第9章 海德堡时期：成为焦点人物(3)
He also maintained his friendship with Sulpiz Boisseree and came to know his brother, Melchior. Sulpiz Boisseree had known Hegel in Nuremberg, and Boisseree had played a role in bringing Hegel to Heidelberg. The brothers had (together with a friend, Johann Baptist Bertram) established an outstanding collection of paintings by old German and Dutch masters (both collected under the title “Old German”), which was unique for its time, and they had been exhibiting them in an older Palais in Heidelberg since i8io. (Goethe himself had made two trips to see the paintings.) With the awakening interest in German national matters, the collection garnered a bit of fame for itself The collection itself was to have quite an impact on Hegel, since it stirred his thought about early Christian art and put him on the path of thinking that eventually led to his lectures on aesthetics in Heidelberg and Berlin. He was likewise to spend many evenings and outings with the Boisseree brothers (particularly Sulpiz).
他还始终与苏尔皮斯·波瓦塞兰过从甚密，并最终结识他的弟弟梅尔希奥。苏尔皮斯·波瓦塞兰早在纽伦堡时期就已认识黑格尔，波瓦塞兰在把黑格尔引进海德堡大学这件事上也发挥了重要作用。这兄弟俩（连同朋友约翰·巴普蒂斯特·贝尔特拉姆）藏有出自旧德国和丹麦大师手笔的杰出画作（两国大师作品都归在“旧德国”名目下），这样的收藏在当时无出其右，他们自1810年起一直在海德堡故宫展出这批珍贵的画作。（歌德两次亲临现场观看画作。）由于唤醒人们对德国国家事务的兴趣，这批藏品为自己赢得了极大的声名。这批藏品本身肯定对黑格尔产生了很大影响，因为它们激起了他对早期基督教艺术的思考，并且促使他走上思索那最终导致他在海德堡和柏林讲授美学课程的东西的道路。他同样肯定在很多夜晚同波瓦塞兰两兄弟（特别是苏尔皮斯）外出散步。
The First Edition of the Encyclopedia
Although the Phenomenology had been Hegel’s self-described “voyage of discovery,” the Logic became more and more for him the main instrument for his rethinking and securing the rationality of modern life. Prior to Napoleon’s creation of a new Germany, Hegel had been ealling for a new order. Now, having seen his call answered - although not completely and certainly not in all its details - he became increas¬ ingly interested in defending and reforming that order in the face of what he took to be its enemies. That shifted his philosophical concerns even more fundamentally toward building his “system” based on the Logic, for although he had never relinquished his concern for how we came to be who we are, and with both how and whether that process of coming-to-be was rational, he became more and more dedicated to showing that who we have come to be is in fact something rational and sustainable in its own right, to defending and articulating the rationality of the post-Napoleonic world. In his own mind, Hegel began to think of himself less as a philosopher sketching out the birth of a new world, and more as the philosopher of reform for the new order that had now been born. The world around him had changed and, correspondingly. so had his idea of his system. His earliest idea of himself as “applying” philosophical thought to the needs of the time had reappeared, only in different form.
《哲学科学全书纲要》第1版
《精神现象学》被黑格尔自己形容为“发现的航行”，《逻辑学》对他来说却越来越成为他重新思考和保卫现代生活合理性的主要工具。早在拿破仑创造新德国之前，黑格尔就已经在要求德国需要确立一种新秩序。现在，在已经见到他的要求得到回应（尽管既没有得到全面的回应，也肯定没有得到事无巨细的回应）后，他在面对他所看作成为这种新秩序的敌人的东西时，对保护和改革这种新秩序变得越来越感兴趣。这就更加从本质上使他把对哲学的关注转到去建构他奠基于《逻辑学》的“体系”，因为，他从未放弃对我们怎样逐渐成为我们是谁的关注，他从未放弃对这样的逐渐成为的过程是怎么的和是否是合乎理性的关注，但他越来越致力于证明我们最终成为谁这个问题实际上是某种当之无愧的、合乎理性和支撑得住的东西，越来越致力于为之辩护和系统阐释的是后拿破仑一世时期世界的合理性。在黑格尔自己的心目中，他开始较少地把自己看作一个勾勒新世界诞生的哲学家，而更多地将自己看作那对现已诞生的新秩序进行改革的哲学家。他周遭的世界已经发生变化，相应地，他关于体系的思想也要发生变化。将哲学思想“应用”到时代需要中，他自己的这个最早的想法再次冒了出来，只是这一次这个想法采取了不同的形式。
That slightly altered conception bore fruit in Heidelberg, where He¬ gel managed to finish and publish his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in 1817. The Encyclopedia (subtitled “for use in his lectures”) was arranged according to the way Hegel had proceeded in the Gym¬ nasium in Nuremberg, that is, according to numbered paragraphs that would then serve as the basis for discussion and extrapolation in lec¬ tures. The Encyclopedia presented Hegel’s whole system in very brief outline; it had a short introduction, a condensed version of the Logic, followed by a section on the philosophy of nature, which was then followed by a section on the philosophy of spirit (Geist). The section on the philosophy of spirit contained a small portion in it called simply “Consciousness,” in which Hegel’s Nuremberg condensation of the opening sections of his Phenomenology appeared. It also introduced a new term, “objective spirit,” to describe the social and political institu¬ tionalizations of Geist, and a section called “absolute spirit,” which repeated the Phenomenology!'s distinctions among the religion of art (that is, Greek religion), revealed religion (that is, Christianity), and philoso¬ phy. (He had not yet separated “art” out into its own special section in the “system.”)
这个稍经改变的构想在海德堡结出了硕果，在这里，黑格尔绞尽脑汁于1817年完成并发表了他的《哲学科学全书纲要》这部著作。《哲学科学全书纲要》（被用作他讲课中的“副标题”）被依照黑格尔在纽伦堡高级中学时采用的结构方式加以编排，也即被根据之后通常用作课堂讨论和推演的基础的编号段落加以编排。《哲学科学全书纲要》以极简短的纲要形式描述了黑格尔的整个体系；它包含一个简短的导论，一个浓缩版《逻辑学》，随后的自然哲学编，紧随其后的是精神（Geist）哲学编。精神哲学编包含了被简单地叫作“意识”的一小节，这一小节中再现了黑格尔纽伦堡时期浓缩版《精神现象学》的开篇部分。精神哲学编还引入了一个被用来描述精神的社会上和政治上的制度化的“客观精神”这个新术语，以及一个被叫作“绝对精神”的部分，这个部分重复了《精神现象学》对艺术、宗教（也即希腊人宗教）、天启宗教（也即基督教）和哲学作出的区别。（他尚未将“艺术”剥离出来作为“体系”中特定的一编。）
In his public lectures on political philosophy in Heidelberg, Hegel filled out the bare bones of the section on “objective spirit” in the Encyclopedia into a full theory of modern political life, but he did not put those thoughts into book form until three years later in Berlin, when he published his Philosophy of Right in 1820.
在海德堡时期关于政治哲学的公开讲演中，黑格尔把他在《哲学科学全书纲要》中只有梗概的“客观精神”这个部分扩充成内容丰富的现代政治生活理论，但他直到三年后的1820年在柏林发表他的《法哲学原理》时，仍然没有把这些想法编纂成书。
Hegel used the Preface to the 1817 Encyclopedia to express his opti¬ mism about the role that his philosophy might play in the new postNapoleonic order and how that order represented a decisive, even fate¬ ful rupture with the past. With undisguised enthusiasm, Hegel wrote, “The first of the phenomena touched upon here can in some measure be regarded as the youthful giddiness of the new epoch that has dawned in the realm of science just as it has in that of politics. If this giddiness greeted the sunrise of the rejuvenated spirit with reveling, and began enjoying the Idea at once without any hard labor, luxuriating for a while in the hopes and prospects that the sunrise offered, it also reconciles [us] more readily to its excesses because there is a kernel [of truth] at the bottom of it, and the morning mist that covers its surface is bound to clear spontaneously.”^'
黑格尔使用1817年出版的《哲学科学全书纲要》中的前言，表达他对自己的哲学可能在后拿破仑一世时期新秩序中扮演的角色的乐观态度，表达这样的秩序怎样代表着与过去断然的甚至是命定的决裂。带着毫不掩饰的热情，黑格尔写道：“在这里首次触及的这些现象可能在某种程度上被看作一种令年轻人眼花缭乱的东西，这种新纪元已经降临科学领域，正像它已经出现在政治学领域一样。如果说，这种令年轻人眼花缭乱的东西以狂欢来迎接这得到复兴的精神的黎明，开始立即享受观念的乐趣而不辛勤劳作，暂时地尽情享受那得到复兴的精神的黎明带来的希望和前景，那么，这种令年轻人眼花缭乱的东西也就会相应地使[我们]更乐意接受这种令年轻人眼花缭乱的东西的肆意嬉戏，因为在这种令年轻人眼花缭乱的东西的底部存在着[真理]的核心，而那笼罩在这种令年轻人眼花缭乱的东西表面的薄薄晨雾自然地必然会被清除干净。”
Hegel’s friend Sulpiz Boisseree helped to reintroduce Hegel to Goe¬ the via Hegel’s newly published Encyclopedia. In the Encyclopedia., Hegel defended Goethe’s theory of colors. Goethe had argued against Newton, who asserted that clear, white light was a collection of all colors of the spectrum. Instead, Goethe had argued in favor of what for him was a more experiential theory of color, namely, that there are in fact two primal colors (white and black), and that all other color is produced simply by a combination of these two as they are blended together when passing through various clouded media. The clouded media force the two elemental and opposed colors of black and white to combine in new ways that then produce the colors of the spectrum; without passing through such clouded media, black and white produce only gray. (Goe¬ the envisioned this as an application of his method of studying nature by attending to the Urphdnomen, the “primordial phenomenon” as it appears to us in experience; all the various appearances of something can be interpreted as variations on the “primordial phenomenon,” that which is presupposed in any encounter with particular instances of a phenomenon.) Few natural scientists took Goethe’s theory seriously as a competitor to Newton’s conception, whatever their feelings about Goethe’s notion of the emotional effects of color. But Hegel defended Goethe’s theory, and when Boisseree sent that section of the Encyclo¬ pedia to Goethe, Goethe was delighted to see a major thinker taking up his cause against so much opposition. This reestablished a link between Hegel and Goethe that was not afterwards to be broken. (It also did not hurt Hegel that his old nemesis, J. F. Fries, in a highly negative review of Hegel’s Eogic, also attacked Goethe’s theory of color; Goethe was thus irrevocably put on Hegel’s side and against Fries.)
黑格尔的友人苏尔皮斯·波瓦塞兰以黑格尔新出版的《哲学科学全书纲要》为由头，帮忙向歌德引荐黑格尔。在《哲学科学全书纲要》中，黑格尔为歌德的颜色理论辩护。歌德为反对牛顿的颜色理论而进行辩论，牛顿断定白光显然是光谱上所有颜色的集合。相反，歌德则通过论证赞成对他来说作为一种更带有经验性质的颜色理论，也就是说，歌德论证道，其实存在着两种初始颜色（白色和黑色），所有的其他颜色都只不过生于这两种颜色的结合，因为黑色和白色在穿过各种不同的被云覆盖的介质时会交织在一起。这被云覆盖的介质迫使白色和黑色这两种基本的、对立的颜色以新的方式结合起来，继而产生光谱上的颜色；如果不穿过这样的被云覆盖的介质，那么白色和黑色就只会产生灰色。（歌德把这种现象设想为他通过留意那在经验中出现的“原始现象”来对自然进行研究的方法的应用；所有关于某种东西的各种不同现象都可被解释成是“原始现象”的衍生物，“原始现象”通常被预先假定为是与现象的具体例子相冲突的。）几乎没有多少自然科学家真把歌德颜色理论看作堪与牛顿构想相匹敌，无论他们对歌德关于人的情绪对颜色的影响的见解有着怎样的看法。可是黑格尔却为歌德的理论辩护；当波瓦塞兰把《哲学科学全书纲要》中的这节寄给歌德的时候，歌德看到一位重要思想家据理力排众议，非常高尚。黑格尔捍卫歌德理论这件事重新确立了黑格尔与歌德之间的联系，这样的联系之后必将是牢不可破的。（黑格尔的宿敌J.F.弗里斯在对黑格尔《逻辑学》作了极端负面评论的同时还攻击歌德的颜色理论，这同样也没有伤黑格尔一根毫毛；歌德因此也义无反顾地站在黑格尔这边反击弗里斯。）
Not everyone was enthusiastic about Hegel’s idealism as he was presenting it at Heidelberg. In particular, the Heidelberg natural scien¬ tists, who were all committed empiricists, had little time for what they saw as the extravagance and obscurity of Hegel’s version of German idealism, and there were discordant rumblings from them about Hegel’s philosophy, which they tended to view as something that the philoso¬ pher had simply spun out of his own head and that had little if any connection to the real world. Hegel’s published defense of Goethe’s theory of color only served as decisive proof for them that he did not know what he was talking about, and some actually resented the leading role that philosophy (or at least Hegel’s version of it) had come to play in the new structure of the university.But those rumblings were distant and faint, and Hegel could choose to ignore them if he wished. On the whole, his stay at Heidelberg was proving to be the kind of success of which he had dreamed.
当黑格尔在纽伦堡时期提出他的唯心主义哲学理论时，有些人对他的这个哲学理论表现得非常冷淡。特别要提及的是，有些海德堡自然科学家，作为十分坚定的经验主义者，几乎无眼去审视被他们看作的极其夸张和晦涩难懂的黑格尔版本的德国唯心主义，他们在怎样看待黑格尔哲学问题上吵得不可开交，黑格尔哲学被他们倾向于看作是这样的东西：这样的哲学是黑格尔这位哲学家纯粹凭借他自己头脑编造出的东西，是纵使与现实世界有联系也是有极少联系的哲学。黑格尔为歌德颜色理论作出的辩护仅仅被用作一种对他们来说黑格尔并不知道自己在谈论的东西的决定性证据，这些人实际上怨恨哲学（或至少黑格尔版本的哲学）终于在新的大学机构中发挥的主导作用。然而，这些争吵云里雾里模糊不清，黑格尔如果愿意的话可以选择对它们置之不理。总的看来，他待在海德堡期间证明他获得了一种他自己早就梦寐以求的成功。
Jean Paul
In 1817, Hegel befriended another literary celebrity in Germany, the poet and writer Jean Paul (Johann Paul Friedrich Richter), who came for a long visit to Heidelberg during that period to see his good friend Heinrich Voss. The visit on the part of such a literary celebrity caused a small sensation in the community. The visit was sure to interest Hegel himself Not merely was Jean Paul one of the best known and most widely read of the generation of early Romantic writers, he had also been one of the early enthusiasts of the Phenomenology of Spirit, pri¬ vately extolling it to Jacobi. Unlike the Jena Romantics, who had taken Fichte’s thought in a certain existential direction and converted Fichte’s views about the revisability of all judgments into a doctrine of irony, Jean Paul had subscribed to Jacobi’s “realist” criticisms of Fichte while at the same time developing his own special notion of the author’s ironic distance and displaying a sense of ironic playfulness in his writings. For him, both “realism” and Fichtean/Schellingian “idealism” needed to be combined into a more stable view of the relation of the self to the world. (Realism, as he was fond of saying, is only the Sancho Panza of idealism.) His writings combined intricate, unsummarizable plot lines with frequent intrusions by the author (who identifies himself as Jean Paul but gives fictive characterizations even of himself), shifting points of view, extensive contrapositioning of scraps of information, elaborate plays on words, confused identities (Jean Paul, after all, coined the term Doppelgdnger), and often brilliant comic asides. Moreover, Jean Paul had throughout his writings penned some wonderfully comical and sardonic spoofs of the foibles of the Jena style of idealism and the way in which one “system” rapidly replaced another during that period. A friend and admirer of Jacobi, who also got along quite well with Fichte personally, Jean Paul had satirized Fichte’s notion of the “F’ positing the “Not-F’; in his Titan, one of the characters is driven mad by thinking of himself as the absolute “I.” His parodies of Schelling had even more bite: In Titan, one of the characters (Schoppe) worries that reading Schelling will make him like the drunkard who on urinating at night into a running fountain ends up staying the whole night at the fountain be¬ cause he is convinced he has not yet finished. Given his own way of combining opposing strands within himself and the way in which so many of his own characters end up doing something that they had not been taking themselves to have been doing, Jean Paul was in a good position to appreciate the way in which Hegel in the Phenomenology had tried to show how the fundamental tensions at work in the various historical shapes of “spirit” inevitably lead them to undermine them¬ selves and to turn out to have been doing quite the opposite of what they originally thought they were doing.
耶安·保罗
1817年，黑格尔与另一位德国文学名流诗人兼作家耶安·保罗（约翰·保罗·弗里德里希·里希特）订交，后者在看望好友海因里希·福斯期间在海德堡住了很长时间。这样一位文学名人的到访在海德堡学界引起了一场小轰动。这次来访必定引起黑格尔自己的关注。耶安·保罗不仅仅当属最知名和作品最被广为传诵的早期浪漫派作家那代人中之一位，他也是《精神现象学》的早期热情解读者之一，私底下在雅科比面前赞美《精神现象学》。不像耶拿浪漫主义者（因为他们以某种存在主义方式解读费希特思想并把费希特关于所有的判断可修改性的观点变成讽刺学说），耶安·保罗则赞成雅科比对费希特“实在论”的批评，与此同时阐述他自己特有的关于作者讽刺的距离这个见解，在作品中展示讽刺的嬉戏感。对于他来说，“实在论”和费希特或谢林的“唯心主义”需要结合成一种对自我与世界的关系的更稳固的观点。（实在论，像他常喜好说的，只不过是唯心主义的桑丘·潘萨——这位堂吉诃德的侍从。）他的作品把复杂的非概述的情节主线和以下内容结合起来：那（自认为是耶安·保罗而甚至赋予自己虚构特征的）作者的频繁侵扰、变换的观点、大量对置的信息碎片、精妙的文字游戏、混乱的身份（耶安·保罗毕竟杜撰了“Doppelgänger”（“面貌极相似的人”）这个词语）、常常卓越的喜剧旁白。不止于此，耶安·保罗在整个作品中充满着某些对耶拿唯心主义风格弱点的精彩的喜剧式和嘲讽的玩笑，充满着那种在这个阶段一个“体系”借以迅速取代另一体系的方式。身为雅科比的友人和仰慕者，而且也与费希特私交很深，耶安·保罗大肆讽刺费希特的“自我”设定“非我”这条原理；在耶安·保罗《提坦》这部小说中，众多人物中有一个因把他自己看作绝对的“自我”而被逼疯。他对谢林的讽喻更为辛辣：在《提坦》这部小说中，众多人物中有一个（朔佩）担心，解读谢林作品可能使他像个醉汉，在夜晚对着正在喷水的喷泉撒尿，整晚都待在正在喷水的喷泉处，因为他确信自己仍然没有撒完尿。考虑到耶安·保罗自己借以默默地把对立的线索结合起来的方式，考虑到耶安·保罗自己笔下的诸多人物借以结束一直在做长期以来没有被他们意识到他们自己始终在做的事情的方式，耶安·保罗有足够能力欣赏这样的一种方式，借此方式黑格尔早在《精神现象学》中就已尝试证明的是，在“精神”的各种不同历史形态中起作用的那些基础张力是如何不可避免地导致他们削弱他们自己，是如何不可避免地导致他们证明他们自己实际上一直在做与他们最初认为他们自己在做的完全相反的事情。
Hegel had, however, at first not been so enamored of Jean Paul, having taken an indirect swipe at him in 1802 in his polemical piece “Faith and Knowledge,” in which he lambasted Jacobi’s use of what he called Jean Paul’s “sentimentalism” to criticize the Kantian philosophy. (Hegel’s criticism of what he took as Jean Paul’s “subjective arbitrari¬ ness” and sentimentalism was to reappear in his Berlin lectures on aesthetics.) But in the period between 1802 and 1817, Hegel had prob¬ ably come to appreciate Jean Paul’s ability to unite both profound religious doubt (bordering on atheism) with equally deep religious sen¬ timent, along with his ability to combine ironic and critical detachment with a sharp, fervid, even sentimentalized attachment to family affairs. Moreover, both he and Jean Paul shared an attachment to the French Revolution, a disinclination for its Jacobin terrors, and an attachment to the ideals of freedom and cosmopolitanism that the Revolution had fostered (even if Jean Paul eventually backslid on that attachment).
不过，黑格尔起初并没有受到耶安·保罗的如此仰慕，他在1812年论战性的《信仰与知识》一文中间接地抨击了耶安·保罗，在该文中，他严厉斥责雅科比运用他称作的耶安·保罗的“感伤主义”批评康德哲学。（黑格尔对他自己看作的耶安·保罗的“主观任性”和感伤主义的批评将在他自己的柏林美学课上重演。然而，在1802至1817年这个阶段，黑格尔很可能开始意识到耶安·保罗有能力把深奥的宗教质疑（无神论的边界）与同样深度的宗教情感结合起来，连同意识到耶安·保罗有能力把讽刺和批判的超脱与一种对家庭事务的强烈的、热诚的、甚至感伤化的依恋结合起来。不止于此，他和耶安·保罗都对法国大革命怀有依恋之情，都对法国大革命中雅各宾派恐怖行动深恶痛绝，都对法国大革命哺育的自由和世界大同的理想怀有依恋之情，尽管耶安·保罗最终放弃了这种依恋之情。）
Many of Hegel’s contemporaries often saw Hegel only as a serious man completely absorbed in his work, but in fact Hegel (although not always easily) combined a detached, jocular temperament with a full earnestness and seriousness about his calling, and he no doubt saw a bit of that feature echoed in Jean Paul. (That Hegel wrote “Faith and Knowledge” during his period of collaboration with Schelling and that Jean Paul had particularly singled out Schelling for his satire had no doubt played some role in Hegel’s initial disinclination toward Jean Paul; Hegel’s break with Schelling and Jean Paul’s appreciation of the Phenomenology no doubt played a role in his reappraisal.)
很多黑格尔同时代的人常把黑格尔仅仅看作一个严肃认真的全身心投入工作的人，但其实黑格尔把一种超然的、幽暗的气质与他要求的事业上一丝不苟、严肃认真结合起来（尽管这种结合并不总是轻而易举的），他无疑也看到有相当多的反映在耶安·保罗身上的同样的特征。（黑格尔在与谢林合办杂志期间写出了《信仰与知识》这篇著作，耶安·保罗特别挑选出谢林作为讽刺对象，这两件事无疑在加剧黑格尔最初对耶安·保罗感到厌恶方面起到某种作用；黑格尔与谢林的决裂和耶安·保罗对《精神现象学》的赞赏无疑在黑格尔对耶安·保罗的重新评价方面起到一定的作用。）
On July II, 1817 (a Friday), Heinrich Voss held a “punch evening” for Jean Paul (a good friend of his) and some Heidelberg luminaries. (A “punch evening” was basically a drinking party for gentlemen, with an emphasis on drinking, smoking, and jovial conversation in the absence of any women - a custom at the time newly imported from England and considered very modern and very sophisticated.) Voss served up what he described as “sweet wine” in large tureens and made sure the glasses were always full. The evening was a great success - which is to say that all the men present got thoroughly plastered, told outrageous jokes and stories, and at the end could barely walk. At one point a local pastor jokingly tried to persuade Hegel to write a philosophy book for young girls that the pastor could use for instructional purposes. Hegel excused himself, saying that not only were his thoughts not really the kinds of things that young girls could grasp but that he was not profi¬ cient enough with language to write such a book. When the minister then proposed that Jean Paul could render Hegel’s thoughts into ac¬ ceptable and beautiful style, Jean Paul retorted by saying, “Ah, so that’s how things are to be. Our old Hegel is to deliver the spirit. I’m to put a hearty body around it and a decorative garment, and then you want to take it to market!”” At this remark, everyone roared with laughter, making even more jokes about a possible Hegel/Jean Paul collaboration on a philosophy for schoolgirls. (Maybe one had to be there to appreci¬ ate it.) Hegel added his own jokes, being that evening, as Voss noted, “so unrestrained, glad-hearted, so popular (something that behind the podium he isn’t always), that little was lacking for him to start writing that philosophy book immediately.”” (It seems that a bit of wine always loosened up an otherwise too-serious Hegel and brought out his more jocular side.)
1817年7月11日（星期五），海因里希·福斯为耶安·保罗（他的好友）和一些海德堡名人举办了一场“潘趣晚会”。（“潘趣晚会”基本上是一种为绅士举办的酒会，重在没有女性在场的情况下饮酒、抽烟、快活交谈——这个风俗那时刚从英国引入并被看作是非常现代的和非常不落俗套的。）福斯用大杯子端上那被他描述为的“甜酒”，并确保每个杯子总是满的。这场酒会非常成功——也就是说，所有的在场男士全都醉得酪酊大醉，讲着下流的笑话和故事，最后几乎走不了路。就在这时，一位当地牧师开玩笑地力图说服黑格尔为年轻的女孩子们写一本哲学书，这样牧师就可用它来达到教育的目的。黑格尔为自己找借口，说不仅他的思想确实不是那种能被年轻女孩子们可以把握的东西，而且他并不足够精通写这样一本书的语言。当牧师接着提出耶安·保罗可以把黑格尔的思想翻译成常人可以接受和优美的风格时，耶安·保罗借以下的这番话答复道：“啊，因此事情必将是这样，老练的黑格尔必将释放精神，我使它拥有丰满的身体和穿上华丽的衣裳，之后你们就希望把它带到集市上了！”听到这番话，大家都呵呵大笑，并对黑格尔和耶安·保罗有可能合作为中小学女生撰写哲学书这件事开了更多的玩笑。（也许人们必须身临其境才能悟出这番话的真义。）黑格尔自己也讲了笑话，在这场酒会上，像福斯指出的，黑格尔“如此尽情尽兴和喜不自禁，如此受到大家喜爱（这些是在讲台上他很少表现出来的东西），以至于他几乎足以迅速开始撰写这本哲学书。”（看来好像一点葡萄酒总是使得过于严肃的黑格尔变得别样的无拘无束，并使他表现出更为诙谐的一面。）
As the men were staggering out at the end of the evening, Hegel looked at Jean Paul and said (no doubt in slurred tones), “He has to become a doctor of philosophy.” All present agreed that this was an excellent idea, and on Monday morning, the faculty (presumably now sober) met to vote on whether to award Jean Paul an honorary doctorate; one mathematician objected, arguing that Jean Paul’s Christianity was somewhat doubtful and his morals even more so. In best playacting seriousness, Hegel defended the idea that Jean Paul was not only a Christian but had to be the best of all Christians and the most moral of men. Voss - a classicist - gave a long disquisition on the difference between bacchic intemperance and bacchanalian drunkenness vis-a-vis Jean Paul. In the end, all agreed on the bestowal of the honorary doctorate; the degree was inscribed on parchment, a due ceremony was held, and more parties began, followed by days and days of excursions and carriage rides to scenic spots.
当男士们在酒会结束时都喝得摇摇晃晃时，黑格尔看着耶安·保罗并（无疑以含糊的语调）说道：“他必须成为哲学博士。”所有在座的人都承认这是极好的主意，在星期一早晨，哲学系全体教工（现在大概清醒的）开会表决是否授予耶安·保罗名誉博士学位；一位数学教师持反对态度，认为耶安·保罗基督教徒的身份有点值得怀疑，而他的道德品质更有点值得怀疑。以极具表演的严肃姿态，黑格尔为耶安·保罗作辩护，认为他不仅是个基督教徒，而且客观上是基督教徒的榜样和人们的道德楷模。福斯——一个古典主义者——与耶安·保罗面对面地做了一个长篇专题演讲，涉及酒神的放纵与酒神节的醉酒的区别。最终，所有人都一致同意授予耶安·保罗名誉博士学位；这个学位被写在学位证书上，举行了正式的典礼，更多的聚会开始了，接下来是连续多天的旅行和乘坐马车去景点。
Marie Hegel joined in the festivities too, although not quite in the way Hegel anticipated. An excursion to the pretty town of Weinheim was planned. Hegel could not make it on the original wagon, so Marie, along with Jean Paul, Heinrich Voss, and Heinrich Paulus’s beautiful and talented daughter, Sophie Caroline Eleutheria Paulus, were to go on ahead. (In the fashion of importing sophisticated tastes from abroad, Sophie Paulus was addressed as “Mamsell Paulus,” obviously a Germanization of the French form of address.) They took off at 8:00 A.M. on Sunday, with the ensemble noting that Marie seemed to be in a particularly good mood that day. There were stopovers for breakfast, hot chocolate and coffee (the women of course had to make the hot chocolate and coffee), and after a delightful lunch with even better wine (and apparently no small amount of it), they all took a stroll, then boarded their carriage again, at which point the four of them decided to play “spin the bottle” and began trading kisses. Marie was allowed to give Jean Paul eight kisses and Voss four; “Mamsell” Paulus had no such restrictions placed on her.-’’ Marie was surely also unaware that Jean Paul had in the meantime developed a great passion for Sofie Paulus, which was requited on her side, and which assuredly had some¬ thing to do with the erotic overtones of the carriage ride, even if it was limited to four adults playing “spin the bottle.” Nothing was to come of it, although it did lead Jean Paul for a while to mull over divorcing his wife so he could establish a union with Ms. Paulus; in late Septem¬ ber 1817, however, the twenty-eight-year-old Sofie Paulus married Au¬ gust Schlegel, almost fifty-one years old at the time, only to have the marriage fall apart within weeks. (That marriage was, curiously enough, the second time that Hegel was present to witness a rapidly failed marriage on August Schlegel’s part.) Hegel later showed up with the children in tow, and Heinrich Voss vowed to keep the ensemble’s mildly erotic secrets from Marie’s husband and Jean Paul’s wife. Hegel himself drank far too much and ended up with a bad hangover. (Perhaps the reason for Hegel’s ardor for Jean Paul notably cooling during his Berlin period had to do with some disclosure by Marie; but perhaps not.)
玛丽·黑格尔也加入了庆祝，尽管她没有完全以黑格尔预期的方式。他们计划去曼海姆这个美丽小镇旅行。黑格尔没有按原计划弄到四轮马车，因此玛丽连同耶安·保罗、海因里希·福斯和海因里希·保卢斯的美丽聪慧的女儿索菲·卡罗利内·埃洛伊特里亚，保卢斯只得提前出发。（模仿国外传入的优雅品味，索菲·保卢斯被称作“马姆泽尔·保卢斯”，明显是法国人称呼形式的德国化。）他们在星期天上午8点启程，所有的人都指出玛丽看来好像那天心情特别好。中途停下来吃早餐，喝热巧克力咖啡（女士们当然必须制作热巧克力咖啡），在喝着上好葡萄酒（显然喝了不少酒）、吃过可口午餐后，他们全都散了一会儿步，继而复又登上他们乘坐的马车，在车上时他们中的四位约定玩“旋转瓶子”游戏并开始交换接吻。玛丽获许给耶安·保罗八个吻，给福斯四个吻；“马姆泽尔”·保卢斯则不受这样的限制。“玛丽当然还未意识到耶安·保罗那时已经极爱索菲·保卢斯，这样的爱在她玛丽身上得到满足，这样的爱无疑与乘坐马车的色情暗示有关，纵使马车上只限定四个成年人之间玩‘旋转瓶子’游戏。”“旋转瓶子”游戏结果什么也没有发生，尽管“旋转瓶子”游戏确实曾致使耶安·保罗有一阵子认真考虑过与妻子离婚，这样他就可以和保卢斯女士结合；然而，在1817年9月底，28岁的索菲·保卢斯嫁给了那时几乎已经51岁的奥古斯特·施莱格尔，而他们的婚姻仅在数周后就破裂了。（说来奇怪，这段婚姻是黑格尔作为证婚人的奥古斯特·施莱格尔第二次很快失败的婚姻。）黑格尔后来带着子女一起到场，海因里希·福斯发誓对玛丽的丈夫和耶安·保罗的妻子保守大家在马车上玩的稍微带有点色情的“旋转瓶子”游戏这个秘密。黑格尔本人喝了太多酒最终呕吐得很厉害。（黑格尔后来在柏林这个阶段对耶安·保罗明显失去热情，个中缘由也许与玛丽向黑格尔对这件事情作了某些透露有关；但也许玛丽根本就没有向黑格尔透露这件事。）
As the parties and excursions with Jean Paul continued, a pattern became established. Whatever was said, Jean Paul would take issue and wittily defend some thesis that he knew would outrage or distress those present. Hegel would counter with some abstract, rigorous argument, which rolled off Jean Paul like the proverbial water off a duck’s back."’*’ For example, Hegel at one point gave his version of the myth of the fall as having to do with the symbolic presentation of the idea that by eating from the tree of knowledge and not of life, men had become like God, that self-consciousness was the impetus for their being driven out of paradise; Jean Paul then wittily retorted that such a view shows that God was therefore only jealous of mankind; Hegel would reply in all seriousness, and so on.^^ Great personal differences still existed between the two men; despite his combining of seriousness with ironic distance, Jean Paul always inclined toward sentimentalist solutions, whereas He¬ gel took that same opposition within himself in a different direction, always inclined to a more sharply critical, even rationalist view of things. Hegel saw religion as grounded in reason, whereas Jean Paul saw it more in the way that Jacobi envisioned it, as a leap, a matter of emo¬ tional and intellectual faith. One thus gets the impression that Jean Paul’s wit might have been beginning to wear a bit thin on Hegel by the end of the visit. But by all accounts, Jean Paul found himself amused if not charmed by Hegel’s continual insistence on pushing their conver¬ sations in a methodical, “scientific” direction.
随着耶安·保罗的社交聚会和旅行的继续进行，他建立起了一种社交模式。不管别人说什么，耶安、保罗都总是对其持有异议，并机智地为这些在他看来将会引起那些在场者愤怒或痛苦的话题进行辩护。黑格尔经常用某些抽象的、严密的论证进行反驳，此举对耶安、保罗像“水落鸭背”这句谚语一样毫无作用。举例来说，黑格尔一度曾说亚当、夏娃智落的神话与对这样的想法——借助吃知识之树上的果实而非吃生命之树上的果实，人们变成了像上帝一样的存在者，同时自我意识促使人们被逐出天堂——作象征的描述有关；耶安、保罗接着机智地反驳道，这样一种观点表明上帝因此只不过是在嫉妒人类；黑格尔当然极严肃地作出反击，如此等等。在黑格尔与耶安、保罗这两个人之间仍然存在着巨大的个人差异；尽管把严肃与讽刺式冷笑结合起来，耶安、保罗仍总是倾向于伤感主义解决办法，而黑格尔却以不同的方式对待在他自己内心恰好对立的东西，总是倾向于对事物采取一种更加尖锐地批评的、甚至理性主义的看法。黑格尔把宗教当作植根于理性看待，而耶安、保罗则更多地以雅科比借以设想宗教的方式把宗教当作一种飞跃看待，当作关于情感和知识的信仰的问题看待。人们因此通常留下的印象是，耶安、保罗的风趣到这次旅行结束时可能已经开始有点使黑格尔失去兴趣。但是，根据各种流传的说法，耶安、保罗发觉他自己也会很开心，如果说他没有被黑格尔持续地坚持以一种方法论的“科学”方式来推进他们俩的交谈迷住的话。
Victor Cousin
Hegel also received a visit from a young Frenchman, Victor Cousin, who was later to play a crucial role in introducing Hegelian philosophy to France (and was also to play crucial roles in redesigning the French educational system and in French politics). Cousin was at the time a young instructor at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris who had arranged a research visit to Germany to acquaint himself with the much vaunted innovations in idealist philosophy going on there. He of course went looking for whom he thought was the most famous living idealist, Schelling, but did not meet him; on his own account, he quite by accident encountered instead Hegel, of whom he had heard little more than that he was one of the leading exponents of the Schellingian school of thought (indicating that even by 1817 the picture of Hegel as an exponent of Schellingian philosophy still had a life of its own). He acquired a copy of Hegel’s newly published Encyclopedia of the Philo¬ sophical Sciences^ which he found somewhat obscure and scholastic. During Cousin’s short visit to Heidelberg, Hegel must have been in a somewhat downcast mood, since Hegel seemed at the time to Cousin to be a man who was unsure of himself and who had little commerce with others (something which clearly was not true of Hegel in his Heidelberg period). To his great surprise, Hegel took an interest in him, although, as Cousin put it, he understood little German and Hegel understood an equivalent amount of French. Their conversations nonetheless made a deep impression on Cousin, who was both struck and quite taken with the depth of Hegel’s knowledge and the scope of his system. Cousin read Hegel’s newly published Encyclopedia together with one of Hegel’s French-speaking students, Friedrich Wilhelm Carove, and together they would go in the evening to Hegel’s house for tea, where they would pepper Hegel with questions (although Hegel’s answers. Cousin admit¬ ted, often did not exactly clear matters up). Cousin did not become a Hegelian, but, as Cousin put it to a friend, Hegel was one of those fellows to which one “attached oneself, not to follow him but to study him and comprehend him.”®* The two men nonetheless became good friends, and later in Berlin Hegel was to play a crucial role in having Cousin freed from political imprisonment.
维克托·库赞
黑格尔还接待了一位年轻的法国人维克托·库赞的来访，此君后来在把黑格尔哲学介绍到法国这件事上起到了至关重要的作用（同样也在重新设计法国教育体系和在法国政治学方面发挥了至关重要的作用）。库赞是那时巴黎高等师范学校的一名年轻讲师，他已经准备到德国做访问研究以便了解德国正在进行的受到大肆吹嘘的唯心主义哲学的革新。他当然打算找寻在他看来那时健在的最有名的唯心主义者谢林其人，但是没有遇到他；照他自己的解释，他反而非常偶然地遇见了黑格尔，对于黑格尔，他几乎只是仅仅听说黑格尔是谢林思想学派的一流阐释者之一（这就表明甚至到1817年黑格尔作为谢林哲学拥趸的写照仍然有着它自己的生命力）。他得到一本黑格尔新出版的《哲学科学全书纲要》，这本书被他感到有点晦涩和烦琐。在库赞短暂访问海德堡期间，黑格尔想必从某种角度说情绪上显得低落，因为黑格尔那时被库赞看作一个对自己不自信和别人很少来往的人（黑格尔在海德堡阶段显然并不是这样）。使他大为吃惊的是，黑格尔却对他很感兴趣，尽管，像库赞说的，他听不太懂德文且黑格尔也同样听不太懂法文。他们俩之间的交谈仍然给库赞留下了深刻的印象，库赞被黑格尔渊博的知识和博大精深的体系所打动和吸引。库赞与黑格尔的一位讲法语的学生弗里德里希·威廉·卡罗韦共同解读黑格尔新出版的《哲学科学全书纲要》，一起约定晚上去黑格尔家里喝茶，将向黑格尔请教问题（尽管黑格尔的回答，库赞承认，常常没有准确地解答问题）。库赞并没有成为一个黑格尔哲学信徒，但是，像库赞向友人说的，黑格尔属于那些“无需被人依附”的人之一，人们不必追随他而必须研究他和解读他。尽管如此，这两个人仍然成了好朋友，后来在柏林黑格尔将在使库赞解脱政治监禁这件事上起到了至关重要的作用。
Hegel’s Relation to Students
Cousin expressed surprise that Hegel took such an interest in such a young, unknown fellow as himself, but had he known Hegel better, he would not have been so astonished. In Jena, in Nuremberg, and in Heidelberg, numerous comments were made about Hegel’s openness to students, the course of their studies, and his continual willingness to spend the necessary time with them - provided, of course, that they showed an interest in “science.” Although no cult around Hegel devel¬ oped at Heidelberg such as later developed at Berlin, numerous students nonetheless apparently found in Hegel someone they could trust and who was always willing to offer advice and help.®*^ An example of Hegel’s openness to students was the experience of the Estonian aristo¬ crat Boris von Uxkiill, who after serving in the Russian army during the wars against Napoleon, decided that he needed to become educated and showed up at the age of twenty-four in Heidelberg, where he encountered Hegel; von Uxkiill remarked on how patient Hegel was with his fledgling efforts at studying philosophy, indeed, how Hegel was even amused at the way in which von Uxkiill found Hegel’s books unintelligible; Hegel gave him some private sessions, suggested addi¬ tional reading, and even gave him some instruction in algebra and Latin.“ Von Uxkiill remembered that in their strolls, Hegel would remark that he thought that “our overly clever times . . . could only come to be satisfied through a method, because a method subdues our thoughts and leads them to the real things themselves.”^' The Jena, Wissenschaft conception of the university required the professor to be not a disciplinarian of students (as he had often been in the older model of the university) but a model for them, an adult who was a living example for the students of the “scientific” approach to things, who showed them by his own practice what it meant to pursue a modern life with its anchoring in one’s own practices. This fit Hegel like a glove, and many students responded to it.
黑格尔与弟子的关系
库赞感到惊奇的是黑格尔对像他自己这样一个年轻的无名之辈如此感兴趣，而如果他对黑格尔了解更深的话那他就理应不会感到这样惊讶。在耶拿，在纽伦堡，在海德堡，他对学生虚怀若谷，在授课过程中表现出的思想开明，他对花费必要的时间与学生们探讨问题的乐此不疲——当然假如他们对“科学”表现出浓厚兴趣——所有这些都受到人们的广泛称道。尽管黑格尔在海德堡没有像后来在柏林那样培养出大批信徒，很多学生依旧显然发觉黑格尔是一位可以被他们信赖和总是愿意为他们提供忠告和帮助的老师。举例来说，爱沙尼亚贵族鲍里斯·冯·乌克斯库尔亲身体验到黑格尔对学子的虚怀若谷，他自抗击拿破仑战争期间就在俄国军队中服役，退役后认为自己需要深造，在24岁时来到海德堡，遇到了黑格尔；冯·乌克斯库尔提到黑格尔对他费力地初学哲学是多么诲人不倦，实际上，黑格尔甚至就连对冯·乌克斯库尔觉得黑格尔的书晦涩难懂这件事依然显得很大度；黑格尔对他进行个别辅导，建议他课外阅读些书籍，甚至还对他在代数和拉丁文方面进行指导。冯·乌克斯库尔清楚地记得，在他们师徒俩散步时，黑格尔总是谈论道，“过于聪明的时代……只有通过一种方法才可能最终得到满足，因为这种方法将征服思想并将致使思想把握真实事物自身。”耶拿大学的科学构想要求不要成为学生的惩戒者（这种模式在过去的大学中经常存在），而成为学生们的楷模，要求教授作为成年人要以身作则引领青年学子以“科学的”方式对待事物，要求教授要借自己的实践向学生表明追求现代生活和现代生活取决于人们自己的实践意味着什么。这样的构想非常符合黑格尔的心意，许多学生也对这样的构想作出积极的回应。
In looking back on his Heidelberg years, one former student re¬ marked that Hegel showed the students “that one must first learn quite a lot before one can make the world a better place.The enrollments in Hegel’s courses correspondingly began to rise dramatically; during Hegel’s last semester in Heidelberg, one student noted to his father that “Hegel’s lectures are so densely filled” and that Hegel was not “preach¬ ing politics but, on the contrary, science. In his inaugural lecture at Heidelberg (on October 28, 1816), Hegel had already spoken directly about what he hoped for in his students and perhaps wistfully compared the storms of his past life to what he saw as the tranquillity of the modern world that finally had heen born. Obviously addressing the students in his audience, Hegel remarked, “We older men who have grown up amid the storms of the time may call you happy who in your youth can devote yourselves undisturbed to truth and philosophy. I have consecrated my life to philosophy ... I hope I may succeed in deserving and gaining your confidence.”*^ During his stay in Heidel¬ berg, a number of students seemed to have warmly responded to Hegel’s offer. Hegel was obviously fully at home in his role and satisfied with the way things were settling down for him.
回顾黑格尔的海德堡岁月,一个以前的学生谈论道,黑格尔向学生明言“一个人首先必须在使世界变得更加美好之前学习大量的知识.“选修黑格尔课的人数相应地开始急剧增加;在黑格尔海德堡最后一个学期,一个学生对父亲说道,“黑格尔的课已被全部选满“,黑格尔也不在课堂上“大讲政治学而相反宣扬科学.““在他(1816年10月28日)海德堡就职演说上,黑格尔就已直截了当地述及他对学生抱有何种期望,也许风趣地把他自己过去的生活的风暴比作他看作的那终于诞生了的现代世界的静谟。明显在针对学生听众作演讲时,黑格尔谈论道,“我们作为饱经风霜的长辈可能称你们是非常幸福的,因为你们在青年时期能够心无旁骜地致力于真理和哲学。我已经把我的一生献给了哲学…...我希望我能够值得且得到你们的信任.“在他待在海德堡期间,许多学生看来好像对黑格尔的提议作出了热烈响应。黑格尔明显对他扮演的角色得心应手并对自己适应新生活方面感到心满意跃。
Hegel’s Review of Jacobi
That Hegel was feeling more at home with both himself and his work also manifested itself in one of the first pieces Hegel wrote for the Heidelberger Jahrbiicher^ a respected learned journal of the time. Shortly after his arrival in Heidelberg, Hegel had been made the editor of the journal at Daub’s insistence, and in 1817 he published a very apprecia¬ tive review of the third volume of Jacobi’s collected works in the journal. The review was striking both for the overview Hegel gave of his own thought and the conciliatory tone he adopted throughout the piece. Missing from his review was any expression of the sharp, polemical edge that had characterized him in his thirties in Jena, when as a member of the new idealist movement, he had felt obligated to make his mark and strike out at what he saw as the opposing views. Part of his contentiousness during that period reflected the passion with which he cared about the issues at stake; for him at the time, they seemed to be no less than whether a philosophy that joined forces with the dynam¬ ics of modern life and the Revolution would succeed, or whether what he saw as a series of philosophies (Jacobi’s included) that were set at halting the spread of modern ideas would prevail. By the time he reached Heidelberg, though, he was a man in his late forties with a family, a good marriage, a secure, well-paying position, and, most im¬ portantly, the world seemed to be going his way. He and what he cared about had, so it seemed at the time, won the day. He could afford to be generous.
黑格尔对雅科比的评论
黑格尔对他自己和工作都感到称心如意,这同样也显露在黑格尔为《海德堡年鉴》这本那时颇受推神的学术刊物撰写的第一批文章中的一篇中。在抵达海德堡后不次,黑格尔在道布的坚持下担任了这本刊物的编辑,并于1817年在该刊物上发表了一篇对《雅科比全集》第3卷的充满赞赏的评论。这篇评论之所以惹人注目不仅是因为黑格尔对他自己的想法作了概述而且是因为他通篇采用的调和的论调。他评论中的措辞已经不复具有他30多岁时在耶拿形成的具有辛辣的论辩式的犀利特点,在耶拿时,作为新唯心主义运动的成员,他已经感到自己应该有所建树并对他所看作的对立的观点进行无情抨击。他在耶拿时期的部分争论反映出他对重大问题的关心上的激情;对于那时的他,这些重大问题看来好像不亚于一种与现代生活动力和法国大革命相结合的哲学是不是将会取得成功,或他所看作的一系列因阻止现代思想传播而遭到拌击的哲学(包括雅科比哲学)是不是将会大行其道。尽管如此,到他抵达海德堡时,他已是一个年近50岁的有家庭、婚姻美满、有一份稳定的高萍职位的男子,最重要地,世界看来好像在按他的方式发展。因此,看来好像在那时,他及其关心的东西顺风顺水。他可以称得上慷慨大方宽宏大量。
Hegel’s review of Jacobi’s work also offered him a chance to make his own philosophical views known to the public in a manner less burdened with the jargon and dense formulations that he thought to be obligatory in his more scholarly, wissenschaftliche works. Full of praise for Jacobi’s contributions, sharp insight, and good-heartedness, Hegel’s review tried to show how Jacobi’s thought could best be understood as a rational but incomplete response to the way modern philosophical thought had de¬ veloped, and to do this, he argued, one had to set all of Jacobi’s works into the context of his much earlier confrontation with Kantianism and Spinozism in his 1785 book. On Spinoza’s Doctrines in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn. As Hegel saw it, the problems to which Jacobi was responding in 1785 were something like the following. By 1785, French philosophy had forsaken Descartes’ revolutionary turn in favor of the English Lockean approach. Unlike the Cartesian system, which had implicitly proposed that we “know thinking as the ground of being and cognize the contours of the latter only within and through the resources of the former,” the Lockean approach had proposed to derive all thoughts from the “immediate givens of the world of appearance.”'’^ But since the Lockean approach then needed to provide an account of how the “givens” of our experience could in any way be counted as authoritative for our judgments, the French were led to postulate “an indeterminate nature" as the metaphysical ground to explain why those “givens” of experience took the shape they did. On the other side of the Rhine, the German Enlightenment had done much the same thing with regard to received religious tradition. Finding that all received religious teaching about the “divine world” could not be found within “self-consciousness,” it had effectively dissolved that tradition, leaving behind only the ^‘'death’s head of an abstract empty essence that cannot be cognized" and finding within its own self-consciousness “only finite ends and utility as the relation of all things to such ends.”'"’ Others in the German Enlightenment had reacted against that and insisted on the priority of their religious feelings, setting out to correct what they saw as the philosophical errors of the more rationalistic Enlightenment thinkers. (Hegel might have had in mind his old mentor, J. F. Abel, who had done just that.)
黑格尔对雅科比作品的评论同样也使黑格尔有机会以一种方式使他自己的哲学观点变得为公众所知,这种方式减轻了由于那被黑格尔认为在他自己学术昧道较浓的科学的著作中必须使用的术语和深奠难懂的系统闸述而给读者造成的负担。在充满对雅科比的贡献、敏锐的洞察力、菪萨心肠的赞美的同时,他的评论还尝试证明雅科比思想怎久可能最好被理解为一种对现代哲学思想已经开出路径的合理而欠完整的回应,有鉴于此,黑格尔建议,人们必须把雅科比所有作品都置于以下的语境中加以理解:他在1785年《关于斯宾诺莎学说给莫泽斯、门德尔松先生的书信集》这部著作中最早对康德主义和斯宾诺莎主义的比较。像黑格尔看到的,雅科比1785年对之作出回应的类似如下这样的问题。到1785年,法国哲学已经抛弃借卡尔的革命式转5向而着手赞同英国洛克的路往。和笛卡尔的哲学体系不同(因为借卡尔哲学体系隐约地提出我们“知道思维是存在的基础并仅仅在思维领域或通过思维领域认识存在的轮廓“),洛克的路径提出了所有的思想都源自“现象世界的直接的给予物.““然而,因为洛克的路径接着需要具体释述经验的“给予物“怎么可能在标种程度上被算作判断的权威的东西,所以法国人被致使假定形而上学基础的“不确定的本性“以便解释为什么经验的这些“给予物“采取它们所采取的形式。在荷茵河的另一边,德国启蒙运动早已做了很多相同的关于得到接受的宗教传统的事情。由于发现所有关于“神圣世界“得到接受的宗教教义都不可能见于“自我意识“中,德国启蒙运动实际上早已撂毁了得到接受的宗教传统,留下的只是“无法被认识的抽象空洞的本质僵死头颅“,发觉在它自己自我意识中“只有有限目的和效用作为使所有东西都与这样目的相关联的东西。““德国启蒙运动的另一些人一反上述想法而行之,坚持他们宗教感觉的优先性,着手纠正他们看作的带有较浓理性主义色彩的德国启蒙运动思想家哲学上的错误。(黑格尔有可能指的是他的资深导师JF.阿贝尔早已恰恰这样做了。)
It was Jacobi’s good sense, Hegel argued, not to be satisfied with either the French or the German Enlightenment approaches. Instead, Jacobi’s acute insight led him correctly to see that “every consistent philosophy must lead to Spinozism”; he failed, however, to see that “true philosophy” must also go beyond Spinozism.'’^ As Jacobi had understood, Spinozism has no real place in it for our self-consciousness; Jacobi had grasped, if only implicitly, that the Spinozistic conception of substance cannot account for how it is that itself, this substance, can come to be aware of itself and give an account of itself, and how this insufficiency in Spinozism requires a move not back to pre-Spinozistic metaphysics but forward to idealist doctrines of self-consciousness. Ja¬ cobi, that is, did not understand that our self-consciousness essentially involved “negativity,” the way in which self-conscious reflection neces¬ sarily introduces a gap between our rationality and the deliverances of our senses; the capacity for self-consciousness, for reflection itself allows us to throw into question whether we can come to regard any of the deliverances of the senses as reasons for belief or action. The senses merely give us, as Hegel says, the “being” of things, that they are, not what our norms (our “oughts”) are to be. Although he took the first step, Jacobi thus ultimately failed to draw out the logical consequence of this line of thought: Since the senses themselves cannot sort out which deliverances count as reasons and which ones do not, reason, as Kant saw, must determine for itself and itself alone what does and does not count as rational. Thus, although Jacobi intuitively understood that the “absolute” must be something like “spirit” {Geist), that “God is spirit, the absolute is free and personal,” he ended up confounding this with a subjectivistic approach to knowledge and action.“
雅科比的高明之处,黑格尔争辩道,在于没有被法国启蒙运动路径或德国启蒙运动路径冲昏头脑。恰恰相反,雅科比敏锐的洞察力致使他正确地看出“每个一以贯之的哲学都必将走向斯宾诺莎主义“;不过他却未能看出“真哲学“同样也必须超越斯宾诺莎主义。像雅科比早已理解的,斯宾诺莎主义自己没有为我们的自我意识留出真正的地盘;雅科比已经领会(但愿已经彻底领会)的是,斯宾莎诺主义关于实体的构想无法说明实体自身怎么能够逐渐意识到自身和怎么能够逐渐对它自身作出释述,无法说明斯宾莎诺主义这个欠缺怎么不是要求后退到前斯宾诺莎主义的形而上学而是要求前进到唯心主义的自我意识学说。也就是说,雅科比并不理解我们的自我意识本质上牵涉到“否定性“,牵涉到自我意识的反思必然借以使我们的合理性与感觉判定之间形成的裂口的方式;自我意识或反思自身能够允许我们去质疑我们能不能逐渐把感觉的判定当作信念或行动的理由看待。桅些感觉仅仅赋孙我们,像黑格尔说的,它们所是的东西而非我们的规范(我们的“应当“〉必将成为的东西。雅科比尽管在这方面迈出了第一步却迄今最终未能引出这条思路的逻辑结论:因为树些感觉本身无法挑出郧些判定可被算作合乎道理的而哪些判定不可被算作合乎道理的,理性,像康德看作的,必然会失定它自身且只能使它自身去确定何物可被算作合乎理性和何物不可被算作合乎理性的。因此,雅科比直观地理解“绝对“必然是柏种像“精神(Geist)“一样的东西,盲观地理解“上帝是精神,绝对是自由的和有人格的,“他最终把他的上述理解与知识和行动的主观路径混为一谈.“
The reason why Jacobi failed to make the idealist move was that his whole approach was, so Hegel explained, that of the “reflecting con¬ sciousness, which, disassociated from reason’s intuition distances itself from the mediating movement of the cognizing of this intuition.”*'^ (Hegel also made clear that by “reason’s intuition” he meant “intellec¬ tual intuition. For Hegel, “reflection” has to do with the way in which in making certain judgments about the structure of appearance, we commit ourselves to norms about what accounts for the structure of appearance; for example, the way in which judging that something to be the case commits us implicitly to general norms about something’s really being the case - such as judgments that things subjectively seem to be such-and-such commit us to general norms about the way things objectively are. But such “reflective” structures, as Hegel believed he had shown in his Logic, presuppose the structure of the “absolute Idea,” the unity of subjective and objective points of view, although they cannot make those structures of the “absolute Idea” explicit within their own structures.
所以黑格尔解释道，为什么雅科比未能把唯心主义运动向前推进，原因在于他的整个路径是“反思意识的路径，意识因与理性直观相分离而使它自己远离认知理性直观这个起着中介作用的活动。”（黑格尔还借“理性直觉”这个他的意义上的“理智直觉”来深入阐明上述解释。）对于黑格尔，“反思”与一种方式有关，借此方式，在作出关于现象的结构的判断时，我们承诺遵守关于对现象结构作出解释的东西的规范；举例来说，借助这种方式，断定某物好像是成问题的，就是促使我们含蓄地承诺遵守关于这个物确实成问题的通用规范——诸如这些主观上似乎如此这般的判断，促使我们承诺遵守关于事物客观上的存在方式的通用规范。但是，这样的“反思”结构，像黑格尔坚信他在《逻辑学》中证明的，是以“绝对观念”的结构或主观观点与客观观点的统一为先决条件的，尽管“反思”结构无法使得“绝对观念”的这些结构清晰地呈现在“反思”结构自己的结构中。
By arguing that Jacobi’s thought only embodied “reflection,” Hegel thus put him in the same camp as Kant (a classification that Hegel had already made in his 1802 essay “Faith and Knowledge”). But even though Kant’s thought, like Jacobi’s, was a philosophy of “reflection,” Kant had nonetheless explicitly recognized, unlike Jacobi, that reason had to be self-determining. Hegel put it strongly: “It is more important, however, not to overlook in this treatment of the Kantian critique of reason . . . that it had also cognized spirit’s freedom in its theoretical aspect as the principle. This principle, in an abstract form, of course, lies in the idea of an original-synthetic unity of apperception of self- consciousness, which seeks in cognition also to be essentially self(ietermining."'^^ Nonetheless, although Jacobi did not explicitly grasp this Kantian point, he was, Hegel argued, on the right track and in the same spirit; in this Jacobi was not to be confused with, as Hegel mischievously notes, some of his “friends” - he clearly meant in this context his old nemesis, J. F. Fries - who, not having understood at all what was important in Jacobi’s criticism of Kant, thought that they could thereby improve on Kant by transforming the critical philosophy into an “an¬ thropology . . . into a simple narration of facts that are lighted upon in consciousness,” an enterprise in which “the cognition of them then consists in nothing further than a dissection of that which is lighted upon.”'^
凭借论证雅科比的思想仅仅体现“反思”而已，黑格尔因此把雅科比列入跟康德相同的阵营（这样的划分黑格尔早在1802年《信仰与知识》一文中就已作出）。但是纵使康德的思想，同雅科比的思想一样，也是一种“反思”的哲学，然而和雅科比不同，康德却明确认识到理智必须自我决定。黑格尔着重指出：“不过，更为重要的，在讨论康德的理性批判时不应忽视……康德的理性批判也已经在它自己的理论层面认识到精神的自由是一条原理。这条原理，这条具有抽象形式的原理，当然依赖于自我意识的统觉具有原初的综合统一功能这个想法，这样的原理还在认知过程中设法做到本质上的自我决定。”然而，雅科比显然没有吃透康德的这个观点，黑格尔论证道，但是雅科比的大方向是正确的且精神实质与康德本人观点大体相同；在这一点上，像黑格尔恶作剧式地说的，雅科比没有被他的（黑格尔的）这些“朋友”（黑格尔在这个语境中显然指的是自己的宿敌J.F.弘里斯）弄得晕头转向，这些“朋友”根本就不明白雅科比对康德的批评有何重要性，认为他们自己可以借助把批判哲学变为“人类学……变为对缺乏意识的事实的简单叙述”由此使康德哲学日臻完美，按照这个雄心勃勃的计划，“他们的认知于是仅仅依赖对所缺乏意识的剖析。”雅科比，凭借他那稳固的作为具体观念的精神“直觉”，同样理直气壮地摒弃费希特的体系，此举只不过使康德的体系“被提升到更高的抽象层面并更加坚定不移地贯彻”康德的体系。
Jacobi, with his firm “intuition” of spirit as concrete, also rightfully rejected Fichte’s system, which is only Kant’s system “raised to a higher abstraction and carried through more consistently.”’^ But although Jacobi thus had a concrete, intuitive feel for how both Kant and Fichte required something like a conception of spirit, Geist, to make good on the promises of their idealism, Jacobi’s intuitive feel for the concrete nevertheless led him mistakenly to suppose that the principles making up this notion of spirit, Geist, therefore had to come from the “heart.” In this way, Jacobi repeated an Aristotelian error, which is to misconceive what is “universal” in “impulses and mores Jacobi thus failed to learn Aristotle’s other lesson, namely, the recognition that “for the higher, cultivated cast of mind and its morality, a still more general cognition is required, namely that of what ought to be, not only its being present to itself as the being of a people, but rather knowing it as the being which appears as nature, world, and history.
然而，尽管雅科比因此具体地直观上觉得康德和费希特两人多么需要某种像“精神”（Geist）一样的东西以便履行他们自己的唯心主义承诺，雅科比关于具体事物的直觉感觉仍然错误地致使他假定这些构成精神概念的原则因此必定是来源于“心灵”。以这样的方式，雅科比重犯了亚里士多德的错误，这就是错误地设想在“冲动”和“道德”（Sitte）中存在“共相”。雅科比因此未能汲取亚里士多德的其他经验教训，即，未能认识到“为了塑造更加高尚的受到教化的心灵及其道德，人们更需要一般认知，也即人们更需要认识到应当做的人不仅仅自身的存在作为一个人的存在，而宁可说是把自己看作显露为自然、世界和历史的存在。”
