Chapter 3 Freedom and community
一个谜
A puzzle
我们已经看到，黑格尔认为一切历史事件都导向自由这一目标。We have seen that Hegel believes all the events of the past to have been leading up to the goal of freedom. 《历史哲学》的结尾暗示，这一目标或许已经达到了。At the conclusion of the Philosophy of History there was an indication that this goal might have been reached; 但黑格尔几乎没有说明为什么普鲁士（或者当时其他任何德意志国家）应被视为3000年的世界历史一直在追求的那个辉煌结果。but Hegel provided few indications why Prussia (or any of the other German states existing at that time) should be regarded as the glorious result for which three thousand years of world history had been striving. 黑格尔讲授历史哲学课程时，冯·施泰因和冯·哈登贝格所领导的普鲁士自由改革时期已经结束。When Hegel gave his lectures on the philosophy of history, Prussia’s period of liberal reform under von Stein and von Hardenberg was over.
统治普鲁士的是国王和其他几个有权势的家族，Prussia was dominated by the king and a few other powerful families. 它缺少一个重要的议会。国家在运转过程中，违反绝大多数公民的意见，强制执行严格的审查制度。It lacked a parliament of any importance, denied the overwhelming majority of its citizens any say in the running of the state, and imposed a strict censorship. 黑格尔怎么会把这样一个当作人类自由的顶峰呢？How could Hegel have regarded such a society as the pinnacle of human freedom? 难怪德国哲学家阿图尔·叔本华在谈到黑格尔时说：“政府把哲学当成服务于国家利益的手段，而学者则把它当作职业。”Is it any wonder that the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer should have said, with Hegel in mind: ‘Governments make of philosophy a means of serving their State interests, and scholars make of it a trade’? 也难怪卡尔·波普尔会认为黑格尔有一个目的，那就是“向开放的社会宣战，从而服务于他的主子——普鲁士的弗雷德里克·威廉”。Or that Karl Popper should believe that Hegel had one aim, ‘to fight against the open society, and thus to serve his employer, Frederick William of Prussia’?
在本章，我将试图解释黑格尔的自由概念。In this chapter I shall try to explain Hegel’s concept of freedom. 我认为，无论黑格尔是出于何种动机，他关于这一主题的思考都必须得到认真对待，因为它深入切中了我们在谈论一个社会是否自由时通常的假定。If I succeed, I will have shown that whatever his motivation, Hegel’s thinking on this subject has to be taken seriously because it cuts deeply into assumptions we frequently make when we say that one society is free and another is not.我们已经看到，在《历史哲学》的导言中，黑格尔说世界历史不过是自由意识的进步罢了。We have seen that in the introduction to the Philosophy of History Hegel says that world history is nothing but the progress of consciousness of freedom. 没过几行他又说，“自由”“是一个不明确的词，极为含糊，……容易导致无数误解、混乱和错误”。He adds, a few lines further on, that this term ‘freedom’ is ‘an indefinite, and incalculably ambiguous term … liable to an infinity of misunderstandings, confusions and errors’. 不幸的是，他拒绝给出进一步的定义，而是说自由的根本性质要在解释世界历史的过程中“去展示”。Unfortunately he declines to give a further definition, saying that instead the essential nature of freedom ‘is to be displayed’ in the process of interpreting the history of the world. 这并不能令人完全满意。对《历史哲学》的考察也许已经使我们对黑格尔所理解的自由有了一个初步印象，This is not entirely satisfactory. Our examination of the Philosophy of History may have given us a glimmering of what Hegel takes freedom to be; 但如果是这样，这个初步印象就迫切需要我们进一步阐明黑格尔在《法哲学原理》中更为明确的看法。but if so, it is a glimmering that urgently requires the further illumination of Hegel’s more explicit comments in the Philosophy of Right.
首先要谈谈标题。对英语读者来说，“法哲学”（Philosophy of Right）会让人觉得与对错（right and wrong）有关，或者说研究的是伦理学。First, a word about the title. To an English-speaking reader, ‘Philosophy of Right’ suggests a work about right and wrong, in other words a study of ethics. 在黑格尔的《法哲学原理》当中，伦理学的确占据着突出地位，但该书的主题更接近于政治哲学。Ethics does figure prominently in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, but its subject is closer to political philosophy. 黑格尔标题中被译成“法”的德文词是Recht，The German word in Hegel’s title which is translated as ‘Right’ is Recht. 可以指“正当的”（right），但也有更广的关联，包括“法”在内，即整体意义上的“法”（the Law），而不是某一特殊的“法律”（law）。This can mean ‘right’, but has wider associations, including that of ‘law’, in the sense in which we refer to ‘the Law’ as a whole rather than to one particular law. 因此《法哲学原理》表达了黑格尔关于伦理学、法学、社会和国家的哲学思想。So the Philosophy of Right expresses Hegel’s philosophical ideas about ethics, jurisprudence, society, and the state. 由于自由始终是黑格尔关注的核心，所以《法哲学原理》包含着黑格尔在社会和政治领域关于自由最详细的讨论。Since freedom is always central to Hegel’s concerns, the Philosophy of Right contains Hegel’s most detailed discussion of freedom in the social and political sphere. 当然它也包含着对其他议题的讨论，但是为了继续理解自由这一重要概念，我将不去考虑那些议题。Naturally, it contains discussions of other topics as well, but I shall pass over them in the interest of pursuing the crucial concept of freedom.
抽象的自由
Abstract freedom
我们不妨从熟悉的东西开始谈起。It will be best to begin with something familiar. 考虑一种观点，或可称为古典自由主义的自由观。Consider what might be called the classical liberal conception of freedom. 自由主义者一般认为，自由就是不受约束。Liberals generally see freedom as the absence of restrictions. 如果别人不干涉我并且不强迫我做不愿做的事，那我就是自由的。I am free if others do not interfere with me and do not force me to do what I do not want to do. 当我可以随心所欲地做事时，我是自由的。当我一个人时，我是自由的。I am free when I can do as I please. I am free when I am left alone. 在其著名论文《两种自由概念》中，以赛亚·伯林把这种自由概念称为“消极自由”。This is the concept of freedom that Isaiah Berlin, in his celebrated essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, called ‘negative freedom’.
黑格尔很熟悉这种自由概念，但伯林和其他许多当代自由主义者和自由意志主义支持者把它看成最可取的自由形式，黑格尔则把它称为形式的自由或抽象的自由，意指它有自由的形式，但没有自由的实质。Hegel was familiar with this concept of freedom but, unlike Berlin and many other contemporary liberals and libertarians who regard it as the most desirable form of freedom, he refers to it as formal or abstract freedom, meaning that it has the form of freedom, but not the substance.
他写道：“如果有人说自由就是可以为所欲为，那么我们只能认为，这种看法表明思想完全没有成熟，因为它对于绝对自由的意志，对于正确的道德生活等等没有丝毫的认识。”He writes, ‘If we hear it said that the definition of freedom is ability to do what we please, such an idea can only be taken to reveal an utter immaturity of thought, for it contains not even an inkling of the absolutely free will, of right, ethical life, and so forth.’ 黑格尔对这种自由概念的反驳是，它把个人选择看成一种基础，认为自由必须从这里出发，至于这些选择如何做出以及为何做出，秉持这种自由观的人却不去追问。Hegel’s objection to this notion of freedom is that it takes the choices of the individual as the basis from which freedom must begin – how and why these choices are made is a question that those who hold this conception of freedom do not ask. 黑格尔则确实问了这个问题，他的回答是：那种脱离其他任何事物来考虑的个人选择乃是任性状况下的产物，所以并不是真正自由的。Hegel’s objection to this notion of freedom is that it takes the choices of the individual as the basis from which freedom must begin – how and why these choices are made is a question that those who hold this conception of freedom do not ask.
这似乎有些专横。黑格尔如何敢说我们的选择是任性的，而他的选择却是真正自由的呢？这不是明目张胆要把他的价值观强加给我们吗？This seems high-handed. How dare Hegel tell us that our choices are arbitrary – while his, presumably, are genuinely free? Is this anything more than a blatant attempt to impose his values on us?
也许是这样。但如果我们考虑当代的一个类似争论，也许就会更加赞同黑格尔所要表明的观点了。Maybe. But we may become a little more sympathetic to what Hegel is trying to say if we consider an analogous contemporary debate. 一些经济学家认为，要想知道一种经济制度运转得如何，恰当的检验是看它在多大程度上能使人满足自己的偏好。Some economists believe that the proper test of how well an economic system works is the extent to which it enables people to satisfy their preferences. 这些经济学家把个人偏好当作评价的出发点，而没有追问这些偏好是如何产生的。These economists take individual preferences as the basis from which assessment must begin. They do not ask how these preferences come about. 这些经济学家说，从众多偏好中进行选择，给某些偏好以更大的重要性（持有偏好的个人所赋予这些偏好的不同重要性除外），将是明目张胆地否认人们有能力判断什么是生活中真正需要的东西，从而把自己的价值观强加于他人。To select among preferences and give some preferences more weight than others (apart from the differing weights given to their preferences by the individuals who hold them) would be, these economists say, a blatant attempt to impose one’s own values on others by denying them the capacity to decide what they really want out of life.
以赛亚·伯林（1909-1997）
我将把这些经济学家称为“自由派经济学家”。I shall call these economists ‘liberal economists’. 自由派经济学家有其批判者，我称之为“激进派经济学家”。The liberal economists have their critics, whom I shall call ‘radical economists’. 激进派经济学家在同意把个人偏好当作评价经济制度运转如何的唯一基础之前，会追问个人偏好是如何形成的。The radical economists ask some questions about how individual preferences are formed before they agree to take such preferences as the sole basis for judging how well an economic system works. 他们举出了下面这样的例子：假定在某一时期，我们的社会把正常人体的气味看成理所当然的。They bring up examples of the following kind: suppose that at a certain time people in our society take the normal human body odours for granted. 对于出汗和可能闻到人身上的汗味这样的事情，人们几乎注意不到，即便注意到，也不会认为令人不快。That humans sweat and that it is possible to smell a sweaty person are things they barely notice, and in so far as they do notice them, they do not consider them unpleasant. 这时有人发明了一种产品，它能有效地抑制出汗和气味散发。Then someone discovers a product which has the effect of inhibiting sweat and the odour it gives off. 这项发明很有意思，但在我们描述的那个社会里，对此项产品有兴趣的人寥寥无几。That is an interesting discovery, but, in the society described, interest in the product will be very limited. 然而，我们的发明者不愿轻易放弃。Our inventor, however, does not give up easily. 他精心策划了一场广告战，旨在让人们为自己是否比别人出汗更多、朋友们是否会对自己的体味产生厌恶而感到不安。He launches a clever advertising campaign designed to make people anxious about whether they sweat more than other people, and whether their friends might find their body odour offensive. 他的广告很成功，人们发展出了使用这种新产品的偏好。His advertising is successful. People develop a preference for using the new product; 而且由于产品价格处于可承受范围之内，很多人都买得起，人们也有能力满足这种偏好。and because the product is widely available at a price within their means, they can satisfy this preference. 从自由派经济学家的立场来看，所有这些都没有什么问题。From the standpoint of the liberal economists, all this is fine. 在这种经济运转方式中，他们看不出有什么比其他方式不好的地方。That the economy works in this way provides them with no basis for rating it less favourably than they otherwise would have. 而激进派经济学家却认为，这显然是荒谬的。The radical economists think this is manifestly absurd. 为了避免这种荒谬性，他们认为经济学家必须去研究偏好的基础这一难题，To avoid such absurdities, they say, economists must face the difficult task of enquiring into the basis of preferences, 在评价一种经济制度时，不应看它是否能够满足任何偏好，而应看它是否能够满足那些基于真正的人类需要或有助于真正的人类幸福的偏好。and must judge economic systems by their ability to satisfy not just any preferences, but those preferences that are based on genuine human needs or contribute to genuine human welfare. 激进派经济学家承认，如果采用他们的方法，我们就不能声称自己的评价是价值中立的。The radical economists concede that if we adopt their method, we cannot claim that our assessment is value-free; 但他们补充说，任何评价经济制度的方法都不可能是价值中立的。but they add that no method of assessing an economic system can be value-free. 自由派经济学家所使用的评价方法仅仅是把满足现有偏好当作其唯一的价值标准。The method of assessment used by the liberal economists simply took the satisfaction of existing preferences as its sole value. 因此，虽然它假装很客观，这种方法的使用已经隐含着一种价值判断。A value-judgement is therefore implicit in the use of this method, though disguised under a cloak of objectivity. 自由派经济学家实际上是对影响人们偏好的任何偶然情形都给予认可。The liberal economists effectively give their blessing to whatever circumstances happen to influence what people prefer.这场争论显然很像黑格尔与那些把自由定义为可以为所欲为的人之间的争论。There is a clear parallel between this debate and Hegel’s debate with those who define freedom as the ability to do what we please. 消极的自由概念就像自由派经济学家关于一个好的经济制度的构想：它拒绝追问我们随心所欲地做事时所感到的“愉快”是由什么影响所致。This negative concept of freedom is like the liberal economist’s conception of a good economic system: it refuses to ask what influences form the ‘pleasings’ that we act upon when we are free to do as we please. 持这种自由观的人断言，追问这样一个问题并以对它的回答来区分出哪些选择是真正自由的、哪些自由选择仅仅是形式上的而非实质性的，这乃是把一个人自己的价值观写进了自由观之中。Those who hold this conception of freedom assert that to ask such a question, and to use the answers as a basis for sorting out genuinely free choices from those that are free only in form and not in substance, would be to write one’s own values into the conception of freedom. 和激进派经济学家一样，黑格尔的反驳是：消极自由观已经以一种价值观为基础了，那就是基于选择行动的价值观，不论这种选择是如何形成的或者有多么任意。Hegel’s retort, like that of the radical economists, would be that the negative conception of freedom is already based on a value, the value of action based on choice, no matter how that choice is reached or how arbitrary it may be. 换句话说，消极自由观对影响人们选择方式的任何情形都给予认可。The negative conception of freedom, in other words, gives its blessing to whatever circumstances happen to be influencing the way people choose.人为创造出新的偏好，以便通过满足人们的这些偏好去牟利，如果你同意必须反对这样一种经济制度，那么你一定会认为激进派经济学家是有道理的。If you agree that it is absurd to see no objection to an economic system that artificially creates new preferences so that some may profit by satisfying them, you must agree that the radical economists have a point. 要把有助于真正人类幸福的偏好与那些无益的偏好区分开固然很困难，Admittedly it will be difficult to sort out the preferences which contribute to genuine human welfare from those that do not. 在这一点上甚至都无法达成一致，但不能因为这项工作困难就原封不动地接受所有偏好。It may prove impossible to reach agreement on this. Nevertheless, the difficulty of the task is no reason for taking all preferences at face value.
如果你认为激进派经济学家有道理，那么你距离认为黑格尔有道理就只有一小步之遥了。事实上，甚至连一小步都没有，If you agree that the radical economists have a point, it is only a small step to agreeing that Hegel has a point. Indeed, it is really no step at all; 因为黑格尔预见到了激进派经济学家立场的核心观点，加尔布雷斯、万斯·帕卡德等工业经济的批评者使这一观点在当代流行起来。for Hegel anticipated the central point of the radical economists’ position, a point that has been popularized in modern times by J. K. Galbraith, Vance Packard, and a host of other critics of the industrial economy. 下面这段话虽然是黑格尔在消费社会初兴时写的，但对其发展方向已经有了充分察觉：Here is Hegel, writing at the very infancy of the consumer society, but perceptive enough to pick up the way it was going:英格兰人所谓的“舒适”是某种不可耗尽的、无法限制的东西。What the English call ‘comfort’ is something inexhaustible and illimitable. 别人可以向你表明，你在任何阶段所认为的舒适其实是不舒适，而这些发现是没有穷尽的。Others can reveal to you that what you take to be comfort at any stage is discomfort, and these discoveries never come to an end. 因此，对于更大舒适的需求并非直接产生于你，而是希望从中牟利的那些人创造出来的。Hence the need for greater comfort does not exactly arise within you directly; it is suggested to you by those who hope to make a profit from its creation.
这段话出现在《法哲学原理》考察黑格尔所谓“需求体系”的一节中，此前则提到了亚当·斯密、萨伊和大卫·李嘉图等古典自由经济理论的伟大人物。This remark occurs in a section of the Philosophy of Right that examines what Hegel calls ‘The System of Needs’ it follows hard upon a reference to the great figures in classical liberal economic theory, Adam Smith, J. B. Say, and David Ricardo. 黑格尔对这一“需求体系”的批判表明，今天的激进派经济学家本质上已经接受了他反对自由经济社会观的理由，Hegel’s criticism of this system of needs shows that the ground of his opposition to the liberal economic view of society was essentially that taken by radical economists today. 而这理由的背后则是黑格尔理智而可靠的历史透视。Behind it lies Hegel’s steady historical perspective. 黑格尔从未忽视一个事实，即我们的需求和欲望是我们生活于其中的社会所塑造的，而这个社会又是历史进程中的一个阶段。He never loses sight of the fact that our wants and desires are shaped by the society in which we live, and that this society in turn is a stage in a historical process. 因此，抽象的自由，那种随心所欲的自由，实际上受到了我们时代社会和历史力量的左右。Hence abstract freedom, the freedom to do as we please, is effectively the freedom to be pushed to and fro by the social and historical forces of our times.
现在看来，作为对消极自由概念的批判，黑格尔的观点显得非常有道理。As a criticism of the negative concept of freedom, Hegel’s view should by now seem reasonable enough. 然而，他打算用什么东西来取代它呢？What, however, does he intend to put in its place? 我们必然生活在特定历史时期的某个特定社会中，必然被我们生活的社会和时代所塑造。We all must live in a particular society at a particular period of history. We will all be shaped by the society and times in which we live. 那么，除了被社会和历史力量引导着自由行动，自由还能是什么呢？How then can freedom be anything more than the freedom to act as we are led to act by social and historical forces?
自由与义务
Freedom and duty
我们的某些欲望出自我们的本性，比如食欲是我们与生俱来的，或如性欲，我们生来就有发展它的潜能。Some of our desires are the product of our nature – like the desire for food, we were born with them, or like sexual desires, we were born with the potential to develop them. 许多其他欲望则一般是由我们的抚养、教育、社会和环境形成的。Many of our other desires were formed by our upbringing, our education, the society in which we live, our environment generally. 无论这些欲望的来源是生物的还是社会的，事实是在每一种情况下我们都无法选择它们。biological or social as the origins of these desires might be, it is true in either case that we did not choose them. 由于这些欲望不是自己选择的，所以我们从欲望出发来行事并不是自由的。Since we did not choose our desires, we are not free when we act from desire.这一论点让人想起了康德而不是黑格尔，但黑格尔沿着这一思路走了下去。让我们作进一步探讨。This argument is reminiscent of Kant rather than Hegel, but Hegel goes along with it up to a point. Let us follow it a little further. 如果我们从欲望出发来行事是不自由的，那么通往自由的唯一可能道路似乎就是清除掉人的所有欲望。If we are not free when we act from desire, it seems that the only possible path to freedom is to purge oneself of all desires. 但这样一来还剩下什么呢？康德的回答是理性。Bàut what would then be left? Kant’s answer is: reason. 行为的动机可以来自欲望，也可以来自理性。dMotivation to action can come from desires, or from reason. 除去了欲望，我们就剩下了纯粹的实践理性。Do away with the desires, and we are left with pure practical reason.仅仅基于理性的行为——这种思想并不容易把握。Action based on reason alone – the idea is not easy to grasp. 我们往往会谈及一个人的行为是合理的或不合理的，但此时我们通常都是相对于这个人的最终目的或目标来谈的，这些目的都是建立在欲望基础上的。We can talk readily enough of a person’s actions being rational or irrational, but we normally do so in relation to the ultimate ends or goals that person has, and these ends will be based on desires. 例如，当我们听说年轻而有天分的女演员海伦试图打入电影界时，我也许会说，她因吃了过多甜食而变得丰满是不合理的，但如果问我海伦想当电影明星是否合理时，我能说什么呢？For example, knowing that Helen, a talented young actress, wants to break into the movies, I can say that it is irrational of her to eat so many sweets that she is becoming plump, but if I am asked whether I consider it rational of Helen to want to be a movie star, what can I say? 我只能说这种欲望太基本了，以至于谈不上合理还是不合理：它只是关于这个女人的一个赤裸裸的事实。Only that this kind of desire is too basic to be either rational or irrational: it is just a brute fact about the woman. 有没有关于合理或不合理的判断不是建立在这种基本欲望基础上的呢？Can there be judgements of rationality or irrationality which are not based on basic desires of this kind?康德说可以有。Kant says there can be. 当我们去除了所有特殊欲望甚至是最基本的欲望时，我们就剩下了合理性的纯形式要素，这个纯形式要素就是道德律自身的普遍形式。When we take away all particular desires, even the most basic ones, we are left with the bare, formal element of rationality, and this bare formal element is the universal form of the moral law itself. 这便是康德著名的“绝对律令”，他是这样说的：“只按照你同时认为也能成为普遍律令的准则去行动。”This is Kant’s famous ‘categorical imperative’, which he puts thus: ‘Act only so that the maxim of your action can be willed as a universal law.’
这里最令人费解的一步是从纯形式的合理性进到某种普遍性的观念。The most puzzling step in this is the move from bare formal rationality to the idea of something universal. 康德认为——黑格尔显然也赞同——理性无疑是普遍的。Kant holds – and Hegel obviously agrees – that reason is implicitly universal. 如果我们知道所有人都会死，并且苏格拉底是人，那么由推理的法则便可得知，苏格拉底会死。If we know that all men are mortal and that Socrates was a man, then a law of reasoning tells us that Socrates was mortal. 告诉我们这一点的推理法则是一个普遍法则。它不仅适用于希腊人或哲学家甚至是整个人类，而且适用于一切理性的存在者。The law of reasoning that tells us this is a universal law – it holds not just for Greeks or for philosophers or even for Earthlings, but for all rational beings. 在实践推理（即关于做什么的推理）过程中，这种普遍要素往往被一个事实所掩盖，即我们是从绝非普遍的特殊欲望出发的。In practical reasoning – that is, reasoning about what to do – this universal element is often concealed by the fact that we start from particular desires which are anything but universal. 让我们看看下面这则实践推理：“我想变得富有；我能从我的雇主那里骗来100万美元而不被发现；因此我应该欺骗雇主。”Consider this piece of practical reasoning: ‘I want to be rich; I can defraud my employer of a million dollars without being detected; therefore I should defraud my employer.’ 这则推理是从我想变得富有这一欲望出发的。这种欲望没有任何普遍性。Here the reasoning starts from my desire to be rich. There is nothing universal about this desire. （不要受许多人渴望变得富有这一事实的误导。作为我推理起点的欲望是：我，彼得·辛格，应当是富有的。而很少有人会和我共有这一欲望。）(Don’t be misled by the fact that many people desire to be rich; the desire from which I begin this reasoning is the desire that I, Peter Singer, should be rich. Very, very few people share this desire.) 由于这则推理的出发点没有任何普遍性，所以它的结论也没有普遍性，它肯定不能适用于一切理性存在者。Because there is nothing universal about the starting point of this piece of reasoning, there is nothing universal about its conclusion, which certainly does not hold for all rational beings. 然而，如果我们不是从任何特殊欲望出发去推理应当做什么，就没有什么东西可以阻碍我们的推理适用于一切理性存在者了。If we were to reason about what to do without starting from any particular desire, however, there would be nothing to prevent our reasoning from holding for all rational beings. 独立于特殊欲望Pure practical reasoning, independently of particular desires, could only embody the universal element in reasoning. 的纯粹实践推理只可能体现推理中的普遍要素。Pure practical reasoning, independently of particular desires, could only embody the universal element in reasoning. 因此康德主张，它会表现为绝对律令所规定的形式。It would therefore, Kant contends, take the form prescribed by the categorical imperative.
如果康德是对的，那么唯一不是源于我们固有的或者受社会影响的欲望的行为就是依照绝对律令来行动。If Kant is right, the only kind of action that is not the result of our innate or socially conditioned desires is action in accordance with the categorical imperative. 因此，只有依照绝对律令来行动才能是自由的。Only action in accordance with the categorical imperative, therefore, can be free. 既然只有自由的行为才能具有真正的道德价值，绝对律令必然不仅是最高的理性律令，而且也是最高的道德律令。Since only free action can have genuine moral worth, the categorical imperative must be not only the supreme imperative of reason, but also the supreme law of morality. 还要补充最后一点。One final point is needed to complete the picture.如果我的行为是自由的，促使我依照绝对律令来行动的动机就不能是我碰巧具有的任何特殊欲望。 If my action is free, my motivation for acting in accordance with the categorical imperative cannot be any particular desire I might happen to have. 因此，它不能是我上天堂或赢得朋友尊敬的欲望，也不能是我为他人做好事的行善愿望。It cannot, therefore, be my desire to go to heaven, or to win the esteem of my friends; nor can it be my benevolent desire to do good to others. 我的动机必须是：依照普遍的理性法则和道德律令来行动，并且只为它们而行动。My motivation must simply be to act in accord with the universal law of reason and morality, for its own sake. 我必须尽我的义务，因为它就是我的义务——康德伦理学有时被概括为一句口号：“为义务而义务。”I must do my duty because it is my duty – the Kantian ethic is sometimes summed up in the slogan: ‘Duty for duty’s sake.’ 事实上，由康德所说可以推出：当我们为义务本身而不是为其他东西而尽自己的义务时，我们才是自由的。It does indeed follow from what Kant said that we are free when we do our duty for its own sake, and not otherwise.
这样我们便得到结论：自由就在于履行一个人的义务。So we have arrived at the conclusion that freedom consists in doing one’s duty. 在现代读者看来，这个结论是悖谬的。To the modern reader this conclusion is paradoxical.“义务”一词已经同服从军队、家庭等社会组织的惯常准则联系在一起。 The term ‘duty’ has come to be associated with obedience to the conventional rules of institutions like the army and the family. 谈及履行义务时，我们常常是指正在做很不愿意做，但因为不愿违抗惯常准则而感觉不得不做的事情。When we speak of doing our duty we often mean that we are doing what we would much rather not be doing, but feel ourselves constrained to do by customary rules we are reluctant to defy. 这种意义上的“义务”是与自由截然对立的。‘Duty’ in this sense is the very opposite of freedom.
倘若这便是“自由就在于履行我们的义务”这一结论所表现出的悖谬性的依据，那么我们应把它撇开。If this is the basis of the paradoxical air of the conclusion that freedom consists in doing our duty, we should put it aside. 康德的结论是，自由就在于做我们真正认为是自己义务的事情，这里的“义务”是在最宽泛意义上使用的。Kant’s conclusion was that freedom consists in doing what we really see as our duty in the broadest sense of the term. 用现代读者更容易接受的方式来表达康德的意思：自由就在于遵循一个人的良知。To put his point in a way that modern readers might be readier to accept: freedom consists in following one’s conscience. 只要我们记得这里的“良知”并不是指我碰巧具有的、受社会影响的“内在声音”，这便准确把握了康德的意思。This accurately captures Kant’s meaning, as long as we remember that ‘conscience’ here does not mean whatever socially conditioned ‘inner voice’ I may happen to have; 这里的“良知”乃是基于理性地接受作为最高道德律的绝对律令。it means a conscience based on a rational acceptance of the categorical imperative as the supreme moral law. 这样一来，我们目前所得到的结论也许仍然令人难以置信，但已经显得不再悖谬了。Put this way, the conclusion we have reached so far may still stretch credulity, but it should no longer appear paradoxical. 毕竟，良知的自由被普遍视为我们所理解的自由的一个本质部分，即使它不是自由的全部。Freedom of conscience is, after all, widely recognized as an essential part of what we take freedom to be, even if it is not the whole of it.
现在回到黑格尔。It is time to return to Hegel.我方才描述的康德立场在很大程度上也是黑格尔的立场。 Much of what I have been describing as a Kantian position is also Hegelian. 当我们依照某些固有的或者受社会影响的特殊欲望来行事时，我们并不自由；That we are not free when we act from particular innate or socially conditioned desires; 理性本质上是普遍的；自由需要到普遍的事物中去寻找——黑格尔从康德那里获得了所有这一切，并把它们转化成为自己的思想。that reason is essentially universal; that freedom is to be found in what is universal – all of this Hegel takes from Kant and makes his own. 此外，正如我们所看到的，黑格尔在《历史哲学》中把宗教改革看成自由新时代的黎明，因为它宣告了个人良知的权利。Moreover in the Philosophy of History, as we have seen, Hegel takes the Reformation as the dawning of the new age of freedom, because it proclaims the rights of the individual conscience. 于是和康德一样，黑格尔也看到了自由与发展个人良知之间的关联。Thus Hegel, like Kant, sees a connection between freedom and the development of the individual conscience. 黑格尔也没有反对“自由就在于履行一个人的义务”这一观点。Nor does Hegel dissent from the idea that freedom consists in doing one’s duty. 他说，义务显得像是对我们的自然欲望或任意欲望的一种限制，但事实上，“在义务中，个人从纯粹的自然冲动中……解放出来。……在义务中，个人获得了实质性的自由”。Duty, he says, appears as a restriction on our natural or arbitrary desires, but the truth is that ‘in duty the individual finds his liberation … from mere natural impulse … In duty the individual acquires his substantive freedom.’ 在直接评论康德时黑格尔说：“我在尽义务时，我心安理得而且是自由的。Commenting directly on Kant, Hegel said: ‘In doing my duty I am by myself and free.对义务的这种意义的强调乃是康德哲学及其崇高看法值得称赞的品质。” To have emphasised this meaning of duty has constituted the merit of Kant’s philosophy and its loftiness of outlook.
于是在黑格尔看来，与随心所欲做事的消极自由观相比，为义务本身而履行义务是一个显著的进步。For Hegel, then, doing our duty for its own sake is a notable advance on the negative idea of freedom as doing what we please. 但黑格尔对康德的观点并不满意。他看到了其中的积极要素，但同时也是其最尖锐的批判者之一。Yet Hegel is not satisfied with Kant’s position. He sees its positive elements, but he is at the same time one of its most trenchant critics. 《法哲学原理》题为“道德”的第二部分在很大程度上就是批判康德伦理学理论的。Part II of the Philosophy of Right, entitled ‘Morality’, is in large part an attack on Kant’s ethical theory.
黑格尔主要有两项反对意见。Hegel has two main objections. 首先，康德的理论从未认真考虑过关于我们应该做什么的详情。The first is that Kant’s theory never gets down to specifics about what we ought to do. 这倒不是因为康德本人对这些实践问题缺乏兴趣，而是因为其整个理论都坚持道德必须基于纯粹的实践推理，而免于任何特殊的动机。This is not because Kant himself lacked interest in such practical questions, but because his entire theory insists that morality must be based on pure practical reasoning, free from any particular motives. 结果，该理论只能给出空洞的、普遍形式的道德律，而不能说明我们具体的义务是什么。As a result, the theory can yield only the bare, universal form of the moral law; it cannot tell us what our specific duties are. 黑格尔指出，这种普遍形式不过是一种一致性原则或不矛盾律。This universal form is, Hegel says, simply a principle of consistency or non-contradiction. 如果我们没有出发点，它就无法把我们带到任何地方。If we have no point to start from, it cannot get us anywhere. 举例来说，如果我们承认财产所有权的有效性，偷窃就是不一致的；For example, if we accept the validity of property, theft is inconsistent; 但我们也可以否认财产能产生任何权利，从而成为完全一致的窃贼。but we can deny that property gives rise to any rights and be perfectly consistent thieves. 倘若促使我们行动的只有“不要用自相矛盾的方式去行动！”这条指令，我们也许会发现自己根本没有做任何事情。If the directive ‘Act so as not to contradict yourself!’ is the only thing we have to move us to act, we may find ourselves doing nothing at all.
对康德绝对律令的这一反驳不仅康德的学生很熟悉，对当代道德哲学有兴趣的人也很熟悉。This objection to Kant’s categorical imperative will be familiar not only to students of Kant, but also to those who have an interest in contemporary moral philosophy. 道德原则在形式上应当是普遍的，这一要求仍被广泛强调（例如《自由与理性》和《道德思考》的作者R. M. 黑尔就是如此）。The importance of the requirement that moral principles be universal in form is still widely insisted upon – for example, by R. M. Hare, author of Freedom and Reason and Moral Thinking 对它的反驳也依然常见，即认为这种要求是一种空洞的形式主义，什么也没有告诉我们。– and the objection that this requirement is an empty formalism that tells us nothing is still frequently made. 在为康德辩护时，有人提出应把康德解释为允许我们从特殊的欲望出发，In defence of Kant, it has been suggested that we should interpret him as allowing us to start from our desires, 但只有当我们能把这些欲望纳入一种普遍形式，承认它们对于类似情形中的任何人都是恰当的行动基础时，我们才能依此行动。but requiring that we act upon them only if we are able to put them into a universal form, that is, to accept them as a suitable basis of action for anyone in a similar situation. 黑格尔预见到了这种解释，他宣称，任何欲望都可以被纳入一种普遍形式，因此一旦允许引入特殊的欲望，对普遍形式的要求就无力阻止我们为合自己心意的任何不道德行为作辩护了。Hegel anticipates this interpretation, claiming that any desire can be put into a universal form, and hence, once the introduction of particular desires is allowed, the requirement of universal form is powerless to prevent us justifying whatever immoral conduct takes our fancy.
黑格尔在讲课
黑格尔对康德的第二项主要反驳是，康德的观点使人性发生分裂，使理性与欲望处于永恒的冲突之中，并且否认人的本性方面有任何权利得到满足。Hegel’s second major objection to Kant is that the Kantian position divides man against himself, locks reason into an eternal conflict with desire, and denies the natural side of man any right to satisfaction. 我们的自然欲望仅仅是某种需要压抑的东西，而康德又把压抑自然欲望这一即使能够完成也十分艰巨的任务交给了理性。Our natural desires are merely something to be suppressed, and Kant gives to reason the arduous, if not impossible, task of suppressing them. 正如我们所看到的，黑格尔在这一反驳中遵循着席勒在《美育书简》中提出的思路，但用自己的方式利用了席勒的批判。In this objection, as we have seen, Hegel was following the lead given by Schiller in his Lectures on the Aesthetic Education of Man; but Hegel made his own use of Schiller’s criticism.
我们可以用现代伦理学中另一个大家熟知的问题来表述这一点。We can put the point in terms of another familiar problem of modern ethics. 在黑格尔看来，对康德伦理学的第二个主要反驳是，它没有为道德与个人利益之间的对立提出解决方案。For Hegel the second major objection to Kant’s ethics is that it offers no solution to the opposition between morality and self-interest. 康德留下了一个没有回答也永远不可能回答的问题：“为什么我应该是道德的？”Kant leaves unanswered, and for ever unanswerable, the question: ‘Why should I be moral?’ 我们被告知，我们应该为义务本身而履行义务，要求给出任何其他理由都将远离道德所要求的那种纯粹而自由的动机。We are told that we should do our duty for its own sake, and that to ask for any other reason is to depart from the pure and free motivation morality demands; 但这根本不是回答，而只是拒绝提出这个问题而已。but this is no answer at all, just a refusal to allow the question to be raised.
席勒在《美育书简》中指出，曾几何时，这个问题还根本没有产生，道德还没有从惯常的美好生活理想中分离出来而成为某种单独的东西，康德式的义务观念也不存在。In his Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller had pointed back to a time when the question had simply not arisen, when morality had not been split off into something separate from customary ideals of the good life, when there was no Kantian conception of duty. 黑格尔则看到，一旦这个问题被提出来，就不可能回到那种惯常的道德观念了。Hegel saw that once the question had been asked, a return to customary morality was impossible. 黑格尔认为康德的义务观念无论如何都是一个进步，没有什么可遗憾的，因为它帮助现代人获得了一种希腊人在其狭窄的习惯性视野中永远不可能有的自由。In any case, Hegel regarded the Kantian conception of duty as an advance that is not to be regretted, for it helps to make modern man free in a way the Greeks, embedded in their narrow customary horizons, never could be. 黑格尔努力要做的就是把希腊生活的自然满足与康德道德观念的自由良知统一起来，从而回答这个问题。What Hegel sought to do was to answer the question in a way that united the natural satisfaction of the Greek form of life with the free conscience of the Kantian idea of morality. 与此同时，他的回答还将为康德理论的另一个主要缺陷，即它完全缺乏内容，提供一种补救。His answer would at the same time provide a remedy for the other chief defect of the Kantian theory, its total lack of content.
有机共同体
The organic community
黑格尔认为，个体的满足与自由之间的统一是与一个有机共同体的社会特质相一致的。Hegel finds the unity of individual satisfaction and freedom in conformity to the social ethos of an organic community. 他所理解的共同体是什么样的呢？What sort of community did he have in mind?
到了19世纪末，黑格尔的有机共同体思想被英国哲学家布拉德雷所接受。Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Hegel’s idea of an organic community was adopted by the British philosopher F. H. Bradley, 布拉德雷虽然在原创性方面也许不能与黑格尔相媲美，但作为散文体作家肯定超过了他。who may not have equalled Hegel as an original thinker, but definitely surpassed him as a prose stylist. 因此，我将让布拉德雷代替黑格尔来阐述私人利益与公共价值之间和谐一致的根据。I shall therefore let Bradley’s presentation of the basis of the harmony between private interest and communal values speak for Hegel. 以下是布拉德雷所描述的在一个共同体中成长的孩子的发展过程：Bradley is describing the development of the child growing up in a community:
孩子……出生……在一个活着的世界中，甚至还没有意识到他独立的自我。The child … is born … into a living world … He does not even think of his separate self; 他随其世界一起成长，心满意足，自由自在。he grows with his world, his mind fills and orders itself; 当他能把自己从那个世界中分开，知道自己与之分离时，他的自我，他那自我意识的对象，便会受到他人存在的潜入、感染和塑造。and when he can separate himself from that world, and know himself apart from it, then by that time his self, the object of his self-consciousness, is penetrated, infected, characterized by the existence of others. 它的内容在每一方面都暗示着与共同体的联系。Its content implies in every fibre relations of community. 他学习说话，或者可能已经学会了说话；在这里他把其种族共同继承下来的东西占为己有，He learns, or already perhaps has learnt, to speak, and here he appropriates the common heritage of his race, 他自己所说的语言是其祖国的语言，这种语言……与其他人说的语言一样，这就给他的内心带来了种族的观念和情感，…the tongue that he makes his own is his country’s language, it is … the same that others speak, and it carries into his mind the ideas and sentiments of the race … …并且打上了不可磨灭的印记。and stamps them in indelibly. 他在一种范例和普遍习惯的氛围中成长。He grows up in an atmosphere of example and general custom ……他内心中的灵魂被普遍的生活所浸透、浇灌和限定，… The soul within him is saturated, is filled, is qualified by, 他吸收了普遍的生活，由此形成了自己的本质，并把自身建立起来。it has assimilated, has got its substance, has built itself up from, 他的生活与普遍的生活是同一的，如果他反对这种生活，那就是在反对自己。it is one and the same life with the universal life, and if he turns against this he turns against himself.
布拉德雷和黑格尔的观点是，由于我们的需要和欲望是由社会塑造的，一个有机共同体会去培养那些对共同体最有益的欲望。Bradley’s point, and Hegel’s, is that because our needs and desires are shaped by society, an organic community fosters those desires that most benefit the community; 此外，这个共同体还会灌输给其成员一种观念，即他们的身份就在于成为共同体的一部分，因此他们不会想到要脱离这个共同体而去追求自己的私利。moreover, it so imbues its members with the sense that their own identity consists in being a part of the community that they will no more think of going off in pursuit of their own private interests than one part of the organism that is my body, 就像我身体有机体的一部分（比如说我的左臂）不会想到要脱离我的肩膀，去寻找比把食物送到我嘴里更好的差事。say my left arm, would think of hiving off from my shoulder to find something better to do than stuff my mouth with food. 我们也不应忘记，有机体与其组成部分之间的关系是相互的。Nor should we forget that the relationship between an organism and its parts is reciprocal. 我需要我的左臂，我的左臂也需要我。I need my left arm and my left arm needs me. 有机共同体不会忽视其成员的利益，一如我不会忽视我左臂受的伤。The organic community will no more disregard the interests of its members than I would disregard an injury to my left arm.
如果可以接受这个有机共同体的模型，我们就会承认，它将结束个人利益与共同体利益之间的古老冲突。If we can accept this organic model of a community, we shall grant that it would end the ancient conflict between the interests of the individual and the interests of the community; 但它如何来维护自由呢？它所显示出的难道不是仅仅固执己见地遵从于习惯吗？它but how does it preserve freedom? Does it not display mere small-minded conformity to custom? 与希腊共同体的区别何在呢？——黑格尔认为，希腊共同体缺乏由宗教改革所提出并为康德的义务概念所把握（即使只是片面把握）的人类自由的基本原则。Where does it differ from the Greek communities which Hegel regarded as lacking the essential principle of human freedom brought forward in the Reformation and captured, if one-sidedly, in Kant’s notion of duty?
黑格尔共同体中的公民之所以不同于希腊城邦的公民，恰恰是因为他们属于一个不同的历史时代，而且拥有罗马、基督教和宗教改革的成就作为其思想遗产的一部分。The citizens of Hegel’s community differ from those of the Greek city-states precisely because they belong to a different historical era and have the achievements of Rome, Christianity, and the Reformation as part of their intellectual heritage. 他们知道自己有追求自由的能力和依照良知做出决定的能力。They are aware of their capacity for freedom and their ability to make their own decisions in accordance with their conscience. 那种惯常的道德之所以会要求遵守其规则，仅仅是因为遵守这些规则是出于习惯，它不能要求自由思想者去服从。A customary morality, which demands conformity to its rules simply because it is the custom to conform to them, cannot command the obedience of free-thinking beings. （我们已经看到苏格拉底的质疑如何对雅典共同体的根基构成了致命威胁。）(We saw how the questioning of Socrates was a mortal threat to the basis of the Athenian community.) 自由思想者只能效忠于他们认为符合理性原则的制度。Free-thinking beings can only give their allegiance to institutions that they recognize as conforming to rational principles. 因此与古代共同体不同，现代的有机共同体必须建立在理性原则的基础之上。Therefore the modern organic community, unlike the ancient ones, must be based on principles of reason.
布拉德雷（1846-1924）
我们在《历史哲学》中看到了当人民第一次冒着危险打倒不合理的制度，建立起一个以纯理性原则为基础的新国家时所发生的事情。In the Philosophy of History we saw what happened when people first ventured to strike down irrational institutions and build a new state based on purely rational principles. 法国大革命的领导者们是在一种纯粹抽象和普遍的意义上来理解理性的，它不会容忍共同体的自然倾向。The leaders of the French Revolution understood reason in a purely abstract and universal sense which would not tolerate the natural dispositions of the community. 法国大革命从政治上体现了康德纯粹抽象和普遍的义务观的错误，后者也不会容忍人类的自然方面。The Revolution was the political embodiment of the mistake Kant made in his purely abstract and universal conception of duty, which would not tolerate the natural side of human beings. 与这种纯粹的理性主义相一致，君主和所有其他贵族等级都被废黜。In keeping with this pure rationalism the monarchy was abolished, and all other degrees of nobility as well. 基督教被理性崇拜所取代，旧度量衡让位于更为理性的公制，甚至对历法也进行了改革。Christianity was replaced by the cult of Reason, and the old system of weights and measures abolished to make way for the more rational metric system.Even the calendar was reformed. 其结果便是恐怖统治，在那里空洞的普遍性与个体发生了冲突并且否定了个体， The result was the Terror, in which the bare universal comes into conflict with the individual and negates him 或者用不那么黑格尔的语言来说就是，国家视个体为自己的敌人并置其于死地。– or, to put it in less Hegelian terms, the state sees individuals as its enemies and puts them to death.
虽然对于经历过法国大革命磨难的人来说，这场革命的失败是一场灾难，但从中可以吸取一个重要教训，Disastrous as the failure of the French Revolution was for those who suffered by it, there is a crucial lesson to be learned from it, 那就是要想建立一个真正以理性为基础的国家，我们就绝不能把一切原有的东西都彻底摧毁而试图完全从零开始。namely that to build a state on a truly rational basis we must not raze everything to the ground and attempt to start again completely from scratch. 我们必须在现实世界中寻找合理的东西，并允许这些合理要素得到充分表达。We must search for what is rational in the existing world and allow that rational element to have its fullest expression. 通过这种方式，我们就可以在一个共同体已有的理性和优点基础上进行建设。In this manner we can build on the reason and virtue that already exists in a community.
这里有一个现代寓言，也许可以说明为什么黑格尔会把法国大革命看成一次光荣的失败，以及他希望我们从中学到什么。Here is a modern parable that may illustrate why Hegel regards the French Revolution as a glorious failure, and what he would have us learn from it. 人们最初开始在城市生活时，没有人想到过城市规划问题。When people first began to live in towns, no one thought of town planning. 人们看哪里最方便，就在哪里建设房屋、商店和工厂，于是城市变得越来越杂乱无章。They just put up their houses, shops, and factories wherever seemed most convenient, and the cities grew higgledypiggledy. 这时有人出来说：“这样不好！我们没有想过我们的城市应当变成什么样子。我们的生活正在被偶然性所支配！需要有人对我们的城市做出规划，使之符合我们关于美和美好生活的理想。”Then along came someone who said: ‘This is no good! We are not thinking about how we want our towns to look. Our lives are being ruled by chance! We need someone to plan our towns, to make them conform to our ideals of beauty and good living.’ 于是来了城市规划者，他们推平了旧居民区，建起有绿色草坪环绕的流线型高层公寓。So along came the town planners, who bulldozed the old neighbourhoods and erected streamlined high-rise apartment buildings, surrounded by swathes of green lawns. 道路修得宽阔笔直，购物中心建在开阔的停车场中央，工厂也被小心翼翼地与居住区隔离开来。Roads were widened and straightened, shopping centres were put up in the midst of generous parking areas, and factories were carefully isolated from residential zones. 然后城市规划者们扬扬自得地等待人们来致谢。Then the town planners sat back and waited for the people to thank them. 但人们抱怨在高耸的公寓里看不到正在十层楼下面草坪上玩耍的孩子，But the people complained that from their high-rise apartments they could not watch their children as they played on the lawns ten floors below. 抱怨当地的街角小店没有了，穿过那些绿地和停车场去购物中心要走很远。They complained that they missed the local corner shops, and that it was too far to walk across all those green lawns and parking spaces to the shopping centres. 他们还抱怨说，由于现在每个人都不得不开车去上班，即使是那些新修的宽广笔直的马路也塞满了车辆。They complained that since everyone now had to drive to work, even those new wide straight roads were choked with traffic. 最糟糕的是，现在没有人步行了，街道变得不再安全，天黑以后穿过那些美丽的草坪变得很危险。Worst of all, they complained that, now no one was walking, the streets had become unsafe and those lovely green lawns were dangerous to cross after dark. 于是，先前的城市规划者被解雇了，新一代规划者成长起来，他们从前辈的错误中吸取了教训。So the old town planners were fired, and a new generation of town planners grew up, who had learned from the mistakes of their predecessors. 新一代的城市规划者所做的第一件事情就是停止拆除旧居民区，开始注意到未规划的旧城市的正面特征。The first thing the new town planners did was to put a stop to the demolition of old neighbourhoods. Instead they began to notice the positive features of the old, unplanned towns. 他们称赞狭窄弯曲的街道上的种种景致，注意到让商店、住宅甚至是小工厂混在一起是多么便利。They admired the varied vistas of the narrow, crooked streets, and noticed how convenient it was to have shops and residences and even small factories mixed up together. 他们谈论这些街道如何鼓励人们步行，使来往车辆保持在最低限度，而且使城市中心既热闹又安全。They remarked on how these streets kept traffic to a minimum, encouraged people to walk, and made the town centre both lively and safe. 这并不是说他们毫无保留地称赞未规划的旧城市，仍有一些事物需要整理。Not that their admiration for the old unplanned towns was totally unreserved; there were a few things that needed to be tidied up, 一些特别让人反感的工业部门要从人们居住的地方迁走，许多旧建筑必须修复，再不然就用一些与周围环境相协调的建筑来替换。some particularly offensive industries were moved away from where people lived, and many old buildings had to be restored or else replaced with buildings in keeping with the surroundings. 无论如何，新的城市规划者发现旧城市是能够良好运转的；What the new town planners had discovered, however, was that the old cities worked; 需要保持的正是这一点，无论还可以作哪些修补。and it was this that had to be preserved, whatever tinkering might still be desirable.
未规划的旧城市就像是以习惯为基础发展起来的古代共同体，第一批城市规划者则如同法国革命者们，热衷于把理性加诸现实。The old, unplanned cities are like the ancient communities that grew up with custom as their basis; the first town planners resemble the French revolutionaries in their fervour to impose rationality on reality; 而第二代规划者乃是真正的黑格尔主义者，过去的教训使他们变得更加明智。他们愿意在那个源于实践适应而非有意规划的世界中发现合理性。while the second generation of planners are the true Hegelians, made wiser by the past and ready to find rationality in a world that is the result of practical adaptation rather than deliberate planning.
一个有规划的共同体
现在我们可以明白，为什么现时代的自由公民会效忠于一个初看起来与那些基于习惯的古代世界共同体并无多大差别的共同体。Now we can see why the free citizens of the modern era give their allegiance to a community which, at first glance, does not differ greatly from the custom-based communities of the ancient world. 这些自由公民了解其共同体所基于的理性原则，因而自由地选择了为它服务。These free citizens understand the rational principles on which their community is based, and so they freely choose to serve it.
当然，现代理性共同体与古希腊共同体之间还是存在着一些差别，There are, of course, some differences between the modern rational community and the communities of ancient Greece. 因为现时代认识到所有人都是自由的，奴隶制已经被废除。Because the modern era knows that all human beings are free, slavery has been abolished. 黑格尔认为，如果没有奴隶，雅典施行的那种耗时的民主制就无法运作。Without slavery, Hegel believes, the time-consuming form of democracy practised in Athens is unworkable. 黑格尔也瞧不起那种带有普遍选举权的代议制民主，部分是因为他认为个人是不能被代表的（Nor does Hegel think much of representative democracy with universal suffrage, partly because he thinks individuals cannot be represented 他说只有“社会的基本领域及其大范围利益”才适合被代表），(he says only ‘the essential spheres of society and its large-scale interests’ are suitable for representation) 部分是因为在有普遍选举权的情况下，个人投票的重要性微乎其微，这便导致对选举普遍漠不关心，于是权力也就落入了代表特殊利益的少数决策者之手。and partly because with universal suffrage each individual vote has so little significance that there is widespread apathy, and power falls into the hands of a small caucus of particular interests.
黑格尔说，理性共同体是一种立宪君主制。The rational community is, Hegel says, a constitutional monarchy. 之所以需要君主制，是因为在某个地方必定存在着最终决策权，在一个自由的共同体中，这种权力应当通过一个人的自由决策来表现。A monarchy is required because somewhere there must be the power of ultimate decision, and in a free community this power should be expressed by the free decision of a person. （对比希腊共同体，后者往往通过祈请神谕——共同体之外的一种力量——来寻求对困难问题的最终解决方案。）(Compare the Greek communities, which often consulted an oracle – a force external to the community – for the final resolution of difficult issues.) 黑格尔说，另一方面，如果这种立宪政体是稳定的，君主通常除了签名什么也不用做。On the other hand, Hegel says, if the constitution is stable the monarch often has nothing to do but sign his name. 因此他的个人性格并不重要，其统治也就不是东方专制君主那种反复无常的统治。Hence his personal make-up is unimportant, and his sovereignty is not the capricious rule of an oriental despot. 立宪君主制的其他要素是行政部门和立法机构。The other elements of the constitutional monarchy are the executive and the legislature. 行政部门由公务员组成。取得公职的唯一客观条件是对能力的检验，The executive consists of civil servants. The only objective qualification for office is proof of ability; 但是当有资格的候选人不止一个并且他们的相对能力无法精确确定时，此时有主观因素进入，便需要君主做出决定。but where there are several eligible candidates and their relative abilities cannot be determined with precision, a subjective condition enters which it is the task of the monarch to decide. 因此，君主保持着任命行政人员的权力。Hence the monarch retains the right to appoint the executive. 与黑格尔关于代表制的观念相一致，立法机构是拥有两院的议会，上院由地主阶层（landed class）组成，下院由商业阶层（business class）组成。The legislature, in keeping with Hegel’s ideas of representation, has two houses of parliament, the upper consisting of the landed class and the lower of the business class. 然而，下院所代表的是像公司和行业协会这样的“大范围利益”，而不是个体公民本身。It is, however, ‘large-scale interests’ such as corporations and professional guilds that are represented in the lower house, not individual citizens as such.
对于生活在21世纪的读者而言，黑格尔的偏好肯定显得很古怪，在他们看来，后来的经验也往往证明他的论点是错误的，因此我只是匆匆讨论了黑格尔所说的理性共同体的一些细节。I have dealt swiftly with these details of Hegel’s rational community because to readers living in the twenty-first century his preferences can only seem quaint, and his arguments for them have often – though not always – been shown by subsequent experience to be erroneous. 就黑格尔的自由观而言，他所偏爱的那些特殊的制度安排并非至关重要。So far as Hegel’s conception of freedom is concerned, the particular institutional arrangements he prefers are not crucial. 现在我们应该清楚，黑格尔并不是在谈人民主权是自由社会的基本要素那种政治意义上的自由，It should by now be clear that Hegel is not talking about freedom in the political sense in which popular sovereignty is an essential element of a free society. 他所感兴趣的乃是一种更加深刻、更具形而上学意义的自由。He is interested in freedom in a deeper, more metaphysical sense. 他所关注的是，当我们不受他人胁迫或我们自然欲望的驱使，也不受社会环境的左右而有能力进行选择时，我们就是自由的。Hegel’s concern is with freedom in the sense in which we are free when we are able to choose without being coerced either by other human beings or by our natural desires, or by social circumstances. 正如我们所看到的，黑格尔认为，只有当我们理性地选择时，这样的自由才能存在；As we have seen, Hegel believes such freedom can exist only when we choose rationally, 而只有当我们依照普遍原则进行选择时，我们的选择才是理性的。and we choose rationally only when we choose in accordance with universal principles.这些选择要想带给我们应有的满足，这些普遍原则就必须体现在一个按照理性方式组织起来的有机共同体中。If these choices are to bring us the satisfaction which is our due, the universal principles must be embodied in an organic community organized along rational lines. 在这样一个共同体中，个人利益与整体利益是和谐一致的。In such a community individual interests and the interests of the whole are in harmony. 在选择尽我的义务时，我的选择因为是理性的，所以是自由的，我在服务于普遍性的客观形态——国家——的过程中也实现了自己。In choosing to do my duty I choose freely because I choose rationally, and I achieve my own fulfilment in serving the objective form of the universal, namely the state. 此外——这是对康德伦理学第二项重大缺陷的弥补——由于普遍法则体现于国家的具体制度，它不再抽象和空洞。Moreover – and here is the remedy for the second great defect in Kantian ethics – because the universal law is embodied in the concrete institutions of the state, it ceases to be abstract and empty. 它规定了我在共同体中的地位和角色所应尽的具体义务。It prescribes to me the specific duties of my station and role in the community.
一个未规划的共同体
我们有充分理由拒绝接受黑格尔对这样一个按理性组建的共同体的描述。We may well reject Hegel’s description of a rationally organized community. 但我们的反驳不会影响其自由观念的有效性。Our rejection will not affect the validity of his conception of freedom. 黑格尔试图描述的是个人利益与整体利益和谐一致的共同体。Hegel was seeking to describe a community in which individual interests and the interests of the whole are in harmony. 如果他没有成功，其他人 可以继续这种探索。If he failed, others can continue the search. 如果没有人成功，而且我们最终认为永远不会有 人成功，那么我们将不得不承认，黑格尔意义上的自由不可能存在。If none succeeds, if we finally accept that no one ever will succeed, we will have to acknowledge that freedom, in Hegel’s sense, cannot exist. 但即使如此，黑格尔自称描述了唯一真正的自由也不会变得无效，这种自由仍然可以充当一种理想。Even that would not invalidate Hegel’s claim to have described the only genuine form of freedom, and this form of freedom could still serve as an ideal.
自由主义？保守主义？还是极权主义？
Liberal? Conservative? Totalitarian?
本章从一个谜开始讲起。We began this chapter with a puzzle. 如此强调自由以至于使之成为历史目的的黑格尔，怎么会认为当时那个独裁的德国社会已经实现了自由呢？How could Hegel, who stresses freedom to the point of making it the goal of history, suggest that freedom had been achieved in the autocratic German society of his own time? 他是不是一个卑躬屈膝的奴才，为讨得统治者的欢心而把这个词的意思作相反的曲解呢？Was he a servile toady who wished to endear himself to his rulers by twisting the meaning of the term into its very opposite? 更糟糕的是，他是不是他死后100年德国出现的那种极权主义国家的思想之父呢？Worse still, was he the intellectual grandfather of the type of totalitarian state that emerged in Germany a hundred years after his death?
揭开这个谜的第一步是要弄清一个事实：黑格尔所描述的理想状态下的理性国家是否纯粹是对他那个时代普鲁士国家的描述？The first step to clearing up this puzzle is to ask a question of fact: is the ideally rational state that Hegel describes merely a description of the Prussian state at the time he was writing? 非也。两者有很大的相似性，但也有重要差异。It is not. There are strong similarities, but there are also significant differences. 我想提到四点。I shall mention four. 也许最重要的是，黑格尔理想中的立宪君主除了签名以外几乎不做什么事，而普鲁士的弗雷德里克·威廉三世却是一个专制得多的君主。Probably the most important is that Hegel’s constitutional monarch ideally had little to do except sign his name, whereas Frederick William III of Prussia was much more of an absolute monarch than that. 第二点差异是，普鲁士根本没有能够运转的议会，A second difference is that there was no functioning parliament at all in Prussia; 而黑格尔的立法机构尽管较为无力，但确实为公众意见的表达提供了一个出路。Hegel’s legislature, though relatively powerless, did provide an outlet for the expression of public opinion. 第三，黑格尔是言论自由的支持者，即使是在非常明确的范围内。Thirdly, Hegel was, if within very definite limits, a supporter of freedom of expression. 诚然，以今天的标准来看，黑格尔在这个问题上显得非常狭隘，因为他从这种自由中排除了一切相当于对政府及其官员的诽谤、诋毁或“轻蔑讽刺”的东西。Admittedly, by today’s standards he appears most illiberal on this issue, for he excluded from this freedom anything that amounted to slander, abuse, or ‘contemptuous caricature’ of the government and its ministers. 但我们现在并不打算用今天的标准来评价他，而是将他的看法与当时普鲁士的情况作对比。We are not now seeking to judge him by today’s standards, however, but to compare his proposals with the state of affairs in Prussia at the time he was writing; 由于《法哲学原理》出版于1819年卡尔斯巴德决议颁布严厉的书刊审查制度后仅18个月，黑格尔肯定是在争取比当时所能允许的更大的言论自由。and since the Philosophy of Right appeared only eighteen months after the strict censorship imposed by the Carlsbad decrees of 1819, Hegel was certainly arguing for greater freedom of speech than was allowed at the time. 第四，黑格尔拥护由陪审团进行的审判，从而在法律程序中把公民们包括进来。Fourthly, Hegel advocated trial by jury as a way of involving citizens in the legal process; 但在当时的普鲁士，陪审审判尚无合法性。but there was no right to trial by jury in Prussia at the time.
这些差异足以使黑格尔免于指控，说他撰写其哲学著作完全是为了取悦普鲁士君主。These differences are sufficient to acquit Hegel of the charge of having drawn up his philosophy entirely in order to please the Prussian monarchy. 但它们并没有使黑格尔成为任何现代意义上的自由主义者。They do not, however, make Hegel any kind of liberal in the modern sense. 他对选举权的反对和对言论自由的限制都足以表明这一点。His rejection of the right to vote and his restrictions on freedom of speech are enough to show this. 他厌恶一切含有民众代表意味的东西，甚至写了一篇文章来反对英国的选举法修正案。His dislike of anything smacking of popular representation went so far that he wrote an essay opposing the English Reform Bill, 这一法案在1832年的最终通过终结了英国下议院在议员选举方面（当时仍把大多数成年男性——更不要说女性——排除在选举人名单之外）臭名昭著的不平等和弊端。which when finally passed in 1832 ended notorious inequalities and abuses in the election of members of the House of Commons (while still excluding the majority of adult males – let alone females – from the electoral roll).
然而，我们理解了黑格尔的自由观念之后，这就不奇怪了。After what we have seen of Hegel’s ideas of freedom, however, this should come as no surprise. 黑格尔会认为，人民选举权就相当于人们依照自己的物质利益或者对某位候选人多变甚至是古怪的好恶去投票。Hegel would have thought that popular suffrage would amount to people voting in accordance with their material interests or with the capricious and even whimsical likes and dislikes they may form for one candidate rather than another. 倘若黑格尔能够目睹现代民主政治下的一场选举，他就不必改变自己的想法。Had he been able to witness an election in a modern democracy, he would not have had to change his mind. 今天为民主制辩护的那些人，几乎不会不同意黑格尔关于大多数选举人如何通过投票来支持某位候选人的看法。Those who defend democracy today could scarcely disagree with Hegel over the manner in which most voters decide whom to favour with their votes; 他们与黑格尔的不同之处在于，他们认为无论大多数选举人可能有多么冲动或任性，选举依然是自由社会的一个关键要素；they would differ with Hegel in regarding the elections as an essential element in a free society, no matter how impulsive or arbitrary the majority of the electors may be. 而黑格尔则会以冲动或任性的选择并非自由行为为由来断然否认这一点，Hegel would have emphatically rejected this, on the grounds that an impulsive or arbitrary choice is not a free act.并强调只有当我们的选择是基于理性时，我们才是自由的。 We are free only when our choice is based on reason. 在黑格尔看来，如果国家的整个方向都依赖于这些任性的选择，就等于将整个共同体的命运交给了偶然性。To make the entire direction of the state dependent on such arbitrary choices would, in his view, amount to handing over the destiny of the community to chance.
这是否意味着黑格尔的确是极权主义国家的辩护者呢？Does this mean that Hegel is indeed a defender of the totalitarian state? 卡尔·波普尔是这样看的。在那本读者甚众的《开放社会及其敌人》中，他援引了黑格尔的一些话来支持自己，这些说法必定会激怒任何持自由主义观点的现代读者。This is Karl Popper’s view, in his widely read The Open Society and Its Enemies, and he backs up the claim with quotations bound to raise the hackles of any modern liberal reader. 以下是一些例子：Here are some examples:
国家是存在于地上的“神的理念”，……因此我们必须把国家当作神在地上的显现来崇拜。The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth … We must therefore worship the State as the manifestation of the Divine on earth … ……国家是神在世界中的行进。……国家……为了它自身的目的而存在。The State is the march of God through the world … The State … exists for its own sake.
在波普尔看来，这些引文足以表明黑格尔坚持“国家的绝对道德权威，These quotations are, Popper thinks, enough to show Hegel’s insistence upon ‘the absolute moral authority of the state, 它压倒了一切个人道德和一切良知”，which overrules all personal morality, all conscience’, 由此使黑格尔成为现代极权主义发展中的一个重要角色。and to give Hegel an important role in the development of modern totalitarianism.
黑格尔强调合乎理性是自由的基本要素，这也使上述解读变得更为可信。Hegel’s emphasis on rationality as the essential element in freedom lends further credence to this reading. 因为由谁来决定什么是理性的呢？For who is to decide what is rational?只有理性选择才是自由的——如果以这一学说来武装自己，任何统治者都可以证明，只要反对其关于国家未来的理性计划，这样的人都应该镇压。 Armed with the doctrine that only rational choices are free, any ruler can justify the suppression of all opposed to his own rational plans for the future of the state. 因为如果他的计划是理性的，推动反对者提出反对的就必定不是理性，而是个人私欲或非理性的狂想。For if his plans are rational, those who oppose them must be motivated not by reason but by selfish desires or irrational whims. 他们的选择并非基于理性，因此不可能是自由的。Their choices, not being rationally based, cannot be free. 于是，查禁他们的报纸和传单并非限制言论自由，逮捕他们的领导者也不是干涉其行动自由，关闭他们的教会，制定新的、更加理性的崇拜形式亦不是干涉其宗教自由。To suppress their newspapers and leaflets is thus not to restrict free speech, to arrest their leaders is not to interfere with their freedom of action, and to close down their churches and set up new, more rational forms of worship does not interfere with their freedom of religion. 只有想办法引导这些可怜的误入歧途者认识到领袖计划的合理性，他们才会真正自由！Only when these poor misguided people are led by these methods to appreciate the rationality of their leader’s plans will they be truly free! 倘若这就是黑格尔的自由概念，还有哪位哲学家提出过比这更好的奥威尔式欺人之谈的例子吗？希特勒和斯大林都曾非常有效地利用这种欺人之谈实施其极权主义设计。If this is Hegel’s concept of freedom, did ever a philosopher provide a better example of the Orwellian double-speak that Hitler and Stalin used so effectively to implement their totalitarian designs?
波普尔的论据并不像它看起来那样有说服力。Popper’s case is not as strong as it seems. 首先，他的引文几乎全都不是出自黑格尔本人的著作，而是从他身后出版的学生们的课堂笔记中摘出来的，而且原书编辑还在序言中解释说自己作了一些改写。First, his quotations nearly all come not from Hegel’s own writings, but from notes of his lectures taken by students and published only after his death, by an editor who explained in his preface that he had done a certain amount of rewriting. 其次，这些响亮的措辞中至少有一句是错译。Second, at least one of these resonant utterances is a mistranslation. 波普尔所引的“国家是神在世界中的行进”更准确的翻译应是“国家的存在是神与世界同在的方式”。Where Popper quotes ‘The State is the march of God through the world’, a more accurate translation would be: ‘It is the way of God with the world, that the State exists.’ 这等于说，某种意义上国家的存在乃是神的规划的一部分。第This amounts to no more than the claim that the existence of states is in some sense part of a divine plan. 三，对黑格尔来说，“国家”并非仅仅指“政府”，而是指整个社会生活。Third, for Hegel ‘State’ does not mean simply ‘the government’ but refers to all social life. 所以他并不是在赞美政府反对人民，而是指整个共同体。Thus he is not glorifying the government against the people, but referring to the community as a whole. 第四，这些引文需要有其他内容来平衡，因为黑格尔常以极端形式来论述某个主题的一个方面，然后再从另一方面去平衡。Fourth, these quotations need to be balanced by others, for Hegel frequently presents one aspect of a subject in an extreme form before balancing it against another. 比如黑格尔关于国家的论述之前是这样一些话：“主观自由的权利是划分古代和近代的转折点和中心点”，然后又说，这种权利“以其无限性”已经成为新的文明形式的“普遍有效的原则”。Thus Hegel’s remarks on the state follow upon earlier passages in which he says: ‘the right of subjective freedom is the pivot and centre of the difference between antiquity and modern times’ and goes on to say that this right ‘in its infinity’ has become ‘the universal effective principle’ of the new form of civilization. 之后他又说：“最重要的是，理性的规律必须被特殊自由的规律完全渗透……”Later, we find him saying: ‘What is of the utmost importance is that the law of reason should be shot through and through by the law of particular freedom …’. 此外黑格尔还强调：“鉴于自我意识的权利”，法律必须被普遍知晓才能有约束力。Moreover, Hegel insists that, ‘in view of the right of self-consciousness’, laws can have no binding force unless they are universally known. 像传说中暴君狄奥尼修斯那样把法律挂得老高，或者把法律埋藏于博学的书籍中，以致没有普通公民能够读到它，这是不公正的。To hang the laws so high that no citizen can read them, as Dionysius the Tyrant is said to have done, or to bury them in learned tomes no ordinary citizen can read, is injustice. 黑格尔对反动作家冯·哈勒尔的致命抨击也是类似的。冯·哈勒尔为一种非常适合希特勒的学说“强权即真理”作辩护。Along similar lines is Hegel’s searing attack on the reactionary writer von Haller, who defended a doctrine of ‘might makes right’ that would have suited Hitler well. 对此黑格尔写道：“对法律和在法律中确定的权利的仇恨是一种口号，它使人们明确无误、原原本本地认识到疯狂、软弱和伪善的本来面目，尽管它们可能伪装自己。Of this author Hegel says: ‘The hatred of law, of right made determinate in law, is the shibboleth whereby fanaticism, flabby-mindedness and the hypocrisy of good intentions are clearly and infallibly recognised for what they are, disguise themselves as they may.’ ”以如此强烈地捍卫法律准则为基础，是很难构建一个带有秘密警察和独裁力量的极权主义国家的。So strong a defence of the rule of law is an awkward base from which to construct a totalitarian state, with its secret police and dictatorial power.
不可否认，黑格尔用来描述国家的惊人之语，以及认为真正的自由要到理性选择中去寻找这一观点，都很容易遭到误用和曲解，以服务于极权主义。That the extravagant language Hegel used to describe the state, and his idea that true freedom is to be found in rational choices, are both wide open to misuse and distortion in the service of totalitarianism is undeniable; 但同样不可否认，这是一种误用。but that it is a misuse is equally undeniable. 我们已经看到，黑格尔关于立宪君主、言论自由、法律准则和陪审审判的许多观点都清楚地表明了这一点。We have seen enough of his views about constitutional monarchy, freedom of expression, the rule of law, and trial by jury to make this plain. 问题在于，黑格尔对理性的认真态度我们今天几乎无人可比。The problem is that Hegel was serious about reason, to an extent that few of us are now. 如果有人告诉我们如何才能最合理地管理国家事态，我们会认为他在表达其个人偏好。When someone tells us how the affairs of the state can most rationally be conducted, we take him to be expressing his personal preferences. 我们认为，其他人会有不同的偏好。至于什么是最“合理的”，鉴于谁也说不清楚，我们还不如把它抛诸脑后，只满足于我们最喜欢的那些做法。Others, we assume, will have different preferences and as for what is most ‘rational’, well, since none of us can really tell, we may as well forget about it and settle for what we like best. 于是当黑格尔写下“崇拜”国家或者在一个理性国家中实现自由时，我们倾向于把这些说法用于合自己心意的无论什么类型的国家——这一理解与黑格尔的意图完全相反。So when Hegel writes of ‘worshipping’ the state, or of freedom being realized in a rational state, we are inclined to apply these remarks to whatever type of state takes our fancy – a reading utterly contrary to Hegel’s intentions. 黑格尔所说的“理性国家”是指某种非常客观、非常具体的东西。By a ‘rational State’ Hegel himself meant something quite objective and quite specific. 它必须是个人真正选择服从和支持的国家，因为他们真正认同其原则，并且真正从作为其组成部分中得到了个人满足。It had to be a state that individuals really did choose to obey and support, because they genuinely agreed with its principles and truly found their individual satisfaction in being part of it. 在黑格尔看来，理性国家绝不会像纳粹和斯大林式的国家那样对待自己的公民。For Hegel, no rational state could ever deal with its citizens as the Nazi and Stalinist states dealt with theirs. 那种观念是一种自相矛盾。The idea is a contradiction in terms. 同样，一旦我们意识到，个体利益与集体利益在黑格尔的理性国家中是和谐一致的，国家利益与个人利益相冲突以及无情压倒个人权利的威胁就不存在了。Similarly, the threat of the interests of the state coming into conflict with and ruthlessly crushing the rights of the individual loses its grip once we realize that in Hegel’s rational state the interests of the individual and of the collective are in harmony.
对于所有这些，现代读者可能会以“是的，但是……”做出回应。To all this a modern reader will probably react with a ‘Yes, but …’. “是的”表明黑格尔本人并不拥护极权主义，“但是”则表明，在这一解释上，黑格尔对人与人之间有可能达成和谐异乎寻常地乐观；‘Yes’ to indicate that Hegel was not himself advocating totalitarianism; ‘but’ to suggest that on this interpretation Hegel was extraordinarily optimistic about the possibilities of harmony between humans, 如果他相信这种和谐会存在于他所描述的那种国家，这种乐观与现实就更是惊人地相左。and even more extraordinarily at odds with reality if he believed that the harmony would exist in the kind of state he described.
我认为后一批评是无法回答的。The latter criticism I believe to be unanswerable. 要使黑格尔关于国家的说法可以得到辩护，他所设想的理性国家就必须非常不同于当时存在的（或此后一直存在的）任何国家。If Hegel’s remarks about the state are to be defensible, the rational state he has in mind must be very different from any state that existed in his day (or has existed since, for that matter). 然而，他所描述的国家虽然可能非常不同，肯定不会完全不同于当时存在的那些国家。Yet the state he described, while it may have differed significantly, certainly did not differ radically from states existing in his own day. 最有可能的解释是，黑格尔太过保守或谨慎，以至于并不提倡从根本上背离他在其中生活和教书的那种政治制度。The most likely explanation is that Hegel was too conservative, or else too cautious, to advocate a radical departure from the political system under which he lived and taught. 说黑格尔的“一个目的是取悦普鲁士国王”，这显然是错误的；To say that Hegel’s ‘one aim was to please the King of Prussia’ is clearly wrong; 但也许可以公平地说，为了避免激怒普鲁士国王（以及所有其他德国统治者），黑格尔并未激进地抛出其背后的哲学理论。but it may be fair to say that in order to avoid the wrath of the King of Prussia (and of all the other German rulers) Hegel muted the radical thrust of his underlying philosophical theory.
然而，关于黑格尔对人与人之间和谐一致的看法还有一点需要说明：There is, however, one more thing that needs to be said about Hegel’s vision of harmony between humans. 他的政治哲学仅仅是一个大得多的哲学体系的一部分，人与人的统一在那里有一种形而上学基础。His political philosophy is only a part of a much larger philosophical system, in which unity between individual human beings has a metaphysical basis. 我们在本章和上一章中给黑格尔在历史和政治方面的思想的篇幅已经偏多了（就它们在黑格尔全部哲学中的地位而言），现在是时候转向那个更大的哲学体系了。In the last two chapters we have given the historical and political sides of Hegel’s thought more than their fair allocation of space, considering their place in Hegel’s work as a whole, and so it is time to move on to the larger philosophical system. 我们很快就会看到，转向黑格尔思想的另一面对于更深刻地理解他的历史哲学和政治哲学同样是有利的。We shall soon see that to turn to the other side of Hegel’s thought is equally desirable for a deeper understanding of both his philosophy of history and his political philosophy.
