英文早读第67篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。
The financial results of TNP were as follows:
TNP的财务结果如下：
(1) On the bonds we invested 260,773 and had an average holding period of slightly under five months. We received 6 1/2% interest on our money and realized a capital gain of 14,446. This works out to an overall rate of return of approximately 20% per annum.
（1）在债券上我们投资了26万773美元，持股平均略少于5个月。我们收到了6.5%的利息基于我们的本金，并实现了资金获利1万4446美元。这是我们整体回报率大约每年20%。
(2) On the stock and warrants we have realized capital gain of 89,304, and we have stubs presently valued at 2,946. From an investment of 146,000 in April, our holdings ran to 731,000 in October. Based on the time the money was employed, the rate of return was about 22% per annum.
（2）在股票和认股权上我们实现资金获益8万9304美金，并且我们持有现在价值2946美金残值。从在4月投资14万6000美元，我们的持股在10月涨到了73万1000美元。基于在我们资金使用的时间，回报率大约每年20%。
In both cases, the return is computed on an all equity investment. I definitely feel some borrowed money is warranted against a portfolio of workouts, but feel it is a very dangerous practice against generals.
在这两种情况，回报率都是基于全部自持资金投资计算。我很确信感到一些借款是必要的用于套利类组合，但是我觉得这在一般类上是危险的动作。
We are not presenting TNP as any earth-shaking triumph. We have had workouts which were much better and some which were poorer. It is typical of our bread-and-butter type of operation. We attempt to obtain all facts possible, continue to keep abreast of developments and evaluate all of this in terms of our experience. We certainly don't go into all the deals that come along -- there is considerable variation in their attractiveness. When a workout falls through, the resulting market value shrink is substantial. Therefore, you cannot afford many errors, although we fully realize we are going to have them occasionally.
我们不是将TNP作为震撼地球的成就来陈述。我们拥有套利类有的好很多，有的更差。这是一个典型的黄油加面包的运作类型。我们试图获得所有可能的方面，继续保持发展并依我们的经验评估所有这类交易。我们当然不会进入随之而来的所有交易——他们在吸引力上差别很大。当一个套利类失败，导致市场价值缩水是巨大的。因此，你付不起太多错误，尽管我们充分认识到我们获得这个结果也是偶然的。
DEMPSTER MILL MFG.
邓普斯特磨具公司
This situation started as a general in 1956. At that time the stock was selling at 18 with about 72 in book value of which 50 per share was in current assets (Cash, receivables and inventory) less all liabilities. Dempster had earned good money in the past but was only breaking even currently.
这个交易在1956年以一般类启动。在那时，这个股票售价18美金，伴随着账面价值72美金，其中每股50美金是除去债务的现金资产（现金，应收款和存货）。邓普斯特在过去盈利良好，但是仅仅最近骤减。
The qualitative situation was on the negative side ( a fairly tough industry and unimpressive management), but the figures were extremely attractive. Experience shows you can buy 100 situations like this and have perhaps 70 or 80 work out to reasonable profits in one to three years. Just why an particular one should do so is hard to say at the time of purchase, but the group expectancy is favorable, whether the impetus is from an improved industry situation, a takeover offer, a change in investor psychology, etc.
定性来看是不好的（一个相当费劲的行业和平平的管理），但是数字尤其吸引人。经验表明你可以购买类似100个这样的交易，或许有70或80家会在一到三年盈利可观。仅仅为什么其中一个应该做，在购买时是很难说清的，但是整体期望是可喜的，不论动力来自于提升的行业水平，一个收购请求，投资者心理变化等等。
We continued to buy the stock in small quantities for five years. During most of this period I was a director and was becoming consistently less impressed with the earnings prospects under existing management. However, I also became more familiar with the assets and operations and my evaluation of the quantitative factors remained very favorable.
我们随后五年持续小量购买这只股票。在大部份时间我是董事，变得持续对在现有管理层下盈利期望感觉平平。然而，我也变得对资产和运作更加熟悉，我对定量方面的评估仍非常可观。
By mid-1961 we owned about 30% of Dempster (We had made several tender offers with poor results), but in August and September 1961 made, several large purchases at 30.25 per share, which coupled with a subsequent tender offer at the same price, brought our holding to over 70%. Our purchases over the previous five years had been in the 16-25 range.
在1961年中，我们持有邓普斯特大约30%（我们做了一些温和的出价但结果一般），但是在1961年8月和9月，一些大量的购买以每股30.25成交，后来又以同样价格做了些温和的订单，是我们持股超过70%。我们在过去5年的购买价格在16-25美金之间。
On assuming control, we elevated the executive vice president to president to see what he would do unfettered by the previous policies. The results were unsatisfactory and on April 23, 1962 we hired Harry Bottle as president.
获得控制后，我们提拔了执行副总作为总裁，来看在现在政策下他能无拘束的做些什么。结果不太令人满意，在1962年4月23日，我们雇佣了亨利波特作为总裁。
119.triumph：胜利；巨大成功；典范；狂喜；重大成就；战胜
120.umimpressive：给人印象不深的；普通的；平庸的
121.expectancy：预期；期望；预料
122.impetus：动力；推动；促进；刺激
123.takeover：收购；接管；接收
124.psychology：心理；心理学；心理特征
125.tender：柔软的；嫩的；温柔的；亲切的；慈善的
126.assuming：假如；假设；假定；傲慢的；取得（权力）；显露（特征）；就（职）
127.elevate：提升；使升高；抬高；晋升
128.unfettered：自由的；不受约束的；无限制的
