Chapter 5 Logic and dialectics
正如我在本书前言中所说，我不打算去阐释黑格尔的《逻辑学》。As I said in my preface, it is not my intention to give an exposition of Hegel’s Science of Logic. 但另一方面，我又不愿留给读者一种错误的印象，就好像《逻辑学》在黑格尔整个哲学体系中并不重要或只是外围工作。On the other hand, I do not wish to leave the reader with the mistaken impression that the Logic is an unimportant or peripheral work in the overall structure of Hegel’s philosophy. 因此，我也要谈谈黑格尔写作《逻辑学》的目的。I shall therefore say something about what Hegel set out to achieve in the Logic. 借此机会，我将解释一下往往被视为黑格尔在逻辑方面最伟大发现的辩证法。In so doing, I shall take the opportunity to explain that aspect of logic so frequently said to be Hegel’s greatest discovery, the dialectical method.
黑格尔的逻辑观念
Hegel’s conception of logic
黑格尔在《逻辑学》导言中告诉我们，逻辑的目标是真理。The goal of logic, Hegel tells us in the introduction to his Science of Logic, is truth. 这一切都没什么问题，但那是一种什么样的真理呢？That is all very well, but what sort of truth? 黑格尔从对这一学科的传统看法开始谈起，传统看法从一开始就把形式与内容分开，认为逻辑研究的是正确思考或有效思考的形式，而不管其内容是什么。Hegel begins by referring to the traditional view of the subject, which begins with a separation between form and content, and takes logic to be the study of the form of true or valid thought, irrespective of its content. 通常所理解的逻辑研究的是下面这样的论证形式：Logic as usually conceived studies forms of argument like:
所有是A的东西都是B，
x是A，
因此x是B。
Everything that is A is B
x is A
Therefore x is B
这里我们有了一种没有内容的形式。分别对应于A、B和x，我们可以写“人”“会死的”和“苏格拉底”，或者“四条腿的动物”“有毛皮的”和“我的宠物乌龟”。Here we have a form without content. We could write ‘human’, ‘mortal’, and ‘Socrates’ for A, B, and x respectively; or we could write ‘four-legged animal’, ‘furry’, and ‘my pet tortoise’. 在这两种情况下，该论证都是有效的，尽管如果前提错误，结论也可能错误。The argument is valid in either case, though where there is a false premise, the conclusion may also be false. 有效性关乎形式，而非内容。逻辑学家对内容不感兴趣。Validity is a matter of form, not content. To the logician the content is of no interest.
这种形式与内容的分离使得逻辑无法告诉我们有关现实世界的任何东西。It follows from this separation of form and content that logic tells us nothing about the actual world. 即使人不会死，或者乌龟有毛皮，逻辑所描述的论证形式也是一样。The forms of argument which logic describes would be exactly as they are if humans were immortal, or if tortoises were furry. 即使根本就没有人和乌龟，这些形式也不会改变。They would not change if there were no humans or tortoises at all.
如果我们还记得黑格尔在《精神现象学》中是如何通过质疑认知者与被认识对象之间的通常区分而开始研究认识问题的，If we recall how in the Phenomenology Hegel began to investigate the problem of knowledge by challenging the commonly assumed distinction between the knower and what is known, 那么当我们得知，黑格尔提到这种形式与内容的传统区分只是为了否定它，就不会感到奇怪了。it should come as no surprise to learn that Hegel mentions this traditional distinction between form and content only in order to deny it. 黑格尔说，逻辑是对思想的研究。但是在《精神现象学》中他已经表明，没有独立于思想的客观实在。Logic, he says, is the study of thought; but in his Phenomenology of Mind he has already shown that there is no objective reality independent of thought. 思想就是客观实在，客观实在就是思想。Thought is objective reality, and objective reality is thought. 因此当逻辑研究思想时，它必定也在研究实在。Therefore when logic studies thought, it must also be studying reality. 黑格尔明确指出：“如果我们还想使用质料（matter）一词”，逻辑的内容就是“真正的名符其实的质料”。‘If we wish still to employ the word matter’, he says, rubbing the point home, the content of logic is ‘the true genuine matter’. 他进而为我们提供了逻辑主题的一些意象。He goes on to provide us with some images of the subject-matter of logic. 他说，逻辑就是真理本身，“真理本身是毫无蔽障、自在自为的”，It is, he says, ‘the truth as it is, without husk in and for itself’, 或者换句话说，“这个内容就是上帝的启示，展示永恒本质中的上帝在创造自然和一个有限的精神以前是怎样的”。or, to put it another way: ‘this content shows forth God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite mind’.
沃尔特·考夫曼称这句话“也许是黑格尔所有著作中最疯狂的意象”，然而它所暗示的思想却并非与逻辑说不出关于世界的任何东西这一传统看法完全无关。Walter Kaufmann calls this ‘perhaps the maddest image in all of Hegel’s writings’, but what it suggests is not entirely unrelated to the traditional view that logic tells us nothing about the world. 黑格尔说，逻辑不涉及自然界和有限精神的世界，这是部分接受了传统看法。In saying that logic is not about the world of nature and of finite minds, Hegel accepts part of the traditional view. 而他最急于摈弃的是这样一种观念，即实在或真理只有在自然界和人类世界中才能找到。The part he is most anxious to reject is the idea that reality, or truth, is to be found only in the world of nature and people. 恰恰相反，根据黑格尔的绝对唯心主义，终极实在只有到精神或理智而不是物质中才能找到。On the contrary, it follows from his absolute idealism that ultimate reality is to be found in what is mental or intellectual, not in what is material. 确切地说，只有在理性思想中才能找到。It is to be found, to be specific, in rational thought. 因此，逻辑研究的是纯粹的终极实在，这种实在已经从它在有限的人类精神或自然界中表现出来的特殊形式中抽象出来。Logic is therefore the study of this ultimate reality in its pure form, abstracted from the particular forms it takes in the finite minds of human beings or in the natural world.
黑格尔关于精神就是终极实在的看法对逻辑的重要性有进一步的影响。Hegel’s view of mind as ultimate reality has a further consequence for the importance of logic. 既然精神塑造世界，那么研究理性思想将会揭示塑造世界所依据的原则。Since mind shapes the world, a study of rational thought will reveal the principles on which the world has been shaped. 用黑格尔自己的意象来说就是：理解上帝创世之前的永恒本质就是理解创世的依据。To put it in terms of Hegel’s own image: to understand God’s eternal essence before the creation of the world is to understand the basis on which the world was created.
辩证法
The dialectical method
马克思在写作《资本论》时曾写信给恩格斯说： While working on a draft of Capital Marx wrote to Engels: 我碰巧又把黑格尔的《逻辑学》浏览了一遍，这在处理事实的方法上帮了我很大的忙。In the method of treatment the fact that by mere accident I again glanced through Hegel’s Logic has been of great service to me … ……如果以后再有工夫做这类工作的话，我很愿意用两三个印张把黑格尔所发现，但同时又加以神秘化的方法中所存在的合理的东西阐述一番，使一般人都能够理解……If there should ever be time for such work again, I would greatly like to make accessible to the ordinary human intelligence, in two or three printer’s sheets, what is rational in the method which Hegel discovered but at the same time enveloped in mysticism …
马克思这里提到的方法当然是辩证法，黑格尔称之为学术阐释和科学阐释的“唯一正确的方法”。The method Marx is referring to is of course the dialectical method, which Hegel describes as ‘the only true method’ of scholarly and scientific exposition. 他在《逻辑学》中正是用辩证法来揭示纯粹思维形式的。It is the method he uses in the Logic to uncover the form of pure thought.
马克思从未找到时间来写他对辩证法合理内容的解释。Marx never found the time to write his explanation of what is rational in the dialectical method. 不过其他许多人写了，而且远比马克思打算写的要长。Many others did, however, and they were by no means as brief as Marx had intended to be. 在这些评注家当中，有些人吹嘘辩证法可以替代所有之前的逻辑形式，可以取代像本章开头给出的简单三段论那样的普通推理。Some of these commentators build up dialectics into an alternative to all previous forms of logic, something that supersedes such ordinary reasoning as the simple syllogistic form of argument set out on the first page of this chapter. 但在黑格尔那里，没有任何东西可以证明这些对辩证法的过分夸奖是正当的，Nor is there any need to treat the dialectical method, as others do, as something deep and mysterious. 也没有任何必要像另一些人那样，把辩证法当作某种神秘深奥的东西。Nor is there any need to treat the dialectical method, as others do, as something deep and mysterious. 黑格尔说，这是一种有着“单纯节奏”的方法，掌握它并不需要什么高超技巧。It is, Hegel says, a method with a ‘simple rhythm’ to dance to it takes no great skill.
事实上，我们在阐释《精神现象学》时一直在走辩证法的两个步骤，In our exposition of the Phenomenology we have in fact already been doing the dialectical two-step, 因为正如黑格尔所说，这部著作是“这种方法应用于一个更加具体的对象即意识的一个范例”。for that work is, as Hegel tells us, ‘an example of this method as applied to a more concrete object, namely consciousness. 只有黑格尔会把《精神现象学》中描述的意识看成一种相对具体的对象。No one but Hegel could think of consciousness as portrayed in the Phenomenology as a relatively concrete object. 不过黑格尔后来的著作中包含有辩证法的更加具体的例子。But more concrete examples of the dialectic are available in Hegel’s later works, 为了阐释的方便，让我们从《历史哲学》中的一个例子谈起。So for ease of exposition let us begin with an instance from the Philosophy of History.
在《历史哲学》中，一场宏大的辩证运动主导了从希腊到现在的世界历史。In the Philosophy of History, one immense dialectical movement dominates world history from the Greek world to the present. 希腊是一个基于惯常道德的社会，一个公民把自己等同于共同体并且想不到反对它的和谐社会。Greece was a society based on customary morality, a harmonious society in which citizens identified themselves with the community and had no thought of acting in opposition to it. 这个合乎习惯的共同体构成了辩证运动的起点，用专门术语来说就是正题。This customary community forms the starting point of the dialectical movement, known in the jargon as the thesis.
下一个阶段是，这个正题表现出了自己的不完善或不一致。The next stage is for this thesis to show itself to be inadequate or inconsistent. 就古希腊共同体而言，这种不完善是通过审问苏格拉底暴露出来的。In the case of the community of ancient Greece, this inadequacy is revealed through the questioning of Socrates. 希腊人是不能没有独立思想的，但独立的思想者却是惯常道德的死敌。The Greeks could not do without independent thought, but the independent thinker is the deadly foe of customary morality. 于是在独立思考的原则面前，这个基于习惯的共同体崩溃了。The community based on custom thus collapses in the face of the principle of independent thought. 现在轮到这条原则发展了，这是在基督教的影响下进行的。It is now the turn of this principle to develop, which it does under Christianity. 宗教改革使人们接受了个人良知的最高权利。The Reformation brings acceptance of the supreme right of individual conscience. 希腊共同体的和谐已经失去，但自由取得了胜利。The harmony of the Greek community has been lost, but freedom is triumphant. 这就是辩证运动的第二阶段。This is the second stage of the dialectical movement.它是第一阶段的对立面或否定，因此被称为反题。 It is the opposite or negation of the first stage, and hence is known as the antithesis.
然后，第二个阶段也表明自己是不完善的。The second stage then also shows itself to be inadequate. 事实证明，它所理解的自由过于抽象和贫瘠，无法充当社会的基础。Freedom, taken by itself, turns out to be too abstract and barren to serve as the basis for a society. 付诸实践后，绝对自由原则成了法国大革命的恐怖。Put into practice, the principle of absolute freedom turns into the Terror of the French Revolution. 于是我们可以看到，无论是惯常的和谐还是个体的抽象自由都是片面的。We can then see that both customary harmony and abstract freedom of the individual are one-sided. 必须把它们结合和统一起来，既保留它们，又避免其不同形式的片面性。They must be brought together, unified in a manner that preserves them, and avoids their different forms of one-sidedness. 这便引出了第三个阶段也是更完善的阶段，即合题。This results in a third and more adequate stage, the synthesis. 在《历史哲学》中，整个辩证运动的合题就是黑格尔时代的德意志社会。In the Philosophy of History, the synthesis in the overall dialectical movement is the German society of Hegel’s time, 他认为这个社会是和谐的，因为它是一个有机共同体，而它又保留了个体的自由，因为它是合理组织起来的。which he saw as harmonious because it is an organic community, yet preserving individual freedom because it is rationally organized.
学生时代的卡尔·马克思（1818-1883）
任何辩证运动都终止于合题，但并不是任何合题都会把辩证过程带到终点，就像黑格尔认为他那个时代的有机共同体已经把历史的辩证运动带到终点那样。Every dialectical movement terminates with a synthesis, but not every synthesis brings the dialectical process to a stop in the way that Hegel thought the organic community of his own time brought the dialectical movement of history to an end. 虽然合题恰当地调和了先前的正题和反题，但事实往往证明，合题在其他某个方面是片面的。Often the synthesis, though adequately reconciling the previous thesis and antithesis, will turn out to be onesided in some other respect. 于是它将充当一个新的辩证运动的正题而使过程继续下去。It will then serve as the thesis for a new dialectical movement, and so the process will continue. 在《精神现象学》中，我们看到这种过程发生了不止一次。We saw this happen more than once in the Phenomenology. 例如，讨论意识的那一节以自我意识的出现而结束。For example, the section on consciousness concluded with the emergence of self-consciousness. 我们把自我意识作为正题，看到它还需要某个对象以从中分化出自己，这个外部对象可被视为反题。Taking this as the thesis, we saw that self-consciousness needed some object from which to differentiate itself.The external object can be taken as the antithesis. 这并不能令人满意，因为外部对象是某种与自我意识异质或敌对的东西。This was unsatisfactory because the external object is something foreign or hostile to self-consciousness. 它们的合题就是欲望，自我意识在欲望中保留了外部对象，但使之成为自身的东西。The synthesis of these was desire, in which self-consciousness retains the external object, but makes it its own. 之后欲望的状态又被证明不能令人满意，于是我们走向了本身就是一个自我意识的外部对象。The state of desire in turn proved (literally) unsatisfactory, and so we moved to an external object which was itself a self-consciousness. 也许可以把这第二个自我意识看成第一个自我意识的反题，两者的合题则是主人统治奴隶从而获得承认的一种局面。The second self-consciousness might be regarded as the antithesis of the first, and the synthesis of these two was a situation in which master was dominant over slave, thereby obtaining acknowledgement. 这一新的合题并不比之前的合题更长久，因为奴隶最终要比主人具有更多的独立性和自我意识。This new synthesis proved no more lasting than its predecessors, for the slave ends up more independent and self-aware than the master. 这一反题在同时关于主人和奴隶的斯多亚主义哲学那里又找到了它的合题，如此等等。This antithesis found its synthesis in Stoicism, the philosophy of both master and slave … and so on.
在《逻辑学》中，同一方法被用于我们用以思维的那些抽象范畴。In the Logic this same method is applied to the abstract categories in which we think. 黑格尔首先讨论了最无规定性、最无内容的概念：有，或空洞的存在。Hegel starts with the most indeterminate, contentless concept of all: being, or bare existence. 他说，纯有就是纯粹的无规定性和空。Pure being, he says, is pure indeterminateness and vacuity. 纯有之中没有任何可以为思维所把握的对象。它完全是空。事实上，它就是无。Pure being has in it no object for thought to grasp. It is entirely empty. In fact, it is nothing.
《逻辑学》的辩证法就是从这个激动人心的开端向前发展的。From this breathtaking beginning the dialectic of the Logic moves forward. 第一个正题有，变成了它的反题无。The first thesis, being, has turned into its antithesis, nothing. 有和无既对立又同一，因此它们的真理就是这种彼此间的融合和分离，换句话说就是生成。Being and nothing are both opposites and the same; their truth, therefore, is this movement into and apart from each other – in other words, it is becoming.
就这样，辩证法继续向前发展，但我们不再进行追溯。So the dialectic leads on; but we shall not follow. 我们已经足以把握辩证法的思想了。We have seen enough to grasp the idea of the dialectical method. 对黑格尔而言，辩证法是一种阐释方法，但他说，这种方法“与它的对象和内容绝没有什么区别——因为推动它前进的正是内容本身，即它本身所拥有的辩证法”。For Hegel it is a method of exposition, but it is a method that, Hegel says, ‘is in no way different from its object and content – for it is the content in itself, the dialectic which it has in itself, that moves it on’. 在我们的思维范畴中，在意识的发展中，在历史的进步中，有许多对立因素导致了看似稳定的东西瓦解，由此产生的新东西调和了之前的对立因素，但也发展出了它自身的内在张力。In the categories of our thought, in the development of consciousness, and in the progress of history, there are opposing elements which lead to the disintegration of what seemed stable, and the emergence of something new which reconciles the previously opposing elements but in turn develops its own internal tensions. 这个过程是必然的，因为无论是思想还是意识都不可能以完满的形式产生出来。This process is a necessary one, because neither thought nor consciousness can spring into existence in an adequate form. 只有通过辩证发展的过程，它们才能达到完满。They can achieve adequacy only by the process of dialectical development. 根据黑格尔的说法，辩证法之所以能够充当一种阐释方法，是因为世界就是辩证运作的。According to Hegel, the dialectic works as a method of exposition because the world works dialectically.
绝对理念
The absolute idea
黑格尔《逻辑学》中最重要的目标很明确，那就是证明绝对唯心主义的必然性。Hegel’s overriding aim in the Logic is straightforward: to demonstrate the necessity of absolute idealism. 正如我们所看到的，他试图从空洞的概念——有——出发，表明这个概念由辩证的必然性导向了能够更为准确和真实地把握实在本质的其他一些概念。He seeks to do this by starting, as we have seen, from the bare concept of being, and showing that this concept leads by dialectical necessity to other concepts which more precisely and truly capture the nature of reality; 而这些概念同样被证明是不完善的，并需要其他概念，直到我们最终达到“绝对理念”为止。and these other concepts in turn prove inadequate and require others, until finally we reach ‘the absolute idea’, 关于绝对理念，黑格尔说：“一切其他东西都是错误、朦胧、意见、趋向、任意和可消逝性；of which Hegel says: ‘Everything else is error and gloom, opinion, striving, caprice and transitoriness; 唯有绝对理念是有，是不消逝的生命，是自知的真理并且是全部真理。”the absolute idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and the whole of truth.’ 因此，《逻辑学》与《精神现象学》很相似，只不过它是概念领域而不是意识领域中的运动。The Logic thus parallels the Phenomenology, except that it moves in the realm of concepts instead of in the realm of consciousness. 所以它的目标不是绝对知识，而是绝对理念本身。Accordingly it has as its goal not absolute knowledge, but the absolute idea itself. 至于它是否成功地证明了绝对唯心主义的必然性，我这里不去考虑。Whether it is successful in proving the necessity of absolute idealism is something I shall not consider here, 不过要想找到一位当今在世的哲学家相信黑格尔成功做到了这一点，恐怕要颇费一番气力。but one would have to search hard to find a philosopher alive today who believes that Hegel succeeds.
那么，什么是“绝对理念”呢？这个问题并不容易回答。So what is ‘the absolute idea’? That is not an easy question to answer. 最好的回答也许是：一切事物。但这听起来还不是很明白，所以我将试着说得更明确些。Perhaps the best answer is: everything. That, however, is not tremendously enlightening, so I shall try to be more specific.
黑格尔说，绝对理念“包含着每一个规定性”。Hegel says that the absolute idea ‘contains every determinate-ness’. 他的意思是，绝对理念在自身之中包含着每一个确定的或独特的事物——每一个人、每一棵树、每一颗星、每一座山、每一粒沙。By that he means that it includes within itself every determinate or distinct thing – every human being, every tree, every star, every mountain, every grain of sand. 他说，自然和心灵是显示绝对理念存在的不同方式，是绝对理念的不同形态。Nature and mind, he says, are different ways in which its existence is manifested: they are different forms of the absolute idea. 艺术和宗教则是领悟绝对理念的不同方式，Art and religion are different ways of comprehending the absolute idea; 或者用黑格尔的话说，艺术和宗教是绝对理念领悟它自身的不同方式。or, to put it exactly as Hegel does, art and religion are different ways in which the absolute idea comprehends itself. （这是一种将自己包括在内的自我领悟，因为人是绝对理念的一部分。）(That it is self-comprehension that is involved follows from the fact that human beings are part of the absolute idea.) 哲学也是领悟绝对理念的一种方式，但其形态要比艺术或宗教更高，因为它从概念上来把握绝对理念，因此不仅懂得其自身的领悟形式，而且也懂得审美和宗教的领悟形式。Philosophy, too, is a way of comprehending the absolute idea, but it is a higher form than art or religion because it grasps it conceptually, and consequently understands not only its own form of comprehension, but the aesthetic and religious forms as well.
以独特而有限的形态显示自身，然后返回自身，这属于绝对理念的本质。It is of the essence of the absolute idea to manifest itself in distinct, limited forms, and then to return to itself. 绝对理念以自我领悟的形式返回自身。Self-comprehension is the form in which it returns to itself. 这就是我们在《历史哲学》《精神现象学》以及现在在《逻辑学》中看到的过程。This is the process we observed in the Philosophy of History and the Phenomenology, and now observe in the Logic. 在《法哲学原理》所描述的那种理想国家中，自我领悟成了一种客观的社会形式。Self-comprehension becomes an objective social form in the ideal state described in the Philosophy of Right. 在《美学讲演录》和《宗教哲学讲演录》中，黑格尔把各种形式的艺术和宗教当作领悟绝对理念的样式来评价其完善性。In the Lectures on Aesthetics and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel assesses the adequacy of various forms of art and religion as modes of comprehending the absolute idea. 不论是表面上还是潜藏在深处，绝对理念的自我领悟都是黑格尔整个哲学的核心主题。On the surface or lurking beneath, the self-comprehension of the absolute is the dominant theme of all Hegel’s philosophy.
我曾说过，在黑格尔看来，绝对理念就是一切事物。I have said that for Hegel the absolute is everything. 我也说过，它试图领悟自身。I have also said that it seeks to comprehend itself. 于是我们又回到了对《精神现象学》的讨论结束时留下的一个悬而未决的问题：So we return again to the question we left unresolved at the conclusion of our discussion of the Phenomenology: 黑格尔真的相信包含一切事物在内的整个宇宙构成了某种有意识的东西吗？绝对理念是上帝吗？does Hegel really believe that the universe as a whole, and everything in it, forms some kind of conscious entity? Is the absolute idea God?
显然，虽然黑格尔是路德宗信徒，但他并非正统的基督教有神论者。It is clear that Hegel, notwithstanding his Lutheranism, was no orthodox Christian theist. 《精神现象学》关于“苦恼意识”那一节的要旨也时常出现于其他一些著作。The message of the section of the Phenomenology on ‘the unhappy consciousness’ is frequently repeated elsewhere in his works. 把上帝看成某种与世界分离的东西，这是使人的灵魂疏离。To regard God as something apart from the world is to alienate the soul of man. 如果上帝存在，他就在世界中，人则分有他的本性。If God exists, he is in the world, and human beings partake of his nature.
那么，黑格尔是否是一个断言上帝完全与世界同一的泛神论者呢？Then is Hegel a pantheist, one who asserts that God is simply identical with the world? 这种解释固然可能与他的某些说法一致，但在《宗教哲学讲演录》中，他明确反对泛神论，甚至否认有人说过“万物是上帝”。This interpretation would be consistent with some of the things he says, but in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Hegel explicitly rejects it, denying even that anyone has ever claimed that ‘all is God’. 当然，黑格尔并不认为特殊的事物和有限的人类就是上帝。Certainly Hegel does not think that particular things and finite human beings are literally God.
黑格尔有没有可能是一个无神论者呢？Could Hegel be an atheist, perhaps? 我们已经看到，他把哲学视为一种高于宗教的领悟绝对理念的方式。We have seen that he places philosophy above religion as a means of comprehending the absolute idea. 意大利哲学家贝内代托·克罗齐曾说，黑格尔的哲学是“完全不虔敬的，因为它并不满足于与宗教相对抗，或者让宗教与自己相并列，而是让宗教变成自己，并以自身去代替宗教”。The Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce described Hegel’s philosophy as ‘radically irreligious, because it is not content to oppose itself to religion or to range it alongside of itself, but it resolves religion into itself and substitutes itself for it’. 克罗齐正确地指出了为什么拒绝赋予宗教以最重要位置的黑格尔哲学在深层是不虔敬的。Croce was right to point to this sense in which Hegel’s philosophy, in refusing to yield pride of place to religion, is deeply irreligious; 但可以看出，黑格尔还有其他许多思想是有宗教气质的，yet there is so much else in Hegel’s thought that is recognizably in the religious mould. 比如他在描述《逻辑学》本质时所使用的那些意象和隐喻；There are his images and metaphors, like the one he used to describe the nature of the Logic. 还有他的历史哲学，旨在说明历史如何在精神的指引下朝着它的目标前进；There is his philosophy of history, which is intended to illustrate how history works towards its goal under the direction of mind. 还有他对终极实在的看法，认为终极实在能够领悟自身，这暗示终极实在是人格化的。There is also his view of ultimate reality as being able to comprehend itself, which suggests that ultimate reality is personal. 因此，把黑格尔说成无神论者违反了他的一些最核心的思想。To portray Hegel as an atheist is to go against some of his most central ideas.
黑格尔（1770-1831）
不是正统的有神论者，不是泛神论者，也不是无神论者——那会是什么呢？Not an orthodox theist, not a pantheist, not an atheist – what else is left? 若干年前，研究黑格尔的学者罗伯特·惠特莫尔指出，黑格尔是一个超泛神论者（panentheist）。Some years ago a Hegel scholar named Robert Whittemore argued that Hegel was a panentheist. 这个词来自希腊文，意思是“万物都在神之中”。它描述了这样一种观点，即宇宙万物都是神的一部分，The term comes from Greek words meaning ‘all in God’ it describes the view that everything in the universe is part of God, 但与泛神论（pantheism）不同，在超泛神论那里，神比宇宙更重要，but – and here it differs from pantheism – God is more than the universe, 因为神是整体，而整体要比它的所有部分之和更伟大。because he is the whole, and the whole is greater than the sum of all its parts. 这就像一个人不只是组成他身体的所有细胞一样——尽管这个人离开了身体就什么也不是。Just as a person is more than all the cells that make up his or her body – although the person is nothing separate from the body 所以根据这种观点，神要比宇宙的所有组成部分之和更多，但又不与它们相分离。– so on this view God is more than all the parts of the universe, but not separate from it. 同样，正如单独的细胞加起来并不等于一个人，宇宙的个别部分加起来也不等于神。Equally, just as no single cells amount to a person, so no individual parts of the universe amount to God.
惠特莫尔的解释似乎是有道理的，不仅是因为它与黑格尔关于上帝的具体说法相一致，Whittemore’s interpretation is plausible, not only because it is consistent with what Hegel says specifically about God, 而且因为它理解了黑格尔哲学最重要的主题。but also because it makes sense of the dominant theme of his philosophy. 如果上帝是绝对理念，是宇宙的终极实在，是其各个部分的整体，我们就可以理解为什么绝对理念必定会在世界中显示自身，并且在那里发展到自我领悟。If God is the absolute idea, the ultimate reality of the universe, the whole of its parts, we can understand why the absolute idea must manifest itself in the world, and there progress to self-comprehension. 上帝需要宇宙就像人需要身体一样。God needs the universe in the same way as a person needs a body.
上帝缺少了某种东西，大多数宗教信徒都会很反感这种想法。The idea that God can lack anything is repugnant to most religious believers. 在他们看来，黑格尔也许说的正是这样的事情，遂把他的哲学解释为不虔敬的。That Hegel might be saying such a thing is, in their eyes, a reason for interpreting his philosophy as irreligious; 但我认为这是错误的。but that is, I believe, a mistake. 因为黑格尔并没有把上帝看成永恒不变的，而是看成了一种需要在世界中显示自己的本质，在显示之后还要为了完善自己而去完善世界。For Hegel sees God not as eternal and immutable, but as an essence that needs to manifest itself in the world, and, having made itself manifest, to perfect the world in order to perfect itself. 这种想法虽然奇特，但却很有力量。It is a strange vision, but a powerful one. 它极为强调发展的必然性，因为历史的前进是上帝为了实现完满而必须走的道路。It is a vision that places immense weight on the necessity of progress: for the onward movement of history is the path God must take to achieve perfection. 黑格尔虽然外表保守，却对激进的革命思想家产生了巨大影响，其奥秘也许就在这里。Therein may lie the secret of the immense influence that Hegel, for all his outward conservatism, has had on radical and revolutionary thinkers.
