Six The Religious Dimension(1)
第六章 宗教的维度(1)
THE UNENDING DEBATE
永无止境的争论
Soon after Hegel’s death in 1831, a fierce dispute arose about the religious dimension of his thought.1 Left-wing Hegelians saw Hegel as a covert atheist or humanist, or at best a pantheist having only nominal affinities with official Christianity. Right-wing Hegelians embraced Hegel as a defender of the Christian faith, and indeed as an apologist for the Prussian Church. In their view, Hegel did for modern Protestantism what Aquinas had once done for medieval Catholicism: he too gave a rational foundation for the faith.
就在黑格尔1831年去世不久，立即兴起一场关于他的思想的宗教维度的激烈争论。1黑格尔派左翼把黑格尔视为一个偷偷摸摸的无神论者和人文主义者，或者至多是一个泛神论者，与官方的基督教只有名义上的联系。黑格尔派右翼则信奉黑格尔为基督教信仰的捍卫者，以及普鲁士教会的一位实实在在的辩护士。在他们的眼中，黑格尔为现代新教教义所作的工作和阿奎那一度为中世纪天主教教义所作的工作别无二致：他也在赋予信仰一个理性的基础。
Both sides could mass evidence in their behalf. The left-wing Hegelians could easily demonstrate that Hegel was no orthodox Protestant. His God was not transcendent but immanent; he had no time for miracles and the Bible; and he portrayed Christianity as a form of alienation between self and world. Was it indeed not Hegel who first declared ‘the death of God’? For their part, the right-wing Hegelians could stress Hegel’s concern to wed knowledge and faith, his attempt to rationalize the trinity and the incarnation, and his eagerness to find reason in the actual institutions of Prussia, first and foremost among them the Church. Indeed, the right had the most telling evidence of all: Hegel’s express declaration, on several occasions, that he was a Lutheran.
双方都可以从自身角度出发搜集大量证据。黑格尔派左翼能够轻而易举地证明，黑格尔绝非一个正统的清教徒。他的上帝不是超验的，而是内在的；他对于奇迹和《圣经》几乎没有什么兴趣；而且，他把基督教描绘为自我和世界之间的某种形式的外化。难道不是黑格尔第一个宣称“上帝之死”吗？从他们的角度出发，黑格尔派右翼可以强调黑格尔对于知识与信仰的结合念兹在兹，想方设法把三位一体和道成肉身的教义理性化，以及总是急不可待地在普鲁士的现实制度中——其中首先和最重要的是教会制度——寻求理性。的确，右翼有着所有证据中最有说服力的那一个：黑格尔在许多场合都曾直接明快地宣称，他是一个路德主义者。
The dispute continues today. To be sure, it has lost its political urgency; but the fundamental issues remain the same. Some scholars insist that the religious dimension of Hegel’s thinking is fundamental for all his thought, because Hegel’s basic aim is to rationalize the Christian faith.4 Others contend that the religious dimension is of negligible significance, a mere mystical gloss for Hegel’s essentially humanistic and atheistic agenda.5 Although they note that Hegel writes about God, they regard this as little more than a pious term for the universe. ‘The secret of Hegel’ is not that he was a Christian apologist but a covert atheist, ‘the precursor of atheistic humanism in German philosophy’.
这场争论一直延续到今天。可以确定的是，它已经失去了它的政治迫切性；但是基本的问题仍旧保持为同一个。某些学者坚称，黑格尔思想中的宗教维度对于他的全部思想而言是根本性的，因为黑格尔的基本目标是将基督教信仰理性化。4另外一些学者争论说，宗教维度的意义可以忽略不计，它不过是黑格尔本质上人本主义的和无神论的议程的故弄玄虚的掩饰。5尽管他们注意到黑格尔撰写了关于上帝的著述，但是他们认为这不过是对于宇宙的一个虔诚的术语。“黑格尔的秘密”不在于他是基督教的辩护士，而在于他是一个偷偷摸摸的无神论者，“德国哲学中无神论的人本主义的先驱”。
This dispute concerns much more than Hegel’s philosophy of religion. The underlying issue is fundamental for the interpretation of all his thought, for it concerns the very purpose of his philosophy. At stake here is the question whether it was Hegel’s purpose to defend or to undermine the Christian legacy. Furthermore, the question about the metaphysical dimension of Hegel’s philosophy, which we discussed in Chapter Three, is really derivative, depending on the role religion plays in Hegel’s philosophy. If religion is indeed central to Hegel’s concerns – if we must take literally his claim that philosophy and religion both have the divine for their subject matter – then all non-metaphysical interpretations of his philosophy will prove untenable.
这场争论涉及到的东西远远超出了黑格尔的宗教哲学。潜在的问题对于他的全部思想之阐释而言是根本性的，因为它涉及到他的哲学的真正目标。在这里悬而未决的是这样一个问题，黑格尔的目标是对于基督教的遗产百般辩护，还是斩草除根。此外，我们在第三章中讨论过的、黑格尔哲学的形而上学维度问题，实际上是派生性的，依赖于宗教在黑格尔哲学中所扮演的角色。如果宗教的确在黑格尔的关怀之中占据核心地位——如果我们必须从字面上的意义来理解他的这个主张，即哲学和宗教都把神圣者作为它们的主题——那么，关于他的哲学的所有非形而上学的阐释都证明是站不住脚的。
This dispute extends to every phase of Hegel’s intellectual development, both his early writings before 1800 and his mature writings after 1806. It is not possible to limit the dispute to Hegel’s mature writings alone, as if his earlier writings are no longer relevant.7 For advocates of both readings take the early writings as the key to the interpretation of the mature Hegel.
这种争论波及到黑格尔思想发展历程的每一个阶段，既包括1800年以前他的早期著述，也包括1806年以后他的成熟著作。要把这一争论仅仅限制在黑格尔的成熟著作，好像他的早期著述与此了无干系，这几乎是不可能的。7因为这两种解读的支持者都把黑格尔早期著作当作是阐释成熟的黑格尔的钥匙。
As we shall soon see, both Christian and humanist interpretations are inadequate. The Christian interpretation has never done justice to Hegel’s critique of Christianity or his heterodox conception of God. The humanist interpretation has failed to reduce Hegel’s God down to the universe, and it has virtually ignored his attempt to rationalize traditional Christian beliefs. Ultimately, the religious dimension of Hegel’s thought proves richer than both extremes. For it was Hegel’s aim to steer a middle path between them; he wanted to develop a new theology to overcome the weaknesses of both humanism and traditional Christianity.
正如我们将要看到的，基督教的和人本主义的阐释都是不充分的。基督教的阐释从来没有公正地对待黑格尔对于基督教的批判或者说他的异教的上帝概念。人本主义的阐释无力做到把黑格尔的上帝还原为宇宙，而且它实质上忽视了他把传统的基督教信念理性化的企图。归根结底，黑格尔思想中的宗教维度要比上述两种极端都更加丰富。因为黑格尔的目的是在它们之间开辟出一条中间道路；他想要发展出一种新的神学，以克服人本主义和传统基督教的脆弱。
EARLY CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIANITY
早期对于基督教的批判
The dispute about the religious dimension of Hegel’s philosophy begins with his early manuscripts, those written in Tübingen, Berne and Frankfurt. The chief manuscripts from the Tübingen (1788–93) and Berne periods (1793–7) are the Tübingen Essay, Berne Fragments, Life of Jesus and The Positivity of the Christian Religion. The main manuscripts from the Frankfurt period (1797–1800) are the Sketches on Religion and Love, The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate and the Fragment of a System.
关于黑格尔哲学的宗教维度的争论始于他的早期手稿，那些写于图宾根、伯尔尼和法兰克福的手稿。图宾根时期（1788年-1793年）和伯尔尼时期（1793年-1797年）的主要手稿包括《图宾根论文》《伯尔尼残篇》《耶稣传》和《基督宗教的实证性》等。法兰克福时期（1797年-1800年）的主要手稿包括《论宗教与爱的草稿》《基督教的精神及其命运》和《体系残篇》等。
Rosenkranz and Haym, who first read these manuscripts, were convinced that Hegel’s primary concerns were religious, and indeed theological.8 According to Dilthey, who made a more thorough study of them decades later, these writings were fundamentally religious and even mystical, revealing Hegel’s place in the tradition of mystical pantheism.9 Herman Nohl, Dilthey’s pupil, edited the early writings and first published them under the title Hegels theologische Jugendschriften (Tübingen: Mohr, 1907). The title summarized a whole tradition of interpretation; but, to some, it was sheer provocation.
罗森克朗茨和海谋最先读到这些手稿，他们相信，黑格尔的主要关怀是宗教方面的，确切地说，是神学方面的。8几十年后，狄尔泰对于这些手稿做了更为深入彻底的研究。依照他的看法，这些著述根本上是宗教的，甚至是神秘主义的，揭示了黑格尔在神秘的泛神主义传统中的位置。9狄尔泰的学生，赫尔曼·诺尔编辑了黑格尔的早期著述，并首次以《黑格尔青年时期神学著作》（图宾根：Mohr, 1907年）为题出版了它们。这个标题概括了一整个阐释的传统；但是，在某种程度上，它是一种纯粹的挑衅。
One of the notable champions of the theological or religious interpretation, though from an antipathetic perspective, was Nietzsche. He saw all the progeny of the Tübinger Stift – Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin – as secret apologists for Christianity. He wrote in Anti-Christ: ‘One only has to say the word “Tübinger Stift” to conceive what German philosophy is at bottom: a cunning theology . . . The Swabians are the best liars in Germany because they lie innocently.’
神学的或者宗教的阐释——尽管是从反对的视角出发——一个著名的领军人物，是尼采。他把图宾根神学院的所有后裔——黑格尔、谢林和荷尔德林——看作是基督教的秘密辩护人。他在《敌基督》一书中写道：“只要提及‘图宾根神学院’，人们就能明白德国哲学在根本上是什么了：一种阴险的神学。……施瓦本人是德国最杰出的说谎者，因为他们说起谎来一脸无辜。”
Other scholars have contended that Hegel’s early writings are best described as anti-theological, indeed as anti-Christian, because they severely criticize Christianity. According to Lukács, the socalled ‘theological phase’ of Hegel’s development is ‘a reactionary legend’. In his view, Rosenkranz, Dilthey and Haering appropriated Hegel for their own nationalist ends, completely ignoring the radical republicanism that was the basis for his critique of Christianity.
其他学者争论说，黑格尔的早期著作最好还是被描述为反神学的，确切地说，反督教的，因为它们激烈地批判了基督教。依照卢卡奇的看法，黑格尔发展历程中所谓的“神学阶段”是一种“反动的传说”。在他看来，罗森克朗茨、狄尔泰和黑林（Hearing）是为了他们自己的国家主义的目的而挪用了黑格尔，完全罔顾作为黑格尔批判基督教的基础的彻底的共和主义。
In this debate it is of the first importance to specify which early writings one is talking about.13 There are great changes in Hegel’s attitude toward Christianity from the Tübingen to the Frankfurt period. While the Tübingen and Berne fragments are very critical of Christianity, the Frankfurt writings are more sympathetic to the Christian legacy. Predictably, humanist interpretations are inspired by the Tübingen and Berne fragments, while Christian interpretations are based on the Frankfurt writings.
在这场争论中，第一要务当在于确定人们在谈论的是哪些早期作品。从图宾根时期到法兰克福时期，黑格尔对待基督教的态度几经变化。尽管图宾根和伯尔尼残篇对于基督教提出了严厉的批判，但是法兰克福时期的著述对于基督教遗产却充满着同情。可以预见的是，人本主义的阐释受到了图宾根和伯尔尼时期残篇的启发，而基督教的阐释却是基于法兰克福时期的著述。
Regarding the Tübingen and Berne writings, it is misleading to describe them as theological, if ‘theology’ means the explanation or justification of Christian doctrine. In the Tübingen Essay, which sets the agenda for his early thought, Hegel explicitly states that theology is a matter of doctrine, and that he does not want to discuss that. During the Tübingen and Berne years he had remarkably little interest in the basis of religious belief, and he was content to accept Kant’s doctrine of moral faith, according to which the beliefs in God, providence and immortality are justified on moral grounds. The reason for this lack of interest is that Hegel’s fundamental concern in Tübingen and Berne was to develop his ideal of a civic religion; his interest in doctrine was not in its meaning or truth but in its value for society and state. Yet, precisely because Hegel has little interest in theology, it would also be misleading to describe these early writings as ‘antitheological’; Hegel has no animus against theology but simply brackets it.
如果“神学”意味着解释基督教教义或者证成之，就图宾根和伯尔尼的著作而言，把它们描述为神学性质的，却有误导人之嫌。《图宾根论文》为黑格尔的早期思想制定了议程，在其中，黑格尔明确申明，神学是一种教义的问题，他无意于讨论这点。在图宾根和伯尔尼的岁月中，他令人惊讶地对于宗教信念的基础几乎毫无兴趣，而满足于接受康德的道德信仰的学说。依照这种学说，对于上帝、天意和不朽的信念基于道德的理由即可证成。这种兴趣之缺乏的原因在于，黑格尔在图宾根和伯尔尼的基本关切是发展出他的市民宗教的理念；他对于教义的兴趣不在于它的意义或者真理，而在于它对于社会和国家的价值。然而，正是因为黑格尔对于神学几乎毫无兴趣，把这些早期手稿描述为“反神学的”也是误导人的；黑格尔对于神学毫无恶意，而仅仅是将之悬置起来而已。
It is fair, however, to describe Hegel’s interests in these writings as ‘religious’, as even the most ardent advocates of the antiChristian reading have conceded.15 Hegel’s religious interests are clear from his distinction between subjective and objective religion in the Tübingen Essay. Objective religion is doctrine and dogma, religion as codified and institutionalized. Subjective religion is religion as it is lived by the individual; it is a matter not of doctrine but of feeling and action. Hegel makes it very plain that his main concern is with subjective religion: ‘Everything depends on subjective religion; this is what has inherent and true worth. Let the theologians squabble all they like over what belongs to objective religion, over its dogmas and their precise determination . . .’. Since his main interest is in subjective religion, the young Hegel has been described as an existentialist avant la lettre.16 But this is a mistake. Hegel’s concern is not Kierkegaard’s: he does not seek those beliefs that give meaning to my life and that are necessary to my salvation or self-realization. He has no interest in personal salvation or self-realization but wants only to foster subjective religion so that the citizen plays a more effective role in the state.
然而，公平的是把黑格尔在这些手稿中的兴趣描述为“宗教性质的”，即使反基督教的解读的最为激越的支持者也承认这一点。格尔的宗教兴趣在他的《图宾根论文》中关于主观的和客观的宗教区分上体现得非常明显。客观的宗教是教义和教条，宗教应该经典化和制度化。主观的宗教之为宗教，是因为它活在个体之中；它事关的不是教义，而是情感和行动。黑格尔使得以下这一点简单明了，即他主要关心的是主观的宗教：“所有事物都依赖于主观的宗教；这是具有内在的和真正的价值的东西。让神学家们尽情地为属于客观宗教的东西，为了它的各种教条以及它们的精确的规定性而争吵不休吧！……”。由于他的主要兴趣在主观的宗教方面，所以青年黑格尔一直被描述为一位存在主义的先驱（avant la lettre）。但是这是一个错误。切勿把黑格尔的关怀误作是克尔凯郭尔的：他并不寻求那些“赋予我的生活以意义，并且对于我的救赎或者自我实现必不可少”的信念。他对于个体的得救毫无兴趣，而只是想要培养主观的宗教，以使公民们在国家中扮演一种实实在在的角色。
Granted that Hegel has no interest in theology, and that his concern with religion is subordinate to politics, is it accurate to maintain that the Tübingen and Berne writings are anti-Christian? At first blush, this seems too extreme. It seems possible to defend a Christian reading of these writings. In the tenth of the Berne Fragments Hegel asks whether Christianity fulfills the requirements of a civic religion, and he answers in the affirmative (BF I, 90/62). Indeed, for just this reason he writes his Life of Jesus where he interprets the gospel of Jesus in terms of Kant’s moral philosophy. Although the fundamental concern of the Positivity Essay is to expose the positivity of the Christian religion, i.e. its attempt to base belief upon legal authority rather than reason alone, Hegel still argues explicitly that the core of Christianity is rational and that it became positive only as a result of historical accident. Further evidence for the Christian reading comes when Hegel states in the Berne Fragments that it is precisely the divinity of Jesus that makes him an exemplar of moral virtue. ‘Without the divinity of his person we would have only the man; whereas here we have a truly superhuman ideal – an ideal not foreign to the human soul . . .’. Finally, the anti-Christian interpretation has difficulty in explaining The Life of Jesus. If this is Hegel’s attempt to write the scripture of a folk religion, why does Hegel choose Jesus as his model?17
鉴于黑格尔对于神学没有兴趣，以及他对于宗教的关心是从属于政治的，那么，固执己见地认为图宾根时期和伯尔尼时期的著述是反基督教的，就是正确无误的吗？乍一看，这似乎也趋向了极端。似乎可能的是，捍卫对于这些著作所作的基督教义的解读。在《伯尔尼残篇》的第十篇文章中，黑格尔追问基督教是否满足了公民宗教的各项要求，而他的回答是肯定的。事实上，正是出于这个原因，他才写了《耶稣传》。在该书中，他根据康德的道德哲学阐释了耶稣的福音。尽管《实证性论文》的基本关怀是阐明基督宗教的实证性，也就是说，基督宗教尝试着使信仰建立在律法的权威性而非仅仅在理性的基础之上。但是，黑格尔仍旧清楚地论证说，基督教的核心是理性的，而它之变成实证的，只是历史偶然性的结果。当黑格尔在《伯尔尼残篇》中申说正是耶稣的神圣性使得他成为道德德性的典范之时，就出现了更多证据支持这种基督教的解读。“没有他的位格的神圣性，我们就只有这个人；而在这里，我们有的是一个超人的理念——这个理念并不外在于人的灵魂……”。最后，反基督教的阐释在解释《耶稣传》时会遇见困难。如果说这是黑格尔撰写一本关于一种民众宗教的圣经（scripture）的尝试，那么，黑格尔为什么要选择耶稣作为他的模范？17
Although there is some evidence for the Christian interpretation of the Tübingen and Berne writings, on balance there is more evidence for the anti-Christian interpretation. Throughout the Berne Fragments and the Positivity Essay there is a pervasive and passionate critique of Christianity. The critique goes so far that it even undermines Hegel’s lukewarm support for the ideas that Christianity has an essentially moral content and that it is suitable as a civic religion. Arguably, if Hegel were more consistent, he would have rejected Christianity as a civic religion, denied the moral value of its teachings, and argued that positivity is the very essence of Christianity.
尽管存在着某些证据可以支持对于图宾根时期和伯尔尼时期的著作进行基督教的阐释，但总的来说，也存在大量的证据可以支持反基督教的阐释。遍观《伯尔尼残篇》和《实证性论文》，无处不存在对于基督教充满激情的批判。这种批判走得如此之远，以至于它甚至削弱了黑格尔对于以下这种观念的不够热烈的支持，即基督教有着本质上属于道德的内容，它适合于充当民众宗教。或可证明的是，如果黑格尔更加首尾一致的话，他当会拒绝把基督教当作公民宗教，否认它的教义的道德价值，乃至论证实证性就是基督教的真正本质。
While Hegel seems to endorse Christianity as a civic religion, the general upshot of his argument both in the Berne Fragments and in the Positivity Essay is that Christianity is dangerous for the state. Thus he argues in the Berne Fragments that Christ’s precepts are contrary to the basic principles of the state, such as laws concerning property and self-defense. The Christian would not defend the state but turn the other cheek; and since he preaches charity he would undermine laws to protect private property. The teachings of Jesus are really only suitable, Hegel contends, for a sect or the family; if we attempt to make them into laws they become ‘the most shocking profusion of repressive institutions and ways of deluding mankind’ . In the Positivity Essay Hegel argued that the Christian concern for personal salvation arose only because of the decline of republican virtue. If the individual worked for the common good, he would find his immortality in the republic.
尽管黑格尔似乎认可基督教是一种民众宗教，但是他在《伯尔尼残篇》和《实证性论文》中两处的论证的总体要点是，基督教对于国家来说是危险的。因此，他论证说，在《伯尔尼残篇》中，基督的箴言是同国家的基本原理——比如与财产和正当防卫相关的法律——背道而驰的。基督徒并不保卫国家，而是逆来顺受，不予还击；由于他鼓吹仁慈，所以，他将会削弱保护私人财产的法律。黑格尔论争说，耶稣的教导实际上只适合于一个教派或者家庭；如果我们尝试着把它变成法律，那么，它们就会变成“压制性的制度和欺骗人类的方式的最令人震惊的渊薮”。在《实证性论文》中，黑格尔论证说，仅仅是因为共和国德性的衰败，才兴起了基督徒对于个人得救的关心。如果个体为了共同善而努力，那么他会在共和国中发现不朽。
Hegel also argues that Christianity is not the best religion for the cultivation of morality. Both in the Berne Fragments and the Positivity Essay Hegel prefers Socrates to Jesus as a teacher of morality . While Socrates respects the freedom of the individual, his right to find the truth for himself, Jesus preaches a prescribed path toward salvation . Socrates does not seek disciples; but Christ demands faith in his person, and even wants ‘an empire complete with generals and assorted high officials’ . Socrates knows he is no better than anyone else; but Christ regards himself as a savior. In the Berne Fragments Hegel even argues that Christianity is useless as a virtue religion because it works only if a person is good already . Furthermore, Christianity cannot claim to be preeminent as a virtue religion because the writings of Rousseau, Plato and Xenophon also stress the value of virtue .
黑格尔还论证说，对于道德修养而言，基督教并非最佳的宗教。无论是在《伯尔尼残篇》中，还是在《实证性论文》中，黑格尔都认为，苏格拉底比耶稣更是一位道德的教师。苏格拉底尊重个体的自由，他为他自己发现真理的权利，而耶稣则鼓吹一条预定的通往得救的道路。苏格拉底并不觅求信徒；但是耶稣要求对于他个人的信仰，甚至想要“一个充满着将军和各种各样的高级官员的帝国”。苏格拉底知道他并不比任何其他人更好，但是耶稣认为他自己是一个救世主。在《伯尔尼残篇》中，黑格尔甚至论证说，基督教作为一种德性的宗教是无用的，因为它只有在一个人已经是好人的情况下才能发生作用。此外，基督教不能声称自己是一种卓越的德性宗教，因为卢梭、柏拉图和克色诺芬的著作也强调了德性的价值。
In the final Berne Fragments Hegel attacks the very heart of Christian ethics, its doctrine of eternal salvation. This doctrine makes the condition of salvation belief in Christ and his expatiatory death. Hegel contends that the real purpose of morality is lost sight of in such an ethic . Morality demands autonomy, whereas Christianity requires faith in the authority of a single person. The Protestant doctrine of salvation sola fide is charged with undermining a fundamental principle of morality: ‘that one is worthy of happiness on the basis of a moral life’ .
在《伯尔尼残篇》最后，黑格尔攻击了基督教伦理的核心，它的永恒得救的教义。这种教义使得得救的条件变成了对于基督和他的冗长的死亡的信仰。黑格尔争辩说，道德的真正目标在那样一种伦理中完全被忘记了。道德需要自律，而基督教的前提条件是对于这个独一的人的权威性的信仰。清教徒的救赎伦理“惟靠信心”（sola fide）应该被指责为削弱了道德的基本原理：“一个人只有在道德生活的基础上才配得上幸福。”
Hegel’s critique of Christian ethics also includes the divinity of Christ, a doctrine he initially appears to accept. Although he first states that this belief encourages morality, he soon retracts this by writing that the whole idea of the divinity of Christ rests upon a degrading conception of human nature. We elevate Christ to divine status, as if he alone were the paragon of virtue, only because we believe natural sin makes us incapable of virtue. Hegel notes that the characteristic belief of Christianity is the divinity of Christ; yet he rejects this belief because it is part of the whole ordo salutatis, which is incompatible with morality.
黑格尔对于基督教的批判也包括基督的神圣性，这个教义最初他似乎曾经接受过。尽管起初他认为，这种信念会促进道德，但是他很快撤回了这个说法。他写道，基督的神圣性的全部观念建立在贬低人性的构想的基础之上。我们把基督抬高到神圣的地位上，就好像单独他就是德性的典范，这只是因为我们相信天生的罪恶使我们无法具有德性。黑格尔注意到，基督教最具特色的信念是基督的神圣性；但是他拒绝这个信念，因为它是整个救恩程序（ordo salutatis）的一部分，而这种程序和道德是不相容的。
There is another powerful reason for thinking that Hegel’s Berne writings are essentially anti-Christian. Namely, in the Positivity Essay he argues that the idea of the divine will as the source of moral laws is a form of hypostasis, and indeed the source of all heteronomy. One almost believes one is reading Feuerbach or Marx in the following passage: ‘The objectivity of the divinity kept apace with the corruption and slavery of man, and it [the objectivity] is only a revelation, only an appearance, of the spirit of the time’. But the passage is not a fluke, a passing passion. Hegel had already anticipated this thesis in the Berne Fragments when he wrote that ‘the great principle that duty and virtue are selfsufficient’ is undermined by ‘the merest association with the idea of God’ .
还有另外一个强有力的理由可以认为黑格尔的伯尔尼手稿本质上是反基督教的。也就是说，在《实证性论文》中，黑格尔论证说，作为道德法则的源泉的神圣意志的观念是某种形式的根本原理，确切地说，是所有他律的源泉。人们几乎相信他在下列段落中所读到的是费尔巴哈或者是马克思：“神圣性的客观性是与人的堕落和奴役齐头并进的，而它（客观性）只是时代精神的显露，只是时代精神的显现。”。但是这个段落并非绝无仅有，只是一股稍纵即逝的激情。黑格尔在《伯尔尼残篇》中已经预言了这一论题，当时他写道，“义务和德行是自足的这一伟大的原则”已经被“与上帝的观念最微不足道的联系”削弱了。
Hegel’s powerful critique of Christianity in the Berne years places him firmly in the tradition of the radical Enlightenment. There are remarkable affinities between Hegel’s critique and the radical English free-thinkers, John Toland, Matthew Tindal and Anthony Collins, whose doctrines were well known in Germany.18 There are many points in common: (1) that the main purpose of Christian doctrine is the propagation of morality; (2) that the clergy are dangerous because they subvert the autonomous action behind morality; (3) that the doctrines of sin, saving faith and the atonement subvert the moral purpose of Christianity by making faith rather than virtue the condition of salvation; (4) that the only essential religious beliefs are in the existence of God, providence and immortality; (5) that the basis of Christian belief cannot rest upon the testimony of history and miracles, because these cannot withstand critical examination; (6) that the divine element in Christ is not unique to him but exists within all humanity. No less important for Hegel’s affinity with this tradition is his republicanism.
黑格尔在伯尔尼时期对于基督教最强有力的批判使他牢牢置身于激进的启蒙的传统之中。在黑格尔的批判和诸如约翰·托兰德、马修·廷德尔和安东尼·柯林斯等激进的英国自由思想家之间存在着令人瞩目的亲缘性，他们的学说在德国尽人皆知。18以下几点是他们共同拥有的：（1）基督教教义的主要目的是宣传道德；（2）神职人员是危险的，因为他们颠覆了道德背后的自律行为；（3）原罪、得救的信仰和赎罪的教义颠覆了基督教的道德目标，因为它们使信仰而非德性成为了得救的条件；（4）唯一本质性的宗教信念是相信上帝存在、天意和不朽；（5）基督教信仰的基础不可能建立在历史的证据和奇迹的基础之上，因为它们不能经受住批判性的审查；以及（6）基督的神圣的元素不是对他独一无二的，而是内在于所有人性之中。就黑格尔和这种传统之间的亲缘性而言，他的共和主义也是同样重要的。
When it comes to the Berne and Tübingen writings, then, those who have argued the case for Hegel’s anti-Christian agenda have the weight of evidence in their favor. Whether Hegel was really an atheist in this period is still hardly proven; but, at the very least, his attitude toward Christianity was extremely hostile.
在谈到伯尔尼时期和图宾根时期的著述时，那些为了支持黑格尔的反基督教的议程而据理力争的人，把所有重量都放在了他们偏爱的证据上。黑格尔在这段时期里是否真是一个无神论者，仍旧难以证实；但是，至少他对于基督教的态度是极为反感的。
REVERSAL IN FRANKFURT
法兰克福时期的倒转
What was true in Tübingen and Berne was not true in Frankfurt. Indeed, almost the exact contrary is the case. During the Frankfurt years Hegel’s thinking about religion underwent a remarkable change, indeed a virtual volte-face. Hegel reverses his earlier thinking in several fundamental respects.19 (1) In the Berne years Hegel saw Kantian morality as the essence and purpose of religion; in the Frankfurt years he sees religion as a standpoint above Kantian morality. The Kantian critic of religion became a religious critic of Kant. (2) In the Berne years Hegel saw the solution to positivity in Kantian morality; in the Frankfurt years he sees Kantian morality as part of the problem of positivity. (3) In the Berne years Hegel was a critic of some of the fundamental articles of faith of Christianity, such as the incarnation and the trinity; indeed, he saw the very idea of faith as a violation of rational autonomy. In the Frankfurt years Hegel not only defended these articles but also argued that faith is essential to Christianity. (4) In his earlier years Hegel insisted upon the ultimate authority of reason as a sanction for religious faith. In the Frankfurt years he maintained that religious belief is based upon the experience of love, which transcends reason. The Kantian rationalist thus became a religious mystic.
适用于图宾根和伯尔尼时期的东西未必同样适用于法兰克福时期。实际情形截然相反。在法兰克福的岁月中，黑格尔关于宗教的思考经历了巨大的转变，确切地说，经历了实质性的大转弯（volte-face）。黑格尔在几个根本性的方面颠倒了他之前的思考。19（1）在伯尔尼的岁月里，黑格尔把康德的道德看作是宗教的本质与目标；在法兰克福的岁月中，他把宗教看作是超越康德道德的立场。康德对宗教的批判变成了宗教对康德的批判。（2）在伯尔尼时期，黑格尔在康德的道德之中看到了对于实证性的解答（solution）；在法兰克福时期，他把康德的道德看作是实证性问题的一个部分。（3）在伯尔尼时期，黑格尔是基督教信仰的某些基本条款——例如，道成肉身和三位一体——的批判者；确切地说，他把信仰的观念看作是对于理性自律的违反。在法兰克福时期，黑格尔不仅捍卫这些条款，而且论证说，对于基督教而言，信仰是本质性的。（4）在早期岁月中，黑格尔坚持理性作为承认宗教信仰的最终权威。在法兰克福时期，他强调说，宗教的信念建立在爱的基础之上，爱超越了理性。就这样，康德式的理性主义者变成了宗教的神秘主义者。
The main writing in which this reversal takes place, The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, is the stumbling block to all anti-metaphysical, atheistic and humanist interpretations of Hegel.20 This manuscript is fundamentally the work of a religious mystic, of a repentant rationalist who has been newly converted to the higher realms of religious experience, and to some traditional religious dogmas that articulate it. A defense of mysticism pervades the whole work: Hegel stresses that the infinite consists in a divine love that transcends demonstration; and he maintains that the infinite is accessible only to faith, which consists in an inner experience. To be sure, Hegel will later break with this mysticism, insisting that the infinite can be known only through reason; but he will not change his more sympathetic attitude toward Christianity that he acquired during the Frankfurt years.
这种颠倒发生于其中的主要著作，《基督教精神及其命运》，对于所有把黑格尔阐释为一个反形而上学者、无神论者和人本主义者的人来说，是一个绊脚石。20这份手稿基本上是一个宗教神秘主义者的著作、一个忏悔的理性主义者的著作。他已经重新皈依了更高的宗教经验的领域，重新皈依了表达出这种经验的某种传统的经验教条之中。在这部著作中，对于神秘主义的辩护无处不在：黑格尔强调说，无限存在于超越了证明的神圣之爱中；他坚持认为，无限只有通过信仰才能通达，而信仰就在于内在经验。可以肯定的是，黑格尔后来同这种神秘主义彻底决裂了，认为无限只能通过理性才能认识；但是，他没有改变他在法兰克福时期赢获的对于基督教的更加同情的态度。
What explains such a dramatic volte-face? Perhaps it was due to the influence of Hölderlin, who had already expressed mystical ideas before Hegel’s arrival in Frankfurt. But this is somewhat hypothetical, since we know so little about the discussions between Hegel and Hölderlin during the Frankfurt years.21 In any case, this could not be a sufficient explanation. For, even if there were an influence, there must have been something in Hegel’s development that made him receptive to it. Ultimately, the answer lies in the inner tensions of Hegel’s intellectual development.
什么可以解释这种戏剧性的大转弯（volte-face）？也许这是由于荷尔德林的影响，他在黑格尔抵达法兰克福之前就已经表达了各种神秘主义的观念。但是这在某种程度上具有假设的性质，因为我们对于法兰克福时期黑格尔和荷尔德林之间的讨论知之甚少。21无论如何，这都不能算是很充分的解释。因为，即使有某种影响，那也必定是在黑格尔的发展历程中有某种东西使得他愿意接受它。归根结底，答案存在于黑格尔思想发展历程的内在张力之中。
The main problem facing Hegel in his Tübingen and Berne years was how to formulate the doctrines of a modern civil religion. Hegel demanded that these doctrines satisfy three criteria: (1) they had to be founded on reason; (2) they had to appeal to the heart and imagination; and (3) they had to serve all the needs of life, especially public and official transactions. The chief obstacle facing Hegel was the Christian legacy, which clashed violently with these desiderata. Contrary to (1), its fundamental teachings were infected with positivity; and contrary to (3), Christianity valued personal salvation over the common good, and its precepts were more suitable for a sect than a state. On the other hand, Hegel recognized that a civic religion would have to be based on Christianity, which had been the dominating force in the development of Western culture for nearly two millennia. He also realized that it was hopeless trying to revive a pagan mythology in the age of Enlightenment.
黑格尔在图宾根和伯尔尼时期面对的主要问题是，如何阐述关于现代公民宗教的学说。黑格尔要求这些学说必须满足以下三个标准：（1）它们必须建立在理性的基础之上；（2）它们必须诉诸心灵和想象力；（3）它们必须服务于所有的生活需要，尤其是公众的和官方的事务。黑格尔所面临的主要障碍是基督教的遗产，它猛烈地撞击着这些急需品。和（1）相反，它的基本教义感染上了实证性；而和（3）相反的是，基督教认为个人的得救凌驾于共同善之上，而且它的箴言更适合于一个教派而不是一个国家。另一方面，黑格尔认识到，公民宗教必须建立在基督教的基础之上，它在近两千年的时间里已经成为西方文化发展中的主导性力量。他还意识到，试图在启蒙的时代复兴异教神话，无意于痴人说梦。
So the tension was that Hegel had to, but also could not, build his civic religion on Christianity. In the Berne years Hegel’s solution to this problem was to interpret Christianity so that it seemed – if not to himself at least to the people – to be a religion of reason. Hence he wrote his Life of Jesus, a story of Jesus’s life, according to which Christ is a preacher of Kantian morality. But the first person who did not believe in this new myth of reason was Hegel himself. For it clashes violently with his belief in the positivity of Christianity. Already in the Berne Fragments Hegel had argued that Christ was an inferior teacher to Socrates because Christ demanded surrendering to faith rather than independent thinking. Ideally, Hegel really wanted Socrates to be the guiding spirit behind his civic religion; but he could not make such a move in the context of his time, which remained in the grip of the Christian tradition.
因此，紧张就在于，黑格尔不得不却又不能在基督教的基础上建立起他的公民宗教。在伯尔尼时期，黑格尔对此问题给出的答案是，阐释基督教，以便它似乎是——如果不是对他自己而言，至少也是对这个民族而言——一种理性的宗教。因此，他写了他的《耶稣传》，根据这部书，基督是康德的道德的布道者。但是黑格尔本人是第一个不相信这种新的理性的神话的人，因为它与他的基督教的实证性的信念发生了急剧的冲突。还是在《伯尔尼残篇》中，黑格尔就论证说，基督是一位低于苏格拉底的教师，因为基督要求向信仰缴械投降，而不是独立的思考。在理论上，黑格尔真的想要苏格拉底成为他的公民宗教背后的指导精神；但是他在自己时代的语境中不能采取那样一个行动，因为他自己的时代仍旧停留在基督教传统的支配之中。
If, then, Hegel were to uphold his ideal of a civic religion, and if he had to base it upon Christianity, he had no other recourse than to re-interpret the meaning of Christianity. This is just what happens in the Frankfurt years. The fundamental move forward is that Hegel now has a new and more plausible interpretation of Christianity. He no longer sees Jesus as the spokesman for Kantian morality but as the preacher of love. After all, there was much stronger biblical evidence for such a reading, first and foremost the gospel of John, which Hegel cites often.22 Such a reading had none of the forced anachronism of making Christ a preacher of Kantian morality. With this reinterpretation Hegel was now in a position to appropriate and explain many of the fundamental doctrines of the Church, such as the incarnation and the trinity. Now even his attitude toward Kant would have to change, given that Kant’s ethics remained on the level of duty and had not recognized the higher power of love.
那么，如果黑格尔想要支持他的公民宗教的理念，而且如果他必须建基于基督教之上，他就别无依赖，只能求助于重新阐释基督教的意义了。这就是法兰克福时期所发生的事情。根本性的往前推进是，现在黑格尔对基督教有了一种新鲜而貌似可信的阐释。他不再把耶稣视为康德道德的代言人，而是视为爱的传教士。毕竟，对于这样一种解读来说，《圣经》当中存在着极强的证据，首先和最重要的是《约翰福音》，黑格尔常常引用它。22这种解读没有把耶稣视作康德的道德的布道者所具有的任何牵强附会和年代错误。借助于这种阐释，黑格尔现在处在这样一个位置上，他可以挪用和解释教会的许多根本性的教义，比如道成肉身和三位一体。现在，甚至他对康德的态度都必须发生变化，如果康德的伦理学仍旧停留在义务的层面，而没有认识到更高的爱的力量的话。
However strategic, the new interpretation of Christianity was still only a temporary solution. For Hegel also realized in the Frankfurt years that the gospel of love was not suitable for his civic religion. While it certainly appealed to the heart and the imagination, it was also an ethic more suitable for a sect than an entire society. While I love my brethren, it is hard to muster any affection for other citizens of a large state. Furthermore, the mystical elements behind love did not satisfy the demands of reason, one of the fundamental desiderata of a civic religion. Paradoxically, the rationalism of Hegel’s later theology was already latent in his mysticism, especially the equation of God with the divine logos .
无论多么具有策略性，这种对于基督教的新阐释仍旧只是临时的解决办法。因为在法兰克福时期，黑格尔也认识到，爱的福音是不适合于他的公民宗教的。尽管它自然会求助于心灵和想象力，但是它也更加适合于一个教派而不是整个社会的伦理。尽管我爱我的同党，但是我很难聚集我的情感去热爱一个很大的国家的其他公民。此外，在爱背后的神秘主义因素不能满足理性的各种要求，而这是公民宗教基本的急需品之一。于是就造成一种悖论，黑格尔晚期神学的理性主义已经潜存于他的神秘主义之中，尤其是把上帝和神圣的逻各斯等同起来。
