said to accept one version of imitation.
当黑格尔强调艺术家的创造性活动的时候，以及当他坚持审美对象取悦我们，是由于其形式是被创造而非被给与的时候，他似乎与那些坚持艺术应该理想化自然的人站在了一边（XIII, 216/164）。他认为，在普遍性中把握主题是艺术家的任务，而这仅仅通过复写所有那些被给与感官的外在的和偶然的特征是达不到的。因而，立刻变得明显的是，黑格尔并不将这种理想化看成一种虚构（fiction），而是看成现实本身的一种更深刻更充分的表象。艺术家所表象的不是对象的特殊性、外在性和偶然性，而是其固有的实质形式。由于这种形式不被给予感官，所以必须由理智自身将之再造出来（XIII, 221，227/167，172）。黑格尔在宗教哲学讲演中对艺术进行说明之时，解释了艺术能够符合其对象的两种不同意义。真理能够存在于正确性（Richtigkeit）之中，在这里，作品是对被给予感官的对象特征的准确无误的摹写；它也能存在于作品与对象之内在概念的一致性中（VPR III, 144/I, 235）。黑格尔认为，只有在后一种意义上，艺术才能够宣称拥有真理；但也是在这个意义上，他可以说接受了某一种版本的摹仿说。
But Hegel’s critique of the traditional doctrine of imitation, and his insistence on the creative powers of the artist, leave a troubling question. How can art give us knowledge of reality if (1) the artist must create his object, and if (2) he should not imitate his object as it is given to him? On just these grounds many aestheticians dismiss the cognitive status of art entirely, maintaining instead that its purpose is to do nothing more than to please our senses or to express feelings. As usual, Hegel seems to want both to have his cake and eat it. He gives the artist license to express his creativity and imagination, and yet confers a metaphysical significance on him for doing so.
但是黑格尔对传统摹仿说的批判，以及他对艺术家的创造性力量的坚持，留下一个令人困扰的问题。艺术如何给我们关于现实的知识，如果（1）艺术家必须创造他的对象，并且如果（2）他不应该就对象被给与他的样子模仿对象？正是出于这些原因，很多美学家完全拒绝艺术的认知地位，相反，他们认为艺术的目的无非是取悦我们的感官或表达情感。黑格尔重施故伎，似乎想让双方都能买他的账。他准许艺术家表达他们的创造力和想象力，又赋予他们如此这般做以一种形而上学的意义。
To understand Hegel’s solution to this problem, we must again place it in the context of his metaphysics. Hegel conceives the artist as one part of the organic whole of nature and history, a whole that is inseparable from each of its parts and that reveals itself entirely in each of them. Furthermore, the artist, as a vehicle of human selfawareness, is one of the highest forms of organization and development of all the powers within this organic whole. This means that the activity of the artist is simply one of the highest manifestations and developments of all the organic powers at work in nature and history, so that what he creates is what nature or history creates through him. It is for just this reason that the artist’s work amounts to a stage in the self-awareness of spirit; the artist is not only aware of himself through his work but the spirit of all of history and nature is aware of itself through him. If we assume the contrary, a Cartesian metaphysics according to which the mind of the artist is a res cogitans and nature is a res extensa, then it is impossible to understand how the artist knows anything in nature at all; for how could two such distinct substances correspond with one another in an act of knowledge? According to a Cartesian metaphysics, then, art must have entirely subjective status, revealing nothing more than the feelings and fantasies of a disembodied mind. If, however, we adopt the opposing organic view of nature, according to which the activities of the mind are simply the highest degree of organization and development of the vital powers of nature, then the representations of the artist manifest, embody and reveal these powers. They do not simply copy or mirror these powers from some external standpoint; rather, they are the manifestation or expression of these powers, their highest organization and development. What the artist creates is what nature creates through him, so that the artist’s representation of nature is nature’s representation of itself through the artist.
为了理解黑格尔对这个难题的解决方案，我们必须再次将之置于其形而上学的语境之下。黑格尔认为艺术家是自然和历史的有机整体的一部分，而这个整体与其各个部分都密不可分并且在每一部分中都完全揭示了自身。此外，艺术家，作为人类自我意识的工具，是这个有机整体中全部力量的一种最高形式的组织和发展。这意味着艺术家的活动纯然是自然和历史中起作用的全部有机力量的最高表现和发展之一，因此，艺术家所创造之物是自然或历史通过他而创造的。正是出于这个原因，艺术家的作品意味着精神之自我意识的一个阶段；不仅艺术家通过其作品意识到自己，而且全部历史和自然的精神也通过他意识到自己。如果我们假设相反的情形，是一种笛卡尔式的形而上学。根据这种形而上学，艺术家的心灵是思维物（res cogitans），自然是广延物（res extensa），那么就无法理解艺术家如何了解自然的一切。因为两种如此不同的实体如何在一种认识行动中彼此对应呢？所以，根据一种笛卡尔式的形而上学，艺术必须具有完全主观的地位，除去揭示一个脱离肉体的心灵之情感和幻想，别无它用。然而，如果我们采纳与之对立的有机的自然观，根据这种自然观，心灵的活动只是自然之生命力组织和发展的最高程度，那么，艺术家的表象就会显示、体现和揭示这些力量。他们不只是从外在的观点复写或反映（mirror）这些力量；毋宁说，他们是这些力量的显示或表达，它们最高的组织和发展。艺术家创造之物是自然通过他创造的，所以，艺术家的自然表象，是自然通过艺术家对自然本身之表象。
It is the same metaphysics that allows Hegel to resolve the apparent tension between the cognitive status of art and the principle of aesthetic autonomy. Prima facie these doctrines seem incompatible, because if art represents a reality outside itself, it has a standard outside itself, and so loses its autonomy. Indeed, on just these grounds, Hegel’s doctrine of representation has been seen as the antipode of the Kantian doctrine of autonomy.23 Hegel’s metaphysics allows him to combine these doctrines, however, since it implies that the representational or cognitive status of the work simply resides in the work itself. The work does not represent or mirror some prototype that lies outside itself. Rather, it simply is how the creative activity of the absolute appears to itself, so that its meaning lies within itself.
正是这同一种形而上学，允许黑格尔消解艺术的认知地位与审美自律原则之间明显的张力。表面看来（Prima facie），这些学说似乎是不相容的，因为如果艺术表象外在于它自身的实在，它就具有了一种外在于自己的标准，因而丧失了它的自律。事实上，正是基于这些理由，黑格尔的表象说一直被视为康德自律说的对立面（antipode）。然而，黑格尔的形而上学允许他把这些学说结合起来，因为它暗示了，作品的表象性的或认知的地位仅仅存在于作品自身之中。作品并未表象或反映自身之外的某种原型。毋宁说，作品就是绝对的创造性活动是如何向自身显现的那个过程（how），因而其意义就在其自身之中。
DEATH OF ART
艺术之死
The most controversial aspect of Hegel’s aesthetics has been his notorious theory about ‘the end of art’. In the introduction to his lectures on aesthetics Hegel shocked his first listeners, and all his readers ever since, by flatly announcing the obsolescence of art. Art, he seemed to say, had exhausted itself. It had no future, no significant role to play in modern culture. What art had once been in the classical and medieval eras – the representation of its highest aspirations and fundamental values – could now be better achieved by philosophy.
黑格尔美学中最有争议的方面是他那臭名昭著的关于“艺术的终结（the end of art）”的理论。在他关于美学讲座的导言中，黑格尔断然宣称艺术已经过时，震惊了他的第一批听众以及后来的所有读者。他似乎是在说，艺术已经耗尽了自身。它没有未来，在现代文化中不再起重要的作用。艺术曾经在古典时期和中世纪之所是——它的最高抱负和基本价值的表象——现在可以经由哲学更好地达到。
Since 1828, Hegel’s announcement has lost none of its power to disturb. It continues to find defenders and detractors to this day.24 Hegel’s theory has indeed become something of a lightning rod for disputes about modern art.25 Those who think that modern art has exhausted itself often claim Hegel as their seer; but those who think that modern art has a promising future make Hegel their bête noire.
自1828年以来，黑格尔的这个宣言从未失去它扰乱人心的力量。直到今天，它仍然不断地发现它的拥护者和诋毁者（detractors）。黑格尔的理论甚至成为有关现代艺术争论的某种避雷针。那这些认为现代艺术已经耗尽自身的人经常宣称黑格尔是他们的先知（seer）；但是那些认为现代艺术仍有光明的未来的人把黑格尔看作是他们的死对头（bête noire）。
Since the doctrine has been so controversial, and since it has been so often misunderstood, it is important to consider exactly what Hegel says and what follows from it.
由于这一学说一直饱受争议，并且经常遭到误解，因此重要的是去确切地考察黑格尔说了什么及其言外之意（what follows from it）。
It is noteworthy that Hegel himself does not use the phrase ‘the death of art’, which has so often been ascribed to him.26 Furthermore, he does not even talk about ‘the end of art’. He does state explicitly, however, that art is now something past for us (XIII, 25/ 10), and that it has been ‘surpassed’ (überflügelt) by philosophy (XIII, 24/10). Art no longer addresses, he explains, ‘our highest needs’ (XIII, 24, 142/10, 103). Whatever the precise wording, Hegel’s main point is simple: that art has ceased to have the central importance in the modern age that it once had in the classical and medieval eras. Art played a pivotal role in those cultures because it was the main medium for the representation of their religion, ethics and worldview. Since the modern age is much more rationalistic, the traditional function of the arts is now better performed by philosophy.
值得注意的是，黑格尔本人没有使用过那个经常被归于他名下的“艺术之死”的说法。而且，他甚至没有谈到过“艺术的终结”。但是，他确实明确地指出艺术现在是某种对我们来说过去了的东西（XIII, 25/10），并且它已经被哲学取而代之了（XIII, 24/10）。他解释道，艺术不再表达“我们最高的需求”（XIII, 24，142/10，103）。不管确切的措辞是什么，黑格尔的主要观点很简单：艺术在现时代不再具有它曾在古典时期和中世纪具有的核心意义。艺术在这些文化中起着关键作用，因为它是它们的宗教、伦理和世界观之表象的主要中介。由于现时代更加理性化，艺术的传统功能现在被哲学更好地执行了。
It is also noteworthy that Hegel’s point is still compatible with the future of the arts. To say that art no longer plays a central role in modern culture is not to say that it should or will end. Hegel never makes such a rash statement; indeed, he expresses the hope that artists will continue to create and strive for greater perfection in their work (XIII, 142/103). He also says that there comes a time in the development of every nation when art surpasses itself (XIII, 142/103), which suggests that the decline of art in modern culture might be a transitory phenomenon, perhaps to be succeeded by a renaissance of the arts in some other epoch.
同样值得注意的是，黑格尔的观点仍与艺术的未来相兼容。说艺术在现代文化中不再起到核心作用，并不就是说它应该或将要终结。黑格尔从未做出如此轻率的声明；事实上，他希望艺术家继续创造并努力使作品臻于更加完善（XIII, 142/103）。他还说，在每个民族的发展历程中，都会有一个艺术超越自身的时期（XIII, 142/103），这意味着，艺术在现代文化中的衰落可能是一个暂时的现象，也许会继以另一时代的艺术之复兴。
But if one should not overstate the implications of Hegel’s theory, neither should one understate them. Many scholars have attempted to soften its implications, as if Hegel did not really mean what he said.27 They maintain that, even though Hegel gives more status to philosophy than art, he still thinks that art is one medium for the cognition of the absolute, so that it should have an important role in modern culture. Basing their argument upon the general structure of the dialectic, they point out that Hegel uses his technical term ‘aufheben’, which means that something has been preserved as well as cancelled in a higher synthesis. Since art is preserved in the dialectic, they infer that it should persist in the modern era, and indeed continue to have its old function as one form of representing the absolute.
但是如果说我们不应夸大黑格尔理论的诸多含义，那么，也不应低估它们。很多学者试图缓和它的蕴含，好像黑格尔的意思实际上不是他所说的意思。他们坚持认为，尽管黑格尔给予了哲学比艺术更高的地位，他仍然认为艺术是绝对认识的一种中介，所以它应该在现代文化中扮演重要角色。通过将他们的论证建立在辩证法的一般结构之上，他们指出黑格尔用了他的专门术语“扬弃（aufheben）”，这意味着在一个更高的综合中，某物被保存也被取消了。由于艺术被保存在辩证法中，他们推断它应该在现时代继续存在，甚至继续葆有其古老的功能，即作为表象绝对的形式之一。
A closer examination shows, however, that Hegel’s theory has harsher implications than these scholars admit. The general principles of the dialectic establish nothing about the enduring presence of art, still less its significance, in modern society. While the dialectic indeed preserves its preceding stages, their preservation does not imply their continual existence, only that they have shaped the present. It is perfectly compatible with the structure of the dialectic, therefore, for art to disappear entirely. More importantly, however, Hegel does not think that art will perform a central role in the modern world. For, as we shall soon see, he maintains that the modern artist is so alienated from society, culture and state that he has lost irredeemably his role as a spokesman for its fundamental beliefs and values. While art will indeed continue, it will do so in a greatly reduced role: it will be nothing more than a form of individual self-expression.
然而，进一步的考察表明，黑格尔的理论所具有的含义，比这些学者所承认的要更加刺耳。辩证法的一般原则关于艺术在现代社会的持存没有确立任何东西，更不用说它的意义了。虽然辩证法确实保留了它的前阶段，但这些阶段的保留并不意味着它们的继续存在，只是说它们塑造了现在。因此，艺术的完全消失与辩证法的结构完美兼容。然而，更为重要的是，黑格尔并不认为艺术将要在现代世界中发挥核心的作用。因为，正如我们即将看到的，他认为现代艺术家与社会、文化和国家如此地相异化，已经无可挽救地丧失了他作为它的基本信念和价值的代言人的角色。尽管艺术事实上将会继续存在，但它将扮演一种大大弱化了的角色：它将只不过是个体自我表达的一种形式。
Granted that Hegel’s theory has such severe implications, why does he state it in the first place? What reasons does he have for thinking that art would be obsolete in the modern world? The premises behind Hegel’s theory are complex and interleaving. Some are historical, others epistemological, still others cultural. While some are more powerful than his detractors assume, others are weaker than his defenders admit.
假使黑格尔的理论有如此严格的含义，那么他为何要一开始就陈述它呢？他有什么理由认为艺术在现代世界过时了呢？黑格尔理论背后的前提错综复杂。有些是历史的，有些是认识论上的，还有些是文化上的。有些比他的诋毁者所设想的更有力，有些则比他的拥护者所承认的更微弱。
Hegel’s belief in the obsolescence of the arts was already built into his general classification of the epochs of art history, which structures the entire first half of the Aesthetics. He saw three fundamental epochs of art history, each of them corresponding to one moment in the development of the idea. (1) The first epoch, which appeared in ancient Persian, Indian and Egyptian culture, was the symbolic. This era had for its object the idea in itself, the idea in its undeveloped and inchoate stage, the infinite that has not yet embodied itself in the finite world. This stage of the idea was represented in the pantheistic religions of the Orient. Because the idea at this stage is still abstract and indeterminate, it cannot be adequately or fully represented through the sensual media of art, which are concrete and determinate. Hence there could be no match, and indeed only a gulf, between the idea and its sensual representation in symbolic art. The medium of symbolic art was the symbol, an image that had some of the qualities of its object; but since the image had other qualities irrelevant to the object it symbolized, it was never a perfect representation of its object. Because of the poor match between a symbol and its object, Hegel regarded symbolic art as really a form of ‘pre-art’, which did not realize the ideal of all art, the perfect unity of form and content. (2) The second epoch, which appeared in ancient Greece, was the classical. This era had for its object the idea in the stage of its externalization, as it manifested itself in the finite world. This stage of the idea was represented in the anthropomorphic religions of the classical world. Since the idea is now in the stage of its externalization, manifesting itself in concrete form, it is perfectly represented through the sensual media of art. The object of art is not simply a symbol of the divine; but it is the manifestation and appearance of the divine. Hence Hegel thinks that classical art fully realized the ideal of beauty: a perfect unity of form and content. (3) The third epoch, which is marked by the Christian era, is the romantic. The idea has now created a realm of spiritual inwardness. It has returned into itself after manifesting itself in the world of sense. Since the Christian God is purely spiritual, and since the media of art are sensual, it cannot be represented in artistic form. The gulf between aesthetic media and their object in symbolic art now returns. All that romantic art can express is the Christian ethic of love, since love does have a sensual appearance and embodiment.
黑格尔关于艺术过时的信念早已成为他对艺术史时代的一般划分，这一部分内容构成了《美学》的整个上半部分。他看到了艺术史的三个基本时期，每一个时期都与理念发展过程中的一个环节（moment）相对应。（1）第一时期是出现于古代波斯、印度和埃及文化中的象征的（symbolic）时期。这个时代的对象是自在的理念（the idea in itself），理念尚处于不发达和未完成的阶段，无限尚未在有限世界中具体化自身。理念的这一阶段在东方的（the Orient）泛神论宗教中得到表象。因为这一阶段的理念仍然是抽象和无规定的，它不能充分或完全地通过艺术的感性中介被表象，因为后者是具体和有规定的。因此，在象征型艺术的理念和感性表象之间不相匹配，甚至存在着一道鸿沟。象征型艺术的中介是象征（symbol），一种具有对象的某些特点的图像；但由于图像还具有与其象征的对象无关的其他特点，因此它绝不会是对象的一个完美的表象。由于象征与其对象之间匹配比较蹩脚，黑格尔将象征型艺术视为一种“前—艺术（preart）”的形式，这种形式尚未实现所有艺术的理念，即形式和内容的完美统一。（2）第二个时期是出现于古希腊的古典的时期。这个时代的对象是外化阶段的理念，它将自身展现于有限世界中。理念的这一阶段在古代世界的神人同形的宗教中得到表象。由于理念现在处于外化阶段，在具体的形式中显示自身，因此它通过艺术的感性中介被完美表象。艺术的对象不再只是一个神圣的象征；而是神圣的显示和显现。因而黑格尔认为，古典型艺术完全实现了美的理念：形式与内容之间完美的统一。（3）第三时期以基督教时代为标志，是浪漫的时期。理念现在已经创造了一个精神内在性（spiritual inwardness）的领域。在感性世界中显示自己之后，理念又回到了自身之中。由于基督教的上帝是纯粹精神性的，并且由于艺术的中介是感性的，因此它不能在艺术形式中被表象。在象征型艺术那里存在着的审美中介和其对象之间的鸿沟现在又回来了。全部浪漫型艺术所能表达的无非是基督教爱的伦理，因为爱确实有一个感性的显现和具体化。
The dialectic behind Hegel’s classification is unique, showing none of the growth and progression typical of its structure. The shape of this dialectic is parabolic, marked by the gradual ascent, climax and eventual descent of the representative powers of art. Hegel himself characterizes the three stages in such parabolic terms. As he puts it, the symbolic stage marks a striving toward the ideal of beauty; the classical stage marks the achievement of this ideal; and the romantic marks the surpassing of this ideal (XIII, 114/81).
黑格尔上述划分背后的辩证法是独特的，没有表现出它的结构所特有的生长性和发展性。这种辩证法的结构是抛物线式的，以艺术的表象性力量的逐渐上升、达到顶峰以及最终衰落为标志。黑格尔以这种抛物线式的术语描述了三个阶段的特征。正如他所说的，象征型阶段标志着对美的理念的一种奋进（striving）；古典型阶段标志着这种理念的完成（achievement）；而浪漫型阶段则标志着对于这种理念的超越（surpassing）（XIII, 114/81）。
However uncharacteristic, the immediate implication of Hegel’s dialectic is plain: that art has no future. The basic problem with art in the modern world is that it cannot represent the fundamental truths behind its characteristic religion: Christianity. Since Christianity remains the dominant religion of the modern world, since its spiritual truths resist sensible representation, art is not an adequate medium to express our fundamental beliefs and aspirations. If we are to comprehend the spiritual truths of Christianity, we need the purely intellectual medium of thought, and so philosophy should replace art in the modern world.
无论多么不同寻常，此处黑格尔辩证法的直接含义是显而易见的：艺术没有未来。艺术在现代世界的基本问题是，它不再能表象其特有宗教——基督教——背后的基本真理。由于基督教仍然是现代世界的主导性宗教，并且其精神性的真理抵制感性的表象，因此，艺术不再是一个表达我们的基本信念和抱负的合适中介。如果我们要领会基督教的精神性真理，我们需要纯粹理智性的思维中介，所以在现代世界，哲学应取艺术而代之。
Obviously, Hegel’s classification of the epochs of art history betrays his classical taste. For Hegel, art essentially revolves around the ideal of beauty, which consists in the perfect unity of form and content, the appearance of the idea in sensual form. Like Winckelmann, Hegel held that this ideal had been perfectly realized in classical Greek art. The Greeks were able to attain this ideal, Hegel explains, chiefly because of their religion. There was no gulf between the ideal and its sensual form in Greek art because Greek religion was fundamentally anthropomorphic (XIII, 102, 111/72, 79). Since the Greeks conceived of divinity in human form, they could express the divine perfectly through the human body. Hence for Hegel, as for Winckelmann, Greek sculpture represents the pinnacle of its aesthetic achievement (XIV, 87, 92/486, 490). After Greek sculpture, it was impossible for art to achieve anything more; art had effectively reached its end. And so Hegel declares: ‘The classical art form had reached the highest that can be achieved through the sensualization of art; and if there is something deficient about it, that is only because of art itself and the limits of the sphere of art’ (XIII, 111/72; XIV, 127–8/517).
显然，黑格尔关于艺术史时代的划分，暴露了他的古典趣味。对黑格尔来说，艺术本质上围绕着美的理念而展开，它包括形式和内容的完美统一，即理念在感性形式中的显现。像温克尔曼一样，黑格尔认为这个理念在古典希腊艺术中曾经完美地实现过。黑格尔解释道，古希腊人之所以能够实现这个理念，主要是由于他们的宗教。在古希腊艺术中，理念和它的感性形式之间并无鸿沟，因为古希腊宗教根本上是人神同形的（XIII, 102，111/72，79）。由于古希腊人以人的形式设想神性（divinity），因此他们可以通过人体完美地表达神圣（divine）。因而，对于黑格尔，正如对于温克尔曼，古希腊雕塑代表了其美学成就的巅峰（XIV, 87，92/486，490）。在此之后，艺术断无可能取得更高的成就；艺术事实上达到了它的终结（end）。因此黑格尔宣布：“古典的艺术形式已经达到了通过艺术的感性化能够达到的最高峰；如果它仍有什么不足的话，那仅仅是由于艺术本身以及艺术领域的局限。”（XIII, 111/72；XIV, 127–8/517）
Given such a declaration, Hegel’s theory about the obsolescence of art comes as no surprise. This theory was his lament for the loss of the classical ideal. Art had no future simply because its glory lay in the past, and its past was unrecoverable. Unlike Winckelmann and the neo-classicists, Hegel did not believe that it was possible to imitate Greek art. Any attempt to revive Greek art would be doomed to artificiality and affectation, because Greek art was the unique product of its time and place, which was now gone for ever. Since the achievement of Greek art rested upon its anthropomorphic religion, it would be impossible to revive it in a more enlightened age. For who nowadays, Hegel asks, believes in the gods (XIV, 233/ 603)? The modern era is so critical that it would never accept the beautiful myths that had been the heart of Greek religion. Hence Hegel rejected the romantic dream of a new mythology.
有了这样的声明，黑格尔关于艺术过时了的理论就显得不足为奇了。这个理论是他对古典理想之失落的挽歌。艺术没有未来仅仅因为它的光荣留存于过去，而它的过去再也不可恢复了。不同于温克尔曼和新古典主义者，黑格尔不相信摹仿古希腊艺术是可能的。任何试图复兴古希腊艺术的努力都注定走向矫揉（artificiality）和做作（affectation），因为古希腊艺术是那已经一去不复返了的时代和地方的独特产物。由于古希腊艺术的成就取决于它的人神同形论的宗教，因此，在一个民智觉醒、更加开明的时代去复兴它是不可能的。黑格尔问道，现在谁人还相信诸神（XIV, 233/603）？现时代如此具有批判性（critical），以至于它绝不会接受那曾经是古希腊宗教之核心的美丽神话。因此黑格尔拒绝了一个新神话的浪漫梦想。
As explained so far, Hegel’s theory seems to rest upon some dubious premises. It assumes that classical art is the epitome of artistic achievement, that art must have a religious vocation, and that Christianity will remain the dominant ideological force of the modern world. It is striking that all these premises were questioned by Schiller and the early romantics, who argued that art was of enduring importance in the modern world precisely because of the decline of Christianity. Since Christianity had fallen victim to the criticism of the Enlightenment, art should replace religion, because it alone could support morality in a popular manner appealing to the heart and the imagination. Philosophy, with all its abstract concepts and abstruse reasoning, could never play this role.
正如迄今所解释的，黑格尔的理论似乎依赖于一些可疑的前提。它假设古典艺术是艺术成就的缩影，艺术必须有一个宗教的使命，并且基督教仍将是现代世界的主导性的意识形态力量。引人注意的是，所有这些前提都受到席勒（Schiller）和早期浪漫派的质疑，他们认为，正是由于基督教的衰落，艺术才在现代世界具有持久的重要性。由于基督教已经成为启蒙运动的批判之牺牲品，艺术应该取代宗教，因为只有艺术才能以一种大众化的方式诉诸心灵和想象力，以支持道德。哲学，由于其抽象的概念和深奥的推理，永远不能扮演这个角色。
But, however questionable these premises might be, they are not essential to Hegel’s theory, which is independent of his classicism and his classification of artistic epochs. The deeper rationale for his theory lies in his diagnosis of the trends and values of modern culture and society (pp. 231–3). In his opening account of the obsolescence of art in the introduction to his lectures, Hegel explains that art has lost its place in modern culture because that culture is so fundamentally rationalistic. Hegel calls it Reflexionskultur, where ‘reflection’ means our power of critical and abstract thinking. Such a culture is not conducive to art, he explains, because art addresses our sensibility, but we want to express truth in abstract form, in terms of laws, rules and maxims (XIII, 24–5/10). The whole of modern culture is more appropriate to aesthetics, to thinking about art rather than artistic production itself. If philosophy arises only when an age has grown old, then aesthetics, the philosophy of art, should arise only when art too has had its day.
但是，无论这些前提可能多么成问题，它们对黑格尔的理论来说并非本质性的，他的理论是独立于他的古典主义和他关于艺术时代的划分的。他的理论更深的理据存在于他对现代文化和社会之趋势和价值的诊断中（页231-3）。在他对艺术过时的公开叙述中，黑格尔解释说，因为文化根本上是如此理性化的，所以艺术在现代文化中已经失去了地位。黑格尔将现代文化称为反思文化（Reflexionskultur），在这种文化中，“反思（reflection）”意味着我们的批评和抽象思维的力量。他解释道，这样一种文化是不利于艺术的，因为艺术表达了我们的感性，但是我们想要用抽象的形式，即用法则、规则和准则来表达真理（XIII, 24–5/10）。整个现代文化更适合于美学（aesthetics），即对艺术的思考而非艺术产品本身。如果哲学只有在一个时代已经衰老的时候才会出现，那么美学，即艺术的哲学，也应该只有在艺术已经辉煌不再了的时代才会出现。
When we examine Hegel’s argument more closely, however, it becomes clear that the problem with modern culture is not its rationalism as such, but the effect such rationalism has had on the artist. Since rationalism demands that the individual always think critically and independently, it alienates him or her from the community. Rather than identifying with its customs, laws and religion, the modern individual constantly questions them, accepting and rejecting them strictly according to whether they satisfy the demands of his or her own conscience and reason. The happy harmony between the individual and society, which was the precondition for art in the classical age, has been destroyed in modern society. Since the Greek artist was not alienated from the religion and culture of his people, he became their spokesman, indeed their priest (XIV, 25–6, 232/437, 603). While the content of classical art was given to the artist by the culture and religion of his people, the modern artist must create his or her content, so that it has only an individual significance. They simply play with the content of their art, treating it with complete indifference, much like a dramatist treats the characters in a play (XIV, 235/605–6).
然而，当我们更加仔细地考察黑格尔的论证，我们可以清楚地看到，现代文化的问题并不是它的理性主义本身，而是这样的理性主义对艺术家的影响。由于理性主义要求个人总是批判地和独立地思考，这使他或她与共同体相异化。现代人与其说认同其习俗、法律和宗教，不如说是在不断地质疑它们，严格按照它们是否满足了他或她自身良心和理性的要求，来选择接受或拒绝它们。作为古典时代艺术之前提的个人与社会之间的水乳交融（happy harmony），在现代社会荡然无存。由于古希腊艺术家并未与他的民族的宗教和文化相异化，因此他成为他们的代言人，甚至他们的祭司（priest）（XIV, 25–6，232/437，603）。古典艺术的内容是通过民族的文化和宗教而给予艺术家的，现代艺术家则必须创造他或她的内容，后者因此只具有一种个体的意义。对他们的艺术内容，他们只是加以把玩，以完全漠不相干的态度对待它，就像一个剧作家对待剧中的人物一样（XIV, 235/605–6）。
The epitome of the artist’s alienation from his community, in Hegel’s view, is contemporary romantic art. The aesthetic of artistic alienation is romantic irony. Since he had developed his critical powers to their fullest, the romantic artist remained distanced from everything. His irony expressed his detachment, his eagerness to stand back from and criticize any content whatsoever. Nothing stood above his own creative powers, which could make anything into a work of art. The result was that art had lost its subject matter – the fundamental values and beliefs of a culture – and so ceased to address its fundamental needs and aspirations. Art had now degenerated into little more than self-expression, and it assumed as many different forms as there are individuals to express themselves. If, however, art were only self-expression, then it had ceased to play a role in culture or history. To be sure, art was not dead, and it would continue as long as artists continued to express themselves. But the crucial question is whether art is still important, whether it had any significance beyond individual self-expression. And here Hegel’s answer was a decisive ‘No’.
在黑格尔看来，艺术家与其共同体相异化的一个缩影就是当代的浪漫型艺术。艺术之异化的审美观即是浪漫派的反讽。由于浪漫派艺术家充分发挥了他的批判性力量，因此他遗世而独立。他的反讽表达了他的超然（detachment），他急切地从一切内容中站出来并且批评一切。没有什么能够超越他自身的创造力，后者可以将任何东西做成一件艺术品。结果是艺术失去了它的主题——一种文化的基本价值和信念——并且因此不再表达它的基本需求和抱负。现在艺术已经退化成几乎是一种纯粹的自我表达，并且有多少要表达自我的个体，它就呈现为多少种不同的形式。然而，如果艺术只是自我表达，那么它就不再在文化或历史中登台亮相了。可以肯定的是，艺术并没有死亡，并且只要艺术家继续表达他们自己，它就会继续下去。但关键问题是艺术是否仍然重要，它是否还有任何超出个体之自我表达的重要性。在这里，黑格尔的回答是一个坚定的“不”字。
Hence Hegel’s theory of the obsolescence of art ultimately rested upon his diagnosis of the alienation endemic to modern politics and culture. As such his theory was independent of his classicism, and indeed his belief in the enduring vitality of Christianity. The fundamental challenge facing art in the modern world was the same as that confronting the state: the powerful alienating force of the right of subjectivity. Just as that right had separated the individual from the state, so it did the same to the artist and the culture of his age. The source of the problem was irremovable, since the right of subjectivity was fundamental to and characteristic of the modern world.
因此黑格尔关于艺术过时的理论最终基于他对现代政治和文化特有的异化之诊断。而他的理论独立于他的古典主义，甚至独立于他对基督教持久生命力的信念。艺术在现代世界面临的基本挑战与国家面临的挑战一样：主体性权利所具有的强大的异化力量。正如那个权利将个体与国家相分离，它同样将艺术家与他时代的文化相分离。由于主体性的权利是现代世界的基础和特征，因此病灶无法移除。
One might ask: Why did Hegel not think there could be a reconciliation between the modern artist and his age, just as there could be one for the modern individual and the state? Why not a new higher synthesis, where the artist expresses the fundamental beliefs and values of his culture on a higher level? But it is just in raising this question that we can see the deeper reasons for Hegel’s pessimism about art. For he had always insisted that the reconciliation of the modern individual with society and state could take place only on the level of reflection. The structure of modern society and the state would have to satisfy the demands of critical rationality; and it was just these demands that could not be satisfied by art. Art appealed to the senses and feeling, not to a detached critical reason. What the modern individual ultimately needed was an explanation, a reason, not an allegory, a novel or a play.
人们可能会问：为什么黑格尔不认为在现代艺术家和他的时代之间会达成和解，就像现代个人和国家之间可能会有的那样？为什么不是一个新的更高的综合，在那里，艺术家在一个更高的层次上，表达其文化的基本信念和价值？但正是在提出这个问题的过程中，我们看到了黑格尔对艺术的悲观主义的深层次原因。因为他总是强调现代个人与社会和国家的和解只能发生在反思的层次上。现代社会和国家的的结构必须满足批判理性（critical rationality）的要求，而艺术恰恰满足不了这些要求。艺术诉诸感官和感觉，而非一个超然的批判理性（critical reason）。现代人最终需要的是一种解释、一个理由，而不是一个寓言、一本小说或一部戏剧。
