Kant took the key to answering his basic question (“What is the relation of representations to the object they represent?”) to hinge on how we understood the respective roles played by both intuition and concepts in judgments and experience. Abstracted out of the role they play in consciousness as a whole, sensory intuitions – even a multiplicity of distinct sensory intuitions – could only provide us with an indeterminate experience, even though as an experience it implicitly contains a multiplicity of items and objects. However, for an agent to see the multiplicity of items in experience as a multiplicity, those items must, as it were, be set alongside each other; we are aware, after all, not of an indeterminate world but of a unity of our experience of the items in that world. We are aware, that is, of a single, complex experience of the world, not of a series of unconnected experiences nor a completely indeterminate experience; and, moreover, our experience also seems to be composed of various representations of objects that are themselves represented as going beyond, as transcending, the representations themselves.
康德回答他的基本问题（“表象与其所表象的对象之间的关系是什么？”）的关键在于，我们如何理解直观与概念在判断和经验中各自发挥的作用。如果它们在意识中不是作为一个整体起作用，那么感性直观——甚至是各种感性直观的杂多一-只能给我们提供一种含糊的经验，即使作为经验，它也暗含着各种内容和对象。然而，对于将经验中的各种内容作为一种杂多的行动者来说，这些内容必然是相互并置的；毕竟，我们所意识到的不是一个含糊的世界，而是意识到我们关于世界中事物的经验的统一体。也就是说，我们意识到的是关于世界的单一的、复杂的经验，而不是一系列互不相干的经验，也不是一个完全模糊的经验；此外，我们的经验似乎是由各种关于对象的表象所构成的，这些对象被表象为超越性的，即表象本身。
An intuitive awareness would not be able to discriminate between an appearance of an object and the object that is appearing – that is, that kind of unity of experience cannot in principle come from sensibility itself, since sensibility is a passive faculty, a faculty of receptivity, which would provide us only with an indeterminate field of experience and therefore not a representation of any objects of experience. That distinction (between the representation of the object and the object represented) thereby requires first of all that the intuitive multiplicity be combined in such a way that the distinction between the experience (the appearance) and the object represented is able to be made. This combination must therefore come from some active faculty that performs the combination. What then is that active faculty, and must it combine the various intuitive representations in any particular way? Or are its combinations arbitrary in some metaphysical or logical sense, a mere feature of our own contingent make-up and acquired habits?
一种直观意识不能区别对象的显像和正在显现着的对象——也就是说，原则上，那个经验的统一体不能来自感性自身，因为感性是一种被动功能，是一种接受能力，它只能给我们提供一个模糊的经验领域，因而不%是关于经验对象的表象。因此，（关于对象的表象和被表象的对象之间的）那种区分首先要求的是，直观杂多以如下方式被联结起来，即能够在经验（显像）和被表象对象之间做出区分。因而，这种联结必然是来自某种执行这种联结的主动能力。那么，这种主动能力是什么？它必须以某种特殊方式将不同的直观表象联结起来吗？或者，在某种形而上学或逻辑学的意义上，它所做的联结是任意的吗？它只是我们自己偶然造成并获得的习以为常的特征吗？
We cannot, after all, somehow jump outside our own experience to examine the objects of the world in order to see if they match up to our representations of them; we must instead evaluate those judgments about the truth and falsity of our judgmental representations from within experience itself. The distinction between the object represented and the representation of the object must itself therefore be established within experience itself. The original question – what is the relation of representations to the object they represent? – thus turns out to require us to consider that relation not causally (as existing between an “internal” experience and an external thing) but normatively within experience itself, as a distinction concerning how it is appropriate for us to take that experience – whether we take it as mere appearance (as mere representation) or as the object itself. That we might associate some representations with others would only be a fact about us; on the other hand, that we might truly or falsely make judgments about what is appearance and what is an object would be a normative matter. The terms in question – “true,” “false” – are normative terms, matters of how we ought to be “taking” things, not how we do in fact take them. Taking an experience to be truly of objects therefore requires us to distinguish the factual, habitual order of experience from our own legislation about what we ought to believe.
毕竟，我们无论如何都不可能跳出我们自己的经验去检验世界之中的对象是否符合我们关于它们的表象；相反，我们必须从经验自身之内出发，评价那些我们就判断性表象的真假所做出的判断。因而，被表象的对象与关于对象的表象之间的区分是建立在经验自身之中的。因此，要想回答最初的问题——表象与其所表象的对象之间的关系是什么？——我们就不能在因果性的意义上（即将这关系视为存在于“内在经验”与外在事物之间的）而是要在规范性的意义上、在经验自身之内考虑这种关系，要将之理解为一种关乎我们如何恰当取得那种经验的区分——我们是将之视为单纯显像（单纯表象）还是对象本身[13]—方面，我们可以将某些表象同其他表象联结起来，这只是一个关于我们的事实；另一方面，我们可以就什么是显像和什么是对象做出真假判断，这则是一个规范性问题。所讨论的那些术语——“真”“假”——是规范性术语，其所涉及的是我们应当如何“看待”事物的问题，而不是我们实际上如何看待它们的问题。因而，要想使一种经验成为真正关于对象的，那我们就需要在如下二者之间做出区分：一方面是事实性的和习惯性的经验秩序，另一方面是我们自己就我们应当相信什么所立的法。
That way of taking our experience involves three steps: first, we must apprehend the objects of intuition in a unified way such that the multiplicity of experience is there “for us” as distinct items in a spatio-temporal framework to make judgments about it. However, that mode of synthesis would never be enough on its own to give us any distinction between the object of representation and the representation of the object; it would only give us an indeterminate intuition of a multiplicity of “items” in space and time. Second, we must therefore unify that intuitive, experiential multiplicity of items according to some set of rules so that our experience will exhibit the sort of regularity that will make it susceptible to judgment. (Such unification, so Kant later argues, must be carried out in terms of how it fits into some view of a “whole,” which requires an act of what Kant calls the “transcendental imagination,” that is, the activity that combines the various representations according to a necessary, conceptual rule and is thus different from the ordinary, empirical imagination, which combines things, at best, in terms of contingent rules of association.) Third and finally, we must make judgments about that sensory multiplicity which, by bringing these intuitions under concepts, makes possible the full distinction between the object represented and the representation of the object. The decisive issue, so Kant saw, involved getting to the third step and asking how it could be possible at the third step that we would be assured that the conditions for our bringing intuitions under concepts in a judgment would be possible – which, again, is a version of his original question: what is the relation between judgments, as representations, to that which they represent?
我们的取得经验的那种方式涉及三个步骤：第一步，我们必须以一种统一的方式去理解直观对象，以便“对我们来说”有一种需要对之做出判断的经验杂多，它是处于时空框架当中的不同内容。然而，综合的模式单凭其自身从来不足以让我们在表象的对象和对象的表象之间做出区分；它只能给我们一种关于时空中各种“内容”的模糊直观。第二步，我们必须根据一系列规则将事物的那种直观的、经验的杂多统一起来，以便我烈们的经验将显示出一种规则性，这将使我们容易对之做出判断。（如康德后来所说，这种统一化必须依照它如何与某种关于“整体”的观点相适应这一点来进行，这种整体要求一种康德称之为“先验想象”的行为，即根据一种必然的、概念的规则将不同表象联结起来的行动，因此不同于普通的经验想象，后者至多是根据偶然的关联规则将事物结合起来。）第三步，我们必须就感性杂多做出判断，这种判断将这些直观置于概念之下，从而能够完全区分开被表象的对象和关于对象的表象[14]。如康德所看到的，关键在于进入这第三步，并提出如下问题：在第三步中，我们如何能够主张，我们在判断中据以将直观归摄于概念之下的条件是可能的——这再次重复了他最初的那个问题，即作为表象的判断与判断所表象的对象之间的关系是什么？
The key to answering that question involved understanding the way in which the most basic of our unifying activities (of apprehension and reproduction by the “transcendental imagination”) take place against the requirements of what is necessary to have a unified point of view on the world. Such a point of view requires there to be an activity that establishes that point of view as a point of view, and this has to do with the conditions under which we can make judgments about that experience.
回答这个问题的关键在于弄清楚，我们这种最基础性的（通过“先验想象”将统觉与再生）统一的活动，是如何在要对世界有一个统一的视角这一要求下发生的。这样一种视角要求有一种活动，这种活动将该视角作为视角确立起来，并且这必须与我们得以对经验做出判断的条件相关。
“It must be possible,” as Kant put it in a key paragraph, “for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.” (In one of the grander understatements of his whole oeuvre, Kant concludes that paragraph by simply noting: “From this original combination, many consequences follow.” ) Kant’s point about the way in which the “I think” must be able, in his words, to “accompany” any representation was that unless it were possible for me to become aware of a representation as a representation – to become aware of my experience of the stone as an experience of the stone – then that representation would be as nothing for me; and that any representation must therefore meet the conditions under which it could become an object of such reflective awareness. That particular move, of course, meant that the condition for any representation’s being a representation (having some cognitive content, being experienced as a representation of something) had to do with the conditions of self-consciousness itself.
康德在一个关键性段落中提出：“‘我思’必须能够伴随着我的一切表象；因为否则的话，某种完全不可能被思考的东西就会在我里面被表象出来，而这就等于说，这表象要么就是不可能的，要么至少对于我来说就是无。”（康德以其作品中少有的不充分陈述来结束这一段落：“从这一本源的联结中可以产生出很多结论来。”[150“我思”必须能够伴随任何表30象，这意味着，除非我能够意识到一种表象是一种表象（如我意识到我关于石头的经验是一个关于石头的经验），否则表象对于我来说就是无；因而，任何表象必须满足它得以成为这种反思性意识之对象的条件。当然，这种特殊的活动意味着，任何表象得以是一种表象（具有某些认知内容、作为关于某物的表象而被经验到）的条件，与自我意识自身的条件有关。
Kant’s term for the kind of self-consciousness involved in such a thought is apperception, the awareness of something as an awareness (which itself is a condition of being able to separate the object from the representation of the object). The question then was: what is the nature of this apperception?
康德用来表述这种自我意识的术语是统觉，即意识到某个东西是一种意识（它本身是能够将对象同关于对象的表象区分开的条件之一）。那么问题是：这种统觉的本质是什么？
Any representation of a multiplicity as a multiplicity involves not merely the receptivity of experience; experiencing it as one experiential multiplicity requires the possibility of there being a single complex thought of the experience. The unity of the multiplicity of experience is therefore in Kant’s words a “synthetic unity of representations.” A single complex thought, however, requires a single complex subject to think it since a single complex thought could not be distributed among different thinking subjects. (A single complex thought might be something like, “The large black stone is lying on the ground” – different subjects could think different elements of the complex, such as “large,” “black,” etc., but that would not add up to a single thought; it would only be a series of different thoughts.) Thus, we need one complex thinking subject to have a single complex thought.
任何将一种杂多作为一种杂多的表象，不仅涉及经验的接受性；将之作为一种可经验的杂多来经验，这要求一种关于经验的单一复合思维[16]。因而，用康德的话来说，经验杂多的统一是“表象的综合统一”。然而,一种单一复合思维之所以要求一个单一复合主体来思考它，是因为一种单一复合思维不能分配给不同的思维主体。（例如，“一块黑色大石头躺在地上”这样一种单一复合思维，不同主体会想到这个复合体的不同要素,如“大”“黑色”等等，但这合起来并不是一种单一思维，它只不过是一系列不同的思维。）因此，我们需要一个复合思维主体具有一种单一复合思维。
On Kant’s picture therefore, we have on the one hand the identity of the thinking subject, and on the other hand the multiplicity of the representations which it has. The same complex thinking subject – as the same subject of different experiences – is correlated therefore to the “synthetic” unity of the multiplicity of experience. On the basis of this, Kant drew his most basic conclusion: a condition of both the synthetic unity of the multiplicity of representations (and what he called the analytic unity of apperception) is the synthetic unity of apperception. That the “I that experiences or thinks about X” is the same “I that experiences or thinks about Y” is, after all, not an analytic truth. (From “somebody thought of Kant” and “somebody thought of Hume,” it does not follow that it was the same person who thought of both Kant and Hume.) On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary that all the different experiences be ascribed to the same thinking subject, that they be capable of being “accompanied” by the same “I think.” Since it is both necessary (and therefore only knowable a priori), and also synthetic (not a self-contradiction to deny), the judgment that I have a unity of self-consciousness is, odd as it sounds, a synthetic a priori judgment.
因而，在康德所构建的图景中，一方面，我们具有思维主体的同一性；另一方面，思维主体又具有表象杂多。因而，就像同一个主体拥有不同经验那样，复合思维主体也是与经验杂多的“综合”统一相关联的。在此基础上，康德得出了他最根本性的结论：表象杂多的综合统一（以力及他所称的统觉的分析统一）的条件是统觉的综合统一[17]。“经验或想到X的我”就是“经验或想到Y的我”，这毕竟不是一个分析真理。（从“某人想到了康德”和“某人想到了休谟”，不能得出结论说，“同一个人想到了康德和休谟”。）另外，绝对必然的是，所有不同的经验都被归于同一个思维主体，它们能够为同一个“我思”所“伴随”。由于这既是必然的（因而只能是先天可知的）又是综合的（被否定时不会自相矛盾），所以我具有自我意识的同一性这一判断，是一个先天综合判断（听起来有些奇怪）。
What follows from that? Whatever is necessary for my being able to comprehend myself as the same thinking subject over a series of temporally extended experiences is also necessary for representations in general to be representations, that is, to have cognitive content, to be not merely internal, subjective occurrences within one’s mental life but to be about something – which brings Kant around to another version of his original question: how can a representation be about anything at all?
由此可以得出什么结论呢？对于我能够将我自己理解为同一个思维主体（从而超出一系列临时扩展出的经验）来说必要的条件，对于一般表象之成为表象来说也是必要的，而成为表象就是说，要具有认知内容，这不仅是一个人心智生活中内在的主观事件，而且是关于某物的——这促使康德转向他那最初问题的另一个版本：一种表象究竟如何能够关于某物？
If there is any way in which the intuitive representations in our consciousness must be combined, then that “must” embodies the conditions under which anything can be a “representation” at all; and the key to understanding what might be further implied by that move, Kant noted, lay in the very idea of judgment itself, the topic with which he had begun the Critique. To make a judgment – to assert something that can be true or false – is different in kind from merely associating some idea with some other idea. To make a judgment is to submit oneself to the norms that govern such judgments. It is, however, simply a matter of fact and not of norms whether I associate, for example, “Kant” with Prussia or Germany or long walks in the afternoon, or, for that matter, with disquisitions on the proper way to throw dinner parties. To make a judgment is to do something that is subject to standards of correctness, whereas to associate something with something else is neither to be correct nor incorrect – it is simply a fact about one’s psychic life.
如果我们意识中的直观表象必须被联结的方式是存在的，那么这方式“必须”包含事物得以能够成为一种“表象”的条件；康德说，理解这一活动之更深层意谓的关键，就在判断本身的观念当中，这是《批判》一开始就谈论的主题。做判断——断言某物是真的或假的——不同于将某个观念同另个观念单纯联结起来。做判断是指服从于支配这些判断的规范。然而，例如，我将“康德”与普鲁士或德意志联结起来，还是将之与午后散步联结起来，抑或与关于举办晚宴的恰当方式的探讨联结起来，这都只不过是一个事实性问题，而不是一个规范性问题。做判断指的是做符合正确性标准的事，而将一个东西和另一个东西联结起来，则不涉及正确与否的问题——它只是关于一个人理智生活的事实。
Judgments themselves, as normative matters, are combinations therefore of two different types of representations into a unity according to the rules of right judgment. This, in turn, showed that concepts could not simply be abstractions from intuitions: a concept is a rule for synthesis in judgments; in Kant’s words, a concept is a “unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation.” Since intuitions cannot produce the unity of such combination themselves, they cannot combine themselves into judgments; only concepts can combine (that is, “synthesize”) such experiential items. To have a concept, Kant argued, is be in possession of a norm, a rule of “synthesis” for a judgment. Having a concept is more like having an ability – an ability to combine representations according to certain norms – than it is like having any kind of internal mental state.
因而，作为规范性问题，判断自身是两种不同类型表象根据正确判断的规则结为一体的结果。反过来，这表明，概念是不能简单地从直观中抽32象出来的：在判断中，概念是综合的规则；用康德的话来说，概念是“把各种不同的表象在一个共同表象之下加以整理的行动的统一性”[18]。由于直观本身不能产生出这种联结的统一性，因而它们不能将它们自己与判断联结起来；只有概念能够联结（也就是“综合”）这些经验性的事物。康德论证说，拥有概念，就是指为判断提供“综合”的规范或规则。与其说拥有概念类似于拥有某种内在的心智状态，不如说它更类似于拥有一种能力-----种依据确定规范将不同表象联结起来的能力。
All this finally comes together, Kant argued, when we think about the conditions under which we could become apperceptively self-conscious as thinking subjects. For me to be aware of myself as a thinking being is to be aware of myself as a unity of experience – as a kind of unified viewpoint on the world – and that unity must be brought about by myself in the activity of combining representations into judgmental form. In combining the multiplicity of sensuous intuitions into a “synthetic unity” (in seeing my experience as more than a series of subjective, psychic events, but instead as a connected series of representations of things), I combine the elements of that experience (intuitions) according to the rules that are necessary for such combinations. Establishing the necessity of these rules thus must consist in looking at how sensuous intuitions must be combined if we are to make judgments about them – if we are to be able to say even mundane things like, “Oh, it looks green in that light, but really it’s blue.” The most basic of those concepts would therefore be the basic concepts necessary in experience in general, or, to use Kant’s reinvention of Aristotle’s classical term, would be the necessary categories of all possible experience. (Kant defined a category as a “concept of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment.” ) Indeed, without such categories, we could not see our intuitions as representations at all. They would be merely psychic occurrences, things that were either there or not, happened or did not happen, not be items that could be said to be adequate or inadequate, correct or incorrect, true or false.
康德认为，当我们思考我们能够以统觉的方式意识到我们是思维主体这一点所依凭的那些条件时，所有这些最终都汇聚到了一起。对于我来说，意识到我自己是一个思维着的存在，就是指意识到我自己是一个经验的统一体——是关于世界的统一观点，并且，这个统一体必须是由我自己、通过将表象联结到判断形式当中而形成的。在将感性直观杂多联结为一个“综合统一体”（即将我的经验视为关于事物的一系列连续表象，而不是一系列主观的、心理的事件）时，我将那种经验（直观）的诸要素联结起来了，所依据的是对于这种联结来说必然的规则。因此，这些规则的必然性的建立，必须包含在对如下问题的思考中：当我们要对感性直观做判断（即便是我们能够做出如下这种平常的判断：“噢，它在光中看起来是绿色的，但实际上它是蓝色的”）时，这些感性直观如何必然地被联结起来。因而，这些概念中最基本的，将是一般经验中必需的基本概念，或用康德对亚里士多德术语进行再造后的说法，将是所有可能经验的必然范畴。（康德将范畴规定为：“范畴是关于一般对象的概念，通过这些概念，对象的直观就在判断的逻辑机能的某个方面被看作确定了的。”[~)的确，如果没有这些范畴，我们根本就不能将我们的直观看作表象。它们将仅仅是心理事件，是在那或不在那、发生或不发生的，而不能被说成是适当或不适当、正确或不正确、真实或虚假的。
To see them as representations, moreover, is to see them as representations of an object. Kant says: “An object is that in the concept of which the multiplicity of a given intuition is united.” We combine various intuitive occurrences – such as black, oblong shaped, and so forth – into the notion of their all being perspectival representations of a single object (the stone). The intuitions themselves cannot, as it were, tell us of what they are intuitions; we make them into intuitions of something, into representations by actively combining them according to the rules of judgment, of conceptual representation in general. For me to be apperceptively self-aware of my experiences as representations, I must be able to take them as combined in certain basic ways, namely, those that correspond to the possible forms of judgment, and if there are only so many forms of judgment, there will be only so many categories.
此外，将它们看作表象，就是将它们看作关于某个对象的表象^康德#说：“对象是在其概念中结合着一个所与直观的杂多的那种东西。”:2°]我们将不同的直观事件（如黑色、椭圆形的，等等）联结到如下观念中：它们都是一个单一对象（这块石头）的透视表象。直观本身不能告诉我们,它们是关于什么的直观；我们将它们变成关于某物的直观，也就是说，我们依照判断的（即一般概念表象的）规则主动地将它们联结起来，从而使它们变成表象。对于我来说，如果要以统觉的方式意识到我自己的经验是表象，那么我必须能够将它们看作是以某种方式联结起来的，并且，有多少判断形式，就将会有多少范畴[21]。
The basic categories themselves thus have to do with the way in which we order and structure our sensory experience into that of a unified experience that represents a single world which consists of objects in space and time interacting with each other according to deterministic causal laws. Kant’s own derivations of those categories were and remained quite controversial, since they were, in his terms, only the “logical forms of judgment” required by our capacity of self-consciousness (that is, ultimately by our capacity to represent within our experience the distinction between the experience of an object and the object itself, to represent ourselves “taking” our experience in certain ways, which presupposes our capacity to bring the logical forms of judgment in normative play in our own experience). The categories of experience (such as those of causality and of enduring substances taking on different properties at different times) emerge as required for us to self-consciously make judgments about our own experiences.
因此，基本范畴本身与我们将我们的经验规整为一种统一经验的方式有关，这后一种经验呈现了一个单一的世界，在这个世界中，处于时空中的对象依照确定的因果律而相互作用。康德自己对那些范畴的推导，依然是相当有争议的，因为用他的话来说，这些推导只是我们的自我意识机能所要求的“判断的逻辑形式”（也就是说，最终是由我们的表象机能所要求的，这指的是在我们的经验中表象出关于对象的经验与对象自身之间的区别，表象出我们自己以某种方式“形成”我们的经验，这预设了，在我们自己的经验中，我们具有将判断的逻辑形式带进规范性游戏的机能）。关于经验的范畴（例如，关于因果性的范畴、关于不同时间拥有不同属性的持存实体的范畴）之所以会出现，是因为我们要自觉地就我们自己的经验做判断[22]。
ONCEPTION AND INTUITIONS: SOME CONCLUSIONS
概念与直观：几点结论
Kant’s line of thought first of all implied that the mind cannot be understood as merely a passive entity of any sorts; in becoming aware of the objects of experience, we do not merely passively see or hear something, nor do we stand merely in any kind of causal relation to an object; our cognitive relation to objects is the result of the active stance we take toward them by virtue of the way in which we combine the various elements (intuitive and conceptual) in our experience.
第一，康德的思路意味着，理智不能被理解为单纯被动的实体；在意识到经验对象时，我们不是仅仅被动地看或听，也不是仅与对象处于因果关系当中；我们同对象的认知关系是我们对对象采取主动立场的结果，这是通过将我们经验中的不同要素（直观的和概念的）联结起来而实现的。
Second, our representations cannot be conceived as “mirrors of nature” (to use Richard Rorty’s phrase); nature cannot determine anything as a representation – things in nature simply are, and they do not, outside of our activity of taking them in a certain way, represent or “stand for” anything. (This does not, of course, deny that there may perfectly well be natural explanations for why we have these and not those particular sensations when we regard them simply as mental events and not as being about anything.) Our sensory intuitions become representations of objects of nature only by being combined with non-intuitive conceptual forms. Moreover, apart from their combination with intuitions, concepts are merely empty, formal rules; in Kant’s famous slogan: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”
第二，我们的表象不能被认为是“自然之镜”（借用理查德•罗蒂的术语）；自然不能决定什么作为表象——自然中的东西只是自然中的东西，并且，如果没有我们以某种方式接受它们这一活动，它们是不会呈现或“象征”什么的。（当然，这并不否认，关于如下^点会有相当完美的自然解释：如果我们将感觉仅仅视为心智事件而不是关于某物的，那为何我们会有这些而没有那些特定的感觉。）仅通过与非直观的概念形式相联结，我们的感性直观就变成了关于自然对象的表象。此外，如果不与直观相联结，概念就仅仅是空洞的形式规则：“思维无内容是空的，直观无概念是盲的”[23]。
Nor, third, are our representations merely internal episodes going on within the confines of our private mental lives, as we might at first naively think; they are rule-governed active “takings” of experiential elements by acts of “synthesis” that produce the various unities necessary for us to have any experience at all – in particular, the unity of the thinking subject and the unity of the objects of experience. For me to make a judgment is for me to be oriented by the rules that would count for all judgers; they cannot be my private rules, since such private rules would not be “rules” at all, but merely expressions of personal proclivities and dispositions. They are the rules necessary for (as Kant puts it) a “universal self-consciousness,” that is, for all rational agents.
第三，我们的表象不是如我们最初所简单认为的那样，是我们私人心智生活边界内发生的、单纯内在的插曲；它们是对经验要素的积极的、受规则掌控的“接受”，这是通过“综合”活动而实现的，这些活动产生了各种对于我们要具有经验来说必然的统-----特别是思维主体的统一与经验对象的统一。我做判断，就意味着我要接受那些对于所有判断者来说都适用的规则；它们不能是我的私人规则，因为这种私人规则根本就不是“规则”，而只是个人癖好和倾向的表达[24:。它们对于一个“普遍的自我意识”（康德语），即对于所有理性行为者来说，是必然的规则[25]。
Fourth, the kinds of objects of which we could be conscious had to be objects in space and time, since space and time were the forms of any possible intuition. Kant’s conclusions implied that the conditions for our being able to be apperceptively aware of our own conscious, thinking lives were that we be aware of an independently existing world in space and time composed of substances interacting causally with each other. That, in turn, disallowed any direct experiential contact with “supersensible” entities (such as the immaterial soul).
第四，我们能够意识到的对象，必须是在时空当中的对象，因为时空是任何可能直观的形式。康德的结论表明，我们据以能够以统觉的方式意35识到我们自己的有意识的、思维着的生命的那些条件，是我们意识到一个独立存在的世界的条件，这个世界存在于时空当中，是由以因果方式相互作用的诸实体构成的。反过来，这拒绝了同“超感觉”物（如不朽灵魂）的直接经验联系。
Fifth, the representational content of thought could not be explained by patterns of association or by naturalistically understood causal patterns; the cognitive content of thought is constituted entirely by the norms governing judgmental synthesis itself.
第五，思维的表象内容不能由联想范式或自然主义所理解的因果范式来解释，思维的认知内容完全是由掌控判断性综合的规范所构成的。
Kant’s basic picture of the mind thus emerged out of his “Transcendental Deduction.” On the one hand, we have intuitions that are the result of the world’s affecting us in certain ways through our senses, which make up a passive faculty of the mind. On the other hand, we also have an active faculty, a way of taking up these intuitions according to certain necessary rules. The active faculty generates concepts purely spontaneously in a way that cannot be derived either from intuitions or from their pure forms (space and time); the basic concepts, categories, of experience are therefore completely underived from intuition, indeed, from empirical experience in general. Moreover, only when both these faculties come together in the act of synthesis do we have consciousness at all; we do not have a partial consciousness that is intuitive, and a partial consciousness that is active; until our receptive faculties and our spontaneous faculty have been combined by the spontaneous faculty itself into an apperceptive unity we are simply not conscious of ourselves or of the world whatsoever.
因此，康德关于理智的基本图像是从他的“先验演绎”中产生出来的。一方面，我们所拥有的直观，是世界以某种方式、通过我们的感官影响我们的结果，这构成了理智的一种被动机能；另一方面，我们也具有一种主动机能，即依照某些必然规则来处理这些直观。这种主动机能纯粹自发地产生出概念，其产生方式既不来自直观，也不来自它们的纯形式（时空）；因而，经验的基本概念、范畴根本就不来自直观，不来自经验性的一般经验[M]。此外，只有当这些机能汇聚到综合行动当中时，我们才会有意识；我们所拥有的不是一种局部性的直观的意识，也不是一种局部性的主动的意识；直到我们的接受机能和自发机能通过自发机能本身联结为一个统觉统一体时，我们才不仅仅意识到我们自己或世界。
The upshot of Kant’s rather dense argument was startling. Behind all our experience of the world is an ineluctable fact of human spontaneity, of our actively taking up our experience and rendering it into the shape it has for us. Neither nature nor God could do that for us; we must do it for ourselves.
康德那相当密集的论证的要点是惊人的6在我们关于世界的经验的背后，是人类自发性这一不可回避的事实，即我们主动地处理我们的经验，并将之转化为适合于我们的形态。自然和上帝都不能为我们做到这一点，我们必须自己做。
Kant had also provided a method for answering the perennial questions of metaphysics. Traditional metaphysics had tried to assert things about non-sensible entities that transcended our experience. Kant proposed something new: his new, “critical” philosophy would be a transcendental philosophy that would show which concepts of non-sensible entities were necessary for the very possibility of our experience. Those “representations” of non-sensible entities that were not necessary for the possibility of experience provided us with no knowledge at all – and, so it turned out, neither the representations of God nor those of the immortal soul would themselves turn out to be necessary for the very possibility of experience. This amounted, as Kant so proudly put it, to effecting a revolution in philosophy as fundamental as the revolution in astronomy effected by Copernicus: what is orbiting around what, suddenly seemed to be at issue in a way nobody had previously imagined.
康德还提供了回答长期存在的形而上学问题的方法。传统形而上学总是试图对超越我们经验的非感性物说些什么。康德提供了新东西：他的新的“批判”哲学将是一种先验哲学，它将表明，关于非感性物的概念哪36些对于我们经验的可能性来说是必要的[27]。哪些关于非感性物的“表象”对于经验的可能性来说并非必要的，它们根本就没有给我们提供什么知识——结果是，对于经验的可能性来说，无论是关于上帝的表象还是关于不朽灵魂的表象都不是必要的。康德相当骄傲地说，这相当于是在哲学中掀起了一场革命，它就如天文学中的哥白尼革命那样具有根本性：谁围绕着谁运行，这个问题突然似乎以一种之前人们不会想到的方式变成了有争议的问题[28]。
